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A.

BUSINESS

The Extension of Creditors' Rights Under RISA

In First Virginia Bank v. Settles,' the Court of Appeals defined the
extent to which a secured creditor is entitled to prejudgment interest when its debtor defaults on an installment sales contract.2 Based
on its previous decision in Union Trust Co. v. Tyndall,' the court denied the creditor the right to recover prejudgment interest at the
agreed finance charge rate.4 Unlike the court in Tyndall, the Settles
court distinguished between two types of prejudgment interest. As
a result, the court abandoned one of the Tyndall precepts and instructed the trial court to award the creditor prejudgment interest at
the legal rate provided in the Maryland Constitution. 5
The effect Settles may have on creditors' rights and consumer
protection law could prove problematic as it appears that the Court
of Appeals erred by removing the issue of prejudgment interest
from the scope of the Retail Installment Sales Act (RISA).6 The policy developed by the court in Settles reflects the desire to assist creditors during the current economic recession.7 This policy indicates a
need for the standardization of prejudgment interest via legislative
reform. Unlike the approach currently taken by the Maryland judiciary,8 a mandatory interest statute would create efficiency and consistency in Maryland courts when dealing with the issue of
prejudgment interest.9
1. The Case.-In February 1988, Angela Settles purchased a
used automobile.'" She made a cash downpayment and agreed to
pay both the balance due the dealership, $7,699.00, and a finance
charge at an annual rate of 12.9%, in 41 monthly installments." In
1. 322 Md. 555, 588 A.2d 803 (1991).
2. See id. at 560-66, 588 A.2d at 805-08. For a definition of prejudgment interest,
see infra note 27.
3. 290 Md. 102, 428 A.2d 428 (1981).
4. See Settles, 322 Md. at 562, 588 A.2d at 807.
5. See id. at 566, 588 A.2d at 808. The Maryland Constitution provides that the
legal rate of interest shall be six percent. See MD. CONST. art. III, § 57.
6. MD. COM. LAw II CODE ANN. §§ 12-601 to -636 (1990).
7. See infra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
10. Settles, 322 Md. at 557, 588 A.2d at 804.
ll. id.
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September 1988, Settles defaulted on the obligation.' 2 In October
1988, First Virginia Bank, to whom the seller assigned the agreement, repossessed the car and sold it at a public auction.' 3 After
deducting the proceeds of the sale and other items from the balance
due by Settles to First Virginia, a deficiency balance of $3,016.41
remained. 14
Steven and Kimberly Muenze and Carla Royal executed similar
installment sales agreements for the purchase of automobiles that
were assigned by their respective sellers to First Virginia.' 5 Because
the Muenzes and Royal defaulted on their payments under the
agreements,
First Virginia
repossessed and resold
the
automobiles. 16 Like Settles, the Muenzes and Royal faced deficiency
balances after the resale of their automobiles.' 7
First Virginia filed complaints against each debtor in the District Court for Prince George's County seeking to recover the deficiency balances.'" According to state law, a debtor is required to file
a notice of intention to defend.' 9 Each of the debtors failed to file a
notice.20 Therefore, in each case, the district court granted judgment on affidavit 2 ' in favor of First Virginia, allowing recovery of
12. Id.
13. Id.

14. Id. In addition to the proceeds of the sale, a return of finance charges that accrued after the date of repossession until the date of resale and proceeds of an insurance
rebate were credited to the balance owed by Settles. Id. Settles was charged with expenses related to the repossession and public auction. Id.
15. Id. at 558-59, 599 A.2d at 805. The Muenzes executed an installment sales
agreement to purchase a truck. The agreement required that the balance due on
purchase, $13,215.41, and a finance charge at an annual rate of 12.75%, would be paid
by the buyers in 60 monthly payments. Id.
Carla Royal executed an installment sales agreement to purchase a used automobile. The agreement required that she pay the balance of the purchase price,
$10,267.90, and a finance charge at an annual rate of 15.50%, in 48 monthly installments. Id. at 559, 599 A.2d at 805.
16. See id. at 558-59, 599 A.2d at 805.
17. See id. The Muenzes' deficiency balance amounted to $3,463.75 and Royal's deficiency balance amounted to $6,019.73. Id. at 559, 588 A.2d at 805.
18. Id. at 557-59, 588 A.2d at 804-05.
19. See MD. R. 3-306(b).
20. Settles, 322 Md. at 557-59, 588 A.2d at 804-05.
21. Maryland Rule 3-306 states that "[tihe affidavit shall be accompanied by supporting documents or statements containing sufficient detail . . . including the precise
amount of the claim and any interest claimed." MD. R. 3-306(a).
In Settles, the Bank submitted Statements of Account and Interest Worksheets as
documents in support of its claims. The Statements of Account showed rebates of finance charges and other applicable adjustments. The Interest Worksheets displayed the
amount of interest due on the deficiency balances from the date of the automobiles'
resale through the trial dates. Brief of Petitioner at 4, Settles (Nos. 91-73 to -75).
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the deficiency balances but denying prejudgment interest. 22
First Virginia appealed the portion of each decision relating to
prejudgment interest to the Circuit Court for Prince George's
County.2 3 That court affirmed the judgments of the respective trial
courts. 4 Because of the confusion regarding the extent to which
prejudgment interest may be awarded in civil actions, the Court of
Appeals granted certiorari.2 5
2.

Legal Background.-

a. General Rules of Prejudgment Interest.-In general, the law allows compensation for a default in the payment of a debt or obligation to include interest because the creditor will have lost the
26
If
opportunity to invest and earn a return on the amount due.
creditors are deprived of this interest, they receive incomplete compensation because they have not recovered the cost of the use of
their money between the time of breach and the time ofjudgment.2 7
Thus, the idea behind court-awarded prejudgment interest is to
compensate the claimant for the loss of use of his money from the
time of breach to the time of judgment.
As the concept of compensation including interest developed,
the distinction between liquidated and unliquidated damages became important. Traditionally, courts only held a defendant liable
for interest on liquidated damages, or those damages with a reasonably ascertainable market value. 28 The basis for the distinction between liquidated and unliquidated damages is that the defendant
should not have to pay interest on damages that cannot be deter-

22. See Settles, 322 Md. at 557-59, 588 A.2d at 804-05.
23. Id. at 558, 588 A.2d at 804-05.
24. Id. In each case, the circuit court refrained from awarding prejudgment interest
based on reasoning different than that of the district courts. In Settles, the circuit court
found that it could not "substitute its judgment for that of the trial judge and find a clear
abuse of discretion." Brief of Petitioner at 5, Settles (Nos. 91-73 to -75). In Muenze and
Royal, the circuit court denied prejudgment interest but expressed its confusion regarding the issue of prejudgment interest, stating that "there are a lot of these cases floating
around and we are going to need some guidance." Id.
25. See Settles, 322 Md. at 560, 588 A.2d at 805. The cases were consolidated for
purposes of appeal. Id.
26. See 47 CJ.S. Interest & Usury § 27 (1982).

27. Prejudgment interest is compensation "allowed by law as additional damages for
loss of use of the money due as damages, during the lapse of time since the accrual of
the claim." CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, DAMAGES § 50, at 205 (1935).
28. Id.
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mined by the defendant prior to judgment.2" Thus, the perspective
of the defendant dictates the distinction that has a profound effect
on the outcome of civil actions involving a claim for prejudgment
interest.
Jurisdictions have approached the award of prejudgment interest in one of three ways; usually the choice depends on the approach
taken to liquidated damages.30 The traditional approach allows for
the recovery of prejudgment interest only when parties to a contract
have expressly agreed to the provision of interest, or when a legislative act provides for interest under certain circumstances. 3 ' Under
no circumstances, however, may a plaintiff recover interest on an
unliquidated damages claim under this approach.3 ' A majority of
jurisdictions have rejected the strict traditional approach because it
does not adequately compensate creditors.3 3
Many state courts use the discretionary approach to prejudgment interest.3 4 These states may have statutes in which the power
to grant or deny interest lies with the jury orjudge3 5 In most cases,
however, discretion to grant prejudgment interest lies with the judiciary. 3 '6 Although the discretionary approach clearly recognizes the
29. See J.G.

SUTHERLAND, THE LAW OF DAMAGES

§ 347, at 935 (John R. Berryman ed.,

3d ed. 1903).
30. For an extensive discussion of the three different approaches, see Anthony E.
Rothschild, Comment, Preudgment Interest: Survey and Suggestion, 77 Nw. U. L. REV. 192
(1982).
31. Id. at 200. Illinois courts employ this strict standard for awarding prejudgment
interest. See, e.g., Spagat v. Schak, 473 N.E.2d 988, 993-94 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (involving
a statute providing for prejudgment interest when monies are due on "any bond, bill,
promissory note, or other instrument of writing"); Gonzalez v. Danaher, 332 N.E.2d
603, 604-05 (I1. App. Ct. 1975) (stating that "[i]nterest is a creature of statutes and is
recoverable only by reason of a statute or contract").
32. In traditional approach jurisdictions, even if the statute allows prejudgment interest, the claim must meet a second requirement that the amount due be a fixed or
easily ascertainable amount. See Spagat, 473 N.E.2d at 993.
33. Rothschild, supra note 30, at 204.
34. See id.; e.g., General Elec. Supply Co. v. Southern New England Tel. Co., 441
A.2d 581, 592 (Conn. 1981) (terming the allowance of interest an equitable concern
within the discretion of the trial court). Some states use a modified discretionary approach to awards of prejudgment interest. A modified discretionary approach allows for
the award of prejudgment interest without judge or jury discretion under certain circumstances. In Maryland, the exceptions to the discretionary approach are established
in case law. See infra notes 42-44 and accompanying text. In California, the exceptions
to the discretionary approach are established by statute. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 3289.5 (West 1985) (allowing an award of prejudgment interest at the legal rate on
retail installment contracts).
35. See Rothschild, supra note 30, at 204 & n.73 (setting out statutes).
36. Id. Under some circumstances, federal courts in nondiversity cases use the discretionary method to determine awards of prejudgment interest. See Sharp v. Coopers &
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claimant's need for compensation between the date of injury and
the date of trial, it lacks consistency. While some courts that apply
this approach still cling to the distinction between liquidated and
unliquidated damages, 7 other courts attempt to disguise interest as
some other form of compensation in order to avoid the liquidatedunliquidated distinction. 8 Under this approach, no guidelines limit
the judicial exercise of discretion, and, thus, there is no guarantee
39
that a claimant will recover prejudgment interest.
Finally, several jurisdictions have statutes or judicial rules mandating the award of prejudgment interest under certain circumstances.4 ° This approach removes the uncertainty inherent in the
discretionary approach because it standardizes the method for
awarding prejudgment interest, leaving behind the distinction between liquidated and unliquidated damages. 4
Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 192-93 (3d Cir. 1981); Ohio v. Crofters, 525 F. Supp. 1133,
1140 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
37. See, e.g., Coale v. Dow Chem. Co., 701 P.2d 885, 890 (Colo. App. 1985) (refusing
award of prejudgment interest on punitive damages due to unliquidated nature of such
damages); Hochman v. American Family Ins. Co., 673 P.2d 1200, 1202-03 (Kan. App.
1984) (awarding prejudgment interest in breach of warranty action in which consequential damages were determinable, and therefore liquidated, at the time of contract). But
cf. Crofters, 525 F. Supp. at 1140 (awarding prejudgment interest on securities claim without regard to the liquidation requirement); General Elec. Supply, 441 A.2d at 592 (stating
that a claimant's entitlement to interest is not automatically defeated if the claim is
unliquidated).
38. For a discussion of how courts have manipulated the term "interest" in order to
award prejudgment interest, see Rothschild, supra note 30, at 205-06.
39. Id. at 208-09.
40. Id. at 208-09 & nn. 97-98 (setting out statutes and rules). New York law automatically awards prejudgment interest on damages arising from breach of contract or deprivation of property as a matter of right, the rate to be determined at the discretion of the
trial judge. See N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 5001(a) (McKinney 1963). There are a number of
other states that provide for interest by statute. See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 9.30.070 (Supp.
1991); CAL. CIv. CODE § 3289 (West Supp. 1991); COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-12-106 (Supp.
1990); MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 600.6013 (West Supp. 1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 524:1-b (1974).
In Busik v. Levine, 307 A.2d 571 (N.J. 1973), the Supreme Court of New Jersey
affirmed the validity of N.J. R. 4:42-11 (b), which authorizes the judicial award of prejudgment interest in tort actions at a rate of six percent per annum, noting that "the
adoption of the rule does not foreclose holders of other unliquidated claims from contending the circumstances which attend their scene are so like the circumstances here
involved that interest should also be allowed to them." 307 A.2d at 583.
41. Neither the New York statute nor the New Jersey rule requires the court to consider whether the damages are liquidated or unliquidated. This approach simplifies the
determination by the court and allows for adequate compensation to the plaintiff.
Rothschild, supra note 30, at 218.
Rothschild's Comment suggests an alternative approach to the award of prejudgment interest. In order to arrive at the ultimate goal of full compensation to the plaintiff, the author suggests that interest-mandating statutes should allow interest from the
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b. Maryland Law.-(1) Prejudgment Interest in General.-Traditionally, Maryland courts have employed a modified discretionary
approach when awarding prejudgment interest.4 2 This approach is
termed "modified" because certain exceptions entitle creditors to
recover interest as a matter of right, without regard to judicial discretion. These exceptions are well established by Maryland case
law. 4 ' This modified discretionary approach differs from the
mandatory interest approach in that the former approach limits the
recovery of interest to claims for liquidated damages. Therefore,
under Maryland law, a claimant must be able to identify the obligation as a sum certain owed at the time of breach in order to recover
44
prejudgment interest.
(2) Prejudgment Interest & RISA.-Prior to Settles, a secured
creditor had no opportunity to collect prejudgment interest on a
deficiency balance resulting from the repossession and resale of personal property originally purchased under an installment sales
45
agreement. The Court of Appeals had ruled previously that RISA
prohibited such an award of prejudgment interest. 46 Although
Maryland courts customarily awarded creditors prejudgment interest in actions concerning breach of contract and breach of promise
date the cause of action accrues, rather than the date of filing. Such a provision would
result in complete compensation to creditors because it would allow them to recover the
contract rate of interest they were entitled to before repossession. Id. at 218-19. The
author also suggests that standardized prejudgment interest rates should be eliminated
in favor of rates adjusted according to an index of current economic indicator averages.
See id. at 220-21.
42. See, e.g., David Sloane, Inc. v. Stanley G. House & Assocs., 311 Md. 36, 53, 532
A.2d 694, 697 (1987); I.W. Berman Properties v. Porter Bros., Inc., 276 Md. 1, 15-20,
344 A.2d 65, 74-77 (1975); Affiliated Distillers Brands Corp. v. R.W.L. Wine and Liquor
Co., 213 Md. 509, 516, 132 A.2d 582, 586 (1957) ("The general rule is that interest
should be left to the discretion of the jury, or the Court when sitting as a jury.").
43. See Affiliated Distillers, 213 Md. at 516, 132 A.2d at 586. Examples of such exceptions are "cases on bonds or on contracts, to pay money on a day certain, and cases
where the money has been used." Id. Under these circumstances, interest is recoverable as a matter of right. Id. None of these cases, however, had been applied to the
terms of sales agreements subject to RISA until the court's decision in Settles.
44. . W. Berman, 276 Md. at 15, 344 A.2d at 74. For an overview of Maryland cases
concerning what constitutes a sum certain, see id. at 15-19, 344 A.2d at 74-76.
45. RISA states, in pertinent part, that "the finance charge under an installment sale
agreement . . . may be computed . . . on the actual unpaid principal outstanding from

time to time." MD. COM. LAw II CODE ANN. § 12-611 (1990). In addition, § 12-612
states that the buyer has the right to "prepay at any time, without penalty, all or part of
the outstanding balance" and that if the buyer pays the balance in full before maturity,
"the holder immediately shall refund to him a portion of the finance charge." Id. § 12612(b), (c).
46. See Union Trust Co. v. Tyndall, 290 Md. 102, 103, 428 A.2d 428, 428 (1981).
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to pay money on a certain day, 4 7 the Court of Appeals determined in
Union Trust Co. v. Tyndall48 that such interest is inconsistent with the
legislative intent behind RISA.4 9 Thus, under Tyndall, if a buyer
under an installment sales agreement defaulted on payment and the
creditor resold the property to cover the balance due, the buyer
would not be responsible for paying prejudgment interest on any
deficiency balance resulting after resale.
In Tyndall, the Court of Appeals denied the availability of prejudgment interest to a creditor seeking to recover finance charges
under an installment sales agreement. 5 ° The facts of Tyndall are
strikingly similar to those in Settles. Tyndall had purchased an automobile under an installment sales agreement; he paid a portion of
the price as a downpayment and financed the unpaid balance at an
annual rate of 15.17% to be paid in 48 monthly installments. 5' After making several consecutive late payments, Tyndall surrendered
his rights to the automobile by executing a voluntary repossession
agreement.5 2 Union Trust, the creditor, sold the automobile at a
private sale and subtracted the proceeds of the sale and insurance
rebates from the balance owed by Tyndall.5" Union Trust filed suit
to recover the deficiency balance.5 4 Tyndall failed to give notice of
intent to defend, but appeared in court objecting to the claim.5 5
The trial judge refused to award the bank the full amount of the
claim because the bank included finance charges in its calculation of
the deficiency balance. 5 6 Upon appeal by the bank, the circuit court
affirmed the holding of the trial court.
The Court of Appeals
granted certiorari to decide whether a creditor is entitled to recover
finance charges after termination of the initial installment sales
58
agreement.
Based on its interpretation of RISA, the court determined that a
47. See, e.g., LW. Berman, 276 Md. at 21-25, 344 A.2d at 77-79 (awarding prejudgment interest at the legal rate on unpaid balances due a construction contractor); Isle of
Thye Land Co. v. Whisman, 262 Md. 682, 708-09, 279 A.2d 484, 498 (1971) (awarding
prejudgment interest on a certain sum of money that was to be paid on a specified date
to the administratrix of an estate).
48. 290 Md. 102, 428 A.2d 428 (1981).
49. See id. at 113, 428 A.2d at 433.
50. See id. at 102, 428 A.2d at 428.

51. Id. at 103, 428 A.2d at 428.
52. Id.

53. Id. at 103-04, 428 A.2d at 428.
54. Id. at 104, 428 A.2d at 428.
55. Id.

56. Id., 428 A.2d at 429.
57. Id.

58. See id.
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secured creditor may not include finance charges in a deficiency balance resulting from the repossession and resale of the collateral securing the debt.5 9 The Tyndall court focused on the fact that RISA
was enacted as a consumer protection statute,6 ° commenting that
RISA "is a carefully constructed and carefully thought out piece of
consumer protection legislation.''6
After establishing the legislation's primary purpose, the court
analyzed the definitions and uses of the terms "finance charge" and
"interest."6 2 Despite the existence of cases that differentiated
between the terms,6 3 the court concluded that both terms essentially
represent compensation for capital and, therefore, were
interchangeable.'
The Tyndall court then determined that the resale of repossessed property for the purpose of satisfaction of the debt constituted a prepayment under section 12-620 of RISA.65 The court
concluded:
Given the fact that whether one talks in terms of finance
charges or interest one is speaking economically in terms
of compensation for the use of capital and the further fact
that [RISA] obviously was intended to protect unsophisticated consumers ....

we hold that When the General As-

sembly in 1965 changed the statute so as to render buyers
...potentially liable for a deficiency it could not and did
not intend to make such persons responsible for unearned
finance charges.6 6
Thus, the Tyndall decision, the sole Maryland precedent directly
on point for the Settles court, stands for three important precepts:
that debtors are not responsible for payment of finance charges after the resale of property; that finance charges and interest are essentially the same thing-compensation for the use of capital; and
59. See id. at 113, 428 A.2d at 433.
60. See id. at 105, 428 A.2d at 429.
61. Id. at 110, 428 A.2d at 432.
62. See id. at 111-12, 428 A.2d at 432-33.
63. See, e.g., Rothman v. Silver, 245 Md. 292, 226 A.2d 308 (1967). Previous Maryland case law differentiated between the terms by describing finance charges as
"amounts payable for the right to purchase goods over a period of time," and interest as
paying for "the privilege of borrowing money." Tyndall, 290 Md. at 111, 428 A.2d at
432 (citing Rothman, 245 Md. at 292, 226 A.2d at 308; Falcone v. Palmer Ford, 242 Md.
487, 219 A.2d 808 (1966)).
64. See Tyndall, 290 Md. at 111-12, 428 A.2d at 433.
65. See id. at 112, 428 A.2d at 433. "If a buyer elects to prepay all or any part of the
unpaid time balance he is entitled to a readjustment of the finance charge." Id.
66. Id. at 113, 428 A.2d at 433.
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that debtors are not responsible for payment of prejudgment interest after the resale of property.6 7
3. The Court's Reasoning.-The Settles decision differs from
Tyndall by allowing the recovery of prejudgment interest on a deficiency balance remaining on an installment sales agreement.
Although the Settles court relied solely upon the reasoning employed
in Tyndall to conclude that finance charges at the agreement rate
were not recoverable under RISA, 6 a the court abandoned the other
two precepts established in Tyndall, concluding that the secured
creditor may be awarded prejudgment interest at the legal rate of
six percent. 6 9 In so doing, the court re-established the difference
between finance charges and prejudgment interest, a distinction
that the court in Tyndall expressly refuted.70
In Settles, the court characterized the recovery of prejudgment
interest at the agreed finance charge rate and the finance charges
themselves as synonymous. 7 ' Based upon the precedent established
by Tyndall, the court denied recovery of interest at the contract
rate.7" The court chose to differentiate between an award of prejudgment interest at the agreed finance charge rate and an award of
interest at the legal rate, however, stating that "since RISA is silent
on the issue of whether prejudgment interest may be awarded in the
suit to recover the deficiency for which the buyer is liable under
[section] 12-626(e)(4), we look to the law governing recovery of pre7
judgment interest generally."- 1
After examining case law relevant to prejudgment interest but
unrelated to RISA,74 the court determined that the agreements executed by the buyers in Settles qualified as instances in which "the
obligation to pay and the amount due had become certain, definite,
and liquidated by a specific date prior to judgment. ' 7' Further, be67. See id.
68. See Settles, 322 Md. at 560-62, 588 A.2d at 806-07.
69. See id. at 566, 588 A.2d at 808.
70. See supra text accompanying notes 63-64..
71. See 322 Md. at 562, 588 A.2d at 807. "The Bank is not entitled to recover finance
charges beyond the date of resale of the repossessed goods as prejudgment interest just
as it is not entitled to recover such charges . . . pursuant to § 12-626(e)(2)." Id.
72. See id.
73. Id. at 563, 588 A.2d at 807. While the statute itself is silent on the subject of
prejudgment interest, the precedent established in Tyndall certainly is not. In his dissent
in Settles, Judge Eldridge disapproved of the majority's disregard for Tyndall. "The majority's holding today improperly erodes the protection of RISA as interpreted by this
Court in Tyndall ..... Id. at 567, 588 A.2d at 809 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
74. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
75. 322 Md. at 564, 588 A.2d at 807. The certain, definite, and liquidated sum owed
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cause the award of prejudgment interest at the legal rate was not
within the scope of RISA, the court reversed the trial courts' discretionary decisions not to award such interest.7 6 Finally, the court determined that any prejudgment interest awarded on remand would
be calculated using the date after the resale when the buyer in default was notified of the deficiency balance as the date from which
the interest was to accrue.7 7
4. Analysis.-Removing the issue of recovering prejudgment
interest from the constraints of RISA enabled the Court of Appeals
to validate its decision to award such interest based on cases unrelated to consumer protection law. By awarding interest at the legal
rate, 78 the court disregarded the extensive legislative interpretation
of RISA and policy arguments established in Tyndall. 79 The Settles
court legitimized the removal of claims from the scope of RISA, allowing the lower courts to avoid the precedent established in Tyndall
and ensure that creditors are awarded prejudgment interest at the
legal rate-even when such an award seems to violate RISA.8 °
Although it did not expressly overrule the precedent established by Tyndall, Settles changes the law by making prejudgment inthe creditor after resale was outlined in the agreements executed by the buyers. The
buyers made the following promises:
You may apply the proceeds of the sale toward what I owe you. I'll pay the
difference between the sale proceeds and what I owe you. You may add to what
I owe you any fees paid to a public official for the costs of repossession and sale
or for enforcing my obligations.
Id. at 565, 588 A.2d at 808.
76. See id. at 566, 588 A.2d at 808.
77. See id. at 565-66, 588 A.2d at 808.
78. See MD. CONST. art. III, § 57. First Virginia sought to recover interest at the
agreed upon sales rates, and only requested the legal rate of six percent in the alternative. See Settles, 322 Md. at 557, 588 A.2d at 804.
79. Tyndall had already established that prejudgment interest and finance charges
were synonymous terms. See 290 Md. at 111-12, 428 A.2d at 433. Because RISA is not
silent with regard to finance charges, see MD. COM. LAw II CODE ANN. §§ 12-611, -612,
-620 (1990), the court's justification for removing the claim from the scope of RISA
seems tenuous at best.
80. In his dissent, Judge Eldridge criticized the majority for abandoning the interpretative reasoning set forth in Tyndall in favor of a policy that will ultimately harm the
very group of citizens RISA was designed to protect. Judge Eldridge suggested that the
legislature "presumably would have amended [RISA] in the ten years since the Tyndall
case was decided," if it had been displeased with the outcome in that case. Settles, 322
Md. at 568, 428 A.2d at 809 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
Judge Eldridge also criticized the majority's conclusion that the sums due First Virginia were liquidated. According to Eldridge, the sale of collateral was an event subsequent to breach, and was therefore not within the boundaries of those amounts defined
as "liquidated." See id. at 569, 588 A.2d at 810 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
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terest available to creditors engaged in retail installment sales
agreements. 8 ' Settles provides creditors with the remedy of prejudgment interest on the deficiency balance as a means of compensating
the creditor for the buyer's use of the balance due.8 2
There is little doubt that the Settles opinion was motivated in
part by economic policy considerations. Tyndall was decided in
1981, a period of economic growth, development, and excess lending by creditors. During the prosperous early and mid-eighties,
banks worried little about the long term effects of lending small
amounts to consumers because of burgeoning corporate accounts.
Moreover, the consumer protection movement gained momentum
during the early eighties. The Tyndall decision was a product of
83
both the protectionist movement and the prosperous economy.
One decade and countless lending institution collapses later,
the Settles decision realigns the interests to be protected, providing
creditors with some economic relief from the severe recession. Because the current financial crisis suffered by Maryland's lending institutions detrimentally affects the state's economy, including the
individual consumer, the Settles opinion appears to be appropriate.
The ramifications of Settles should prove favorable to secured
creditors such as First Virginia who, under the current standard, will
be assured of a six percent return on deficiency balances owed by
debtors under installment sales agreements. To some extent, this
assurance of compensation will offset costly factors involved in litigation, such as delays in scheduling by courts and delay tactics by
defendants .84

Nonetheless, the Settles decision will not necessarily stifle the
consumer protection movement in Maryland. The decision only
holds consumers executing an installment sales agreement responsible for prejudgment interest at the legal rate, because any rate in
excess of the legal rate would be viewed as an additional finance
charge forbidden under RISA. This six percent cap on prejudgment
interest is reasonable when compared to the original finance charge
rates that creditors generally charge under sales agreements.8 5 Further, these consumers will only be responsible for prejudgment in-

81. See supra text accompanying note 69.
82. See 322 Md. at 562-66, 588 A.2d at 807-08.
83. See 290 Md. at 113, 428 A.2d at 433 ("IT]his statute obviously was intended to
protect unsophisticated consumers .... ").
84. See Brief of Petitioner at 40, Settles (Nos. 91-73 to -75).
85. See supra notes 11, 15 and accompanying text.
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terest accruing after the collateral is sold and a final notice of the
balance due is received.
Defaults in repayment of loans by individuals and corporations,
as well as unwise lending practices by financial institutions, may
have been contributing causes of the current recession. The decision in Settles can be viewed as an attempt by the Court of Appeals to
encourage consumers and lenders to exercise better judgment when
borrowing and lending. Buyers executing installment sales agreements should be aware of the possibility of being liable for prejudgment interest if they default on payments under such agreements.
In addition, lending institutions must adhere to stricter credit standards if they expect to avoid bankruptcy and maintain government
trust. The Settles decision allows for partial losses to both the consumer and the lender-losses that could have been avoided had
each party exercised better judgment.
In the area of installment sales agreements, Settles demonstrates
a moderate approach to tackling the prejudgment interest problem.
On a larger scale, however, the opinion may represent an attempt by
the judiciary to influence the legislature to enact a comprehensive
mandatory interest statute that requires only that the damages assessed be liquidated.8 6 Such a statute would benefit parties to lawsuits and the Maryland judicial system in various ways. First, a
mandatory interest statute would justly compensate plaintiffs for the
loss of the use of their money during pending litigation. Also, a
mandatory interest statute would discourage defendants from postponing settlement negotiations to prolong litigation. 7 This effect
would lead to a quicker rate of settlement in an overcrowded judicial
system. Finally, enactment of a mandatory statute would eradicate
the confusion surrounding the application of prejudgment interest
and rid the judicial system of any inconsistencies regarding actions
that allow recovery of interest, the liquidation requirement, and
awardable rates. Such a statute could produce the conformity in judicial decisions that the current approach lacks.

86. It would be extremely difficult for defendants to assess properly the extent of
damages in certain tort actions that encompass compensatory damages for items such as
pain and suffering.
87. Thomas F. Londrigan, Prejudgment Interest: The Case For, ILL. B.J. 62, 64-65 (Oct.
1983). Such a statute would eliminate the advantage for defendants to prolong litigation in hope of a lower settlement, because they would be charged continuously for the
damages amount awarded to the plaintiff from the time of filing the cause of action (or
even the time of breach) until settlement or judgment at trial. Id.
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5. Conclusion.--Settles is more a reflection of the troubled economy than a radical progression in creditors' rights law. The decision, however, indicates a movement in the Maryland courts toward
more favorable compensation for the plaintiff8 in an area of law
previously favoring the defendant. Settles extends the actions allowing prejudgment interest to include situations involving installment sales agreements breached by the debtor. Furthermore, the
decision limits the factual discretionary power of the trial courts in
these actions through its allowance of appellate review regarding
the scope of prejudgment interest under specific circumstances. Finally, the judicial activism in policymaking displayed by the Court of
Appeals demonstrates the need for the Maryland Assembly to clarify
its position regarding prejudgment interest, specifically under
RISA, and generally, through a mandatory interest statute.
B.

The Prudent Investor Rule and the Duty to Invest Idle Trust Funds

In Maryland National Bank v. Cummins,89 the Court of Appeals
upheld the trial court's ruling that certain practices used by a bank
trustee in administering personal trust assets violated the prudent
investor rule. 90 The court held that when a failure to invest trust
assets is found to violate the rule, the appropriate measure of damages to award the beneficiary is the lost return on uninvested assets,
as opposed to the profits received by the bank from the use of those
assets. 9 ' In addition, the court held that the prejudgment interest
awarded should be simple interest computed at the legal rate of six
percent per annum. 9 2 Finally, the court found that an award of a ten
percent reduction of the bank trustee's commissions was not an
93
abuse of discretion.
In Cummins, the court adhered to its prior decisions involving
bank trustees and the prudent investor rule and also applied wellestablished common-law trust principles. But Cummins also
presented issues relating to aspects of banking, trust accounting,
and data processing as they existed in the 1970s and early 1980s, for
which there is little precedent. Consequently, the Cummins decision
makes Maryland one of the first states to expand retroactively the
88. Full compensation to the plaintiff is a primary goal of civil actions in American
MCCORMICK, supra note 27, § 5.
89. 322 Md. 570, 588 A.2d 1205 (1991).

jurisprudence.

90.
91.
92.
93.

See
See
See
See

id. at 580-95, 588 A.2d at 1209-17.
id. at 597, 588 A.2d at 1218.
id. at 599-600, 588 A.2d at 1219-20.
id. at 601, 588 A.2d at 1220.

522

MARYLAND

LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 51:509

scope of the traditional prudent investor rule to encompass the duty
of a bank trustee to invest temporarily idle trust assets.
Although the court's holding imposes a strict standard on bank
trustees, its prospective impact on the trustees will be minimal. Developments in investment technology and short term investment vehicles now allow most bank trustees to keep trust assets fully
invested on a daily basis. 4 Moreover, current regulations of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) require that national
banks obtain the maximum available return on idle trust assets. 5
1. The Case.-The plaintiffs were the income beneficiaries of a
testamentary trust funded in September 1972 and administered by
the trust department of Maryland National Bank (MNB). 96 Prior to
hearing the case, the circuit court certified the plaintiffs to represent
a class consisting of the life tenants of all personal trusts administered by MNB from September 1, 1972 throughJuly 26, 1982 ("the
class period").9 7
During the class period, MNB administered an average of 2000
personal trusts pursuant to specific internal cash management policies.98 First, MNB deposited all cash receipts directly into a demand
deposit account (DDA), which did not earn interest. 9 9 Second,
MNB left income cash received on behalf of the trusts in the DDA
until scheduled disbursement to the beneficiaries.' 0 Finally, for
those trusts having assets in excess of$150,000, MNB invested principal cash only in increments of $1000.'0 Although not recorded
until 1976, these policies were in effect throughout the class
period. 102
94. See Saul Levmore, Bank Trust Departments and "Float" Revenue: Finding the Proper
Procedures, 98 BANKING L.J. 817, 820 (1981).

95. See infra notes 206-208 and accompanying text.
96. Cummins, 322 Md. at 573, 588 A.2d at 1206.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.

100. Id.
101. Id. at 573-74, 588 A.2d at 1206. For smaller trust accounts, MNB invested assets
into collective investment funds (CIFs) in increments of $500. Id. at 574, 588 A.2d at

1206-07; see 12 C.F.R. § 9.18 (1992) (allowing collective investment of common trust
funds contributed to by bank as trustee).

102. Cummins, 322 Md. at 574, 588 A.2d at 1207. Throughout the class period, MNB
operated an automated trust accounting system that essentially treated the separate
trusts as one common trust by using a single DDA for the receipt and disbursement of
cash and the purchase and sale of assets. Id. at 576, 588 A.2d at 1208-09.
However, due to the timing differences between the debit and credit of cash in the
trust accounts and the receipt of cash, the DDA trailed the trust accounting. Id. at 578,
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As a result of its cash management policies, several benefits accrued to MNB. For example, the bank had the advantage of having
trust cash available for its commercial lending practice without incurring interest costs.10 3

Further, pursuant to regulations of the

OCC, MNB was able to reduce its reserve requirements by classifying a percentage of the uninvested trust cash held in the DDA as
time deposits.

04

1

Throughout the class period, MNB furnished each beneficiary
with a statement reflecting all trust transactions, as well as any principal or income cash left uninvested."0 5 In addition, MNB made all
allocations to the individual trusts necessary for the proper functioning of its accounting system, while also abiding by federal
regulations.

0 6
1

The plaintiffs contended that MNB's cash management practices represented an imprudent failure to invest cash held in
trust. 10

7

At trial, MNB sought to justify these practices principally

on the grounds that further investment would have been prohibitively expensive.'O' The trial judge was unconvinced and entered
judgment against MNB for $3,857,129.69, consisting of lost return
on uninvested cash, compounded prejudgment interest, and a ten
percent reduction of the bank's commissions earned on the trusts
during the class period.'0 9 MNB appealed, challenging both liability
and the measure of relief fashioned. On its own motion, the Court
of Appeals granted certiorari prior to hearing by the Court of Special Appeals." 0 On appeal, MNB advanced three main reasons that
it believed the trial court decision was clearly erroneous: (1) MNB's
policy complied with OCC requirements; (2) MNB's policy conformed to the "universal industry practice"; and (3) further invest588 A.2d at 1208-09. Consequently, receipts of cash would produce a float favorable to
the trustee and disbursements would produce a float favorable to the bank. Id., 588
A.2d at 1209. See generally Van de Kamp v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 251
Cal. Rptr. 530, 532 (1988); Levmore, supra note 94, at 820.
103. Cummins, 322 Md. at 576, 588 A.2d at 1208.
104. Id. at 579, 588 A.2d at 1209; see EDWARD S. HERMAN, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST:
COMMERCIAL BANK TRUST DEPARTMENTS 111 (1975).
105. Cummins, 322 Md. at 577, 588 A.2d at 1208.
106. Id. at 577-78, 588 A.2d at 1208. The pertinent regulation provides:
The investments of each account shall be either:
(1) Kept separate from those of all other accounts, except [for CIFs], or
(2) Adequately identified as the property of the relevant account.
12 C.F.R. § 9.13(b) (1992).
107. Cummins, 322 Md. at 574, 588 A.2d at 1207.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See id. at 575, 588 A.2d at 1207.
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ment of trust cash would have required a prohibitively expensive
allocation of income."' The Court of Appeals found that MNB's
evidence was sufficient to support its claims; 1 2 however, the evidence did not rise to the level of requiring judgment on behalf of
MNB as a matter of law.'
Because MNB's witnesses did not convince the factfinder that MNB was acting as a prudent investor and
"the totality of the evidence did not present a question of law,"'"'
5
the decision of the trial court was affirmed.' 1
2.

Legal Background.-

a. Duty of Loyalty.-The duty of loyalty owed by a trustee to the6
beneficiary is one of the most fundamental principles of trust law. 1
Under this duty, a trustee cannot use the property of the beneficiary,
or profit at the trustee's expense, unless authorized to do so by the
terms of the trust or under permission of a court. 1 17 When such
self-dealing occurs, the trustee will be liable to the beneficiary for
any profits made regardless of whether the activity injures the
beneficiary. 118
Banks generally operate both a trust department and a comI 11.

Id. at 582, 588 A.2d at 1211. MNB also asserted, as a fourth justification, that its

cash management policies provided significant benefits to the trust beneficiaries. Id.at
583, 588 A.2d at 1211. The court summarily rejected this argument, determining that
these benefits resulted from the economics of administering a number of trusts, and not
from the failure to pay interest on trust cash. See id. In addition, MNB asserted that free
checking and overdraft protection received by the beneficiaries alone justified its policies. Id. The court found, however, that MNB's audit report of 1976 showed that
MNB's policy was to limit overdrafts on principal and income cash; therefore, the beneficiaries received no benefit. See id. at 583-84, 588 A.2d at 1211. The bank might argue
that its ability to profit from "float" results in a net gain to beneficiaries by reducing
direct fees. Levmore argues, however, that when a grantor chooses a large bank such as
MNB, one of the things that attracts him is the economies of scale that the bank's size
offers. See Levmore, supra note 94, at 833. Thus, it would be "surprising" if large banks
could now justify "float" revenues by pointing to lower direct fees. Id.
112. See Cummins, 322 Md. at 583, 588 A.2d at 1211.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.at 602, 588 A.2d at 1221.
116. Giankos v. Magiros, 238 Md. 178, 185-86, 208 A.2d 718, 722 (1965) ("There is
no equitable principle more firmly established in our jurisprudence than that a fiduciary
is under a duty of loyalty to his beneficiaries and cannot use the property of a beneficiary
for his own purposes."); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170 (1959) (stating
that the "trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary to administer the trust solely in the
interest of the beneficiary").
117. Giankos, 238 Md. at 186, 208 A.2d at 723 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS, § 2 cmt. b); Carey v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 168 Md. 501, 514, 178 A. 242,
247 (1935).
118. See Carey, 168 Md. at 514, 178 A. at 247.
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mercial banking operation; when a bank deposits trust funds in its
commercial department, an inherent conflict of interest is created" 9
because the use of the deposited trust funds clearly benefits the
bank.' 20 Since its holding in Real Estate Trust Co. v. Union Trust
Co.,121 the Court of Appeals has consistently permitted such deposits.1 22 In Real Estate Trust Co., the court stated that if a bank trustee
"could take money from others on deposit, it surely could open an
account with itself when acting as trustee." 123
In Ghingher v. O'Connell,124 the court reaffirmed the Real Estate
Trust Co. holding, noting that when a bank acting as trustee deposits
trust cash with itself, the relationship between the bank and the trust
becomes one of debtor and creditor.' 25 Consequently, the funds
represent a loan made by the trust to the bank, a transaction not
prohibited by principles of trust law.' 26 Although not a per se
breach of trust, the fact that such a loan is made without interest
accruing to the creditor-trust may violate the prudent investor
27

rule. 1

119. See Van de Kamp v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 251 Cal. Rptr. 530,
534 (1988); In re Conservatorship of Pelton, 183 Cal. Rptr. 188, 191 (1982); see also
HERMAN, supra note 104, at 107-18. Comments by a respected trust law authority summarize the conflict:
One of the main sources of its income as a bank is the loaning of the balances
which are on deposit with it and the resultant receipt of interest. From the
point of view of the stockholders of the bank it is desirable to secure the largest
possible amount of deposits. As a trustee, on the other hand, the corporation
should seek the safest place of deposit and the most advantageous terms ....
In its desire to maintain its deposits at a high figure, the bank may be tempted
to leave trust funds on deposit for an unnecessarily long time or in an unnecessarily large amount, where its duty as trustee would lead to investment of idle
balances.
GEORGE G. BOGERT & GEORGE T. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 543(k),
at 551 (rev. 2d ed. 1980).
120. See, e.g., supra notes 103-104 and accompanying text.
121. 102 Md. 41, 61 A. 228 (1905).
122. See, e.g., id. at 53-55, 61 A. at 233-34 (finding interest penalty charged to trustee,
who kept trust accounts in its own name, inappropriate); Newark Distrib. Terminals Co.
v. Hospelhorn, 172 Md. 291, 298, 191 A. 707, 710 (1937) (reaffirming Real Estate Trust
Co.); Ghingher v. O'Connell, 165 Md. 267, 273, 167 A. 184, 186 (1933) (determining
that self-depositing is permissible so long as there is no breach of trust).
123. 102 Md. at 54, 61 A. at 233.
124. 165 Md. 267, 167 A. 184 (1933).
125. See id. at 272, 167 A. at 186.
126. See Cummins, 322 Md. at 596, 588 A.2d at 1217; see also Newark Distrib. Terminals

Co., 172 Md. at 298, 191 A. at 710; Ghingher, 165 Md. at 222, 167 A. at 186.
127. See Cummins, 322 Md. at 590-91, 588 A.2d at 1215; see also Van de Kamp v. Bank
of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 251 Cal. Rptr. 530, 535 (1988) ("[T]he right to selfdeposit does not overcome the duty to maximize returns on investment of trust funds.");
Newark Distrib. Terminals Co., 172 Md. at 300, 191 A. at 711 ("The mere deposit of the
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The majority of states agree with the Real Estate Trust Co. decision and statutorily authorize the self-depositing of trust funds by
bank trustees.1 21 In many jurisdictions, statutory guidelines require

that sufficient securities first be set aside as collateral for the protection of the deposit.' 29 Federal banking statutes and regulations also
mandate similar restrictions.' 3 0 Nevertheless, in Maryland, the acceptance of this form of self-dealing has endured only 3as a judicial
creation that the General Assembly has never altered.' '
b. Prudent Investor Rule.-Under the Restatement (Second) of
Trusts, the degree of care to be exercised by the trustee in investing
the assets of the trust is governed by the prudent investor standard.' 3 2 This standard requires that the trustee "exercise such care
and skill as a man of ordinary
prudence would exercise in dealing
33
with his own property."'

In 1830, the prudent investor rule was judicially created in
Harvard College v. Armory.' 34 Maryland first embraced the prudent
investor rule in 1884 in McCoy v. Horwitz, 135 when the Court of Apmoneys in its banking department therefore involved no breach of trust, if its selection
of a depositary [sic] was consistent with reasonable care and prudence."); In re Estate of
Ames, 448 N.W.2d 250, 254 (Wis. 1989) (determining that self-investment decisions are
governed by the prudent investor rule).
128. See, e.g., CAL. PROBATE CODE § 16225(b) (West 1991 Spec. Pamphlet); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-9z, 36-9aa (West 1958); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 17, para. 1552-8
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991); IND. CODE ANN. § 28-1-12-5 (Burns 1986); N.Y. BANKING LAW
§ 100-b(l) (McKinney 1990); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36A-63(b) (Supp. 1990); see also UNIFORM TRUSTS ACT § 4 (1937).
129. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 17, para. 1552-8; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36A-63(b); see also
UNIFORM TRUSTS ACT § 4.
130. See 12 U.S.C. § 92a(d) (1989); 12 C.F.R. § 9.10(b) (1992).
131. See Cummins, 322 Md. at 597, 588 A.2d at 1218.
132. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 174 (1959).
133. Id. § 174 cmt. a.
134. 26 Mass. 446 (1830). Prior to Armory, courts had relied on English law, which
was construed as limiting trust investments to government or real property securities.
BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 119, § 613. Due to the lack of equivalent investment
vehicles in the United States, courts had difficulty applying the English law. See Austin
Fleming, PrudentInvestments: The Varying Standardsof Prudence, 12 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR.
J., 243, 243 (1977). Thus, in defining the prudent investor rule, the Massachusetts court
provided American trustees with greater flexibility in choosing suitable trust investments. The rule stated in Armory is: "All that can be required of a trustee to invest is,
that he shall conduct himself faithfully and exercise a sound discretion. He is to observe
26
how men of prudence, discretion and intelligence manage their own affairs ....
Mass. at 461; see BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 119, § 613; David M. Tralins, Contemporary Fiduciary Investments: Why Maryland Needs the Prudent Man Rule, 12 U. BALT. L. REV.
207, 210 (1983); cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, § 174 (employing the standard
of the man of ordinary prudence).
135. 62 Md. 183 (1884).
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peals held that the trustee, in making investments on behalf of the
trust, should not be held liable for losses that result from an "honest
mistake in judgment."'13 6 The rule was clearly articulated in Gilbert
v. Kolb,'1 7 in which the court held the trustee liable for losses resulting from the trustee's investment in certain mortgages. 3 8 In holding the trustee liable to the trust for these losses, the court defined a
man would [have made]
"judicious investment" as one a "prudent
1 39
affairs."'
own
his
of
management
the
in
Although many states have expressly adopted the standard by
statute, 14 0 Maryland has consistently reaffirmed its adherence to the
prudent investor rule by judicial decision. 141 The Court of Appeals
most recently explained the rule in Shipley v. Grouse,' 4 2 in which the
court stated: " 'A trustee is required to manifest in all his management of the trust the care, skill, prudence, and diligence of an ordinarily prudent man engaged in similar business affairs and with
objectives similar to those of the trust in question.' "143 The court
later refined the rule in Board of Trustees of Employees' Retirement System
v. Mayor of Baltimore City, 14 4 stating that the trustee's duty "is not
necessarily to maximize the return on investments but rather to secure a 'just' or 'reasonable' return." '4 Thus, in Maryland, the prudent investor rule has evolved into a flexible standard,
encompassing every aspect of the trustee's activity, yet focusing on
the trustee's duty to secure a reasonable return for the beneficiaries.
Implicit in the prudent investor rule is the duty of the trustee to
use reasonable care and skill to make the trust property productive. 14 6 In the case of money, this duty normally requires the trustee
to invest it so that it will produce income.' 4 7 However, a trustee
may hold funds on deposit for a reasonable time, depending upon
136. Id. at 190.
137. 85 Md. 627, 37 A. 423 (1897).
138. See id. at 636, 37 A. at 424.
139. Id.
140. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
141. See, e.g., Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Owrutsky, 322 Md. 334, 350 n.7, 587
A.2d 511, 519 n.7 (1991); Board of Trustees of Employees' Retirement Sys. v. Mayor of
Baltimore City, 317 Md. 72, 103, 562 A.2d 720, 735 (1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1167
(1990); Fox v. Harris, 141 Md. 495, 506, 119 A. 256, 260 (1922).
142. 279 Md. 613, 370 A.2d 97 (1977).
143. Id. at 621, 370 A.2d at 103 (quoting GEORGE G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS
AND TRUSTEES, § 541 (2d ed. 1960)).
144. 317 Md. 72, 562 A.2d 720 (1989).
145. Id. at 107, 562 A.2d at 737.
146. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 181 (1959).
147. See Carey v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 168 Md. 501, 514, 178 A. 242, 247 (1935);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 181 cmt. c.
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such circumstances as the amount of the deposit, the possibility of
finding suitable investments, and the administrative needs of the
trust.' 48 Although a bank may legally deposit trust funds into its
own commercial operations, 14 9 it is questionable whether such deposits must be in interest-bearing accounts. Prior to 1980, banks
were prohibited from paying interest on demand deposit accounts. 1 50 Thus, the issue arose as to whether the bank trustee
could properly place trust funds in such accounts or whether the
bank trustee's duties required her to place temporarily idle trust
cash in some other, interest-bearing vehicle.'
At its most basic
level, the issue is whether idle trust funds must bear interest.
Although there is a dearth of case law on point, the issue was
indirectly addressed by the California Court of Appeals in Van de
Kamp v. Bank of America National Trust & Savings Ass'n, "5' 2 a class action challenging a bank trustee's use of temporarily idle trust funds
for its own profit.'5 3 The bank had invested all funds awaiting per54
manent investment or distribution in passbook savings accounts,
Moreover, beginning in 1976, all principal cash in excess of $100
was "swept" into a fund that invested in money market mutual
funds; by 1982, all cash was invested "to the penny."' 5 5 The trial
court held that the bank was entitled to profit from this use of idle
trust funds and found the bank's practices to be prudent. The ap6
pellate court affirmed.15

3. Analysis.-The Cummins decision represents a case of first
impression for the Court of Appeals. As the court noted, several
jurisdictions have found self-depositing bank trustees liable for fail148. See Lynch v.John M. Redfield Found., 88 Cal. Rptr. 86, 89 (1970); see also Braman
v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 47 A.2d 10, 25 (N.J. Ch. 1946) (stating that "periods of three months, six months and one year have been held to be reasonable"); 2A
AUSTIN W. Scor
& WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 181, at 542-43 (4th
ed. 1987).
149. See supra notes 119-131 and accompanying text.
150. See 12 U.S.C. § 371a (repealed by Pub L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 147 (Dec. 31,
1980)).
151. See generally 2A ScoTr & FRATCHER, supra note 148, § 181, at 546-50. Throughout the class period, this duty was regulated by OCC Regulation 9, which prescribed that
"[f]unds held in a fiduciary capacity by a national bank awaiting investment or distribution shall not be held uninvested or undistributed any longer than is reasonable for the
proper management of the account." 12 C.F.R. § 9.10(a) (1982).
152. 251 Cal. Rptr. 530 (1988).
153. See id. at 532.
154. Id. at 538.
155. Id.
156. See id. at 537-39.
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ure to invest assets prudently. 5 7 Further, given that "[r]easonable
persons do not, as a matter of policy, continuously leave uninvested
sums up to $999," ' 58 the burden rested on the trustee to persuade

the factfinder that a prudent investor would have left the trust cash
in the DDA.' 5 9
a. Breach of Duty.- Notwithstanding the lack of precedent, the
court's application of the prudent investor rule in Cummins is consistent with both its earlier decisions and sound trust law principles. 6
When liquid, short-term investments are readily available and practical, prudent management undoubtedly would require the trustee
to invest temporarily idle funds.' 6 ' Questions concerning breach of
the prudent investor rule necessarily present mixed questions of fact
and law that an appellate court should not overturn unless the lower
court's determination is clearly erroneous.i62 Accordingly, the Cummins court properly gave considerable weight to the trial court's con157. See, e.g., Manchester Band of Pomo Indians, Inc. v. United States, 363 F. Supp.
1238 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (granting summary judgment against United States when it deposited Indian funds in Treasury at four percent interest when short term government
bonds were available at higher yields); Blankenship v. Boyle, 329 F. Supp. 1089 (D.D.C.
1971) (holding trustee liable for breach due to an accumulation of funds in checking
account without interest for 20 years); In re Orrantia's Estate v. First Nat'l Bank, 285 P.
266 (Ariz. 1930) (holding executor bank liable for four percent interest for self-depositing funds held without interest for six months); New England Trust Co. v. Triggs, 135
N.E.2d 541 (Mass. 1956) (finding bank trustee liable based on self-depositing over
$100,000 for over 2 years); In re Doyle's Will, 79 N.Y.S.2d 695 (1948) (finding testamentary trustee properly surcharged for depositing in special interest account earning approximately one-half of that which could have been earned in a savings account); Reid v.
Reid, 85 A. 85 (Pa. 1912) (concluding that the bank trustee breached his duty by selfdepositing funds without interest, and finding trustee liable at interest rate paid by it to
third parties depositing in similar accounts); In re Estate of Lychos, 470 A.2d 136 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1983) (holding bank trustee liable for failure to invest balance of mortgage
proceeds held in trust in an interest bearing account). But see Application of Harris, 146
N.Y.S.2d 730 (1955) (finding self-depositing bank trustee not liable for interest in absence of custom among commercial banks to pay interest on similar accounts), aff'd, 143
N.E.2d 505, cert. denied, 355 U.S. 891 (1957).
158. Cummins, 322 Md. at 581, 588 A.2d at 1210.
159. Id. at 581-82, 588 A.2d at 1210.
160. See supra notes 146-148 and accompanying text.
161. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 181 cmt. c (1959); 2A ScoTr &
FRATCHER, supra note 148, § 181, at 549. This duty has been held to apply to income
cash as well as principal cash. See Lynch v.John M. Redfield Found., 88 Cal. Rptr. 86, 90
(1970) (finding no authority making or discussing a distinction between the types of
cash). As one commentator suggests, "it [is] hornbook law that cash should not be left
unproductive except for overriding liquidity needs." Martin E. Lybecker, Regulation of
Bank Trust Department Investment Activities: Seven Gaps, Eight Remedies, 90 BANKING L.J. 912,
929 (1973).
162. See Cosden v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 41 Md. App. 519, 531, 398
A.2d 460, 467 (1979); MD. R. 8-131(c).
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clusion that MNB had available a number of feasible modes of
investment.163 The Cummins court found the bank's argumentsthat such investments were not required to be made by law, that
industry standards required no such investment, and that it would
have been prohibitively expensive to invest the funds further-to be
insufficient to override the trial court's determination of liability.t "4
(1) Adherence to OCC Policies and Regulations.-Throughout the
class period, MNB was subject to an OCC regulation regarding the
investment and distribution of trust funds. 165 At trial, the former
Chief National Trust Examiner of the OCC testified that MNB's retention of principal cash below $1000 in DDAs complied with this
regulation.' 6 6 Nevertheless, the court rejected the argument that
adherence to OCC regulations presumptively indicates that no
67
breach of duty occurred.1

163. The district court found that a master passbook savings account or individual
passbook savings accounts could have been utilized for trust cash at a return of five
percent. The court also found that as early as 1976, cash in the DDA could have been
invested in money market mutual funds. See Cummins, 322 Md. at 582, 588 A.2d at 1211;
accord Van de Kamp v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 251 Cal. Rptr. 530, 538
(1988) (finding that a bank trustee who invested idle trust cash in passbook savings accounts until 1976 and thereafter in money market mutual funds acted prudently). In
addition, the trial court found that CIFs could have been utilized more fully with lower
participation levels. See Cummins, 322 Md. at 582, 588 A.2d at 1211; supra note 101.
164. See 322 Md. at 602, 588 A.2d at 1221.
165. See supra note 151.

166. Cummins, 322 Md. at 584, 588 A.2d at 1211-12. Although no recent decisions
have addressed the issue of federal preemption, the comments of the Supreme Court of
Alabama in 1939 in First National Bank v. Basham, 191 So. 873 (Ala. 1939), support
MNB's views:
[T]he inference is clear that the examiners were advised of all the matters here
complained of, fully disclosed by the records of the Trust Department, and that
this course of business was known to and sanctioned by the [Clomptroller [of
the Currency]. . . . It is enough to say the General Rule that the administrative construction of the laws by agencies created by law to administer them is to
be given much weight . . . applies with especial force to supervising agencies
set up by law to supervise the doings of those engaged in a trust business,
matters of so vital concern in a vast business of every day recurrence.
Id. at 880-81. Furthermore, as one commentator noted, the OCC has "long informally
prescribed what sound fiduciary principles require." Martin E. Lybecker, Regulation of
Bank Trust Department Activities, 82

YALE

L.J. 977, 979 (1973).

167. See Cummins, 322 Md. at 584, 588 A.2d at 1212-13. The court relied on a products liability case that held that although a manufacturer's compliance with the Federal
Flammable Fabrics Act is evidence of due care, it does not preclude a finding of negligence on part of the manufacturer. See Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, Inc., 303 Md. 581,
602,495 A.2d 348, 358 (1985), cited in Cummins, 322 Md. at 584, 588 A.2d at 1211-12; see
also W.

PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS

§ 36 (5th ed.

1984). Although products liability cases involve different policy considerations, the
court's analogy is helpful.
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There is a sound basis for the court's decision: federal regulation of trust departments may afford the beneficiary only limited
protection due to the conflicting interests of the OCC.'
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As one

commentator has suggested, "[t]he primary goal of the regulators is
to protect the solvency of banks by making sure that banks do not
leave themselves open to solvency-threatening surcharges. The interest of the regulatory agencies in the fiduciary clients is only an
incidental by-product of regulation."'' 69 Thus, the Cummins court
properly dismissed the bank's first argument.
(2) Conformance with Industry Standards.-MNB further argued
that it conformed with the universal standards of the industry during the class period. 7 ' Although there is considerable evidence
that during that period most trust departments utilized investment
policies similar to MNB's,' 7 1 the court was justified in finding that
the practices of "even a majority of commercial banks which operated trust departments" were not controlling. 1 72 Because a bank receives considerable benefits from the use of idle trust cash in its
commercial operations, the temptation to sacrifice trust income for
liquidity is great.
Therefore, the actions of other banks may re168. See Steven R. Hunsicker, Conflicts of Interest, Economic Distortions,and the Separationof
Trust and Commercial Banking Functions, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 611, 623-25 (1977).
169. Id. at 624; see also HERMAN, supra note 104, at 120-21 ("The primary interest of
the regulatory authorities is in the solvency of the banks; the function of regulation is
often acknowledged to be 'keeping the banks open' by seeing that they do not leave
themselves vulnerable to solvency-threatening surcharges." (footnote omitted)).
In June 1990, the OCC proposed an amendment to 12 C.F.R. § 9.10(a) that would
clarify the role of state or local law in establishing the standard for the investment of idle
trust funds. See 55 Fed. Reg. 26,210 (1990) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 9.10(a)). The
proposed amendment would require that funds awaiting investment or distribution be
made productive in trust quality investment "[u]nless otherwise provided by specific reference in the governing instrument or by language in local statutory law which specifically refers to the investment of trust funds awaiting investment or distribution." Id. at
26,211. This amendment, which would effectively preempt state judicial decisions, has
led commentators to question whether the OCC has such authority, pursuant to 12
U.S.C. § 92a. SeeJohn D. Hawke et al., The Authority of National Banks to Invest Trust Assets
in Bank-Advised Mutual Funds, 10 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 131, 174-82 (1991).
170. See Cummins, 322 Md. at 584-85, 588 A.2d at 1214.
171. See HERMAN, supra note 104, at 112-14.
172. Cummins, 322 Md. at 586, 588 A.2d at 1213; cf. Levmore, supra note 94, at 830
("There is no indication that industry practice is sufficient to permit the trustee's profiting from the float.").
173. See Lybecker, supra note 166, at 985. In a 1975 study of trust department practices, Professor Herman found "[miost telling ... the slowness with which banks have
developed and improved machinery for keeping trust cash to a minimum," commenting
that computerization had made it possible for larger trust banks to keep idle assets to a
minimum. HERMAN, supra note 104, at 116. Professor Herman concluded that a "truly
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flect their inability to resist the temptation rather than their prudent
investment practices.
In discrediting the bank's second argument, the court also referred to the legitimate practices of the trustee bank in Van de Kamp
v. Bank of American National Trust & Savings Ass 'n. 174 The bank trustee
in Van de Kamp invested idle trust cash in passbook savings accounts
and, beginning in 1976, in money market mutual funds.' 75 At trial,
the trustee prevailed; the trial court found this practice to be prudent and appropriate, and the appellate court affirmed.' 76 Thus,
the Cummins court refuted MNB's "industry standard" argument by
pointing to the contrasting practice the trustee bank in Van de Kamp
employed during the class period. In fact, this was precisely the
practice the lower court found to be a feasible option for MNB, calculating damages using the passbook rate as the lost rate of return
on the plaintiffs' funds. 177 By upholding the circuit court, the Court
of Appeals demonstrated willingness to accept the practices discussed in Van de Kamp as the benchmark for a bank trustee's duty to
invest.
(3) Cost-Benefit Analysis.-Finally, MNB asserted that any alternative form of investment of idle trust cash was prohibitively expensive during the class period.178 MNB essentially argued that, during
the class period, its automated trust accounting was not capable of
allocating income to the individual trusts if the idle cash was invested, and that prior to "cash sweeping" it could not accurately
account for the income earned on such investments. 17 9 In the
'undivided loyalty' ... would have resulted in a more rapid advance in the cash management of personal trust accounts." Id.
174. 251 Cal. Rptr. 530 (1988).
175. Id. at 538. Prior to and during the class period in Cummins, several commentators
discussed the investment alternatives available for temporarily idle trust cash. See, e.g., J.
Alden Butler, Starting a Short-Term Securities Fund, 109 TRUSTS & ESTATES 490 (1970);
Hunsicker, supra note 168, at 630; T.H. Schneider, Setting Up a Cash Asset Fund, 110
TRUSTS

& ESTATES 372 (1971).

In Van de Kamp, however, it was determined that investment in pooled funds of
income cash by "cash sweeping" would not have been prudent until mid-1982. See 251
Cal. Rptr. at 543.
176. See Van de Kamp, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 538, 557.
177. See Cummins, 322 Md. at 575, 588 A.2d at 1207. The circuit court directed that,
for the years 1972 through 1976, MNB pay five percent on the average DDA balances
for those years, "an investment return analogous to passbook savings account interest
earnings." Id. From 1977 to the end of the class period, the court directed that MNB
pay amounts calculated by applying the average rate of return earned by a money market
mutual fund in the particular year to the respective average DDA balances. Id.
178. See id. at 589, 588 A.2d at 1214.
179. See id. at 590, 588 A.2d at 1214.
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words of MNB, "the game would not have been worth the candle."' 8 0 The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's finding that,
although allocation would have been imprecise, MNB had the ability
Again,
to invest the trust funds-they simply chose not to do so.'
the court's reasoning is supported by the practices of the trustee
bank in Van de Kamp.'1 2 Furthermore, the bank put forth no evidence to indicate that available, alternative investments would have
83
been cost prohibitive.
b. Damages.-Although the court imposed a strict standard for
the proper care of trust accounts, the impact of the decision is mitigated by the court's partial revision of the damage award.' 8 4 On
cross appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the proper damages for
MNB's breach of duty should have been the profits realized by
MNB"'a-based upon the common-law trust principle that the
trustee cannot use the trust assets for his personal gain and must
disgorge any profits made from such use.' 8 6 With regard to trustees
in general, this analysis is sound; but, as the court noted, it is clearly
inconsistent with the court's earlier decisions regarding self-depositing trustees. In Real Estate Trust Co. v. Union Trust Co. ,187 the court
took the view that the funds in the bank "were to the credit of the
trustee, and were not used by the trustee. The trustee, as such,
made no profit out of them."' 8 8 Thus, the Cummins court found the
trial court's award of lost return rather than profit realized by the
bank to be appropriate and consistent with precedent in Maryland,
as well as the decisions of a majority of jurisdictions.' 8 9
180. Reply Brief of Appellant at 21, Cummins (No. 90-36).
181. Cummins, 322 Md. at 595, 588 A.2d at 1217. The court found that despite the
requirements of 12 C.F.R. § 9.13(b), any income earned could have been periodically
allocated to the trusts in proportion to the trust's share of the total cash in the trust
accounting system. Id. at 593-94, 588 A.2d at 1216. "From the standpoint of a trustee's
duty to act as a prudent investor, such a system is certainly preferable to paying no
interest whatsoever .... " Id. at 593, 588 A.2d at 1217; see Levmore, supra note 94, at
827-28 ("It may be that the best practice would be to utilize ... some inexpensive and
(perhaps) rough allocation method so that the float income could be returned to the
accounts without prohibitive costs.").
182. 251 Cal. Rptr. 530, 541 (1988).
183. See Cummins, 322 Md. at 595, 588 A.2d at 1217.
184. See id. at 595-97, 588 A.2d at 1217-18.
185. See id. at 595, 588 A.2d at 1217.
186. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 206 cmt. j (1959).
187. 102 Md. 41, 61 A. 228 (1905).
188. Id. at 55, 61 A. at 233.
189. See 322 Md. at 596, 588 A.2d at 1218; see also Van de Kamp v. Bank of Am. Nat'l
Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 251 Cal. Rptr. 530, 537 (1988); Hayward v. Plant, 119 A. 341, 34748 (Conn. 1923); In re People's Trust Co., 155 N.Y.S. 639, 640-41 (1915); Stahl v. First
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The court also upheld the trial court's decision to award the
plaintiffs ten percent of the commissions earned by the bank during
the class period.' ° In so doing, the court relied on an 1831 case'
in which a self-dealing trustee was forced to disgorge fifty percent of
the commissions he earned during the period of self-dealing.' 9 2
The court noted that in the Cummins case, "although there was no
prohibited self-dealing, there was a breach of trust which caused serious loss.'

93

Because there was no reason to distinguish the

breaches, an award of returned commissions
was entirely appropri19 4
ate and supported by precedent.
The trial court's award of prejudgment interest at the rate of
ten percent compounded did not withstand the bank's attack on appeal, however. Despite the acknowledgement of circumstances in
which compound interest may be appropriate against a self-dealing
trustee, 195 the court found that the compounding of interest against
a self-depositing trustee was inconsistent with the rule set out in
Real Estate Trust Co. v. Union Trust Co. 196 "Compounding of interest,
as a substitute for actual profits realized, is not permitted against the
self-depositing bank trustee because .

.

. the trustee is not consid-

ered to have used trust funds for its own purposes. '"' 9 7 Thus, the
court wisely chose to avoid an inconsistent result by holding that a
trustee who has breached his duty by allowing the trust principle to
remain idle will be subject only to simple interest.' 9 8

Finally, the court modified the prejudgment interest award by
imposing the six percent legal rate of interest 9 9 rather than the ten

Penn. Banking & Trust Co., 191 A.2d 386, 388 (Pa. 1963); In re Moore's Estate, 60 A.
991 (Pa. 1905). But see In re Estate of Swiecicki, 477 N.E.2d 488, 493 (Ill. 1985); Enright
v. Sedalia Trust Co., 20 S.W.2d 517, 522 (Mo. 1929).
190. See Cummins, 322 Md. at 601, 588 A.2d at 1220.
191. See Diffenderfer v. Winder, 3 G. &J. 311 (1831).
192. See id. at 347-48.
193. 322 Md. at 601, 588 A.2d at 1220.
194. See id. The retroactive reduction in MNB's commissions for the class period was
$2,225,426.04, approximately 35% of its before-tax profits from personal trust operations during the period. Reply Brief of Appellant at 30, Cummins (No. 90-36). This
award represented approximately 58% of the circuit court judgment.
195. See Cummins, 322 Md. at 597-99, 588 A.2d at 1218-19.
196. See id. at 599, 588 A.2d at 1219 (citing Real Estate Trust Co. v. Union Trust Co.,
102 Md. 41, 55, 61 A. 228, 233 (1905)).
197. Id.
198. See id.
199. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 49, § 3 (1972) (repealed 1975) (applicable during class
period until repeal); MD. COMM. LAw II CODE ANN. § 12-102 (1990) (applicable post1975 through the remainder of the class period).
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percent rate set by the trial court. 2 0 Because there was no applicable statute or contractual stipulation to apply a different rate, "the
rate of prejudgment interest may not exceed the legal rate of six
0
percent."

2

'

c. Consequences.-The court left little doubt that when trust department investment policies leave idle trust cash uninvested, the
burden will rest on the bank to justify its practices.20 2 Shifting the
burden to the bank in this manner can be justified on two grounds.
First, it is presumably the greater technology and expertise of banks
that encourages grantors to turn to large banks to act as trustees. 20 3
When a bank with a large trust department holds itself out as having
such expertise in the management and investment of trust assets, it
should be held to that higher standard.20 4 Second, as in the instant
case, when the bank has received considerable benefit from the use
of idle trust cash, the courts should undertake a stricter scrutiny of
the bank's practices for any signs of self-dealing.20 5 Thus, it does
not seem unreasonable that a bank trustee should bear the considerable burden of justifying its policies.
Nevertheless, Cummins should have little or no impact on future
practices of national bank trustees. In 1982, the OCC amended
Regulation 9 to require that "[e]ach national bank exercising fiduciary powers shall adopt and follow written policies and procedures
intended to ensure that the maximum rate of return available for
trust-quality, short term investments is obtained."20 6 The OCC has
further taken the position that, unless otherwise provided by law or
agreement, principal and income cash should be made productive
within one week of receipt by a bank trustee.20 7 Furthermore, bank
200. See Cummins, 322 Md. at 599-600, 588 A.2d at 1219.
201. Id. at 600, 588 A.2d at 1219.
202. See id. at 596, 588 A.2d at 1218; see also Goldman v. Rubin, 292 Md. 693, 713, 441
A.2d 713, 724 (1982); Lopez v. Lopez, 250 Md. 491, 501, 243 A.2d 588, 594 (1968)
("[T]he person who challenges the conduct of a trustee, must first allege that the trustee
has a duty and has been derelict in the performance of this duty, and offer evidence in
support of this allegation. Then, and not until then, does the trustee have the burden of
rebutting the allegation.").
203. See Levmore, supra note 94, at 823.
204. See In re Estate of Lychos, 470 A.2d 136, 140-41 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 174 (1959).
205. See Blankenship v. Boyle, 329 F. Supp. 1089, 1101-02 n.7 (D.D.C. 1971); Pelton
v. Wells Fargo Bank, 183 Cal. Rptr. 188, 192 (1982); In re Cullhane's Estate, 256 N.W.
807, 811 (Mich. 1934).
206. 47 Fed. Reg. 27,831 (1982) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 9.10(a)).
207. See OCC Banking Bulletin No. 83-57, 5 Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) $ 60,560A
(Dec. 13, 1983).
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trustees who failed to invest idle funds at less than the maximum
rate for trust quality short term investments are obligated to reimburse the trusts for the difference between what was actually received and what should have been received, plus interest.2" 8 Thus,
the OCC has set a requirement for investment that is well within the
standard prescribed by the Cummins court. Consequently, future
claims against bank trust departments, at least those under federal
regulation, for failure to invest trust assets prudently will likely be
limited to practices utilized prior to 1982.
Moreover, equitable claims such as those in Cummins should be
barred by laches. In Ridgely v. Pfingstag,20 9 the court stated that if the
beneficiary is aware that the trustee violated the trust, it will apply
an equitable or analogous legal statute of limitations. 21 There was
uncontroverted evidence that, throughout the Cummins class period,
MNB furnished the trust beneficiaries with periodic statements reflecting, among other things, the amount of principal and income
cash left uninvested. 21 t
Although MNB had raised the defense of laches in its answer, it
failed to incorporate the defense into its proposed findings of fact
and conclusions of law. Therefore, the circuit court did not address
the issue and the Court of Appeals could not, under rule 8131(a),2 consider the issue on appeal. 1 3 Although the court was
forced to leave open the question of whether MNB's account statements constituted sufficient notice, 2 4 equity should not allow the
beneficiary to recover for practices of which the beneficiary should
have been aware and that occurred more than ten years ago.
208. See id. The OCC also indicated that it intends to sanction those national banks
that fail to obtain the maximum prudent rate of return on idle trust assets. See id.
209. 188 Md. 209, 50 A.2d 578 (1946).
210. Id. at 234, 50 A.2d at 590.
211. 322 Md. at 577, 588 A.2d at 1208. In addition, 70% of the trusts involved
"shared investment authority," with the majority of the co-trustees being attorneys.
Brief of Appellant to the Court of Special Appeals at 30-31, Cummins (No. 90-44). As
one commentator suggests:
[u]ninvested cash is ... a highly visible item in a trust customer's monthly statement from the bank. All statement recipients can understand it, whether they
are sophisticated corporate treasurers monitoring pension trusts or individuals
monitoring grandmother's legacy. Thus, most trust customers can be expected
to keep a critical eye on uninvested cash in their account ....
Lybecker, supra note 161, at 934.
212. MD. R. 8-131(a) provides: "Ordinarily, the appellate court will not decide [an
issue other than jurisdiction] unless it plainly appears by the record to have been raised
in or decided by the trial court ... ." Id.
213. See Cummins, 322 Md. at 601-02, 588 A.2d at 1220.
214. See id.
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4. Conclusion.-In Cummins, the Court of Appeals broadened
the scope of the prudent investor rule to encompass the duty of
bank trustees to make productive idle trust funds awaiting investment or distribution. However, the prospective impact of the
court's decision should be minimal. Due to the development of
computerized "sweep" accounts and the increased availability of liquid, short term investments, 15 most bank trust departments should
be able to satisfy the prudent investor standard by fully investing
idle trust cash on a daily basis. In light of the strict standards set by
the OCC amendment, there is considerable incentive for trust departments to utilize these capabilities. Nevertheless, in affirming the
decision of the lower court, the Court of Appeals has set a strict
standard of prudence for courts to use in the future when evaluating
the cash management policies of bank trust departments. As a result, these departments will face a heavy burden in justifying their
past practices.
E. COUGHLAN
V. HEAPHY, IV

TRACI
WILLIAM

215. See Levmore, supra note 94, at 822.

II.

A.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

Keeping the Courtroom Door Open

In Baltimore Sun v. Colbert,' the Court of Appeals held that the
press and public are entitled to prior notice of a motion to close
courtroom proceedings and a reasonable opportunity to procure
counsel to oppose the closure in order that they may assert their
right of access to criminal proceedings guaranteed by the First
Amendment and the Maryland Declaration of Rights.2 In a unanimous decision that reviews the applicable standards for excluding
the press and public from the courtroom, sealing court documents,
and conducting hearings on motions for closure, the court vacated
an order of the Circuit Court for Howard County that had sealed
both a pretrial motion and the transcript of the hearing on that motion.3 The Court of Appeals directed, however, that the seal on the
documents be temporarily continued pending a reconsideration of
the necessity of a seal order to avoid prejudice to the defendant's
right to a fair trial.4
1. The Case.-Tyrone Michael Colbert was to be tried on December 3, 1990, in the Circuit Court for Howard County on charges
of first degree murder, armed robbery, use of a handgun in the commission of a felony, and carrying a concealed weapon. 5 The State
had filed a notice of its intention to seek the death penalty, or alternatively, life without the possibility of parole.6 On November 29,
1990, Colbert filed a "Motion to Enforce Terms of Plea Bargain
Agreement or Alternatively to Strike the State's Notice to Seek the
Death Penalty or Life Imprisonment without Parole." 7 A hearing on
the motion was scheduled for the same day. The motion had not
been docketed, and was later ordered sealed upon Colbert's request.' After a brief bench conference at the beginning of the hearing, the court announced that Colbert had asked that the public be
excluded from the hearing on the motion. The State opposed clo1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

323 Md. 290, 593 A.2d 224 (1991).
See id. at 300, 593 A.2d at 229.
See id. at 306-07, 593 A.2d at 231-32.
See id.
Id. at 295, 593 A.2d at 226.

6. Id.
7. id.
8. Id.
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sure.9 The court stated that it would "evaluate the public's right to
know about the issue against this Defendant's right to a fair trial."'°
The court then proceeded to make a broad and conclusory finding
that "the rights of the Defendant ultimately to a fair trial mandate
that I exclude the public and press from this particular hearing."''
Michael J. Clark, a reporter for The Sun present at the hearing,
objected to the closure of the courtroom and announced his immediate intention to procure counsel to oppose the closure.' 2 The
court replied that it would proceed with the closure of the hearing
and would entertain arguments in opposition from The Sun's counsel when they arrived.'" The courtroom was cleared of the press
and public and the hearing was conducted.
Counsel for The Sun arrived at 4:00 p.m., approximately one
hour after being notified of the closed hearing.' 4 At 6:00 p.m. counsel was admitted and intervened for the limited purpose of asserting
The Sun's right of access to pretrial criminal proceedings.' 5 When
asked to articulate its reasons for excluding the press and public
from the hearing, the trial court responded that it had balanced the
rights of the public against the right of the defendant to a fair trial
and had concluded that the defendant's right to a fair trial outweighed the public's "right to know."' 16 The Sun moved that the
court reveal the subject matter of the hearing and provide its reporter with a tape recording of the closed proceedings. The court
denied both motions.17
The Sun appealed from the denial of these motions. The Court
of Appeals then issued a writ of certiorari before the intermediate
appellate court had the opportunity to rule on the issues. 18
2.

Legal Background.-

a. Supreme CourtJurisprudnce.-TheSupreme Court first recognized the right of the press and public to have access to criminal
trials in Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia. This presumptive right of
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 296, 593 A.2d at 226.
Id.

Id.
See id., 593 A.2d at 227.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
448 U.S. 555 (1980) (plurality opinion).
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access was based on the First Amendment protection of freedom of
the press.2" In recognizing this right, ChiefJustice Burger reasoned
that "fundamental rights, even though not expressly guaranteed,
have been recognized by the Court as indispensable to the enjoyment of rights explicitly defined."'" Following this line of reasoning, the Court recognized that the right to attend criminal trials that
historically have been open to the public2 2 is implicit in the First
Amendment guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press.2"
This presumptive right of access was later extended by the
Supreme Court to voir dire proceedings in Press-EnterpriseCo. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise1)24 and to preliminary hearings before a
magistrate in Press-EnterpriseCo. v. Superior Court (Press-EnterpriseII).2"
In extending the right of access to a preliminary hearing in PressEnterprise H, the Court outlined a two-part test for evaluating
whether a qualified right of access attaches to a particular type of
proceeding.2 6 The Court considered first "whether the place and
process have historically been open to the press and general public," and second "whether public access plays a significant positive
role in the functioning of the particular process in question."27 If,
after examining the proceeding in question, a court determines that
access to the proceeding would "pass[] these tests of experience and
logic, a qualified First Amendment right of public access
28
attaches."

The Press-EnterpriseH Court, in evaluating the first prong of the
test, discussed the long tradition of public pretrial proceedings, noting the trial of Aaron Burr for treason in 1807 as an example. 9 In
that trial, a probable cause hearing was moved from the courtroom
20. Id. at 575-77. The First Amendment to the Constitution provides, in relevant
part, that "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press." U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
In separate concurring opinions, Justice Stevens and Justice Brennan distinguished
Richmond Newspapers from Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979), which rejected the contention that Sixth Amendment rights could be asserted by the public. See
id. at 379-80; Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 584 n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at
584-85 (Brennan, J., concurring). Gannett held that the Sixth Amendment right to a
public trial was personal to the accused. See 443 U.S. at 379-84.
21. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 580.
22. See id. at 564-73 (outlining the history of public trials).
23. See id. at 580.
24. 464 U.S. 501 (1984).
25. 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
26. See id. at 8.
27. Id.
28. Id.at 9.
29. See id. at 10; United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 1 (No. 14,692) (C.C. Va. 1807).

1992]

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

to the Hall of the House of Delegates in Virginia in order to accommodate the crowds that were interested in attending the proceedings.3" Similarly, in Richmond Newspapers and Press-EnterpriseI, the
Court examined, respectively, the long history of open trials in early
English history prior to the Norman Conquest" and the development of jury selection as an open and public process.3 2
In determining that the presence of the public serves a significant purpose in a preliminary hearing (the second prong of the test),
the Press-EnterpriseH Court minimized the fact that an accused could
not be tried and convicted in such a proceeding-a factor that
weighed heavily in earlier decisions of the Court. 3 Rather, the
Court emphasized that the preliminary hearing is the only proceeding in a large number of criminal cases and may be determinative of
the final outcome in the case.3 4 In this sense, a preliminary hearing
functions much as an actual trial and the same considerations of
openness apply. As stated by Chief Justice Burger:
The value of openness lies in the fact that people not actually attending trials can have confidence that standards of
fairness are being observed; the sure knowledge that anyone
is free to attend gives assurance that established procedures are being followed and that deviations will become
known. Openness thus enhances both the basic fairness of
the criminal trial and the appearance of fairness so essential to public confidence in the system.3 5
The Court recognized, however, that the right of access is not
absolute.3 6 The public's right of access must be balanced against
the rights of the accused, particularly the accused's right to a fair
trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. 7 In some cases, the
30. See Press-Enterprise11, 478 U.S. at 10. The Court also surveyed state court decisions and found that an overwhelming majority of states had held that a tradition of
openness extended to trials and pretrial proceedings or had determined that, although a
historical perspective was lacking, the nature of pretrial proceedings mandated that the
traditional right of access should apply. See id. at 10 n.3.
31. See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 564-69.
32. See Press-Enterprise1, 464 U.S. at 505-08.

33. See 478 U.S. at 12. Compare Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 394 (1979)
(Burger, C.J., concurring) (rejecting claim of enforceable right of access under Sixth
Amendment: "a hearing on a motion before trial to suppress evidence is not a trial")
with Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 563-64 (upholding right of access to actual criminal trial, distinguishing Gannett on that basis).
34. See Press-Enterprise11, 478 U.S. at 12.
35. Press-EnterpriseI, 464 U.S. at 508.

36. See Press-EnterpriseH, 478 U.S. at 13-14; Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court,
457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982).
37. Press-Enterprise11, 478 U.S. at 14. The Sixth Amendment provides, in relevant
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rights of the accused may outweigh the interests of the public and
press, mandating closure of the courtroom.3 8 The Court in PressEnterprise I alluded to the procedures necessary to effect closure:
The presumption of openness may be overcome only by an
overriding interest based on findings that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to
serve that interest. The interest is to be articulated along
with findings specific enough that a reviewing court can determine whether the closure order was properly entered. 9
b. Maryland Jurisprudence.-Maryland courts have also recognized a presumptive right of access to criminal proceedings. In Patuxent Publishing Corp. v. State," the Court of Special Appeals vacated
a circuit court order closing the courtroom during a hearing on a
motion to close the courtroom throughout the trial. 4 ' Citing Richmond Newspapers, the court struck down the broad closure order because the lower court failed to tailor the order as narrowly as
possible to avoid prejudice.4 2 As an alternative, the court suggested
that the allegedly prejudicial material be revealed during a brief
43
bench conference or in camera proceeding.
In News American v. State,"" a criminal defendant attempted to
limit the ability of nonparties to assert their right of access by arguing that nonparties lack standing to appeal a gag order.4 5 Rejecting
that argument, the Court of Appeals ruled that the newspaper had
standing and that the appropriate means for the press to assert its
First Amendment right of access was intervention into the criminal
proceeding for the limited purpose of opposing closure. 4 6 Because
part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed .... " U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
38. Press-EnterpriseH, 478 U.S. at 14. The Court rejected the test advocated by the
Supreme Court of California, which would allow closure if there exists a "reasonable
likelihood" of prejudice to the accused, and held that "substantial probability" was the
appropriate standard. See id.
39. 464 U.S. at 510.
40. 48 Md. App. 689, 429 A.2d 554 (1981).
41. See id. at 690-91, 429 A.2d at 555-56.
42. See id. at 693, 429 A.2d at 556-57.
43. See id.
44. 294 Md. 30, 447 A.2d 1264 (1982).
45. Id. at 40, 447 A.2d at 1269.
46. See id. at 41-45, 447 A.2d at 1270-72. The Court of Appeals considered three
methods of preserving the press's First Amendment rights:
1. By an application to an appellate court for review, by extraordinary writ, of
the action of the order-entering court;
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an order for closure is tantamount to an adjudication of the only
claim, the right of access asserted by the intervenor, the court also
held that such an order constitutes a final order with respect to the
intervenor and therefore is appealable.4 7
In Buzbee v. Journal Newspapers,"8 the Court of Appeals, applying
an analysis similar to that later outlined by the Supreme Court in
Press-EnterpriseH, expanded the First Amendment right of access to
all pretrial judicial proceedings in Maryland. 49 In Buzbee, the defendant, charged with multiple counts of rape, moved for closure of
a pretrial suppression hearing, imposition of a "gag order," and the
sealing of all court documents. 50 After surveying the case law of
various states and examining both the history of public attendance
at pretrial hearings and the positive role that such attendance plays,
the court concluded that in Maryland all pretrial proceedings should
be presumptively open to the public. 5 Acknowledging that the
right of access is not absolute, the court discussed the requirements
for closing a pretrial proceeding. The court held that a trial court
must make specific findings "as to the nature and extent of any
threatened prejudice" and explore alternatives to closure and their
probable efficacy in limiting the alleged prejudice.5 2 The trial court,
upon finding a reasonable probability of prejudice, may then grant
the order for closure or sealing of documents, but only to the extent
necessary to protect the interest of the defendant.5 3 The potential
dilemma resulting from public disclosure of the purportedly prejudicial information at the hearing on the motion to close may be
2. By appearing before the order-entering court in the case in which the order
is entered, with further review on direct appeal by the press from an adverse
determination in that forum; and
3. By applying to another trial court, or to the order-entering court in a separate civil action, for an injunction or declaratory judgment, with further review
by direct appeal.
Id. at 41, 447 A.2d at 1270. The court rejected the third alternative as impractical and
disruptive to the "entire administration ofjustice." Id. at 42, 447 A.2d at 1270 (citing
Kardy v. Shook, 237 Md. 524, 533, 207 A.2d 83, 88 (1965)). After considering cases
using both of the remaining methods, the court chose the second alternative based on
the advantages inherent in having the trial judge decide the issue, because he is better
positioned to "evaluate matters which may be rapidly unfolding before him and in the
community in which the criminal case is pending." Id. at 45, 447 A.2d at 1272.
47. See id. at 45, 447 A.2d at 1272.
48. 297 Md. 68, 465 A.2d 426 (1983).
49. See id. at 75-80, 465 A.2d at 430-33.
50. Id. at 70-71, 465 A.2d at 427-28.
51. See id. at 75-80, 465 A.2d at 430-33.
52. Id. at 81-82, 465 A.2d at 433-34.
53. Id. at 82, 465 A.2d at 434.
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avoided by having such information revealed in camera.54
3.

The Court's Reasoning; Analysis.-

a. Prior Notice of Closure.-The Court of Appeals in Baltimore
Sun focused not on the substantive rights of the press and public
55
guaranteed by the First Amendment to the federal constitution
and Article 40 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, 56 but on the
courtroom procedures essential to the effective assertion of those
substantive rights. 5 7 The court began its analysis by tracing the development of the constitutional doctrine recognizing a First Amendment right of access to criminal trials and pretrial proceedings. 5 8
The court discussed the recognition of that right in Richmond Newspapers as well as Maryland's recognition of a right of access to pretrial proceedings in Buzbee. 59
But despite the existence of a well-established and defined legal
right, the existence of the means to assert that right is equally crucial. 6 ° In the context of the right of access to judicial proceedings,
the ability to assert that right necessitates providing a reasonable
opportunity to oppose the closure of courtroom proceedings. The
court held that prior notice of a motion to close is essential to having that opportunity. 6 '
The requirement of prior notice may be satisfied simply by
docketing a motion for closure in advance of the hearing.6 2 In Baltimore Sun, the lower court had permitted arguments by The Sun's
54. Id. at 84, 465 A.2d at 435.
55. For the relevant portion of the First Amendment, see supra note 20.
56. Article 40 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights provides that "the liberty of the
press ought to be inviolably preserved; that every citizen of the State ought to be allowed to speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for
the abuse of that privilege." MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTS. art. 40.
57. See 323 Md. at 300-01, 593 A.2d at 229.
58. See id. at 297-300, 593 A.2d at 227-28.
59. See id.
60. Cf News American v. State, 294 Md. 30, 40-41, 447 A.2d 1264, 1269-70 (1982)
(finding that newspaper had standing to appeal a "gag order" based on a violation of its
right of access under the First Amendment).
61. See Baltimore Sun, 323 Md. at 300, 593 A.2d at 229. The issue of the adequacy of
the notice provided was not raised by the parties to the action. See id. at 301, 593 A.2d at
229. The Court of Appeals ruled on the issue pursuant to its authority under rule 8131(a), which provides, in part:
Ordinarily, the appellate court will not decide any other issue unless it plainly
appears by the record to have been raised in or decided by the trial court, but
the Court may decide such an issue if necessary or desirable to guide the trial
court or to avoid the expense and delay of another appeal.
MD. R. 8-131(a).
62. See Baltimore Sun, 323 Md. at 300, 593 A.2d at 229; see also In re Knight Publishing
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counsel in opposition to the motion, but only after the motion had
already been argued and granted,6 3 eviscerating any meaningful exercise of The Sun's right to oppose closure. Prior notice, in the form
of a docketed motion, would have enabled The Sun to obtain counsel
in advance, prepare oral and written argument in opposition to closure, and present arguments at the hearing on closure.
The court recognized that providing notice may not always be
practicable, in terms of either giving advance notice-in the case of
an oral motion, when notice to those in the courtroom may sufficeor providing individual notice to all who may have an interest in
opposing closure.'
Nevertheless, in cases of limited notice, the
trial court still may not proceed without affording the opportunity to
oppose closure to anyone who might express an interest in doing
65

so.

By recognizing the prior notice requirement in Maryland, the
Court of Appeals has adopted the position taken by numerous jurisdictions.6 6 The rationale for these decisions is consistent throughout the cases: prior notice of and an opportunity to oppose closure
is essential to preserving the substantive rights of the public.6 7
b. Determining Whether to Close the Courtroom.-Inthe second part
of its opinion, the Court of Appeals reviewed the circumstances
under which a trial court may close a proceeding and suggested procedures for conducting a hearing on a motion for closure. 6' The
court, echoing the language of Press-Enterprise I,69 required first that
the trial court come to a "determination that it is substantially probable that prejudice will result from an open hearing."7 Second, the
Co., 743 F.2d 231, 234 (4th Cir. 1984); United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1162, 1168
(9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550, 557-60 (3d Cir. 1982).
63. See 323 Md. at 296, 593 A.2d at 226-27.
64. See id. at 301, 593 A.2d at 229.
65. See id.
66. The need for a requirement of prior notice of a motion for closure has been
widely recognized in both federal and state courts. See, e.g., United States v. Hailer, 837
F.2d 84, 87 (2d Cir. 1988); Knight Publishing Co., 743 F.2d at 234; Brooklier, 685 F.2d at
1168; State v. Williams, 459 A.2d 641, 658 (NJ. 1983); New York Times Co. v.
Demakos, 529 N.Y.S.2d 97, 100 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988); In re Times-World Corp., 373
S.E.2d 474, 481 (Va. 1988).
67. See supra notes 62, 66 and accompanying text.
68. See Baltimore Sun, 323 Md. at 302-05, 593 A.2d at 229-31.
69. See 478 U.S. 1, 14 (1986) (requiring that there be a substantial probability the
defendant's right to a fair trial will be prejudiced by publicity that closure would prevent
and that reasonable alternatives to closure cannot adequately protect the defendant's
fair trial rights).
70. Baltimore Sun, 323 Md. at 302, 593 A.2d at 230. In Buzbee v. Journal Newspa-
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trial court must make a specific finding that no reasonable alternative to closure exists. 1 Possible alternatives include "continuance,
change of venue, voir dire, voluntary cooperation of the media, and
jury instructions." 7 2
The court outlined procedures for trial courts to follow in conducting hearings on motions for closure. In addressing the primary
problem in such hearings, the necessity of disclosing the information that allegedly will prejudice the defendant's right to a fair trial,
the court acknowledged that a trial court may need to close portions
of the hearing to the public and seal portions of the record. 73 Consequently, the closure and sealing of records must be for no longer
than required to protect the defendant's interests, and the hearing
must be on the record. 4
The extent to which a member of the press who appears in opposition to closure may participate in the hearing presents an additional dilemma because the press might immediately publish
anything seen or heard in a courtroom. 7' To counter this concern,
the court suggested a voluntary agreement of nondisclosure for a
specified period of time. Barring an agreement, the court sanctioned exclusion of the press during those portions of the hearing at
which the prejudicial information will be revealed, and sealing the
correlative portion of the record.7 6
c. Sealing Records.-The final issue addressed briefly in Baltimore Sun concerned sealed judicial records and documents, such as
the motion sealed by the lower court. In acknowledging the right of
the public and press to inspect and copy such records, the court
discussed the common-law right to inspect pleadings,7 7 upon which
pers, 297 Md. 68, 465 A.2d 426 (1983), the court reserved the question of the level of
prejudice to be demonstrated to overcome the presumption of access, see id. at 82-83,
465 A.2d at 434, but this was prior to the holding in Press-EnterpriseII requiring a "substantial probability." See 478 U.S. at 14.
71. Baltimore Sun, 323 Md. at 303, 593 A.2d at 230; see also Richmond Newspapers v.
Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580-81 (1980) (plurality opinion); Buzbee, 297 Md. at 82, 465
A.2d at 433-34.
72. Baltimore Sun, 323 Md. at 303, 593 A.2d at 230.
73. See id. at 303-04, 593 A.2d at 230.
74. Id. at 303-05, 593 A.2d at 230-31; see also In re Knight Publishing Co., 743 F.2d
231, 234 (4th Cir. 1984); State v. Williams, 459 A.2d 641, 658 (NJ. 1983).
75. See Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977).
76. Baltimore Sun, 323 Md. at 304-05, 593 A.2d at 230-31; see also Buzbee v. Journal
Newspapers, 297 Md. 68, 84, 465 A.2d 426, 435 (1983); Patuxent Publishing Corp. v.
State, 48 Md. App. 689, 693, 429 A.2d 554, 556-57 (1981).
77. See Baltimore Sun, 323 Md. at 305, 593 A.2d at 231.
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the Supreme Court relied in Nixon v. Warner Communications.7 8 In
Nixon, several major broadcasting organizations sought permission
to copy, broadcast, and sell the tapes of Oval Office conversations
made by then President Richard Nixon that had been introduced at
the Watergate trial. 79 The Supreme Court held that the commonlaw right of access did not require release of the tapes,8 0 stating that
the right to inspect and copy judicial records is "not absolute.""'
Noting that the defendants in the Watergate trial had filed notices of
appeal, the Court upheld a determination by the trial court that the
right of the press to copies of the tapes did not outweigh the potential prejudice to the defendants.8 2
In Baltimore Sun, the court also recognized the qualified nature
of this right and held that the procedures applicable to the closure
of a courtroom apply equally to the sealing of pleadings. The court
held, therefore, that the press and public are entitled to prior notice
of and an opportunity to oppose a motion to seal.8 3 Although a seal
may be granted, it must be narrowly tailored, possibly by redacting
the prejudicial material from pleadings or transcripts, and for no
longer than is necessary. 8 4
4. Conclusion.-The decision in Baltimore Sun does not represent either a radical departure from or a broad expansion of the
current state of the law in Maryland with regard to the rights of the
public to access to criminal proceedings. What the Court of Appeals did provide, however, are practical guidelines for the difficult
task of balancing the rights of an accused against the rights of the
press and public. The court's establishment of a procedural requirement of prior notice is significant because it enhances the ability of the public and press to assert their substantive rights
guaranteed by the First Amendment and Article 40 of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights. In dealing with the inherent difficulties in adjudicating a conflict between two rights of constitutional stature, the
78. 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978).
79. Id. at 594.
80. Id. at 608.
81. Id. at 598.
82. See id.at 597-608.

83. Baltimore Sun, 323 Md. at 305, 593 A.2d at 231 (citing In re Knight Publishing Co.,
743 F.2d 231, 235 (4th Cir. 1984)).
84. Baltimore Sun, 323 Md. at 305-06, 593 A.2d at 231. Although the Court of Appeals apparently did not feel it was necessary to address the question, at least one court
has held that the First Amendment right of access extends to documents filed in connection with judicial proceedings that themselves implicate that right of access. See In re
Washington Post, 807 F.2d 383, 389-90 (4th Cir. 1986) (en banc).
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court correctly recognized that procedural guarantees are crucial to
the realization of substantive rights.
B.

Voter Purge Statutes

In Hoffman v. Maryland,8 5 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit held that voter purge statutes do not violate the
First Amendment.8 6 Voter purge statutes provide that the names of
voters who have not exercised their right to vote in a certain number
of years shall be removed from the registration rolls. The Maryland
voter purge statute that was challenged and upheld in Hoffman requires the removal of the names of voters who have not voted in a
87
primary, general, or special election for five consecutive years.
In ruling on the constitutionality of the voter purge statute, the
court held that the statute survived a First Amendment challenge
because it served a substantial governmental interest and did not
preclude other avenues of communicating dissatisfaction with the
choice of candidates in an election.88 The court further held that
the voter purge statute does "not violate the constitutional requirement of equal protection of the laws." 8 9 Thus, the court effectively
precluded the use of arguments based upon free speech and equal
protection in challenges to voter purge statutes.
1. The Case.-The plaintiffs, Thomas Hoffman and Timothy
Ulrich, were registered voters in the State of Maryland but did not
vote between November 1984 and April 1990.90 In accordance with
Maryland's voter purge statute, 9 ' the Baltimore City Board of Supervisors of Elections (City Board) removed the plaintiffs' names
85. 928 F.2d 646 (4th Cir. 1991).
86. Id. at 649. For the relevant portion of the First Amendment, see supra note 20.
The First Amendment applies to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. See Gitlow v.
People of New York, 268 U.S. 625, 666 (1925).
87. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 33, § 3-20 (1990). The pertinent text of this section
provides:
If a registered voter has been registered but has not voted at least once at a
primary, general or special election within five preceding calendar years, it shall
be the duty of the [election] board, unless cause to the contrary be shown, to
cause the registration of that voter to be cancelled ....
Id.
88. Hoffman, 928 F.2d at 649.
89. Id. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[n]o State shall ... deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1.
90. Hoffman v. Maryland, 736 F. Supp. 83, 84 (D. Md. 1990), aff'd, 928 F.2d 646 (4th
Cir. 1991).
91. MD. ANN. CODE art. 33, § 3-20. For the text of the statute, see supra note 87.
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from the registration rolls.9 2 Their names were among the 55,000
names scheduled to be purged in Baltimore City in April 1990 pursuant to the statute.9 3 Pursuant to the statute, the City Board
mailed notification of pending removals to these individuals at their
last known addresses. 9 4 These notices provided the voters an opportunity to prove that their names should not be removed because
they had in fact voted in an election in the previous five years. 9 5 The
voter purge statute does not preclude a voter whose name has been
96
removed from re-registering.
Hoffman and Ulrich filed suit in the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland, pursuant to section 1983 of Title 42 of
the United States Code.9 7 The complaint, which sought declaratory
and injunctive relief, alleged that Maryland's five-year purge statute
violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 98 The plaintiffs
contended that the statute restricted their right to vote and not to
vote, violated equal protection principles, and burdened their freedom of speech.9 9 They argued that their nonvote, publicly reported
by the difference between the number of registered voters and the
total number of votes cast, expressed their dissatisfaction with the

92. Hoffman, 928 F.2d at 648.
93. Hoffman v. Maryland, 736 F. Supp. at 84.
94. Hoffman, 928 F.2d at 648. Section 3-20(a) provides, in part, "[a] notice of [the
removal] and the reason therefore shall be sent to the last known address of the voter."
MD. ANN. CODE art. 33, § 3-20(a).
95. Hoffman, 928 F.2d at 648. The plaintiffs in Hoffman did not argue that enforcement of the statute violated due process. That argument had already proven to be unsuccessful in another jurisdiction. See Duprey v. Anderson, 518 P.2d 807, 810 (Colo.
1974). The Supreme Court of Colorado stated: "At most, constitutional due process
requires that upon purging a name from the registration book, a notification of that fact
is sent to that person at the address shown on the registration book." Id.
96. Hoffman, 928 F.2d at 649.
97. See Hoffman v. Maryland, 736 F. Supp. at 84. The pertinent portion of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1988) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in
an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Id.

The plaintiffs initially sought a class action suit pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
They dropped their request for class certification because the equitable relief that they
sought would have benefitted the whole class without such certification. See Hoffman v.
Maryland, 736 F. Supp. at 84 n.l.
98. Hoffman v. Maryland, 736 F. Supp. at 85.
99. Id.
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candidates.'
Hoffman and Ulrich claimed that any impairment to
this form of expression was a violation of the right to free speech.'0 1
The district court denied Hoffman and Ulrich's request for relief, stating that the voter purge statute "does not offend the constitutional rights of [the] plaintiffs to vote, or not to vote, or equal
protection principles, or the exercise of [the] plaintiffs' right of free
speech."' 0 2 The court recognized that Dixon v. MarylandState Administrative Board of Election Laws, 10 3 a case upon which the plaintiffs' ar10 5
gument relied, 0 4 alluded to the existence of a right not to vote.
Asserting that the right not to vote is a protected right, 0 6 the district court nevertheless denied relief to Hoffman and Ulrich because
the restraints that the statute places on the rights of a registrant are
minimal in that voters whose names are purged from the rolls are
free to re-register. 0 7 The court noted that although the right to
vote is of constitutional dimension, the "right is subject to the imposition of appropriate state standards."' 0 8 Applying this standard,
the court noted that the state's interest in preserving the integrity of
election procedures is rationally related to the statute's restriction.' 0 9 Reasoning that the effect of this statute was not a complete
bar to the right to vote, the district court rejected the plaintiffs'
claim that the strict scrutiny and "compelling" state interest stan100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 89.
103. 878 F.2d 776, 786 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that a Maryland statute requiring
certification of write-in candidates in order to have their vote totals publicly reported
violated the First Amendment).
104. See Hoffman v. Maryland, 736 F. Supp. at 85.
105. See id. The Dixon court stated that "the right to vote for the candidate of one's
choice includes the right to say that no candidate is acceptable." 878 F.2d at 782, quoted
in Hoffman v. Maryland, 736 F. Supp. at 85.
106. See Hoffman v. Maryland, 736 F. Supp. at 85. "The right not to vote-and to
have one's nonvote recorded-must be viewed in the same light [as that in Dixon]. In
that context, the right to vote includes the right not to vote." Id.
107. Id. at 89; cf Bradley v. Mandel, 449 F. Supp. 983, 987 (D. Md. 1978) (three-judge
court) (commenting on the liberal registration-by-mail statute in Maryland); Broadwater
v. State, 306 Md. 597, 605, 510 A.2d 583, 586 (1986) (noting the ease of registration
under current Maryland law).
108. Hoffman v. Maryland, 736 F. Supp. at 85 n.4.
109. Id. at 85. The court stated:
Nevertheless, plaintiffs' . . . equal protection and free speech claims may not
prevail because, to the extent that the Maryland statute restricts the rights of a
registrant, it does so on a minimal basis and for a purpose which is rationally
related to the interests of the State of Maryland in providing appropriate standards to govern election procedures.
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dards should be applied to the statute." ° Because the lower standard was met, the district court upheld the statute."' The plaintiffs
appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit." 2
Although the court of appeals affirmed the decision of the district
court, it curtailed much of the constitutional analysis put forth by
3
the lower court.' 1
2. Legal Background.-Previous challenges to the constitutionality of voter purge statutes have not been successful." 4 In Williams
v. Osser," 5 the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania rejected the plaintiffs' arguments that a two-year
purge statute put an unconstitutional burden on the fundamental
right to vote and violated equal protection principles." 6 The key
issue was the applicable standard for analyzing the alleged infringement of these rights. With respect to the equal protection argument, the Williams court rejected the compelling state interest
standard.'
Rather, the court followed the less stringent test requiring that there be a legitimate state interest reasonably and rationally related to the classification." 8 This test was deemed
appropriate for the equal protection argument because the classification of "nonvoter" was not based on race or wealth and there was
110. See id. at 86; cf. Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289, 298 (1975) (applying a "stringent"

test of justification to a Texas statute that disenfranchised all voters who do not own
property); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 337 (1972) (applying a strict scrutiny test,
which requires a demonstration of a "compelling" state interest, to a statute designed to
deny voting rights to anyone who moved into the state less than one year prior to an
election); Muller v. Curran, 889 F.2d 54, 56-57 (4th Cir. 1989) (declaring Maryland statute that allowed block of popular vote by property owners unconstitutional), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 1121 (1990).
111. See Hoffman v. Maryland, 736 F. Supp. at 89.
112. See Hoffman, 928 F.2d 646.
113. See id.at 648.
114. See, e.g.,
Citizens' Comm. for the Recall of Jack Williams v. Marston, 507 P.2d
113, 116 (Ariz. 1973) (holding that a statute calling for removal from the rolls of all
voters who did not vote in the previous general election did not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment); Duprey v. Anderson, 518 P.2d 807, 811 (Colo. 1974) (holding that a biennial purge statute does not result in invidious discrimination of nonvoters).
115. 350 F. Supp. 646 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
116. Id. at 653 ("[Tlhe two-year purge bears a rational relationship to a legitimate
state end.").
117. This standard was outlined in Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S.
663, 670 (1966) (holding that a poll tax is unconstitutional). "[Cilassifications which
might invade or restrain [voting rights] must be closely scrutinized and carefully confined." Id. But see Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972) ("[N]ot every limitation or
incidental burden on the exercise of voting rights is subject to a stringent standard of
review.").
118. See Villiams, 350 F. Supp. at 650.
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not an absolute bar to voting." 9 The contention that the voter
purge statute violated the right to vote was also analyzed using the
same standard and reaching the same conclusion-the purge statute
120
did not violate the Constitution.
The results of a lenient balancing test between state interests
and voters' rights accounts for the failure of earlier challenges to
voter purge statutes. The burden of re-registering after a name is
purged has been considered minimal or incidental, while the governmental interest in preventing voter fraud has been found to be
substantial and important.' 2 ' The history of challenges to purge
statutes reveals that the courts most often find that states' interests
override the burden placed on the voter or nonvoter by the statute. 1 2 2 However, until Hoffman, no one had challenged a voter
purge statute on the grounds that it violated a First Amendment
3

right. 12

3. The Court's Reasoning.-On appeal, Hoffman and Ulrich argued that Maryland's voter purge statute violated the principles of
free speech and equal protection because it restricted their right not
to vote.' 24 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit applied the test used by the Supreme Court in Renton v. Playtime
119. Id.; see also McDonald v. Board of Elections, 394 U.S. 802, 807 (1969) (holding
that when prisoners awaiting trial were denied absentee ballots, the stringent test did
not apply if the discrimination was not based on race or wealth and there was no absolute bar).
120. See Williams, 350 F. Supp. at 653. The court concluded that there was only a
minimal burden on the right to vote. See id.
121. For example, in Duprey v. Anderson, 518 P.2d 807 (Colo. 1974), the plaintiffs
argued that nonvoters were "unduly impeded in exercising their future right to vote
because they must re-register." Id. at 809. The Supreme Court of Colorado replied that
"[t]his argument is unacceptable. This impediment or burden which [the plaintiffs] say
is so heavy, is not, in our view, more than minimal and incidental." Id. In Williams, the
federal district court stated that even a two-year purge statute, which would require
more frequent re-registration, especially for the many voters who only vote in presidential elections, is only a "minimal burden . . justified by the state interest." 350 F. Supp.
at 653 n. 11.
122. But see Michigan State UAW Community Action Program Council v. Austin, 198
N.W.2d 385, 388 (Mich. 1972) (holding that the two-year purge statute in question was
unconstitutional). "Any burden, however small, will not be permitted unless there is
demonstrated a compelling state interest" that will justify the infringement on the right
to vote. Id. The court defined "compelling" as "necessary and essential and not achievable by less drastic means." Id. at 389. The dissenting opinion ofJudge Black, explaining the politics behind the decision, sheds light on this isolated decision. See id. at 392405 (Black, J., dissenting).
123. See Hoffman v. Maryland, 736 F. Supp. at 87 n.7.
124. Hoffman, 928 F.2d at 647.
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Theatres, Inc. 125 to these claims.' 2 6 This test requires that the legislation " 'serve a substantial governmental interest and.., not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of communication.' ,"27 The
Court of Appeals found that this standard was appropriate because
the form of expression was conduct, which is partially "nonspeech," rather than pure speech. Only the latter requires the
higher level of scrutiny.' 28 The court also applied this standard be29
cause the voter purge statute was "content-neutral."'
The Fourth Circuit ultimately affirmed the district court's decision and held that Maryland's purge statute does not violate the
Constitution. 13 ' According to the court, "even if there is a right not
to vote of constitutional significance, [that right] is not infringed
upon by Maryland's purge statute."''
This conclusion was based
on the reasoning that there is no violation of the right not to vote,
because in order to exercise that right, it is not necessary to be a
2
registered voter.'

3

In answer to the plaintiffs' argument that the First Amendment
125. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
126. See Hoffman, 928 F.2d at 648-49. In Renton, the Supreme Court held that a city
ordinance prohibiting "adult" movie theatres from operating within one thousand feet
of any residential zone, church, or park, and within one mile of any school, did not
violate the First Amendment. See 475 U.S. at 54-55.
127. Hoffman, 928 F.2d at 648 (quoting Renton, 475 U.S. at 47).
128. See id. This terminology was used by the Supreme Court in United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968). In O'Brien, the defendant burned his Selective Service certificate in an act of protest to American involvement in the Vietnam War. See id.
at 369. The Court held that the defendant's conviction, pursuant to a federal statute
making this act criminal, was not a violation of the First Amendment's guarantee of free
speech. Id. at 377. The Court stated that "a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First
Amendment freedoms." Id. at 376.
The Hoffman court also quoted the four-prong test outlined in O'Brien:
[A] regulation is 'sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of
the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is
no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.'
Hoffman, 928 F.2d at 648 (quoting O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377).
129. See Hoffman, 928 F.2d at 649. The Supreme Court has defined "content-neutral"
regulations on speech as those that are "justified without reference to the content of the
regulated speech .... narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and
...leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information." Clark
v. Community for Creative Nonviolence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984). The plaintiffs did
not prove, or even argue, that the purpose of the legislation was to limit the message
allegedly expressed by the plaintiffs. See Hoffman, 928 F.2d at 649.
130. See Hoffman, 928 F.2d at 649.
131. Id. at 648.
132. See id.
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right of free speech necessarily includes being counted as registered
and not voting, the court stated that any alleged infringement of the
right was outweighed by the State's valid and important interest in
maintaining "accurate, reliable and up-to-date voter registration
lists.' t s Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit stressed that the statute
does "not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of communication." 134 A voter whose name has been purged but who wishes to
be counted as a nonvote need only re-register, not an overly burdensome "price to pay for the prevention of vote fraud."' 3 5
The court concluded by refuting the plaintiffs' argument that
the statute violated equal protection principles.' i 6 Hoffman and
Ulrich did not demonstrate that they were members of a suspect
class.' 3 7 Furthermore, there was no need to conduct a separate
analysis under equal protection principles when a First Amendment
analysis demonstrated that there was no infringement of a constitu3 9
tional right.'33 Thus, the statute was upheld.1
4. Analysis.-The First Amendment challenge to Maryland's
voter purge statute was unprecedented because no other plaintiff
has challenged such a statute on the grounds that it restricts the
right not to vote and thereby violates the right to free speech. By
holding that the statute did not violate the plaintiffs' First Amendment right to free speech, 40 the court effectively closed that avenue
to plaintiffs who challenge voter purge statutes. Two key elements
133. Id. at 649. "Without removing the names, there exists the very real danger that
impostors will claim to be someone on the list and vote in their places.... Accordingly,
keeping accurate, reliable and up-to-date voter registration lists is an important state
interest." Id.; see Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 761 (1973) ("[P]reservation of
the integrity of the electoral process is a legitimate and valid state goal."); Bums v.
Fortson, 410 U.S. 686, 686-87 (1973); Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679, 681 (1973); Williams v. Osser, 350 F. Supp. 646, 653 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
134. Hoffman, 928 F.2d at 649.
135. Id.
136. See id.

137. Id.; see Citizens' Comm. for the Recall ofJack Williams v. Marston, 507 P.2d 113,
116 (Ariz. 1973) (holding that even if voter purge statutes discriminate against ethnic
minorities who are less economically fortunate and less educated, they do not violate the
equal protection clause because "there is a justified need for the legislation").
138. See Hoffman, 928 F.2d at 649; Dixon v. Maryland State Admin. Bd. of Election
Laws, 878 F.2d 776, 780 (4th Cir. 1989). Dixon followed a new trend set by the Supreme
Court of applying a "direct [F]irst [A]mendment analysis to evaluate the constitutionality of election laws, rather than analyzing the issue under an equal protection framework. See Michael S. Warshaw, Certificates of Candidacy: First Amendment Violation,
Developments in Maryland Law, 1988-89, 49 MD. L. REv. 583, 583-84 (1990).

139. See Hoffman, 928 F.2d at 649.
140. See id.
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of the court's decision enabled it to refute the First Amendment argument successfully. First, it did not decide whether a constitutionally protected right not to vote exists. Second, it did not apply a
strict scrutiny test to the voter purge statute.
With respect to the first element, the court asserted that even if
a protected right not to vote exists, it is not infringed by the voter
purge statute. 1 4 1 Framing the issue as a hypothetical, the court assumed "for argument that such a First Amendment right exists, a
question we do not decide."' 142 The court thereby dodged the tedious analysis of the source, nature, and meaning of this elusive right,
which a definite conclusion as to its existence or nonexistence would
3

require. 14

The district court, on the other hand, openly recognized the
existence of a protected right not to vote when it stated that "the
right to vote includes the right not to vote."' 14 4 This conclusion was
drawn from an improper analysis of Dixon, however. In analyzing
voters' rights, the Dixon court equated voting for a write-in candidate who is unlikely to win with expressing the opinion that no candidate is acceptable to that voter.' 4 5 The court explained that
a vote does not lose its constitutional significance merely
because it is cast for a candidate who has little or no chance
of winning. Nor do we think it loses this character if cast
for a non-existent or fictional person, for surely the right to
vote for the candidateof1one's
choice includes the right to say that no
46
candidate is acceptable.

It is important that the discussion of the right to say that no candidate is acceptable was made in the context of voters exercising the
franchise. By contrast, the issue in Hoffman involved nonexercise of
141. See id. at 648. This method of analysis-assuming for the sake of argument that a
certain right is protected by the Constitution-was also used by the Supreme Court in
Clark v. Community for Creative Nonviolence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
142. Hoffman, 928 F.2d at 648.
143. The Hoffman court may have chosen to dodge this question to avoid further expansion of First Amendment rights in the area of "nonspeech." Certain forms of conduct that are not "pure speech" have been held to implicate the protections of free
speech in several cases. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989) (burning
the United States flag); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410 (1974) (attaching a
peace sign to a United States flag); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969) (wearing of black arm bands by students and teachers to
protest the involvement of the United States in the Vietnam War); Brown v. Louisiana,
383 U.S. 131, 141-42 (1966) (protesting racial segregation by holding sit-ins).
144. Hoffman v. Maryland, 736 F. Supp. at 85.
145. See Dixon v. Maryland State Admin. Bd. of Election Laws, 878 F.2d 776, 782 (4th
Cir. 1989).
146. Id. (emphasis added).
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the franchise. Therefore, it was incorrect for the district court to
extend Dixon's allusion to the right not to vote to the facts of
Hoffman.
The Fourth Circuit implied that it disagreed with the district
court's finding that there is a protected right not to vote when it
stated that "[w]e need not and do not decide the correctness of the
comparison" made by the lower court between the Dixon holding
and the right not to vote.14 7 In addition to avoiding such a judgment, the court avoided answering the question of whether there is
a constitutionally protected right not to vote.
The second element-the choice of a standard less stringent
than the requested strict scrutiny-was more crucial to the court's
decision that Maryland's voter purge statute is constitutional. The
Hoffman court only required that the voter purge statute serve a
"substantial governmental interest." 4 This level of scrutiny is significantly less exacting than one that requires a "compelling" state
interest. 149 The infringement of the alleged right not to vote is incidental considering the ease of re-registration. It is logical that a less
stringent test be applied to such a minimal restriction of a questionable right. In this regard, the Hoffman court was following the lead
of the Supreme Court, which said that "[i]t would be odd to insist
on a higher standard for limitations aimed at regulable conduct and
having only an incidental impact on speech."' 0 The Fourth Circuit
thus continued the trend of the earlier cases that addressed claims
against voter purge statutes. 151
This consistent application of the less stringent test to voter
purge statutes indicates that courts are determined to uphold them.
This attitude is evidenced by the holdings in federal and Maryland
courts that the burden of registering to vote is not unduly taxing to
a citizen.' 52 The message conveyed by the Hoffman court is that

147. Hoffman, 928 F.2d at 648.
148. Id.
149. See supra notes 117-122 and accompanying text; see also supra note 110.
150. Clark v. Community for Creative Nonviolence, 468 U.S. 288, 298 n.8 (1984). In
Clark, the plaintiffs were demonstrators who wanted to sleep in tents in Lafayette Park
and the Mall in the District of Columbia as a means of expressing their sympathy for the
plight of the homeless. Id. at 289. National park regulations prohibited this conduct.
Id. The Court held that there was no unconstitutional restriction on the campers' First
Amendment rights. Id. at 298-99.
151. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
152. See, e.g., Bradley v. Mandel, 449 F. Supp. 983, 987 (D. Md. 1978); Broadwater v.
State, 306 Md. 597, 605, 510 A.2d 583, 586 (1986). "Maryland procedures for registration are sufficiently simple that a person who has not voted within a five-year period can
re-register, in effect, with less difficulty and time-consumption than is true with regard to

19921

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

557

both the right to vote and the right to express freely one's dissatisfaction with the candidates by not voting are accompanied by the
duty to register.
The court's decision was proper in that it prevented extension
of the First Amendment's protection of free speech to such preposterous ends. The short opinion written by Judge Widener justified
the result by resorting to the traditional array of tests and analyses.
In the end, however, a case such as Hoffman, which demands substantial time and resources from the court, "trivializes the First
Amendment"' 5 3 and undermines the integrity of the Bill of Rights.
5. Conclusion.-In Hoffman, the Fourth Circuit prevented constitutional challenges to voter purge statutes based on the idea that
such statutes infringe upon an alleged right not to vote and voters'
First Amendment rights. The court artfully circumvented a discussion of whether the right not to vote exists by proving that, even as a
hypothetical right, it is not infringed beyond the limits of the Constitution by the existence of a voter purge statute. The court, in effect,
continued the trend set in the 1970s in other jurisdictions of applying a relaxed test to voter purge statutes and favoring the state's
interest in the prevention of voter fraud over the small burden on
individual voters of re-registering.
C.

Failing to Confront Defendants' Sixth Amendment Rights

In Coleman v. State,' 5 4 the Court of Appeals upheld a protective
order that precluded criminal defendants in a drug-related murder
case from obtaining the names of the State's key witnesses until the
day of trial.' 5 5 In addition, the court held that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in limiting the cross-examination of a State's
witness. The defense counsel sought to question the witness as to
his putative knowledge of the mandatory life sentence that he could
have received for an unrelated crime if he had not entered into a
favorable plea agreement when he implicated the defendants in the
homicide at issue. 156
most persons who exercise their rights to vote and go to the polls, even if they do not
have to stand in line before voting." Hoffman v. Maryland, 736 F. Supp. at 86.
153. Clark, 468 U.S. at 301 (Burger, C.J., concurring). ChiefJustice Burger wrote that
"it tells us something about why many people must wait for their 'day in court' when the
time of the courts is pre-empted by frivolous proceedings that delay the causes of litigants who have legitimate, nonfrivolous claims." Id.
154. 321 Md. 586, 583 A.2d 1044 (1991).
155. See id. at 611, 583 A.2d at 1056.
156. See id.
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The court recharacterized the issues raised on appeal to avoid
the problematic constitutional questions concerning the Sixth
Amendment right of the accused to face and cross-examine adverse
witnesses. Instead, the court focused on its power to protect actual
and potential witnesses in drug-related prosecutions.157
1. The Case.-On April 25, 1988, seventeen year old Gregory
Givens fatally shot twenty-four year old Delroy "Pappy" McNeil in
the head, chest, and abdomen as the victim sat on the steps of the
Old Landmark Baptist Church.'15 Police investigation revealed that
Givens was an "enforcer" for a local drug ring, and had been dispatched by nineteen year old Anthony Coleman to "take care of"
the victim in retaliation for McNeil's alleged theft of cocaine from
the organization's drug stashes and his subsequent sale of the cocaine for his own profit.' 5 9
Givens and Coleman were convicted in the Circuit Court of Baltimore City of first degree murder, conspiracy to commit murder,
and use of a handgun in the commission of a felony. 6 0 Their prosecution and convictions were facilitated by the testimony of two witnesses: one allegedly saw Givens shoot the victim, and another
overheard an incriminating conversation between Coleman and Givens.' 6 ' The State withheld the identities of these two key witnesses
from the defendants' counsel until two weeks prior to trial, and from
the defendants themselves until the day of the trial, pursuant to a
protective order issued under Maryland Rule 4-263.161
At the hearing on the protective order, the State presented the
157. At the outset of its opinion, the court stated that the "reluctance [of potential
witnesses] to report to enforcement authorities or to seek their help or to testify in prosecutions is at the heart of the questions presented by this appeal." Id. at 590, 583 A.2d
at 1046.
158. Id. at 590-91, 583 A.2d at 1046.
159. Id. at 594, 583 A.2d at 1047.
160. Id. at 591, 583 A.2d at 1046. Givens and Coleman were each sentenced to life
imprisonment on the murder convictions. Givens was sentenced to 20 years, and Coleman to 10, on the handgun conviction, to run consecutively to the murder sentence.
Givens was sentenced to 30 years, and Coleman to 20, on the conspiracy conviction, to
run concurrently with the murder and handgun sentences. Id. at 591 n.2, 583 A.2d at
1046 n.2.
161. See id. at 595, 583 A.2d at 1048.
162. Id. at 597, 583 A.2d at 1049. The Rule requires the State's Attorney, upon request of the defendant, to "[d]isclose to the defendant the name and address of each
person then known whom the state intends to call as a witness at the hearing or trial to
prove its case in chief or to rebut alibi testimony," subject to certain enumerated exceptions to discovery. MD. R. 4-263(b)(1). Further, the Rule provides for the issuance of a
protective order "on motion and for good cause shown [such that] . . . specified disclosures may be restricted." MD. R. 4-263(i).
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testimony of two members of the Baltimore City Police Department
to show good cause why discovery of the identities of the State's
civilian witnesses should not merely be restricted, but foreclosed to
the defendants. 6 3 Both officers drew on their personal experiences
to describe the ruthless practices of the drug organization,16 4 the
difficulties inherent in investigating drug-related incidents and obtaining testimony from witnesses,' 65 and the pervasive fear for personal safety experienced by the inhabitants of drug-infested
neighborhoods.' 6 6 Looking less to the existence of any specific
threats made by the defendants to the State's witnesses and more to
the grim scenario depicted by the officers, the motions judge connames were
cluded that the witnesses might be endangered if their
1 67
appropriate.
was
order
protective
a
that
and
revealed
Although the motions judge forbade disclosure of the witnesses' identity to the defendants until trial, she made three concessions to alleviate the burdens that nondisclosure would place on the
defendants. She provided that defense counsel could obtain the
witnesses' names two weeks prior to trial, question the witnesses out
of the presence of the State's Attorney during that time, and request, prior to trial, a reasonable period of time in which to follow
up on any information obtained as a result of the interviews.i68
Givens and Coleman were tried together before a judge, but
not before the motions judge. Although there was no suggestion
that the parties had not complied with the order, defense counsel
nevertheless objected to the protective order and moved to dismiss
the indictments on the grounds that the provisions of the protective
163. Coleman, 321 Md. at 592, 583 A.2d at 1046.
164. The court elaborated on this testimony:
The brazen murder of McNeil was not the only illustration the officers gave of
the manner in which the organization attempted to preserve its territory and to
protect its interests. The murder of one Maurice Ireland was [also] traced to
[Ireland] forcibly tried to get his money back [owed him by the
Givens ....
organization] .

.

. and as a result his murder was ordered.

Id. at 594, 583 A.2d at 1047-48.
165. Detective Keller explained:
[Witnesses] are very candid, usually that they don't want to be involved because
they fear that they will be hurt in retribution for any information that they
would give to us ....

These cases are usually very, very difficult to make an

arrest on ... because there is a low level of cooperation in the community.
Id. at 595, 583 A.2d at 1048.
166. "The residents of those neighborhoods are trapped in an anomie and have little
chance of escape .... They are forced by fear and intimidation to accept an oppressive
and onerous way of life." Id. at 593, 583 A.2d at 1047.
167. See id. at 597, 583 A.2d at 1049.
168. Id. at 597-98, 583 A.2d at 1049.
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order had deprived the defendants of their constitutional rights to
confrontation, fundamental fairness, and due process.' 69 Counsel
for the defendants argued that "the State's whole case is going to
rise and fall on the two witnesses who are being protected by this
protective order."' 7 0
The trial court balanced the defendants' right to a fair trial
against the witnesses' right to personal safety and concluded that
the balance tipped in favor of the latter consideration. 171 The court
denied the defendants' motion, but provided that once the witnesses had testified, the court would grant a "day or two to track
witnesses, or to do further investigation," if
down additional
7 2
necessary.1
The trial proceeded and the only other error claimed by the
defendants on appeal was the trial judge's refusal to allow defense
counsel to cross-examine the State's eyewitness, Louis Wesley Jackson, as to whether Jackson knew at the time he implicated the defendants that he faced life imprisonment without parole. 17 3 Jackson
had been arrested on burglary and other related charges in June
1988, approximately two months after McNeil's murder. Because of
his criminal record, the State could have sought life without parole
on the burglary charges. 17 4 As a result of plea negotiations, however, Jackson pled guilty to two of the burglary charges and received
two concurrent eighteen month sentences in exchange for his testimony.' 75 Defense counsel contended that "the jury is, in all fairness[,] .. .entitled to know how good was the deal this man got.- 176

The trial judge was not persuaded, and limited inquiry to whether
sentence was for the crimes with
Jackson knew what the17statutory
7
which he was charged.

The Court of Special Appeals held that there was no abuse of
discretion in protecting the identities of the State's key witnesses
from disclosure to the defendants until trial.'17 Further, the intermediate appellate court held that the trial judge's limitation on de169. See id. at 599, 583 A.2d at 1050.
170. Id.
171. See id. at 600, 583 A.2d at 1050.
172. Id., 583 A.2d at 1050-51.
173. See id. at 608-09, 583 A.2d at 1055.
174. Id. at 608, 583 A.2d at 1054.
175. Id. at 606, 583 A.2d at 1053. The other charges were nol prossed. d.
176. Id. at 608, 583 A.2d at 1054.
177. See id.
178. See Coleman v. State, 82 Md. App. 247, 251, 571 A.2d 249, 251 (1990), afftd, 321
Md. 586, 583 A.2d 1044 (1991).
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fense counsel's cross-examination of Jackson was not an abuse of
discretion. 179
The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to review these two issues and, after a lengthy excursus on the inner-city drug problem
and a cursory review of the relevant case law, concluded that80 the
convictions were not tainted by any constitutional infirmities.,
2. Legal Background.-The right of a criminal defendant to confront adverse witnesses is guaranteed by both the Sixth Amendment
to the United States Constitution 8 ' and Article 21 of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights.'8 2 The federal and state provisions have
been held to be "coextensive"'' 8 3 and to secure "the same right."'8 4
Moreover, in Pointer v. Texas,' 85 the Supreme Court stated that the
Confrontation Clause created a right
"made obligatory on the states
' 86
Amendment."'
by the Fourteenth
a. The Impact of Informers and Reluctant Witnesses on a Defendant's
Confrontation Clause Rights.-The Sixth Amendment ideal announced
in Alford v.United States, 187 guaranteeing the criminal defendant wide
latitude in cross-examination and confrontation, has necessarily
been circumscribed by the practical concerns for the safety of witnesses and the accommodation of informers who aid law enforcement officers. The seminal case in this area is Roviaro v. United
States.'88 Although the Roviaro Court ostensibly declined to create a
fixed rule as to disclosure, espousing instead a balancing test,' 8 9 it
nonetheless articulated a fairly liberal standard for determining
179. See id. at 252, 571 A.2d at 252.
180. See Coleman, 321 Md. at 684, 583 A.2d at 1052.
181. The pertinent portion of the Sixth Amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against
him." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

182. The pertinent portion of Article 21 provides: "[I]n all criminal prosecutions,
every man hath a right . . .to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
process for his witnesses; to examine the witnesses for and against him on oath.
MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTS. art. 21.
183. Cordovi v. State, 63 Md. App. 455, 462 n.1, 492 A.2d 1328, 1331 n.l (1984).
184. Crawford v. State, 282 Md. 210, 211, 383 A.2d 1097, 1098 (1978).
185. 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
186. Id. at 403.
187. 282 U.S. 687, 691 (1931).
188. 353 U.S. 53, 55 (1957) (holding that the trial court committed prejudicial error
in refusing to disclose to the defendant the identity of an undercover employee and
informer who, although not a witness at trial, had played a material part in discovering
the accused's alleged illegal conduct).
189. Id. at 62. This balancing test weighs the public interest in protecting the flow of
information against the individual's right to prepare a defense. Id.

562

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 51:538

when the nondisclosure privilege should be lifted. The Court stated
that "where the disclosure of an informer's identity, or of the contents of his communication, is relevant and helpful to the defense of
an accused, or is essential to a fair determination of a cause, the
190
privilege [not to disclose] must give way."'
A series of Maryland cases reiterate and refine Roviaro's standard. In Drouin v. State,' 9 ' the prosecution's failure to disclose an
informer's identity was held to be reversible error "if the name of
the informer is useful evidence to vindicate the innocence of the accused, lessens the risk of false testimony or is essential to a proper
disposition of the case." ' 19 2 Further, the Court of Appeals has stated
that the "general privilege of the State to withhold the identity of an
informer must give way to the right of the accused to obtain relevant
and competent evidence to his defense."' 93 The court has specifically noted that "the cases universally recognize the exception to the
non-disclosure privilege where the informer was a participant, accessory, or witness to the crime."' 94
Most recently, the Court of Appeals, in Brooks v. State,' 9 5 emphasized the importance of applying the Roviaro balancing test in
each case. 196 The court focused less on the role of the informer per
se, and more on "the materiality of his testimony to the determination of the accused's guilt or innocence balanced against the State's
interest in protecting the identity of the informer."'' 9 7 In addition,
the Brooks court echoed the observation made in Roviaro that the
primary purpose of the nondisclosure privilege is to protect the
public interest in effective law enforcement, facilitated by the use of
98
informers, and not to protect the informers themselves.'
b. The Confrontation Clause and the Right to Cross-Examine Adverse
Witnesses.-The broad right to "confront" adverse witnesses has typically been interpreted to encompass two specific functions: (1) to
provide the factfinder with the opportunity to observe the demeanor
of the testifying witnesses and appraise their credibility accordingly;
190. Id. at 60-61.

191. 222 Md.271, 160 A.2d 85 (1960).
192. Id. at 286, 160 A.2d at 93.
193. Gulick v.State, 252 Md. 348, 353, 249 A.2d 702, 705 (1969).
194. Id.
195. 320 Md. 516, 578 A.2d 783 (1990).
196. See id. at 525, 578 A.2d at 787.
197. Id., 578 A.2d at 788.
198. See id. at 522-24, 578 A.2d at 786-88; see also Nutter v.State, 8 Md.App.635, 641,
262 A.2d 80, 84 (1970) (holding that once an informer testifies for the prosecution, the
State's privilege of nondisclosure yields to the defendant's right of confrontation).
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and (2) to provide the defendant with the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses.' 99 The cross-examination may elicit "matters and
facts as are likely to affect [the witness's] credibility, test his memory
or knowledge, show his relation to the parties or the cause, his bias
or the like."' 20 0 In 1931, the Supreme Court held in Alford v. United
20 2
States20 ' that cross-examination of a witness is a matter of right.
Over thirty years later, the Court was no less vehement about the
centrality of the Confrontation Clause, declaring in Pointer v.
Texas 2 °3 that the clause created "a fundamental right essential to a
fair trial in a criminal prosecution. '2 0 4 Similarly, the Maryland
Court of Appeals has noted that the "primary interest secured by
the confrontation clause is the right of cross-examination; an adequate opportunity for cross-examination, therefore, may satisfy the
clause in the absence of physical confrontation. "205
The right to cross-examination is not absolute, however, and is
subject to the sound discretion of the trial judge, who has a duty to
protect the witness "from questions which go beyond the bounds of
proper cross-examination merely to harass, annoy or humiliate
him."' 20 6 The application of this discretionary standard has led to
disparate results in cases in which the circumstances warrant similar
treatment.2 0 7 As a general rule, it seems that early cases emphasize
199. See, e.g., Moon v. State, 300 Md. 354, 364,478 A.2d 695, 700 (1984); Crawford v.
State, 282 Md. 210, 214, 383 A.2d 1097, 1099 (1978); Cordovi v. State, 63 Md. App.
455, 462, 492 A.2d 1328, 1331 (1984).
200. Kantor v. Ash, 215 Md. 285, 290, 137 A.2d 661, 664 (1958).
201. 282 U.S. 687 (1931).
202. See id. at 691.
203. 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
204. Id. at 404.
205. Crawford v. State, 282 Md. 210, 214, 383 A.2d 1097, 1099 (1978) (holding that a
transcript ofwitness testimony elicited at a preliminary hearing was admissible at a subsequent trial, because the defendant had a full opportunity to confront and cross-examine the witness at the hearing).
206. Alford, 282 U.S. at 692.
207. For example, two Supreme Court cases reversed the convictions of the respective
defendants, specifically holding that the trial judge impermissibly restricted cross-examination as to the witnesses' addresses. See Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129, 133 (1968)
(holding that the defendant had the right, guaranteed to him under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, to cross-examine an informer who testified under an alias as to his
actual name and address); Alford, 282 U.S. at 692 (reversing conviction when government witness was excused from giving his place of residence and holding that prejudice
ensues from denial of the right to place a witness in his proper setting). However, two
subsequent United States Circuit Court cases upheld the respective lower courts' exercise of discretion in forbidding inquiry into the witnesses' addresses, each court enunciating a somewhat different standard for making the critical discretionary call. Compare
Alston v. United States, 460 F.2d 48, 53 (5th Cir. 1972) (stating that it "should be the
government that comes forward with an explanation of its objection to the divulging of
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the pre-eminence of the cross-examination right, ° a while later cases
20 9
expand the discretion given to trial judges.
One essential aspect of the right to cross-examination, which is
subject to the discretion of the trial judge, is the right to probe the
witness to uncover potential bias or an ulterior motive for testifying.2 ° In particular, bias resulting from the witness's desire to obtain leniency for his own crimes or to consummate a plea agreement
can alter the weight the jury places on the witness's testimony or
tarnish his credibility. The accused has a right to explore such biases and motivations on cross-examination . 2 t' The cases illustrate a
wide spectrum of judicial attitudes toward cross-examination to expose the bias of a witness who is cooperating with the Government
out of self-interest.
In Delaware v. Van Arsdall,21 2 the Supreme Court held that the
trial court violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation when it barred all cross-examination of a key witness concerning a plea agreement in which drunk driving charges against the
witness were dropped in return for his testimony."' Despite finding that the defendant's constitutional rights had been violated, the
Court declined to reverse the conviction, opting2 instead
to vacate
14
and remand the case for harmless error analysis.
At the opposite end of the continuum lies United States v.
Bond,2 1 5 in which the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld the defendant's conviction, noting that the trial court had fully
respected the defendant's "constitutional right to show the jury that
an address by any witness") with United States v. Varelli, 407 F.2d 735, 750 (7th Cir.
1969) (holding that when "the government has shown that a witness' safety is in jeopardy, the burden may shift to the moving party [i.e., the defendant] to show the materiality of the request for the address").
208. "[T]he essence of a fair trial [is] that reasonable latitude be given to the cross-examiner, even though he is unable to state to the court what facts a reasonable cross-examination might develop." Alford, 282 U.S. at 692 (emphasis added).
209. See, e.g., Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986). The Van Arsdall Court
stated: "trialjudges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose

reasonable limits on . . . cross-examination based on concerns about, among other
things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant." Id. at 679 (emphasis added). Note
that Van Arsdall expands the trial judge's discretion beyond the basic "harass, annoy or
humiliate" prohibitions in Alford. See supra text accompanying note 206.
210. See Kantor v. Ash, 215 Md. 285, 290, 137 A.2d 661, 664 (1958).
211. Id.
212. 475 U.S. 673 (1986).
213. Id. at 676.
214. See id at 680.
215. 847 F.2d 1233 (7th Cir. 1988).
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[the witness] was in deep water and had struck a bargain to save his
own neck, a bargain that gave [the witness] a reason to testify
falsely."' 2 16 The trial court was more than generous in its allowance
of cross-examination: it allowed the defendant to show that the witness faced "staggeringly large penalties, ' 2 17 allowed defense counsel to add up on a blackboard the statutory maxima of the penalties
the witness had negotiated away, 21 s and did not intercede until defense counsel began to pose hypothetical crimes with which the witness could have been charged.2 1 9
Between these two extremes is Hoover v. Maryland,2 2 ° in which
the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit observed that "[t]he vital question, which the defendant is constitutionally entitled to explore by cross-examination, is what the witness understands he or she
will receive [in exchange for the testimony], for it is this understanding which is of probative value on the issue of bias." '2 2 ' The Fourth
Circuit position therefore appears to be that a defendant is entitled
to cross-examination inquiry into a witness's subjective understanding of what benefit will inure to him by virtue of his testimony.
Although the Fourth Circuit's subjective test is not always congruent with approaches taken by the Supreme Court or other circuits, it
with the rule in Maryland as explicated in Brown v.
is consistent
State.2 22
In Brown, the Court of Special Appeals reversed a robbery conviction on the ground that the trial court erred in disallowing crossexamination inquiry of the prosecution's sole witness into unrelated
criminal charges against her that had been nol prossed prior to the
defendant's trial.2 2 3 Despite the lack of an actual nexus between the
leniency afforded the witness and her testimony in aid of the prosecution, the court found the denial of cross-examination to be reversible error because the witness's subjective, albeit erroneous, belief
216. Id. at 1240.
217. Id.
218. Id. An interesting subset of the plea bargain bias cases consists of those cases in
which the trial court ruled on the appropriateness of eliciting from the witness the maximum sentence he would have faced absent his plea bargain. See, e.g., United States v.
Rahme, 813 F.2d 31, 37 (2d Cir. 1987) (upholding trial court's refusal to permit such a
question); United States v. Dorta, 783 F.2d 1179, 1182 (4th Cir. 1986).
219. Bond, 847 F.2d at 1240.
220. 714 F.2d 301 (4th Cir. 1983).
221. Id. at 305. But see Dorta, 783 F.2d at 1182 (holding that when the cross-examination on possible bias arising from plea agreement had been exhaustive, the defense was
not entitled to question the witness on his subjective beliefs regarding his plea bargain).
222. 74 Md. App. 414, 538 A.2d 317 (1988).
223. See id. at 421-22, 538 A.2d at 321.
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that the State's Attorney had been lenient on her in return for her
2 24
testimony was determinative of potential bias.

3. The Court's Reasoning; Analysis.-Many of the issues that have
shaped the Confrontation Clause cases since Alford coalesce in Coleman: the use of a balancing test to weigh the defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial against concerns for the safety of witnesses;
the impact of informers and witnesses on defendants' Confrontation
Clause rights; the appropriate scope of the trial judge's discretion to
limit cross-examination designed to elicit the potential bias of witnesses testifying against the accused pursuant to a plea bargain
agreement; and the extent to which such agreements should be revealed to the jury.
a. The Balancing Test.-Part of the difficulty in analyzing the
constitutional issues presented in Coleman comes from the fact that
the court made so little effort to do so. Faced with weighing the
defendants' constitutional rights against concerns for the witnesses'
safety, the Coleman court invoked Roviaro's balancing test, as did
Maryland courts in the cases from Drouin through Brooks.2 2 5 However, the Coleman court departed from these precedents in applying
the test. While Roviaro and the Maryland cases focused on whether
the defendant could have obtained a fair trial absent disclosure of
the witnesses' identities, the Coleman court focused on whether the
inevitable prejudice inuring to the defendants as a result of the protective order could have been lessened.2 2 6 The court placed much
emphasis on the special provisions made by the hearing judge in the
protective order 2 27 and the additional investigatory time allowed by
the trial judge, 2 concluding that the defendants were not left
"hanging to twist in the wind." '2 29 Although these special provisions
were intended to lessen the impact of nondisclosure on the defend224. See id.at 421, 583 A.2d at 320; see also Fletcher v.State, 50 Md. App. 349, 359,
437 A.2d 901, 905 (1981) (holding that "what is essential to the preservation of the right
to cross-examine is that the interrogator be permitted to probe into whether the witness

is acting under a hope or belief of leniency or reward").
225. See Coleman, 321 Md. at 602-03, 583 A.2d at 1051-52; see supra notes 188.198 and
accompanying text.
226. The court admitted that "without the testimony of the [two protected] witnesses,
the charges against Givens and Coleman simply could not be proved." Coleman, 321 Md.
at 603, 583 A.2d 1052.
227. See supra text accompanying note 168.
228. See supra text accompanying note 172.
229. Coleman, 321 Md. at 603, 583 A.2d at 1052.
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ants, they appear to be paltry concessions in the face of the injustice
worked by the denial of confrontation.
As is generally the case with balancing tests, no bright-line rules
2 30
can be established to address the disclosure issue in Coleman.
Rather, a more flexible balancing test is necessary to meet the exigencies of each individual case. However, because of the important
constitutional issues presented in such cases, such as the confrontation and fair trial rights, courts should give careful and thoughtful
consideration to the balancing.
Unfortunately, the Coleman court scarcely mentioned the constitutional rights of the accused, concluding at one point that "we see
no constitutional violation in the circumstances. ' ' 23 1 Instead, the
court concentrated on the evils of the drug war and decided the major issues not against the defendants in particular, but against what
they represented: the underworld of drugs and drug-related crime.
In fact the court failed to give due consideration to the threshold
question of whether the witnesses' lives were actually in danger. At
the hearing on the State's motion for a protective order, the police
officers' testimony was most convincing when it was general and
speculative. When questioned as to whether the witnesses had actu23 2
ally been threatened, Officer Keller admitted that they had not.
230. In Grandison v. State, 305 Md. 685, 506 A.2d 580 (1986), the defendant claimed
that the trial court's refusal to allow him to interview personally a potential defense
witness rendered the trial inherently unfair. Id. at 740, 506 A.2d at 607. The Court of
Appeals refused to reverse the defendant's conviction, reasoning that "the circumstances under which a defendant can conduct a pretrial interview of a prospective witness are a matter [sic] best left to the trial court's discretion," id., 506 A.2d at 608, a view
with which Coleman is apparently in accord. Yet the Grandison court, in holding that there
was no abuse of discretion, further noted that the defendant "was not compelled to
prepare his defense without prior knowledge of the potential significance and thrust of
[the witness's] testimony." Id. Thus, if Grandison were applied as a "rule," it appears
that the actions of the trial court in Coleman would amount to an abuse of discretion.
231. 321 Md. at 604, 583 A.2d at 1052.
232. The colloquy between the defendants' attorney and officer Keller was as follows:
Defense Counsel: You testified that Mr. Coleman has sent emissaries from the
Baltimore City Jail to intimidate witnesses, is that correct, yes or no?
Officer: No.
Q. He has not. Has anyone in regards to State's witnesses in this case been
intimidated?
A: No.
Q So, therefore, you are telling Her Honor, based on everything that you
know, you cannot say that Mr. Anthony Coleman has intimidated anyone since
April 25, 1988 [the date of the murder] up until today or sent anyone to intimidate anyone in this case, is that correct?
A: That is correct.
Transcript of Hearing on State's Motion for a Protective Order at 36-37, Coleman (No.
90-54). This excerpt of the pretrial hearing on the State's Motion for a Protective Order
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Thus, the Coleman court applied a scattered and biased balancing
test, ignoring the tremendous constitutional and factual issues
presented.
What is particularly disturbing about Coleman, then, is not the
end, but the means. Instead of confronting the important constitutional issues, the court hid behind rhetoric about the horrors of the
drug war. In place of fixed constitutional guarantees, the court substituted the expansive discretion of a trial judge.
b. Determining the Proper Scope of Cross-Examination.-Also entrusted to the trial judge's discretion is the proper scope of crossexamination designed to discredit a witness or reveal a potential
bias arising out of the witness's desire to procure leniency for the
witness's own wrongdoings. Cases that address the proper scope of
cross-examination are difficult to reconcile, chiefly because "the
sound discretion of the trial judge" is such an individualized, imprecise standard.
In Coleman, the Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's disallowance of a cross-examination question as to the witness's personal
understanding of his plea bargain." 3' This ruling contradicts the intelligent and coherent standard espoused in previous Maryland
cases, which stand for the proposition that it is the witness's subjective
understanding of the leniency or plea bargain agreement that is probative of bias and therefore a proper subject for exploration on
cross-examination. 23 4 Moreover, even if the generalized standard
for cross-examination enunciated in Alford v. United States 23 5 were
applied to the Coleman facts, there was no showing that the question
posed to Mr. Jackson 23 6 was in any way intended to harass, annoy,
or humiliate him. The court provided no satisfactory reason for disallowing this question, and the holding departs from the Maryland
standard that encourages the precise line of inquiry that was fore2 37
closed to the defendant in Coleman.
illustrates the lack of a rational basis for granting the protective order and, coupled with
the police officers' and motion judge's statements, see supra notes 164-166 and accompanying text, the alarmist nature of the whole proceeding.
233. See 321 Md. at 611, 583 A.2d at 1056.
234. See Hoover v. Maryland, 714 F.2d 301, 305 (4th Cir. 1986); Brown v. State, 74
Md. App. 414, 421, 538 A.2d 317, 320 (1988); Fletcher v. State, 50 Md. App. 349, 359,
437 A.2d 901, 905 (1981).
235. 282 U.S. 687, 691-92 (1931).
236. See supra text accompanying note 173.
237. See supra notes 220-224 and accompanying text (explaining that Maryland courts
have allowed cross-examination questions as to the subjective belief of the witness regarding his or her potential sentence).
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c. Protecting and Expanding Defendants' Right to Confrontation.One issue not explicitly raised in Coleman is nonetheless suggested
by a careful consideration of its holding: namely, the possibility or
desirability of expanding the right of confrontation to pretrial or
other critical proceedings that affect the outcome of the trial. Several recent Supreme Court cases have sought to expand defendants'
confrontation rights, or at least protect them from further contraction. In Coy v. Iowa,2 38 the Supreme Court held that the use of a
one-way screening device to spare a child victim the trauma of facing her alleged abuser violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to confrontation.23 9 In Kentucky v. Stincer,24 ° the Court held
that the defendant has a right to be present at any stage of the
"criminal proceeding that is critical to its outcome if her presence
24
would contribute to the fairness of the proceeding."- '
And, although the Supreme Court recently held in Pennsylvania
v. Ritchie24 2 that the right to confrontation is exclusively a trial
right, 2 43 the dissent by Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall,
presents a convincing argument that the bright-line distinction between pretrial and trial is somewhat facile: "[The plurality's] interpretation ignores the fact that the right of cross-examination also
may be significantly infringed by events occurring outside the trial
would
itself, such as the wholesale denial of access to material that
2 44
trial."at
inquiry
of
line
significant
a
serve as the basis for
In Ritchie, the defendant was denied access to information contained in the state's child abuse agency files, which were protected
from disclosure by a state confidentiality statute. 24 5 The pretrial denial of access to this crucial information, analogous in effect to the
pretrial protective order in Coleman, significantly impaired the effectiveness of cross-examination at trial. In his concurrence, Justice
Blackmun opined that "a state [cannot] avoid Confrontation Clause
problems simply by deciding to hinder the defendant's right to effective cross-examination ... at the pretrial, rather than at the trial,
238. 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
239. Id. at 1020. But see Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3170 (1990) (holding that
if an adequate showing of necessity is made, the State may permit children to testify via
videotape in child abuse cases).
240. 482 U.S. 730 (1987).
241. Id. at 745.
242. 480 U.S. 39 (1987).
243. Id. at 52-53 (holding that the right to confrontation is exclusively a trial right
and, as such, "does not include the power to require pretrial disclosure of any and all
information that might be useful in contradicting unfavorable testimony").
244. Id. at 66 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
245. Id. at 44.
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stage."2'4 6 Under this analysis, it is plausible that denying Coleman
and Givens access to the identities of their accusers, on whose testimony "the State's whole case [was to] rise and fall, ' 2 4 7 was an unjustifiable denial of their constitutional right to confrontation.
4. Conclusion.-In Coleman, justice required that the defendants
be convicted; one would be hard-pressed to say that the case was
decided incorrectly. Yet there lingers a nagging sense that Coleman
and Givens were presumed guilty long before their trial began-a
presumption that does violence to the Sixth Amendment rights held
by all, even the most morally reprehensible. Coleman adheres to a
narrow standard for evaluating a defendant's confrontation rights
and expands the discretion granted to trial judges to balance these
important rights against collateral concerns that are often inimical
to a fair trial.
ALAN

W. ADAMSON

SUSAN S. QUARNGESSER
EDITH F. WEBSTER

246. Id. at 65 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
247. Coleman, 321 Md. at 599, 583 A.2d at 1050.

III.

A.

CONTRACTS

Duress Defense Expanded in Maryland

United States ex rel. Trane v. Bond' presented an issue of first
impression to the Court of Appeals regarding the duress defense as
a means of avoiding a contractual obligation.2 The United States
District Court for the District of Columbia certified to the court the
following question: 3 May a party to a contract, alleging coercion by
a third party, assert the defense of duress against another party to
the contract?4 In Bond, the Court of Appeals held that a coerced
party may raise the duress defense based on alleged coercion by a
third party, even if the party against whom the defense is asserted
was not aware of the coercion.5 The court further determined that
physical injury is not a prerequisite to a third party duress defense.
Rather, mere threats may amount to duress, depending on the action threatened and the circumstances surrounding the threats. 6
The court's holding expands the duress defense, departing from the
general rule that protects innocent third parties from duress
defenses.
Although the result reached in Bond appears to be just in light
of the compelling facts of the case, the new rule could undermine
confidence in certain contracts executed in Maryland. Bond should
therefore be interpreted narrowly, and its rule applied only in extraordinary circumstances.
1. The Case.-Mech-Con Corporation contracted with the
United States government to perform mechanical work at a government facility located in Maryland.7 The parties signed the contract
in Maryland.' Mech-Con, as principal, and Albert and Lorna Bond,
as cosureties, executed a payment bond to cover project expenses. 9
Both Mech-Con and Albert Bond subsequently declared bank1. 322 Md. 170, 586 A.2d 734 (1991).
2. See id. at 171, 586 A.2d at 734.
3. This question was certified to the Court of Appeals pursuant to the Maryland
Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 12601 to -609 (1989).
4. Bond, 322 Md. at 171, 586 A.2d at 734.
5. See id. at 182-83, 586 A.2d at 740.
6. See id.

7. Id. at 171, 586 A.2d at 734.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 171-72, 586 A.2d at 734; see infra note 65 and accompanying text.
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ruptcy.'l After Mech-Con failed to meet its contractual obligations,
the United States sued Lorna Bond to recover on the payment
bond. "
Lorna Bond raised the defense of duress, alleging that her husband had "physically threatened ... and abused her to coerce her to
sign" the payment bond.' 2 She contended that the threats rendered
the contract void.' 3 Such a finding would make the contract unenforceable, even by parties unaware of the coercion.' 4
The United States moved for summary judgment, contending
that Albert Bond's threats rendered the contract voidable, but not
void.' 5 Further, the Government argued that as a voidable contract,
the payment bond could not be enforced by Mr. Bond, as the party
who exerted the duress, but could be enforced by the United
States-an innocent party who gave value."6 Thus, the issue
presented was whether duress, 7under Maryland law, renders a contract void or merely voidable.'
2.

Legal Background.-

a. General Rules.-Traditional contract law recognizes two
types of duress: duress by threats and duress by physical compulsion. li In the former case, one party threatens the victim into as10. Bond, 322 Md. at 172, 586 A.2d at 734.
11. Id., 586 A.2d at 734-35.
12. Id., 586 A.2d at 735.
13. Id.

14. See RESTATEMENT
A TREATISE ON THE LAW

(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 174 (1979); 13 SAMUEL WILLISTON,
OF CONTRACTS § 1622A (Walter H.E. Jaeger ed., 3d ed. 1957).

A contract will be void if there is no assent by one of the parties. To this end, the
Restatement provides:
If conduct that appears to be a manifestation of assent by a party who does not
intend to engage in that conduct is physically compelled by duress, the conduct
is not effective as a manifestation of assent.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 174 (1979).
15. Bond, 322 Md. at 172-73, 586 A.2d at 735.
16. Id.; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175; 13 WILLISTON, supra note
14, § 1622A. The Restatement provides:
(1) If a party's manifestation of assent is induced by an improper threat by the
other party that leaves the victim no reasonable alternative, the contract is voidable by the victim.
(2) If a party's manifestation of assent is induced by one who is not a party to
the transaction, the contract is voidable by the victim unless the other party to
the transaction in good faith and without reason to know of the duress either
gives value or relies materially on the transaction.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175.
17. See Bond, 322 Md. at 171, 586 A.2d at 734.
18. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 174-175.
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senting to a contract.' 9 The means used to induce assent are
improper; nevertheless, assent is obtained and a contract is
formed. 2 ' The law acknowledges the existence of such a contract,
but makes that contract voidable. 2 ' Because the duress defense is
always allowed against the party who exerted the coercion, 2 2 the coercing party is prevented from profiting from his wrongful actions.2 3
The victim of the threats, however, may still be contractually bound
to third parties who lack knowledge of the duress.2 4
Instead of using threats, a party might physically compel another into indicatingassent, without ever coercing the victim into actually assenting. For example, one could forcibly move another's
hand across a page, causing a signature to be written. In such cases,
the element of assent is lacking, and the contract is not merely voidable, but void. 25 Such a contract imposes no obligation on the victim, and cannot be enforced by anyone.2 6
Though the two scenarios just described are both termed duress, they are fundamentally different. Accordingly, the Restatement
separates them into two sections, with different rules applicable to
each.2 7 These different rules produce divergent results when the
person responsible for the coercion is not the party seeking to enforce the contract. Because duress by physical compulsion provides
a defense against innocent parties, the contract is unenforceableregardless of the fact that the enforcing party did not coerce the
victim and had no knowledge of the compulsion. 2 ' Duress by
threats alone, on the other hand, may be asserted only against the
issuer of the threats. Consequently, a third party who relies or gives
value may enforce the contract against the victim of duress, as long
as the enforcing party had no reason to know that threats had been
19. See id. § 175.
20. For example, if a parent agrees to pay a kidnapper to save his child's life, the
parent's assent is genuine. JOHN D. CALAMARI &JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 9.2, at 338 (3d ed. 1987).
21. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175 cmt. d.
22. Id. § 175.
23. Thus, the kidnapper cannot enforce the parent's ransom agreement. See supra
note 20.
24. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175 & cmt. e. Suppose that instead
of demanding cash, a kidnapper, for reasons unknown, instructs a parent to execute a
contract with some unrelated and uninvolved third party. That third party may enforce
the contract if he relies upon the agreement or gives value without reason to know that
coercion was used. See id.

25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. § 174 cmt. a.
Id. § 174.
Compare id. § 174. with id. § 175.
See id. § 174 cmt. b.
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made. 9
When a court allows assertion of the duress defense against an
innocent third party, the victim's losses are shifted arbitrarily to the
innocent party seeking enforcement. This result can be justified
only if a contract was never formed---i.e., where there was no true
assent by one party.3 0
b. Maryland Case Law.-Three Maryland cases provide the
framework within which the duress defense has developed. In Central Bank v. Copeland,"l the defendant, Mrs. Copeland, had mortgaged her real estate to secure her husband's outstanding debts.3 2
She claimed that she had been terribly ill when her husband, using
threats, forced her to sign the mortgage. 3 She argued that the contract should not be enforceable because "she never would have
signed [the mortgage], but for her weak, shattered and helpless situation and the threats used."3 4 The Court of Appeals permitted Mrs.
Copeland to assert a duress defense against the mortgagees, her
husband's creditors.3 5
The court viewed the husband as an agent of the mortgagees
because of his previous indebtedness to them.3 6 Once the husband's coercive acts were attributed to the mortgagees, duress was
no longer being asserted against an innocent third party. This holding applied the standard rule for cases involving agency: the duress
defense does not protect a party to whom the duress is attributable
under agency laws.3 7
First National Bank v. Eccleston3 1 involved a fact scenario almost
identical to that of Copeland. Like Mrs. Copeland, Mrs. Eccleston
also had executed a mortgage to secure her husband's pre-existing
29. See id. Commentators have analogized this rule to the rule protecting a good
faith purchaser for value from claims by the original owner, when the good faith purchaser bought from one who obtained the property by duress. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTS § 175 cmt. e; E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.19, n.1 (2d ed.
1990). See generally RONALD A. ANDERSON, 3 ANDERSON ON THE COMMERCIAL CODE, §§ 2313 to -509 (1983) (commenting that protecting parties who are unaware of the coer-

cion fosters the free flow of commerce and is consistent with principles of relative fault).
30. According to the Restatement, a physically compelled party does not assent; a
threatened party does. See supra notes 18-26 and accompanying text.

31. 18 Md. 305 (1862).
32. Id. at 306.

33. Id.
34. Id. at 306-07.
35. See id. at 317.
36. See id. at 320.
37. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
38. 48 Md. 145 (1878).

OF CONTRACTS

§ 175 cmt. e (1979).
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debts.3 9 Mr. Eccleston allegedly had threatened his wife while she
was ill, and she was unable to refuse.4 ° The court invalidated the
mortgage on her property, citing Copeland.4 ' Again, the agency rationale supported the duress defense.
In the third case, Whitridge v. Barry,4 2 a husband used threats to
coerce his wife into signing a blank form authorizing assignment of
an insurance policy.4" He then filled in the blanks, assigning the
policy to a creditor to secure his outstanding debt.4 4 The court determined that the circumstances surrounding the wife's endorsement "amount[ed] to a controlling duress.... which deprived her of
that necessary freedom in the exercise of her mental faculties to
make the act binding on her." 4 5 Permitting Mrs. Barry to assert duress and invalidate the assignment, 4 6 the court noted that Mr.
Barry's creditor, as his assignee, was vulnerable to any defenses that
might be asserted against Mr. Barry.4 7 Thus, the Whitridge court applied a recognized exception to the rule protecting innocent third
parties: assignees are generally subject to any defenses that would
be effective against the assignor.48
3. The Court's Reasoning.-The Bond court based its holding on
the three nineteenth century cases outlined above. The court examined the cases, focusing on the severity of the threats rather than
the agency and assignment analyses employed by the previous
courts.4 9 In addition, the court relied on a Supreme Court opinion,
Brown v. Pierce,5 ° which held that a conveyance was void and unenforceable by an innocent third party because of the threats of death
or violence made against the party who conveyed the land. 5 ' The
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id.
Id.
See
42
Id.
Id.

at 153.
at 154.
id. at 159 (citing Central Bank v. Copeland, 18 Md. 305 (1862)).
Md. 140 (1875).
at 150-52.

45. See id.at 141.
46. See id.at 153.

47. See id.at 151.
48. See id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 336(1) (1979) ("By an assignment the assignee acquires a right against the obligor only to the extent that the obligor
is under a duty to the assignor; and if the right of the assignor would be voidable by the
obligor . . .the right of the assignee is subject to the infirmity."); FARNSWORTH, supra

note 29, § 11.8 (stating that an assignee acquires no better rights than the assignor).
49. See Bond, 322 Md. at 174-77, 586 A.2d at 735-37.
50. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 205 (1869).
51. Id.at 216; see Bond, 322 Md. at 177-78, 586 A.2d at 737-38.
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Court refused to enforce the contract despite the innocent party's
good faith and value given, stating:
Actual violence is not necessary to constitute duress, even
at common law.... because consent is the very essence of a
contract, and, if there be compulsion, there is no actual
consent, and moral compulsion, such as that produced by
threats to take life or to inflict great bodily harm, . . . is
everywhere regarded as sufficient, in law, to destroy free
because, in
agency, without which there can be no contract,
52
that state of the case, there is no consent.
The Bond court observed that the Brown Court had cited Copeland,
and had specifically noted that the type of injury threatened in Copeland met the standards of duress.53
Although the Bond court acknowledged the differing opinions
of other courts and commentators 5 4 the court adhered to its interpretation of the rule of Copeland and its progeny. Explaining this
rule, the court stated:
Nothing in Copeland or Eccleston adopted the principle
that mere threats, if succumbed to by the victim, rendered a
contract void .... Rather, these early cases, without distinguishing between physical compulsion and threats of violence, turned on the Court's view of the intensity of the
the victim as it impacted on the vicduress exerted upon
55
tim's will to resist.
Thus, according to the court, the focus in Maryland is not on the
acts taken upon the victim's body; rather, the focus is on the nature
harm and the impact that the threats have on the
of the threatened
56
victim.
The Bond court therefore established the Maryland rule that a
victim may assert the duress defense against an innocent third party
in a situation involving only threats, and not any physical compulsion, as long as the threats meet certain criteria. 57 In Maryland, duress can now render a contract void if it involves the threat of
52. Brown, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 214. As in Whitridge v. Barry, 42 Md. 140 (1875), the
Brown court dealt with a duress defense asserted against the coercer's assignee; thus, the
doctrine that an assignee stands in the shoes of the assignor applied. The Bond court
failed to recognize the existence of the assignee-assignor theory of recovery present in
the Brown case.
53. See Bond, 322 Md. at 178, 586 A.2d at 738.
54. See id. at 178-79, 586 A.2d at 738-39.
55. Id. at 182, 586 A.2d at 740.
56. See id.
57. See id. at 182-83, 586 A.2d at 740.
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"immediate physical force sufficient to place a person in... reasonable[] and imminent fear of death, serious personal injury, or actual
imprisonment. '5' The new rule implies that severe threats can
cause a person to indicate assent without actually assenting.5 9 This
ruling represents an expansion of the duress defense, and a signifi60
cant departure from traditional contract law.
4.

Analysis.-

a. Application of the Rule to the Bond Facts.-The facts in Bond do
not include the essential elements that formed the bases for the
holdings in Copeland, Eccleston, and Whitridge. Albert Bond was not
previously indebted to the United States government and could not
be considered its agent;6 1 nor did Bond involve an assignment, because Lorna Bond contracted directly with the United States as a
surety. 6" The Bond court, therefore, adopted a rule that is both new
to Maryland law and contrary to the rule applied by other states.63
Lorna Bond can be perceived as a spousal abuse victim and a
person of limited means, being pursued by the United States government for a debt incurred by her husband's business. When the
defendant is described in these terms, the result reached in Bond
appears to bejust. The Bond rule might, however, affect future cases
in less desirable ways. In a future case, the expanded duress defense could be asserted against an innocent party who lacks the
58. Id.

59. See id. at 183, 586 A.2d at 740.
60. Most states have adopted the Restatement position. See, e.g., Kozera v. National
Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 714 F. Supp. 644, 651 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); USLife Title Co. v.
Gutkin, 732 P.2d 579, 586-87 (Ariz. 1986); Leeper v. Beltrami, 347 P.2d 12, 18 (Cal.
1959); Standard Fin. Co. v. Ellis, 657 P.2d 1056, 1061 (Haw. App. 1983); Regenold v.
Baby Fold, Inc., 369 N.E.2d 858, 867 (Ill.
1977); McCoy v. James T. McMahon Constr.
Co., 216 S.W. 770, 771 (Mo. 1919).
61. Bond, 322 Md. at 171, 686 A.2d at 734.
62. Id.

63. See supra note 60 (listing cases outside of Maryland following the contrary approach of the Restatement). The court stated that its holding is consistent with the common-law rule of duress enunciated by Blackstone. See Bond, 322 Md. at 182, 586 A.2d at
740. Blackstone suggested that threats to life or limb should provide a stronger basis
for a duress defense than other, less serious threats. See 1 SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 131 (William D. Lewis ed., 1922). Blackstone's treatise, however, did not address the issue presented in Bond-whether duress
may be asserted against a nonthreatening party regardless of the seriousness of the
threats involved. See id. At least one commentator recalls an early common-law rule
allowing the duress defense against innocent third parties, but clearly recognizes that
such a rule has not been the law in modern times. See 13 WILLISTON, supra note 16,
§ 1622A.
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means to bear any resulting losses. One who gives value or relies on
a contractual bond in good faith can no longer be certain of the
legal status afforded the contract. If applied broadly, the new rule
will to some extent erode confidence in the security of many contracts executed in Maryland.
b. A More Limited Expansion.-The result in Bond could have
been achieved by a more limited expansion of the duress defense.
In addition to the sympathetic posture of the defendant in.Bond, the
record contains other significant facts supporting the court's expansion of the duress defense in this case. According to the Restatement,
if the United States had reason to know of the duress inflicted on
Lorna Bond, the Government could not claim to be protected from
the defendant's claims of duress as an innocent third party.' The
facts of Bond suggest that the United States had notice of at least the
possibility that Lorna Bond's execution of the surety was coerced.
The Miller Act requires a government contractor to execute a
payment bond before a contract for construction or repair will be
awarded by the United States. 6 5 Sureties of the bond must be satisfactory to the officer awarding the contract.6 6 Consequently, Albert
Bond, to assure the sufficiency of the bond, needed his wife's signature to use marital property as collateral for the bond. The United
States therefore knew that it was important to Albert Bond to include his wife's name on the surety bond. These circumstances may
have given the Government sufficient reason to know of the duress
alleged by Lorna Bond, subjecting the United States to Lorna
Bond's duress defense.6 7
The mere fact that the cosureties in Bond were married to each
other probably does not provide the "reason to know of the duress"
contemplated by the Restatement, however. Yet Albert Bond's circumstances and his relationship to Lorna Bond do weaken the
United States' contention that it had absolutely no reason for suspicion. That is, the United States might be said to have assumed the
risk of being subject to a duress defense. These facts help to qualify
the types of cases in which the new Maryland rule might be appropriate. Bond should be limited to cases in which unique factors pro64. A party may enforce a voidable contract only if that party has given value or
relied materially "without reason to know of the duress." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 175(2) (1979).

65. See 40 U.S.C. § 270(a) (1988).
66. Id.
67. See supra note 64.
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vided constructive notice of a likelihood of coercion. When the
plaintiff is a paradigmatic innocent third party, the defendant should
not be allowed to raise a duress defense based upon threats alone,
regardless of the severity of the threats. An expansion of the duress
defense so limited is more consistent with the spirit of the Restatement, with its emphasis on whether the third party had an opportunity to learn that coercion was used.6"
Limiting Bond in the manner just described has the disadvantage of potentially incapacitating some individuals' ability to contract. Procurement officials, for example, might decline to accept a
contractor's spouse as a surety, fearing vulnerability to a potential
claim of duress. Any attempt to protect a certain class of individuals
will inevitably disadvantage that class in some way. One certainly
hopes that the scenario presented in Bond is rare enough not to
induce widespread reluctance to accept a contractor's spouse as a
surety. In any event, an exception for narrowly defined circumstances is superior to Bond's broad expansion of the duress
defense.6 9
5. Conclusion.-The rule announced in Bond significantly departs from widely accepted contract principles. After Bond, any
party to a contract executed in Maryland cannot enforce the obligation if the other party proves that serious threats induced assent. As
long as the threats were severe enough, the contract is void even
though the enforcing party is unaware that threats were made.
The relationship between the coercing party and his victim,
combined with the surrounding circumstances of Bond, justify the
result in this case. When this issue arises in the future, however, the
court should expressly limit the Bond holding to its significant facts.
In this way, the court can lessen the adverse consequences that its

68. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175(2). The suggested approach
also has practical merit. Ordinarily, a victim unrelated to the coercing party would be
able to alert the other contracting party promptly after the contract is executed. Only
when the victim and coercing party are intimately related, as in Bond, is the victim usually
incapable of coming forward before the other party relies upon the contract. Note that,
like Loma Bond, all three parties claiming duress in Copeland, Eccleston, and Whitridge
were alleged to be victims of abusive husbands.
69. Reluctance to accept contractors' spouses as sureties might already be the practical effect caused by Bond. By refusing to contract with spouses, one may avoid the situation in which a third party duress claim is most likely to arise. See supra note 68.
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departure from the Restatement will have on the sanctity of ordinary
contractual relationships.
DAVID L. LITILETON

IV.

A.

CORPORATE LAW

The Successor Liability Rule in a Products Liability Setting

In Nissen Corp. v. Miller,' the Court of Appeals held that in products liability cases, Maryland follows the general corporate rule of
successor liability with its four well-recognized exceptions; the court
refused to adopt the minority fifth exception for "continuity of enterprise." 2 When a corporation acquires the assets of another corporation for cash,3 the traditional corporate rule states that the
successor does not acquire the liabilities and debts of the predecessor absent one of the following situations: There is an agreement to
assume the liabilities; the transaction is essentially a consolidation
or merger; the successor entity is a reincarnation of the predecessor;
or the transaction was fraudulent, made without good faith, or
lacked sufficient consideration.'
Because the facts in Nissen did not give rise to any of the enumerated exceptions, the initial plaintiff and the cross-claim plaintiff
urged the Court of Appeals to adopt a fifth exception for the "continuity of enterprise," which would permit suit against a successor
1. 323 Md. 613, 594 A.2d 564 (1991).
2. See id. at 632, 594 A.2d at 573.

3. There are three general types of corporate acquisitions: (1) statutory merger or
consolidation; (2) acquisition through stock purchase; and (3) acquisition of assets for
cash.
Mergers or consolidations are generally effectuated pursuant to specific state laws.
In a statutory merger the acquiring corporation purchases the assets of the target corporation in exchange for shares of the acquiring corporation. The acquiring corporation
survives while the merged (target) corporation ceases to exist. In a consolidation, however, the two corporations unite in an entirely new corporate entity, and both prior corporations cease to exist. Robert J. Yamin, The Achilles Heel of the Takeover: Nature and
Scope of Successor Corporation Products Liability in Asset Acquisitions, 7 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y
185, 213-14 (1984); see also MD. CORPS. & Ass'Ns CODE ANN. § 3-105 (1985) (outlining

the statutory procedure for mergers and consolidations in Maryland).
A stock acquisition occurs when one corporation sells all its stock to another corporation in return for "stock, cash, or other property." Yamin, supra, at 213. The corporations do not have to comply with any statutes in order to complete this transaction. Id.
at 214. After sale, "the selling corporation.., remains a fully functioning enterprise as
a subsidiary of the purchaser." Id. (footnote omitted).
A corporation may also acquire the assets of another corporation for cash without
the need for statutory compliance. Generally, an asset purchase is the preferred form of
acquisition because it "provides the maximum insulation from successor liability." Id.
The Maryland Code defines "assets" as "any tangible, intangible, real, or personal property or other assets, including goodwill and franchises." MD. CORps. & Ass'NS CODE
ANN. § 1-101(d).
4. Nissen, 323 Md. at 617, 594 A.2d at 565-66; 1 AMERICAN LAw OF PRODucTs LIABIITY 3D § 7:1, at 10-12 (Timothy E. Travers ed., rev. ed. 1990).
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corporation based on injuries caused by its predecessor's defective
products. 5 Judge Chasanow, writing for the majority, rejected the
"continuity of enterprise" exception, finding the liberal minority approach incompatible with Maryland case law and policy.6
1. The Case.-In October 1986, Frederick Brandt injured his
finger while attempting to adjust a treadmill that he had purchased
from Atlantic Fitness (Atlantic) in January of 1981.' The treadmill
was designed, manufactured, and sold by American Tredex Corporation (American Tredex).8 In July of 1981, six months after Brandt
had purchased the treadmill, Nissen Corporation (Nissen) acquired
all of American Tredex's assets, including trade name, goodwill,
patents, and inventory. 9 Pursuant to the cash purchase agreement,
Nissen assumed some of American Tredex's contractual obligations;
an express provision in the agreement stated, however, that Nissen
would not be liable for any personal injuries caused by an American
Tredex product sold prior to the acquisition."0 The agreement also
provided that American Tredex would continue to operate for the
next five years under the name AT Corporation."1
After the asset acquisition, Nissen relocated the inventory and
manufacturing equipment and notified American Tredex's dealers
of the asset purchase.' 2 Nissen also hired some American Tredex
employees, provided replacement parts for American Tredex prod5. 323 Md. at 619, 594 A.2d at 566. Under the "continuity of enterprise" excep-

tion, a successor corporation may be held liable if it is found that "[tihere was basic
continuity of the enterprise of the seller corporation, including . . . retention of key
personnel, assets, general business operations, and even ... name." Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 244 N.W.2d 873, 883-84 (Mich. 1976). This exception differs from
the "mere continuation" exception, which focuses only on continuity of ownership. Nissen, 323 Md. at 620, 594 A.2d at 567.
6. See Nissen, 323 Md. at 633, 594 A.2d at 574; see also infra note 25 (listing some
jurisdictions which have adopted the minority approach).
7. Miller v. Nissen Corp., 83 Md. App. 448, 451, 575 A.2d 758, 759 (1990), rev'd,
323 Md. 613, 594 A.2d 564 (1991).
8. Nissen, 323 Md. at 615, 594 A.2d at 565.
9. Id.

10. Id. For a discussion of disclaimer of liabilities in successor purchase agreements,
see 1 AMERICAN LAw OF PRODuCrs LIABILITY 3D, supra note 4, § 7:3, at 14-15.
11. Nissen, 323 Md. at 615, 594 A.2d at 565. The Court of Appeals found the asset
acquisition to be an "arms length transaction." Id. Under the agreement, Nissen was
required to advance American Tredex $600,000. Id. Nissen also agreed to pay AT Corporation 4% of the net sales of any treadmills sold that were offered or under development by American Tredex at the time of acquisition or that were merely modified
afterwards. This clause provided AT Corporation a minimum of $100,000 to a maximum of $1,000,000 annually. Id.
12. Id. at 616, 594 A.2d at 565.
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ucts, honored existing ninety-day warranties, and serviced old customer accounts.13 In December 1987, five years after
the
14
acquisition, AT Corporation was administratively dissolved.
In September 1988, eight months after the AT Corporation's
dissolution and almost two years after Brandt was injured, he and
his wife brought suit against American Tredex, AT Corporation,
Nissen, and Atlantic, alleging negligence, breach of express and implied warranties, strict liability, and loss of consortium. 5 Atlantic
filed a cross-claim against Nissen for indemnity and contribution.' 6
Nissen moved for summary judgment, arguing that under the asset
purchase agreement, it was not responsible for any injuries caused
by an American Tredex product sold prior to the acquisition.' 7
The trial court granted Nissen's motion for summary judgment.' 8 The Court of Special Appeals reversed, holding that Nissen
could be sued under "an expanded interpretation of the third exception" to the traditional rule of corporate successor liability. 9
This new "continuity of enterprise" exception "would only apply
where the predecessor corporation is functionally extinct at the time
the action is filed." 20 The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to
decide whether to adopt the "continuity of enterprise" exception
and whether consequently Nissen could be held accountable for
Brandt's injuries.2

13. Id. at 621, 594 A.2d at 568. In November 1982, Nissen provided replacement
parts for Brandt's treadmill. Miller v. Nissen Corp., 83 Md. App. at 451, 575 A.2d at
759.
14. Nissen, 323 Md. at 616, 594 A.2d at 565. The record does not reveal the grounds
on which AT Corporation was dissolved; however, AT Corporation's five year period of
duration, as provided by the 1981 asset purchase agreement, had expired. See supra text
accompanying note 11. See generally REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 14.20 (1984)
(listing grounds for administrative dissolution).
For a discussion of how corporate dissolution affects products liability plaintiffs, see
Harry G. Henn & John R. Alexander, Effect of Corporate Dissolution on Products Liability

Claims, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 865, 888-908 (1971); Friedrich K. Juenger & Stephen H.
Schulman, Assets Sales and Products Liability, 22 WAYNE L. REV. 39, 41 nn.8-9 (1975);
Timothy J, Murphy, Comment, A Policy Analysis of a Successor Corporation'sLiability for Its
Predecessor'sDefective Products When the Successor Has Acquired the Predecessor's Assets for Cash,

71

L. REV. 815, 816 (1988).
15. Nissen, 323 Md. at 616, 594 A.2d at 565.
MARQ.

16. Id.

17. Miller v. Nissen Corp., 83 Md. App. at 451, 575 A.2d at 760.
18. Id. at 452, 575 A.2d at 760.
19. Id. at 456, 575 A.2d at 762.
20. Id.

21. Nissen, 323 Md. at 616, 594 A.2d at 565.
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Legal Background.-

a. Origins of the "Continuity of Enterprise" Theory .- The traditional successor nonliability rule was created to protect creditors'
rights by preventing a corporation from rearranging its assets in order to escape liability. 2 The rule also serves to "protect the successor from unknown or contingent liability" 2 3 and to "promote
predictability in corporate transactions, free availability and transferability of capital, and mobility in the business and economic
world in general." 2 4 The "continuity of enterprise" exception, however, was created in response to a concern that the general rule was
inadequate to protect the rights of products liability plaintiffs.2 5
One of the first cases to deviate from the traditional rule was
22. See Baltimore Luggage Co. v. Holtzman, 80 Md. App. 282, 297, 562 A.2d 1286,
1293 (1989). The Court of Special Appeals stated that "[tlhe 'mere continuation' exception reinforces this policy by allowing a creditor to recover from the successor corporation whenever the successor is substantially the same as the predecessor." Id.; see also
Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 244 N.W.2d 873, 877-78 (Mich. 1976) (discussing
how the general rule developed, and its inapplicability to products liability cases);
George L. Lenard, Note, Products Liability of Successor Corporations: A Policy Analysis, 58 IND.

L.J. 677, 683 (1983) (discussing the creditor-protection rationale behind the general
rule).
23. Murphy, supra note 14, at 821.
24. Yamin, supra note 3, at 207; see also Polius v. Clark Equip. Co., 802 F.2d 75, 78
(3d Cir. 1986) (examining how the general rule promotes "free alienability of business
assets").
Many commentators have analogized the traditional corporate rule to the rule protecting bona fide purchasers. See Yamin, supra note 3, at 207-08; Lenard, supra note 22,
at 684-87; Murphy, supra note 14, at 821-22. This doctrine, applicable to property and
commercial law, states that an individual who purchases property in good faith and for
adequate consideration will not be held liable for any "prior or contingent" claims or
liabilities. Murphy, supra note 14, at 821. The rationale follows that of the general corporate rule: A successor corporation that acquires a predecessor's assets in good faith,
for adequate consideration, and without knowledge of any prior claims and liabilities
against the predecessor, is not held accountable. Yamin, supra note 3, at 207. One
commentator explained that the rationale for the traditional rule is "an extension of the
policy underlying the theory of incorporation itself: the fundamental public policy of
promoting economic activity through the granting to shareholders of insulation from
personal liability." Id. at 208.
25. Departures from the traditional rule have generally taken on two forms. See 1
AMERICAN LAW OF PRODuCTs LIABILITY 3D, supra note 4, § 7:20, at 36-37 (discussing
deviations from the general rule). Some courts have expanded the "mere continuation"
exception and adopted the "continuity of enterprise" exception. See, e.g., Mozingo v.
Correct Mfg. Corp., 752 F.2d 168, 176 (5th Cir. 1985) (applying Mississippi law); Cyr v.
B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145, 1154 (1st Cir. 1974) (applying New Hampshire law);
Bonee v. L & M Constr. Chems., 518 F. Supp. 375, 381 (M.D. Tenn. 1981); Holloway v.
John E. Smith's Sons Co., 432 F. Supp. 454,456 (D.S.C. 1977) (applying South Carolina
law); Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 244 N.W.2d 873, 883-84 (Mich. 1974); Salvati
v. Blaw-Knox Food & Chem. Equip., Inc., 497 N.Y.S.2d 242, 247 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985).
Other courts have created an entirely new "product line" exception. See, e.g., Ray v.
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Cyr v. B. Oflen & Co. ,26 in which the United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit expanded the "mere continuation" exception
and held a successor corporation strictly liable despite the finding
that the facts did not give rise to any of the traditional exceptions. 7
The court found that the corporate policies that underlie the general rule of nonliability, such as protecting creditors' rights and promoting free alienability of corporate assets, are misplaced in the
torts context. 28 The corporate policies are inapplicable in a products liability case, according to the court, when a successor "assumes all [the] benefits and liabilities of its predecessor, holds itself
out to the world as the same enterprise, without notifying known
customers, [and] continues to function in the same manner.., with
the same key employees, producing the same product. '29 The First
Circuit imposed liability on the successor, justifying its holding
based on policies underlying strict liability:
The manufacturer's successor ...is . . . in a better position
than the consumer to gauge the risks and the costs of [production]. The successor knows the product, is as able to
calculate the risk of defects as the predecessor, is in position to insure therefor and reflect such cost in sale negotiations, and is the only entity capable of improving the
quality of the product."0
In 1976, the Supreme Court of Michigan also departed from
the traditional rule and created the "continuity of enterprise" exception in Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co. " The Turner court found
the general corporate rule and its four well-recognized exceptions
inapplicable in the torts context, because the rule had been
designed to protect creditors and shareholders, not products liabil-

Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3, 11 (Cal. 1977); Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 431 A.2d 811
(NJ. 1981).
26. 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974) (applying New Hampshire law).
27. Id. at 1154. In Cyr, one individual was seriously injured and another died while
attempting to clean a printing press designed and manufactured by B. Offen Company
("B. Often I"), a sole proprietorship. Id. at 1147-48, 1151. When the sole proprietor
died, a group of B. Often I employees formed B. Often & Co., Inc. ("B. Often II") to
purchase B. Often I for cash. Id. at 1151. The contract called for the continuation of the
old business in substantially the same manner as it had been conducted before the proprietor's death, and customers were not given notice of the formation of a new or different business. Id.
28. See id. at 1153.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1154.
31. 244 N.W.2d 873, 883-84 (Mich. 1976).
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ity plaintiffs.3 2 The problems arising in products liability were recognized as "substantially different" from those associated with
creditors and shareholders. 33 The Turner court therefore disregarded the traditional analysis, which focused on the form of the
corporate acquisition," and created a new test to determine
whether a successor continued the enterprise of its predecessor.3 5
b. Maryland Case Law.-Prior to Nissen, the issue of corporate
successor liability in a products liability context had not been decided by the Court of Appeals.3 6 In 1988, however, this issue was
addressed in two cases before the United States District Court for
the District of Maryland. 7 Both district court judges agreed that
the general corporate rule of successor liability with its four traditional exceptions was the law in Maryland; however, the judges disagreed on whether Maryland would adopt the "continuity of
32. See id. at 877-78. In Turner, the plaintiff had both his hands amputated by a defective power press manufactured by "Old Sheridan." Id. at 875. Prior to the accident,
"Old Sheridan" sold its "entire business, good will, name and assets" to "New Sheridan" for cash. Id. at 875-76. Four days after the asset acquisition, "Old Sheridan" was
dissolved. Id.
33. See id. at 878.

34. See id. at 880-81.
35. Id. at 879, 883-84. Three prongs of the Turner four-part test were adopted from
Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797 (W.D. Mich. 1974), as follows:
"(1) There is a continuation of the enterprise of the seller corporation, so that
there is a continuity of management, personnel, physical location, assets, and
general business operations.
[(2)] The seller corporation ceases its ordinary business operations, liquidates, and dissolves as soon as legally and practically possible.
[(3)] The purchasing corporation assumes those liabilities and obligations
of the seller ordinarily necessary for the uninterrupted continuation of normal
business operations of the seller corporation."
Turner, 244 N.W.2d at 879 (quoting Shannon, 379 F. Supp. at 801) (emphasis added).
The fourth prong of the Turner test is that "the purchasing corporation [holds] itself out
to the world as the effective continuation of the seller corporation." Id. at 884.
36. See 323 Md. at 622, 594 A.2d at 568.
37. See Giraldi v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 687 F. Supp. 987 (D. Md. 1988); Smith v.
Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 687 F. Supp. 201, republished as corrected, 737 F. Supp. 1446
(D. Md. 1988).
The federal district court judges had to predict how the state's highest court would
have ruled on the issue because Maryland case law was silent on the matter. See Erie
R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). In general, the area of corporate law is a
state function and is largely governed by statute. Absent a controlling statute, a state's
highest court is the authority on corporate law issues. The Court of Appeals, therefore,
may reject the federal district court's interpretation of Maryland law. See Navistar, 737 F.
Supp. at 1449 (stating that the general rule of successor liability "is the law of Maryland
unless and until the Court of Appeals suggests otherwise").
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3
enterprise" exception.

8

In Giraldi v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,39 Judge Smalkin held that
Maryland would follow the well-established majority view that accepts the four exceptions and rejects any additional exceptions.40
He believed the Court of Appeals would adopt "the 'pure' version
of the traditional rule, because reported Maryland cases recognize
limited successor liability in the corporate-matters sphere.' 4t The
liberal exceptions to the traditional rule, such as the "continuity of
enterprise" and the "product line" theories, were rejected in light
of the underlying social and public policies of products liability.4 2
Moreover, Judge Smalkin commented that traditionally Maryland
has been very conservative in the field of products liability4 3 and
thus, "seemingly would embrace the philosophy of not holding
purchasing corporations responsible for unliquidated tort liabilities
44

of the seller."
In Smith v. Navistar International Transportation Corp. ,'5 Judge

Niemeyer predicted that Maryland would adopt the "continuity of
enterprise" exception. 4 6 Judge Niemeyer found that the "continuity
of enterprise" theory was justified where the successor "step[ped]
into the shoes" of the predecessor, because it created the presumption that the successor assumed the liability. 4 7 The inability to sue
38. See Giraldi,687 F. Supp. at 991 (rejecting the exception); Navistar, 737 F. Supp. at
1451 (adopting the "continuity of enterprise" theory).
39. 687 F. Supp. 987 (D. Md. 1988).
40. See id. at 991. For an exhaustive list of jurisdictions and cases adopting the majority rule, see I AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILrrY 3D, supra note 4, § 7:1, at 11-12.
See also infra note 54 (listing jurisdictions and cases in the majority).
41. Giraldi, 687 F. Supp. at 991; see Colandrea v. Colandrea, 42 Md. App. 421, 43335, 401 A.2d 480, 487-88 (1979).
42. Giraldi, 687 F. Supp. at 991.
43. See id. at 992; see, e.g., Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 352-53, 363
A.2d 955, 963 (1976) (adopting the theory of strict liability in tort). In Giraldi, Judge
Smalkin also noted that Maryland law requires a plaintiff to prove that the defect is
"unreasonably dangerous," whereas more liberal jurisdictions, such as California, do
not. See 687 F. Supp. at 992.
44. Giraldi, 687 F. Supp. at 991.
45. 687 F. Supp. 201, republished as corrected, 737 F. Supp. 1446 (D. Md. 1988).
46. See 737 F. Supp. at 1449-50 (discussing the Turner four-part test for "continuity
of enterprise"). Judge Niemeyer relied on the district court decision in Polius v. Clarke
Equip. Co., 608 F. Supp. 1541 (D.V.I. 1985), remanded, 802 F.2d 75 (3d Cir. 1986), which
followed the "continuity of enterprise" exception and found the successor liable. See
Navistar, 737 F. Supp. at 1150. However, Judge Niemeyer's reliance was flawed because
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the district court in
Polius, stating, "we also reject the continuity of enterprise theory because it too proposes

an ill-considered extension of liability to an entity having no causal relationship with the
harm." Polius, 802 F.2d at 82.
47. Navistar, 737 F. Supp. at 1451.
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the predecessor was considered a necessary condition before the
new exception would apply.4 8 The Navistar court noted that in the
cases applying the "continuity of enterprise" exception, "the predecessor corporation dissolved, went out of business or was no longer
available to be sued." 4 Because the predecessor in Navistar was
"viable" and able to be sued, the successor corporation escaped liability despite the court's acceptance of the "continuity of enterprise" exception.5"
3. The Court's Reasoning.-The central issue in Nissen was
whether Maryland should adopt the "continuity of enterprise" exception to the general rule of successor nonliability in a products
liability case. 5 Judge Chasanow, writing for the majority,5 2 rejected
the theory.5" The Nissen court stated that Maryland, like the majority of other states,5 4 adheres to the traditional corporate rule, which
holds that successor corporations are not liable for the debts and
liabilities of their predecessors after an asset acquisition, unless: (1)
there is a specific agreement to assume the predecessor's liabilities;
(2) the asset acquisition is actually a merger or consolidation; (3) the
successor is a "mere continuation or reincarnation" of the predecessor's entity; or (4) the transaction was fraudulent, made in bad faith,
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See id. In Navistar, the successor only purchased five percent of the predecessor's
assets. Id. Thus, the successor in no way "step[ped] into the shoes of [the predecessor]
and did not substantially continue its business." Id.
51. 323 Md. at 617, 594 A.2d at 565.
52. Nissen was decided by a 4-2 margin. In their dissent, Judges Eldridge and Hinkel
commented, without explanation, that in addition to the exceptions provided in the general rule of corporate nonliability, Maryland should adopt the "continuity of enterprise"
exception in the context of a products liability case. See id. at 633-34, 594 A.2d at 574
(Eldridge and Hinkel, JJ., dissenting).
53. See id. at 632, 594 A.2d at 573.
54. A majority of states have adopted the general rule of successor liability and rejected the expanded "continuity of enterprise" theory. See, e.g., Florom v. Elliott Mfg.,
867 F.2d 570 (10th Cir. 1989) (applying Colorado law); Conn v. Fales Div. of Mathewson Corp., 835 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1987) (applying Kentucky law); Tucker v. Paxson
Mach. Co., 645 F.2d 620 (8th Cir. 1981) (applying Missouri law); Swayze v. A.O. Smith
Corp., 694 F. Supp. 619 (E.D. Ark. 1988) (applying Arkansas law); Bernard v. Kee Mfg.
Co., 409 So. 2d 1047 (Fla. 1982); Green v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 460 N.E.2d 895
(Ill. App. Ct. 1984); DeLapp v. Xtraman, Inc., 417 N.W.2d 219 (Iowa 1987); Niccum v.
Hydra Tool Corp., 438 N.W.2d 96 (Minn. 1989); Jones v. Johnson Mach. & Press Co.,
320 N.W.2d 481 (Neb. 1982); Downtowner, Inc. v. Acrometal Products, Inc., 347
N.W.2d 118 (N.D. 1984); Goucher v. Parmac, Inc., 694 P.2d 953 (Okla. Ct. App. 1984),
cert. den. by unpublished order (Okla. Jan. 23, 1985); Hamaker v. Kenwel-Jackson Mach.,
Inc., 387 N.W.2d 515 (S.D. 1986); Ostrowski v. Hydra-Tool Corp., 479 A.2d 126 (Vt.
1984); Fish v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 376 N.W.2d 820 (Wis. 1985).
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or without adequate consideration.5 5
The Nissen court had no trouble adopting the general rule and
its four exceptions because the first, second, and fourth exceptions
are specifically codified by statute in Maryland. 56 The third exception is not codified by statute; however, the policies underlying this
exception can be found throughout the Corporations and Associations and Commercial Law Articles. 57 Thus, the Nissen court held
that the rule of successor nonliability and the four well-recognized
exceptions should be adopted in Maryland.5 8
Because the parties in Nissen agreed that the asset acquisition
55. 323 Md. at 617, 632, 594 A.2d at 565-66, 573.
56. Id. at 617-18, 594 A.2d at 566. The first exception is reflected in § 3-115(c) of
the Corporations and Associations Article, which provides that in a transfer for assets,
"[t]he successor is liable for all the debts and obligations of the transferor to the extent
provided in the articles of transfer." MD. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. § 3-115(c) (1985);
see also Smith v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 687 F. Supp. 201, 204, republished as corrected, 737 F. Supp. 1446, 1449 (D. Md. 1988); Baltimore Luggage Co. v. Holtzman, 80
Md. App. 282, 291-92, 562 A.2d 1286, 1290-91 (1989). The second exception is similar
to § 3-114(e)(1) of the Corporations and Associations Article, which states that in a consolidation or merger transaction, "[t]he successor is liable for all the debts and obligations of each nonsurviving corporation." MD. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. § 3-114(e)(1)
(Supp. 1991); see also Navistar, 737 F. Supp. at 1449; Baltimore Luggage, 80 Md. App. at
291, 562 A.2d at 1290. See generally 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUcrs LIABILrrY 3D, supra

note 4, § 7:10, at 26-27 (discussing the second exception).
The Maryland Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act parallels the fourth exception
to the extent that it "protects the rights of creditors of a corporation which transfers its
assets with an intent to defraud or without fair consideration." Navistar, 737 F. Supp. at
1449; see MD. COM. LAw II CODE ANN. §§ 15-201 to -214 (1985 & Supp. 1991) (Maryland
Fraudulent Conveyance Act). One provision of the Act allows a creditor of a transferor
to attach or levy on the property conveyed to the transferee, if the transfer is fraudulent.
See id. § 15-209(a)(2); see also Baltimore Luggage, 80 Md. App. at 290-91, 562 A.2d at 1290
(stating that the Act "implicitly recognizes that a successor corporation may be held
liable for the obligations of its predecessor").
57. See Nissen, 323 Md. at 618, 594 A.2d at 566; Baltimore Luggage, 80 Md. App. at
296-97, 562 A.2d at 1293.
The traditional third exception provides that a successor corporation will be held
liable if the new entity is a "mere continuation or reincarnation of the predecessor entity." 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PRODucTs LIABILrrY 3D, supra note 4, § 7:1, at 10. The focus
is on the continuity of ownership and control rather than on the continuation of the
business operations. Id. § 7:20, at 36. The following factors have been considered in
determining whether the "mere continuation" exception is applicable:
[A] common identity of the officers, directors, and stockholders in the selling
and purchasing corporations; continuation of the business operations of the
predecessor, evidenced by the use of the same name, the same location, and the
same employees; and the existence of only one corporation at the conclusion of
the transaction, that is, the predecessor corporation must be extinguished.
Id. § 7:14, at 30-31; see also Baltimore Luggage, 80 Md. App. at 297, 562 A.2d at 1293
(listing factors for "mere continuation" exception).

58. See 323 Md. at 619, 632, 594 A.2d at 566, 573.
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fell outside the scope of the traditional exceptions, 5 9 the issue was
whether the Court of Appeals should expand the "mere continua-

tion" exception and adopt the "continuity of enterprise" theory in a
products liability case.6 0 The Court of Appeals analogized the "continuity of enterprise" exception to strict liability in tort because the
arguments made by the respondents 6' were identical to those tradi62
tionally urged for imposing strict liability.
In Maryland, for plaintiffs to recover under strict liability in
tort, they must prove that the defendant's product was in a defective
condition when it was placed into the stream of commerce and that

it was unreasonably dangerous to the consumer. 3 Nissen was
neither at fault nor responsible for the defective treadmill manufactured by American Tredex because "[a] corporate successor is not

[the] seller and bears no blame in bringing the product and the user
together."'

Responsibility and fault are placed only on those who

produce the defective and unreasonably dangerous product and
place it in the market.6 5

Following the same line of reasoning, the Court of Appeals
found the "continuity of enterprise" exception to be inconsistent
with the theory of strict liability because the exception ignores the

59. Id. at 619-20, 594 A.2d at 566-67. The Nissen court indicated that some jurisdictions have allowed products liability plaintiffs to recover under the "product line" theory. However, the issue was not raised by the respondents and the court felt no need to
address it. See id.at 620 n.l, 594 A.2d at 567 n.1.
60. See id. at 619, 594 A.2d at 566-67.
61. Brandt argued that he "suffered a personal injury for which some entity must be
held responsible." Id. at 621, 594 A.2d at 567.
62. See id. at 619, 594 A.2d at 567. Brandt sued American Tredex, AT Corporation,
Nissen, and Atlantic, based on negligence, breach of warranty, and strict liability. Judge
Chasanow reasoned that a rejection of the "continuity of enterprise" exception under
strict liability would preclude liability under the other counts as well. Id.
63. See Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 344, 363 A.2d 955, 958 (1976)
(stating the elements for strict liability as set forth in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 402A (1965)); cf. Cronin v.J.B.E. Olson Corp., 501 P.2d 1153, 1155 (Cal. 1972) (holding that proving a product was "unreasonably dangerous" is unnecessary in California if
the plaintiff can prove a defective condition).
64. Nissen, 323 Md. at 624, 594 A.2d at 569.
65. The Nissen court reiterated the policies underlying the adoption of strict products
liability in Maryland:
"[T]he theory of strict liability is not a radical departure from traditional tort
concepts. Despite the use of the term 'strict liability' the seller is not an insurer, as absolute liability is not imposed on the seller for any injury resulting
from the use of his product. Proof of a defect in the product at the time it
leaves the control of the seller impliesfault on the part of the seller sufficient to
justify imposing liability for injuries caused by the product."
Id. at 623, 594 A.2d at 568-69 (quoting Phipps, 278 Md. at 351-52, 363 A.2d at 963)
(citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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fundamental concept of causation "between the defendant's acts
and the plaintiff's injury." 6 6 Thus, Judge Chasanow stated that it
would be "patently unfair to require [an asset purchaser] to bear the
cost of unassumed and uncontemplated products liability claims primarily because [the purchaser] is still in business and is perceived as
a 'deep pocket.' "67
Furthermore, the Nissen court dismissed the respondent's argument that Nissen should be held liable because it "enjoyed American Tredex's goodwill and held itself out as the effective
continuation of American Tredex."6 8 The respondents argued that
a corporation should not be allowed to purchase the benefits in an
asset acquisition "while denying its attendant liabilities to the consuming public."' 69 In rejecting this argument, Judge Chasanow reasoned that any goodwill that Nissen acquired from American
Tredex would be diminished if the predecessor's products caused
injuries." The court also would not penalize Nissen "for retaining
a few of American Tredex's employees or for assuming some of
American Tredex's commitments."'" Nissen's actions had important value to society and did not give rise to successor liability.
The Nissen court then examined and rejected the two main cases
supporting the adoption of the "continuity of enterprise" exception.
66. Id. at 627, 594 A.2d at 570 (quoting Polius v. Clark Equip. Co., 802 F.2d 75, 81
(3d Cir. 1986)).
67. Id. at 624, 594 A.2d at 569. The court indicated that the plaintiffs may be able to
recover if they could prove that the successor corporation knew of the tort liability.
Both the fourth exception to the general rule for fraudulent transactions and the "bona
fide purchaser" theory would permit such recovery. Id. at 624-25 n.2, 594 A.2d at 56970 n.2; see also infra notes 94-98 and accompanying text (discussing the "bona fide purchaser" rule as a viable theory for holding successor corporations liable for the defective
products of their predecessors).
The Nissen court also indicated that a corporation may be subject to an independent
duty to warn, despite the nature of the transfer, when it has knowledge of defects in a
predecessor's products. 323 Md. at 626 n.3, 594 A.2d at 570 n.3. The court did not
have to address this issue because neither Brandt nor Atlantic claimed that Nissen knew
of any defect or had an independent duty to warn. Id.
The Nissen court rejected the "deep pocket" theory as a justification for adopting
the "continuity of enterprise" exception because liability would not only be imposed on
large corporations, "but it would also be imposed upon the small business operation
which may not be in a position to spread the risk or insure against it." Id. at 625, 594
A.2d at 570.
68. 323 Md. at 621, 594 A.2d at 568. Atlantic pointed to the fact that Nissen sold
replacement parts, performed some existing contracts, retained some employees,
honored existing 90-day warranties, and serviced existing customer accounts. Id.
69. Id., 594 A.2d at 567-68.
70. See id. at 625, 594 A.2d at 570.
71. Id. at 626, 594 A.2d at 570.
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The Cyr v. B. Offen & Co. 7 2 decision was distinguishable--Cyr involved a sole proprietorship, rather than a corporation, and the successor owners were a group of employees who had worked for the
predecessor. 73 Judge Chasanow noted that the Cyr court extended
liability upon finding "a nexus between the owners of the successor
corporation and those responsible for [the] plaintiffs' injuries-the
employees. "174
In Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co. ,7 the Supreme Court of
Michigan found the general rule of corporate successor nonliability
inapplicable to meet the "substantially different problems associated with products liability torts.", 76 The Nissen court found the Turner rationale to be "nebulous" and did not believe that the general
rule of successor liability should be disregarded as an "impediment"
in products liability cases. 7 7 Thus, the enterprise theory was rejected, and the Court of Appeals adhered to the traditional successor nonliability rule, with only its four well-recognized exceptions. 78
4. Analysis.-One of the major criticisms of the general rule of
successor nonliability is that it is based on corporate law and is
therefore inapplicable in a products liability setting. 79 Courts that
have adopted the "continuity of enterprise" exception have used
the policies underlying strict products liability to justify their decisions.8" The Nissen court analyzed the "continuity of enterprise" issue within the framework of strict liability and concluded that
because the theory of strict liability abandons any concept of fault,
72. 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974).
73. Id. at 1151; Nissen, 323 Md. at 628, 594 A.2d at 571; see supra notes 26-30 and

accompanying text (giving the facts and reasoning in Cyr).
74. Nissen, 323 Md. at 628, 594 A.2d at 571.
75. 244 N.W.2d 873 (Mich. 1976).
76. Id. at 878; see supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text (discussing the Turner
case and its rationale).
77. See Nissen, 323 Md. at 629, 594 A.2d at 572.
78. See id. at 632, 594 A.2d at 573. The other cases cited by the respondent were
held to be equally unpersuasive. See id. at 630-32, 594 A.2d at 572-73; e.g., Mozingo v.
Correct Mfg. Corp., 752 F.2d 168, 176 (5th Cir. 1985) (finding successor liability because the successor purchased stock from the predecessor and because a substantial
amount of the stockholders were the same); Holloway v.John E. Smith's Sons Co., 432
F. Supp. 454, 456 (D.S.C. 1977) (following Cyr); Andrews v. John E. Smith's Sons Co.,
369 So. 2d 781, 786 (Ala. 1979) (following Turner). The Nissen court found no reason to
extend liability under the "continuity of enterprise" theory expressed in Mozingo, because the situation was covered by the traditional "mere continuation" exception. Nissen, 323 Md. at 630, 501 A.2d at 572.
79. See Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145, 1153 (1st Cir. 1974); Turner, 244
N.W.2d at 878.
80. See, e.g., Cyr, 501 F.2d at 1154; Turner, 244 N.W.2d at 881-82.
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the policies of strict liability fail to support the extension of liability
in the successor corporation context."'
a.

Strict Products Liability Policies.-Because the "continuity of

enterprise" exception was created in the context of strict products
liability cases, it is important to consider the underlying tort policies
in order to determine the exception's validity. In Phipps v. General
Motors Corp.,82 the Court of Appeals identified four major policy rationales to justify adopting strict liability."3 First, the "proof of a

defect rendering a product unreasonably dangerous is a sufficient
showing of fault on the part of the seller to impose liability without

placing an often impossible burden on the plaintiff of proving specific acts of negligence."8

4

Second, when manufacturers put prod-

ucts into the market there is an implied representation of safety
upon which consumers reasonably rely. 5 Third, imposition of liability will cause manufacturers to remedy the defective products and
improve their safety.8 6 Finally, the manufacturer is in the best position to spread the cost of the plaintiff's injury through pricing or
liability insurance or both. 7
The Nissen court made it clear that the main factor underlying
strict products liability in Maryland is the concept of fault; a manu-

facturer who places an unreasonably dangerous and defective product into the stream of commerce should be held responsible for that
product.8 8 In advocating the "continuity of enterprise" exception,
81. See supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
82. 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976).
83. See id. at 352, 363 A.2d at 963; see also Lenard, supra note 22, at 688-95 (discussing the four main policy rationales behind strict liability).
84. Phipps, 278 Md. at 343, 363 A.2d at 958.
85. See id. at 352, 363 A.2d at 963. The Court of Appeals stated:
"[B]y marketing his product for use and consumption, [the seller] has undertaken and assumed a special responsibility toward any member of the consuming public who may be injured by it; . . . the public has the right to and does
expect, in the case of products which it needs and for which it is forced to rely
upon the seller, that reputable sellers will stand behind their goods."
Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, cmt. c (1965)).
86. See id. at 352-53, 363 A.2d at 963 ("[T]he seller of that product is in a better
position to take precautions and protect against the defect."); Lenard, supra note 22, at
691-92 (referring to this policy as the "deterrence" rationale).
87. See Phipps, 278 Md. at 352, 363 A.2d at 963. The Phipps court stated " 'that public
policy demands that the burden of accidental injuries ... be placed upon those who
market [the harmful products], and be treated as a cost of production against which
liability insurance can be obtained.'" Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 402A, cmt. c (1965)).
88. See 323 Md. at 624, 594 A.2d at 569. Other states weigh the policies underlying
strict liability differently than Maryland. For example, in California, products liability
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the respondents in Nissen and the courts in Cyr and Turner failed to
address the causation requirement or any concept of fault. Successor corporations neither manufacture the defective products nor
place them into the market, and so do not implicitly represent to the
public any guarantee of safety or quality. As the Nissen court noted,
"[a] corporate successor is not a seller and bears no blame in bringing the product and the user together."8 9
Without some nexus between the successor corporation and
the injured consumer, it is reasonable to conclude that no duty of
care is assumed by the successor. Under the "continuity of enterprise" theory, the nexus between the successor corporation and the
injured consumer is based on "continuity of management, personnel, physical location, assets, and general business operations." 90
This connection is insufficient to impose a duty, however, because
without continuity of ownership, the successor and the predecessor
corporations are two completely separate entities. 9 ' Because the
successor and predecessor are both autonomous and independent
corporations, it would be improper to hold one liable for the unrelated acts of the other.9" Thus, the Nissen court properly rejected
the "continuity of enterprise" theory as inconsistent with the law of
strict products liability in Maryland.
b. "Bona Fide Purchaser"and "Duty to Warn" Theories.-Although
the Court of Appeals was reluctant to extend liability under the enterprise theory, dicta in the decision left open the opportunity for
products liability plaintiffs to go beyond the traditional exceptions
of the general rule and sue successor corporations based on an inplaintiffs do not have to prove that defects are "unreasonably dangerous." See Cronin v.
J.B.E. Olson Corp., 501 P.2d 1153, 1155 (Cal. 1972). In addition, the Supreme Court of
California has created the liberal "product line" exception to the general rule of successor nonliability. See Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3, 11 (Cal. 1977). These factors indicate that California courts afford more weight to the "cost spreading" rationale, as
opposed to "causation."
89. 323 Md. at 624, 594 A.2d at 569.
90. Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 244 N.W.2d 873, 879 (Mich. 1976) (setting
out the first element of the four-part test for "continuity of enterprise").
91. The existence of continuity of ownership is the key requirement for the "mere
continuation" exception of the successor nonliability rule. See supra note 57. This exception is consistent with the concept of fault because when there is continuity of ownership, the successor and predecessor are really the same entity under a different shell.
Lenard, supra note 22, at 699-700. In this scenario, the successor has played a part in
manufacturing the defective product and placing it into the stream of commerce, and
consequently should be held responsible for the plaintiff's injuries. Id.
92. See Lenard, supra note 22, at 699-700.
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dependent "duty to warn" or a "bona fide purchaser" theory. 9
Both theories are consistent with the policies underlying strict products liability.
(1) "Bona Fide Purchaser" Theory.-Under the "bona fide purchaser" theory, a successor corporation may be held liable for the
"defective products of its predecessor only if it knew or should have
known of those defective products." 94 This theory is in accord with
the rationales underlying strict products liability. Although the successor corporation did not manufacture the defective product or
place it in the stream of commerce, the successor may be at fault if it
"knowingly or negligently contributed causally to the plaintiff's inability to recover from the predecessor.- 9 5 The successor corporation may know that the predecessor is planning to dissolve soon
after the asset acquisition, thereby preventing injured plaintiffs from
recovering.9 6 Although the Nissen court noted that a successor's
knowledge of a predecessor's defective products and potential tort
claims may fall under the fourth exception to the general rule, which
covers fraudulent transactions,9 7 it found the "bona fide purchaser"
rule to be "an interesting alternative to the continuity of enterprise
theory. '"98 Because the respondents had not alleged that Nissen had
knowledge of any defect, the "interesting alternative" was inapplicable in Nissen. 9 9
(2) "Duty to Warn" Theory.-A successor corporation's knowledge of a predecessor's defective products may also give rise to 1ia93. See Nissen, 323 Md. at 624-26 & nn.2-3, 594 A.2d at 569-70 & nn.2-3.
94. Murphy, supra note 14, at 848.
95. Lenard, supra note 22, at 705. Lenard also notes that the "bona fide purchaser"
theory is consistent with the "deterrence" rationale because liability under this rule
would discourage a successor corporation from entering into transactions when it knows
of the predecessor's defective products and potential tort claims. Id.; see also Murphy,
supra note 14, at 849 ("[U]nder'the ['bona fide purchaser'] theory the deterrence is the
prevention of the manipulation of the structure of an asset acquisition for the sole purpose of avoiding products liability claims.").
96. See Murphy, supra note 14, at 849. While the causal connection between the successor's actions and the plaintiffs' inability to recover for their injuries does not fit the
traditional notion of causation in tort law, "it is not that much of a departure ... in light
of the fact that . . . tort law often imposes liability on distributors and retailers even
though they had no reason to know that products . . . were defective." Id.
97. See 323 Md. at 624 n.2, 594 A.2d at 569 n.2. The fourth exception states that a
successor may be held liable if the asset acquisition was made fraudulently, in bad faith,
or without adequate consideration. Id. at 617, 594 A.2d at 566.
98. Id. at 624 n.2, 594 A.2d at 569 n.2.
99. See id.
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bility based on an "independent duty to warn."'' ° A successor has a
duty to warn owners of its predecessor's defective products if: "(1)
the successor knows or should know of defects . . . and (2) some
type of special relationship exists between the successor corporation
and the owners of products manufactured by the successor's predecessor."' 0 ' If successor corporations have knowledge of a defect
and have some special relationship with the consumers who own the
product, they will be in a position to repair the defective product or
notify the owners of the defect. 0 2 Failure to warn owners of a
known defect or remedy the condition may give rise to successor
liability. The "duty to warn" theory is compatible with strict liability
policies because liability stems directly from a successor's "breach
of its own duty of care, rather than for its predecessor's breach of a
03
duty."
The Court of Appeals did not have to address the duty to warn
issue in Nissen because it was not raised by the parties. Liability
based on an "independent duty to warn," however, may be a viable
tool for products liability claims falling outside the scope of the
traditional rule of successor nonliability.
5. Conclusion.-In Nissen, the Court of Appeals adopted the
majority rule of successor nonliability and its four well-recognized
exceptions in a products liability case in which a successor corporation purchased the assets of its predecessor. 0 4 Expansion of successor liability under the "continuity of enterprise" exception was
rejected because it was found to be incompatible with the policies
underlying strict products liability in Maryland.'0 5 The fatal defect
in the enterprise theory is that it abandons any concept of fault and
imposes liability on a successor corporation because it is perceived
as the party best able to spread the cost of the injuries. While the
100. See id. at 626 n.3, 594 A.2d at 570 n.3.
101. Murphy, supra note 14, at 846. In determinigg whether a successor knew or
should have known of the defects, courts consider the following factors: "sufficient contact between successor corporation and purchasers of the predecessor's goods; remoteness in time between the predecessor-manufacturer and the defendant-successor; and
geographical remoteness between the predecessor and successor." Id. at 830-31 (footnotes omitted). To determine whether a special relationship exists, courts focus on the
continuity between the successor and predecessor corporations. Id. at 831. Courts also
consider whether a successor serviced any of the predecessor's service contracts, performed maintenance or remedial service on any of the predecessor's products, or knew
the identity and location of consumers who purchased the predecessor's products. Id.
102. Id. at 847.
103. Id.
104. See 323 Md. at 632, 594 A.2d at 573.
105. See supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
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enterprise theory was rejected, dicta in the Court of Appeals' decision indicates that products liability plaintiffs may be able to hold a
successor corporation liable under a "bona fide purchaser" theory
or an "independent duty to warn."' 1 6 Neither theory has yet been
tested, however, by the Maryland appellate courts.
B.

Fiduciary Duty and Professional Service Corporations

In Mar, P.C. v. Langhoff,' °7 the Court of Appeals held that an
oral contract concerning the allocation of cases between a professional service corporation and a departing shareholder terminated
the relationship between the parties as well as the fiduciary duty dethe allocated cases became "new
rived from that relationship;'
business" of the new entities.109 The central legal issue of the case
was whether the participants owed the association the fiduciary duty
of partners or the lesser fiduciary duty of corporate employees. The
court did not specify whether the corporate or partnership analysis
should apply, but stated that the result would be the same in either
case. 110
At the heart of the Mar case is Maryland's law on the fiduciary
duty owed by a departing corporate shareholder or a partner during
the dissolution of the corporation or partnership. The Mant decision limits the fiduciary duty of the partners or shareholders in these
circumstances by allowing for the contractual termination of that
duty.111 The Mart court left open, however, the question of whether
professional corporations, also known as "incorporated partnerships,"'

'

2 should be subject to the laws of partnerships or corpora-

106. See supra notes 94-103 and accompanying text.
107. 322 Md. 657, 589 A.2d 470 (1991).
108. See id. at 672-73, 589 A.2d at 477.
109. See id. at 671, 589 A.2d at 477. The court appeared to be particularly influenced

by a similar ruling in a Massachusetts court, Meehan v. Shaughnessy, 535 N.E.2d 1255
(Mass. 1989). The Meehan court held that "[t]he two entities surviving after the dissolution possess 'new business' unconnected with that of the old firm, and the former partners no longer have a continuing fiduciary obligation."

Id. at 1262.

110. See Mart, 322 Md. at 672, 589 A.2d at 477.
111. See id. at 673, 589 A.2d at 477 (stating that the "contract substituted for the
fiduciary duty").
112. " 'Professional corporation' means a corporation which: (1) Is organized under
[the Code] for the exclusive purpose of performing professional service; and (2) Has as
stockholders only individuals licensed in the State to perform the same professional service as the corporation." MD. CORPS & Ass'NS CODE ANN. § 5-101(d) (1985). "Incorporated partnerships" is a term referring to a small corporation in which the stock is
closely held and the distribution of stock is such that. the shareholders share control;
they are simply partnerships that have incorporated in order to take advantage of the
corporate tax structure and to limit personal liability of participants. See generally Kelvin
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tions in regard to the dissolution of the partnership and the
fiduciary duty owed between participants.
1. The Case.-In the middle of 1981, Stephen Langhoff, Esquire, approached the law firm of Marr and Bennett, P.A., with the
proposition of consolidating his practice with that of the firm." 3
Michael Marr and Richard Bennett, partners in Marr and Bennett,
P.A., agreed to consolidate their practices, and the firm changed its
name to Marr, Langhoff, and Bennett, P.A. (ML&B)." 4 Langhoff
moved into the offices occupied by Marr and Bennett, and the three
attorneys agreed on October 19, 1981, that the fees collected after
that date, including fees resulting from work previously done, would
be assets of ML&B.II 5 On November 4, 1981, the State Department
of Assessments and Taxation approved the Articles of Amendment
and Restatement, and ML&B formally came into existence." 6
Joseph Evans, an associate attorney with Marr & Bennett, P.A.,
continued as an associate at ML&B." 17 Prior to the merger, Evans
had been representing Marguerite Cook and three others in an abusive discharge action against their employer, Rite Aid."18 With the
formation of ML&B, it was decided that Langhoff would work with
Evans on the case." 19
In December 1981, Evans left ML&B to join the Maryland Attorney General's Office.' 2 ° Unable to proceed in the Cook action,
Evans made arrangements to have his wife, Nedda Pray, an experienced litigator, work with Langhoff on the Cook case as an independent contractor. 121
During the fall of 1981, Marr and Langhoff began to disagree
about the financial management of ML&B. 1 22 On December 29,
1981, after only ten weeks in practice together, Langhoff and Marr
H. Dickinson, Partners in a Corporate Cloak: The Emergence and Legitimacy of the Incorporated
Partnership, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 559 (1984).

113. Marr, 322 Md. at 660, 589 A.2d at 471.
114. Id.
115. Id. The court noted that there were two exceptions to the fee agreement that
were not material to the case. See id.
116. Langhoffv. Marr, P.C., 81 Md. App. 438, 441, 568 A.2d 844, 845 (1990), vacated
and remanded, 322 Md. 657, 589 A.2d 470 (1991). Marr and Langhoff each held 37.5% of
the stock and Bennett held 25% of the stock. Id.
117. Marr, 322 Md. at 660, 589 A.2d at 471.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 661, 589 A.2d at 471. As an Assistant Attorney General, Evans was not
permitted to engage in the private practice of law. Id.
121. Id., 589 A.2d at 471-72.
122. Id., 589 A.2d at 472.
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agreed that ML&B would be dissolved and that Langhoff's last day
with the firm would be January 1, 1982.123 At some point near
Langhoff's last day with the firm, Langhoff and Bennett agreed that
Langhoff would keep the cases that belonged to him and that Marr
1 24
and Bennett would likewise retain their cases.
Langhoff subsequently moved out of the office, taking the Cook
file with him.' 25 When Bennett, who considered the Cook case the
property of Marr & Bennett, P.A., discovered that the case was missing, he called Langhoff. 1 26 Admitting that he had the file, Langhoff
stated that he would let the clients decide who they wanted to represent them.' 27 Langhoff and Bennett thereafter spoke with Evans,
who stated that the Cook clients should be represented by Langhoff
and Pray.' 2 8 Evans arranged a meeting with the clients at which
they agreed, upon Evans's suggestion, to be represented by
Langhoff and Pray.'

29

In January 1986, after judgment in favor of the Cook plaintiffs
was affirmed, Langhoff and Pray each received a portion of their
share of the contingency fee.130 The action was thereafter com3
menced by Michael E. Marr, P.C.' '
123. Id.
124. Id. The court referred to the agreement as the "Langhoff-Bennett" contract.
Bennett testified, "I broached the topic, whatever is yours is yours, and whatever is ours
is ours." Id. Langhoff gave a similar version of the conversation. "[W]e had a specific
discussion regarding [an unrelated matter] but other than that.., we were ...going to
go our separate ways and continue on ...basically as we were before [the merger of the
practices]." Id. at 661-62, 589 A.2d at 472. Marr did not challenge Bennett's authority
to contract for the corporation. Id. at 667 n.3, 589 A.2d at 475 n.3.
125. Id. at 662, 589 A.2d at 472.
126. Id. After Langhoff's departure, the professional service corporation was
renamed Marr & Bennett, P.A. Id. It is noteworthy that the Court of Special Appeals
commented that "[i]t
is clear from the record that the work contribution of Marr to the
success of the [Cook] case was infinitesimal when compared with that of Langhoff and
Pray." Langhoff v. Marr, P.C., 81 Md. App. at 442, 568 A.2d at 846.
127. Mart, 322 Md. at 662, 589 A.2d at 472.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 663, 589 A.2d at 472-73. Langhoff and Pray received the remainder of the
fee in the summer of 1986. Id. The Cook case is reported as Moniodis v. Cook, 64 Md.
App. 1, 494 A.2d 212, cert. denied, 304 Md. 631, 500 A.2d 649 (1985).
131. Marr, 322 Md. at 663, 589 A.2d at 473. Michael E. Marr, P.C. is the successor to
Marr and Bennett, P.A., which was the successor of ML&B. Id. at 662, 589 A.2d at 472.
The original complaint was filed against Langhoff, Pray, and Evans and contained
four counts:
(I) tortious interference with the contracts of representation between Marr P.C.
and the Cook plaintiffs; (II) conspiracy among the defendants to induce the
breach of those contracts; (III) breach of fiduciary duty owed to Marr P.C.; and
(IV) a count, labeled "assumpsit," which alleged that the defendants "have re-
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The sole theory of recovery presented at trial by Marr was that
32
Langhoff had breached the fiduciary duty he owed to ML&B.1
Marr argued that the legal relationship between Marr, Langhoff, and
Bennett was that of partners, and because partners owe each other a
fiduciary duty during the winding up of business, there was a viable
33
cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty against Langhoff.'
The trial court agreed that partnership law should apply to the
professional service corporation when determining the nature and
extent of the fiduciary duty owed by Langhoff during dissolution.
The trial court, finding that Langhoff breached the fiduciary duty
owed by partners, ruled in favor of Marr.1 34 The Court of Special
Appeals vacated the trial court's decision, however, finding that the
trial court had erred in applying partnership law to the ML&B corporation. Because the court determined that corporate laws applied, the case was remanded for a new trial in which corporate law
1 35
would govern.
36
The Court of Appeals granted cross petitions for certiorari.
The court determined that the Bennett-Langhoff agreement terminated the fiduciary duty owed under either partnership or corporate
law, and therefore there was no basis for a breach of fiduciary duty
claim.1 3 7 Because the contract theory disposed of the case, the
court did not reach the question of whether partnership or corporate law applied.'3 8
ceived money which is rightfully that of [Marr P.C.] and should not be allowed
to retain it."
Id. at 663, 589 A.2d at 473 (brackets in original). The claim against Pray was later
dropped. Id. Evans filed a counterclaim "alleging defamation and seeking a promised
bonus"; however, a settlement agreement was reached by Marr and Evans. Id. As part
of that settlement, counts I, II, and IV were dismissed with prejudice as to both Evans
and Langhoff. Id.
132. Id. at 664, 589 A.2d at 473.
133. Id. Marr relied on the Restatement (Second) of Torts to support the existence of this
cause of action. Id. "One standing in a fiduciary relation with another is subject to
liability to the other for harm resulting from a breach of duty imposed by the relation."
RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF TORTS §

874 (1977).

134. Mart, 322 Md. at 664, 589 A.2d at 473. The trial judge agreed with the legal
argument presented by Marr, concluding that Langhoff was liable as a matter of law.
Judgment was entered for Mart, and the trial court denied Langhoff's request to credit
his 37.5% share of ML&B profits against the judgment. Id. at 664-65, 589 A.2d at 47374. The main reason for rejecting Langhoff's request was that the lower court had determined that the Cook case belonged to Marr and Bennett, P.A. under the BennettLanghoff contract. Id. at 665, 589 A.2d at 474.
135. See Langhoff v. Mart, P.C., 81 Md. App. at 461-62, 568 A.2d at 855-56.
136. Marr, P.C. v. Langhoff, 319 Md. 632, 574 A.2d 312 (1990).
137. Alarr, 322 Md. at 667, 589 A.2d at 474.
138. See id.
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Legal Background.-

a. Fiduciary Duty Owed by a Departing Participant of a Corporation.-A participant in a professional service corporation is generally
a shareholder and an officer or employee of the corporation. 1 39 By
virtue of that relationship to the firm, an active participant owes a
fiduciary duty that may limit the participant's opportunity to depart
140
and compete with the corporation.
Although the Maryland courts have not discussed the fiduciary
duty owed by a departing shareholder, there are Maryland cases
dealing with the fiduciary duty owed by departing corporate employees. In C-E-I-R, Inc. v. Computer Dynamics Corp.,141 the Court of
Appeals determined whether there had been a breach of fiduciary
duty by balancing the departing employee's duty of loyalty against
the public policy of preserving free competition and the right of an
individual to become an entrepreneur. 1 42 The defendant-employees had planned to start their own business and solicited business
from the corporate employer's clients. The employees had also
gathered information from the employer's records in order to bid
on a government contract after departure. 4 s The C-E-I-R court reviewed the established principles of fiduciary duty, stating that "the
employment relationship is one of confidence and trust and places
upon the employee a duty to use his best efforts on behalf of his
employer."' 1 44 The court stated further that the agent owes a duty
of" 'loyalty to the interest of the principal and ... [must] avoid any
conflict between that interest and his own self interest.' "145 Finally,
the court noted that although an employee may engage in preparatory acts during the employment, and competition is permissible
following employment, an employee may not solicit his employer's
clients during the employment.' 4 6
139. There is no requirement, however, that a participant be an employee or active
participant. See MD. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. § 5-106 (1985).
140. See generally HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS
§ 236 (1983).
141. 229 Md. 357, 183 A.2d 374 (1962).
142. See id. at 366, 183 A.2d at 379.
143. Id. at 360-65, 183 A.2d at 376-78.
144. Id. at 366, 183 A.2d at 379.
145. Id. (quoting Maryland Credit Fin. Co. v. Hagerty, 216 Md. 83, 90, 139 A.2d 230,
233 (1958)).
146. See id. at 366-67, 183 A.2d at 374; see also Becker v. Bailey, 268 Md. 93, 102, 299
A.2d 835, 840 (1973) (holding a postemployment noncompetition agreement unreasonable).
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Maryland Metals, Inc. v. Metzner 14 7 expounded on the fiduciary
duty owed by a corporate officer or upper management employee.
The Court of Appeals restated the general rule that a corporate officer owes "an undivided and unselfish loyalty to the corporation."' 14 8 Based on this general rule and the C-E-I-R rule on
departing employees, the court concluded that an officer cannot
compete with the corporation or solicit the corporation's customers
during her tenure as officer.' 4 9 However, the court in Maryland Metals acknowledged the policy of enhancing free competition by recognizing a privilege in favor of departing officers that "enables them
to prepare or make arrangements to compete with [the corporation]
prior to leaving the employ of their prospective rivals without fear of
' 50
incurring liability for breach of fiduciary duty of loyalty."'
In Dworkin, D.D.S., P.A. v. Blumenthal,' the trial court applied
the departing corporate employee principles to a professional association of dentists. The departing employees had compiled a patient list from the association's files prior to departure, and the
association sued them for breach of fiduciary duty.' 52 The Court of
Special Appeals held that the trial court's decision, which was based
on corporate law and concluded that the employees did not breach
their fiduciary duty, was not clearly erroneous. 53 Significantly, the
case applied Maryland corporate law concerning fiduciary duty to a
professional service corporation. 154
The Maryland Professional Service Corporation Act addresses
147. 282 Md. 31, 382 A.2d 564 (1978).
148. Id. at 38, 382 A.2d at 568.
149. See id.
150. Id. at 39, 382 A.2d at 569. The court noted that the privilege is not absolute, and
does not "immunize employees from liability where the employee has committed some
fraudulent, unfair or wrongful act," id. at 40-41, 382 A.2d at 569, such as misappropriation of trade secrets, misuse of confidential information, solicitation of customers prior
to departure, conspiracy leading to mass resignation, or usurpation of the employer's
business opportunity. See id. The court held that the defendant-employees' acts in
Maryland Metals fell "within the mere preparation privilege." Id. at 48, 382 A.2d at 573.
151. 77 Md. App. 744, 551 A.2d 947 (1989).
152. Id. at 779-80, 551 A.2d at 949.
153. Id. at 780, 551 A.2d at 949. The court reviewed whether the patient list constituted a trade secret as a matter of law. If so, the misappropriation of the list would have
constituted a breach of duty and limited the former employees' rights to compete. Id. at
781, 551 A.2d at 950 (citing Operations Research, Inc. v. Davidson & Talbird, Inc., 241
Md. 550, 556, 217 A.2d 375, 378-79 (1966)). The Dworkin court held that the "appellant's patient list did not constitute a trade secret." Id. at 782, 551 A.2d at 951.
154. The terms "professional association" and "professional corporation" both identify a professional service corporation. See MD. CORPS. & Ass'Ns CODE ANN. § 5-109
(1985).
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the operations of professional service corporations. 5 ' Although
the Act does not specifically address the fiduciary duty owed by a
departing participant, it does state that dissolution does not occur
upon the departure of one of the participants and must take place in
1 56
accordance with the Maryland General Corporation Law.
Likewise, the Maryland General Corporation Law does not specifically address the fiduciary duty owed by shareholders or officers
during dissolution. It is clear, however, that during the dissolution
phase, shareholders and officers are not relieved of their obliga57
tions, including their fiduciary obligation.
b. Fiduciary Duty Owed During the Winding Up of Partnerships.Partnerships are governed by the Maryland Uniform Partnership
Act.' 58 Subtitle 6 of the Act states that when a partnership is dissolved, "the partnership is not terminated but continues until the
59
winding up of partnership affairs."1
One of the basic characteristics of partnerships is the fiduciary
duty that the partners owe to one another and to the partnership
entity.'16 The leading case in Maryland on the fiduciary duty owed
during dissolution of a partnership is Resnick v. Kaplan.16 1 In Resnick, a partner who handled many of the partnership's cases after the
155. See Act of April 22, 1975, ch. 311, § 2, 1975 Md. Laws 1489 (codified at MD.
CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. §§ 5-101 to -122 (1985)).
156. MD. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. § 5-107. This section provides: "A professional corporation has perpetual existence until dissolved in accordance with [the Maryland General Corporation Law] .... " Id.; see also id. § 1-103.
157. Id. § 3-419(a). "The voluntary or involuntary dissolution of a corporation does
not relieve its stockholders, directors, or officers from any obligation or liability imposed
on them by law." Id.
158. See Act of April 22, 1975, ch. 311, § 2, 1975 Md. Laws 1489 (codified at MD.
CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. §§ 9-101 to -703 (1985)).
159. MD. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. § 9-601. The Act defines dissolution as "the
change in the relation of the partners caused by any partner ceasing to be associated in
the carrying on as distinguished from the winding up of the business." Id. § 9-101(e).
160. See id. § 9-404 (holding the "partner accountable as a fiduciary"); see also Herring
v. Offutt, 266 Md. 593, 597, 295 A.2d 876, 879 (1972) (stating that the "partnership
relation is of a fiduciary character which carries with it the requirement of utmost good
faith and loyalty and the obligation of each member to make full disclosure"). See gener-

ally

ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, 2 BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIP § 7.08 (1988); HAROLD G. REUSCHLIEN & WILLIAM A. GREGORY, HANDBOOK ON THE
LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP § 188 (1979); Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L.
REV. 795 (1983).

161. 49 Md. App. 499, 434 A.2d 582 (1981); see also Geo. Bert. Cropper, Inc. v. Wisterco Invs., Inc., 284 Md. 601, 616-17, 399 A.2d 585, 592-93 (1979) (noting that a partner may bind the partnership during dissolution for acts relating to the winding up of
the partnership).
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dissolution failed to provide an accounting to his ex-partner. 6 2 Applying the Maryland Uniform Partnership Act, the Court of Special
Appeals reiterated that "after [its] dissolution . . .[the partnership]

was not terminated but continued until the winding up of its affairs
was complete."'' 63 Further, because the partners had a duty, based
on their contractual and professional obligations, to complete the
unfinished work of the dissolving partnership, 164 the fiduciary duty
65
owed by the partners continued during the winding up process.1
Therefore, a partner had no right, beyond the partnership agreement, to compensation for completing the unfinished work, and the
166
fees collected had to be distributed in accord with the agreement.
In contrast to the corporate fiduciary duty, the duty owed by a partner is more expansive and continues beyond the termination of
employment.
3. The Court's Reasoning; Analysis.-In Marr, the Court of Appeals declined to decide whether dissolution of a professional service corporation and the related fiduciary duties should be governed
by partnership or corporation law.' 6 7 The court held that the oral
contract entered into by Langhoff and Bennett allocated the unfinished business between the parties and therefore extinguished any
16 8
continuing duty of loyalty, regardless of which law applied.
The court first addressed the oral contract, noting that the parties did not dispute the existence or objective manifestations underlying the contract; rather, their dispute centered around the legal
interpretation and consequences of the agreement.' 6 9 As stated by
the court, when the facts surrounding the execution and content of
162. 49 Md. App. at 501-05, 434 A.2d at 584-86.
163. Id. at 506-07, 434 A.2d at 587; see MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 9-601.
164. Resnick, 49 Md. App. at 507, 434 A.2d at 587 (citing Geo. Bert. Cropper, Inc. v.
Wisterco Invs., Inc., 284 Md. 601, 399 A.2d 585 (1979)).
165. Id. (citing MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 9-404; Herring v. Offutt, 266 Md.
593, 295 A.2d 876 (1972)).
166. Id. In Berkson v. Berryman, 62 Md. App. 79, 488 A.2d 504, cert. denied, 303 Md.
295, 493 A.2d 349 (1985), the court rejected the appellant's request to distinguish a
similar case on the grounds that the majority of the clients in Berkson belonged to the
appellants prior to entering into a short-lived partnership. Id. at 93, 488 A.2d at 512.
The argument failed. Id. at 94, 488 A.2d at 512.
167. See 322 Md. at 667, 589 A.2d at 474.
168. See id. The Court of Appeals first noted that it assumed, without deciding, that
the Court of Special Appeals decided correctly that the dismissal with prejudice of the
assumpsit count would not preclude or bar the tort action of breach of fiduciary duty.
See id. at 666, 589 A.2d at 474. This approach is questionable, however, because, in the
words of the Court of Special Appeals, the assumpsit issue "could render the other ...
issues moot." Langhoffv. Marr, P.C., 81 Md. App. at 444, 568 A.2d at 847.
169. AMarr, 322 Md. at 667, 589 A.2d at 475.
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a contract are undisputed, the interpretation of the contract rests
with the court.1 7 0 "In Maryland, under the objective law of contracts, a court, in construing an agreement, must first determine
from the language of the agreement itself, what a reasonable person
in the position of the parties would have meant at the time it was
7
effectuated." ' '
Under the partnership theory, the court interpreted the contract to end immediately the winding up of ML&B. 1 72 Under the
corporate theory, the contract was interpreted to extinguish any
fiduciary duty owed by the departing shareholder, Langhoff.' 73 The
court only developed the analysis of the partnership model, however, suggesting that it is more appropriate to apply principles of
partnership law to the dissolution of professional service
74
corporations.'
The court summarized the fiduciary duty owed by a partner
upon dissolution of the partnership:
Work in progress at the time of dissolution is an asset of
the dissolved firm and the partners of the dissolved firm
have an obligation to complete the work in progress. The
compensation of the partners for completing work in progress during the winding up of the dissolved partnership is
determined, absent special agreement, by the partner's
in75
terest in the profits of the dissolved partnership.
The court noted that upon completion of the winding up, the mutual fiduciary duties are extinguished.' 76 Therefore, if the partners
agree to settle their accounts at the same time they agree to dissolution, and a new entity continues the business, " 'unfinished business
loses its character as partnership property, and the outgoing partner
severs the fiduciary association that binds him to the post-dissolution entity.' "177
To support its assertion that the oral contract terminated the
partners' fiduciary duties, the court cited a Massachusetts case,
170. Id. (citing American Towing & Lightering Co. v. Baker-Whiteley Coal Co., 111
Md. 504, 522, 75 A. 341, 344 (1909)).
171. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Insurance Comm'r, 293 Md. 409, 420, 445 A.2d 14,
19 (1982); see also Herget v. Herget, 319 Md. 466, 470, 573 A.2d 798, 804-05 (1990).
172. See Marr, 322 Md. at 668, 589 A.2d at 475.
173. See id. at 672, 589 A.2d at 477 (stating that the "contract extinguishes the fiduciary duties ... even if the correct analysis here proceeds on a corporate model").
174. See id.
175. Id. at 668-69, 589 A.2d at 475.
176. See id. at 670, 589 A.2d at 476.
177. Id. (quoting Beckman v. Framer, 579 A.2d 618, 634 (D.C. 1990)).
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Meehan v. Shaughnessy.' 78 In that case, the partnership agreement at
issue had a clause providing for the winding up of the firm upon the
occurrence of certain events.17 9 The Meehan court held that the
agreement had the effect of winding up the firm immediately upon
the occurrence of the stated conditions, and therefore no unfinished
business remained and no fiduciary duty was owed by the partners
departing after the dissolution.' 80 Likewise, the Marr court held
that the Langhoff-Bennett contract effected a winding up of ML&B,
leaving no unfinished business and terminating Langhoff's fiduciary
duty. 8' Therefore, the claim based on breach of fiduciary duty
18 2
failed as a matter of law.
Unlike the agreement in Meehan, the agreement in Marr did not
specifically state that it was completing the winding up of the firm,
yet the Court of Appeals found that to be the objectively reasonable
effect of the contract.' 8 ' Therefore, it appears likely that Maryland
courts will construe agreements made by departing partners or
shareholders broadly so as to terminate any continuing relationship,
and in the case of partnerships, to end the winding up period.
Clauses in partnership agreements relating to the allocation of work
during the winding up period will likely be interpreted as immediately ending the winding up process.
After its discourse on partnership law, the court, without discussion, held that the result would have been the same under the
corporate model.' 84 The court may have declined to examine the
corporate model because of the Court of Special Appeals' careful
analysis using corporate law. Interestingly, however, the Court of
Special Appeals did not decide whether Langhoff owed a duty under
corporate law; rather, the case was remanded to the trial court for
further proceedings on that issue.' 8 5 The Court of Appeals found
that remand was unnecessary, however, because even if Langhoff
178. 535 N.E.2d 1255 (Mass. 1989), cited in Marr, 322 Md. at 670, 589 A.2d at 476.
179. See Meehan, 535 N.E.2d at 1261.
180. Id. at 1262 ("[T]he former partners no longer have a continuing fiduciary obliga-

tion to wind-up for the benefit of each other the business they shared in their former
partnership."); see also supra note 109.
181. See 322 Md. at 671, 589 A.2d at 477.
182. Id. at 672-73, 589 A.2d at 477.
183. See id. at 672, 589 A.2d at 477. Marr unsuccessfully argued "that it was not the
intent of the parties to the Langhoff-Bennett contract to waive fiduciary duties." Id.
184. See id.

185. See Langhoffv. Marr, P.C., 81 Md. App. at 462, 568 A.2d at 855-56. The Court
of Special Appeals was unclear as to whether Marr's complaint asserted the claim for
breach of fiduciary duty based on Langhoff's position as an officer, director, or shareholder of the corporation. Id.
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had owed a fiduciary duty under corporate law, the contract extinguished the duty.' 8 6
In its conclusion, the court noted that "Langhoff may well have
breached the Langhoff-Bennett contract by physically taking the
87
Cook file, but Marr, P.C. has not sued on that express contract."'1
Therefore, it appears that it was Marr's inadequate pleading that ultimately caused the loss.
Finally, the court added a note of warning to those law partnerships that may try to protect themselves from a predicament like
that of Marr by providing a covenant not to compete after dissolution in their partnership agreements. 88 Rule 5.6(a) of the Maryland
Rules of Professional Conduct clearly prohibits such covenants. 89
4. The Unanswered Question.-The larger question, which the
court did not answer, is whether professional service corporations
or incorporated partnerships should be subject to partnership or
corporate laws. Although the court did not decide whether partnership or corporate law controlled, the court did intimate that, at least
as to fiduciary duty issues, partnership law is applicable to professional service corporations. 190 Whether partnership or corporate fiduciary duties should be imposed on a shareholder in a professional
service corporation is a question involving policy concerns and statutory interpretation questions.
a. Public Policy.-Underlying the question of whether partnership fiduciary duties should be applied to members of professional
service corporations is the question of whether lawyers should be
held to a higher level of fiduciary duty than other corporate participants. Public policy concerns, such as the need for civility among
"professionals" and the need to ensure that the clients' interests are
protected, present a strong argument that lawyers should be held to
a higher standard.
Partnership law requires a high level of loyalty and honesty between partners.' 9 ' Relieving shareholders in professional service
186. See Marr, 322 Md. at 667, 589 A.2d at 474-75.
187. Id. at 673, 589 A.2d at 477-78.
188. See id., 589 A.2d at 478 (quoting MARYLAND RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

Rule 5.6(a) (1991)).
189. The Rule prohibits an attorney from entering into a "partnership or employment
agreement that restricts the rights of a lawyer to practice after termination of the rela-

tionship."

MARYLAND RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.6(a) (1991).
190. See supra text accompanying note 174.

191. Judge Cardozo, comparing joint venture participants to partners, wrote:
[Partners] owe to one another.., the duty of the finest loyalty. Many forms of
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corporations from the fiduciary duties of partnership creates a dual
system in which attorneys practicing within a professional association will be held to a lower standard than those practicing in traditional partnerships. If held to the corporate standard, the fiduciary
duty of an attorney in an incorporated partnership would be reduced to that of a corporate employee.
In deciding to apply partnership law, the trial court in Marr
found the reasoning of a California case, Fox v. Abrams,' 9 2 to be persuasive.' 93 In Fox, the California Court of Appeals, citing the strong
policy concerns of client autonomy and lawyer integrity, held that
state law covering dissolution of partnerships applied to professional service corporations practicing law.' 94 The Fox court concluded that the fees in question resulted from cases that were the
unfinished business of the professional corporation.' 9 5 The California court then applied the holding of Jewel v. Boxer,' 9 6 a partnership
case ruling that, due to the fiduciary duty owed by the partners during the winding up phase, the net income generated by the unfinished business should be distributed in accordance with the
partnership agreement.' 9 7 The Fox court found that the Jewel holding was not based simply on partnership law but also on "sound
public policy reasons";' 9 8 therefore, the rule proposed in Jewel leads
to a civilized ending of legal affairs and protects the clients from
high pressure solicitation.' 9 9 The Fox court did not go so far as to
conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm's length, are
forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something
stricter than the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior. As to this
there has developed a tradition that is unbending and inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of courts of equity when petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the "disintegrating erosion" of
particular exceptions ....

Only thus has the level of conduct for fiduciaries

been kept at a level higher than that trodden by the crowd.
Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (citations omitted).
192. 210 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1985).
193. See Mar, 322 Md. at 670, 589 A.2d at 476.
194. 210 Cal. Rptr. at 265-66. "There is no reason to hold that when lawyers decide
to practice together in corporate form rather than partnership, they are relieved of fiduciary obligations toward each other with respect to the corporation's business." Id.
195. See id. at 263.
196. 203 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1984). The Jewel court relied heavily upon Resnick v. Kaplan,
49 Md. App. 499, 506-07, 434 A.2d 582, 587 (1981), which recognized a cause of action
for breach of fiduciary duty during dissolution. See Jewel, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 19; see also Fox,
210 Cal. Rptr. at 266.
197. Jewel, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 19, cited in Fox, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 263.
198. Fox, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 263.
199. Id. The Fox court noted that
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state that it was applying partnership law, but instead declared that
the duty owed by attorneys in a professional corporation is "very
similar" to the duty of partners, and there is no reason to apply different principles for dissolution.2 ° °
b. Statutory Interpretation.-The Court of Special Appeals in
Mare supported its decision to apply corporate law with a Wisconsin
Court of Appeals case, Melby v. Omelia.2 0 1 The Melby court held that
corporate law applied to professional corporations because the professional service corporation statute clearly articulated that the statutes governing the privileges and duties of corporations also governed professional corporations.20 2
An underlying premise of the decision to apply general corporate principles is the issue of legislative intent. The Professional
Service Corporations Act specifically covers dissolution and requires
that dissolution take place according to general corporation law.2 °3
To hold that the dissolution of professional service corporations
should be governed by partnership law would therefore seem to
contradict legislative intent.
The issue centers around the interpretation of section 5-120(b)
of the Maryland Professional Service Corporation Act, which exempts from the Act certain issues that are to be covered by preexisting laws. 20 4 In Marr, the Court of Special Appeals interpreted
-[t]he rule prevents partners from competing for the most remunerative cases
during the life of the partnership in anticipation that they might retain those
cases should the partnership dissolve. It also discourages former partners from
scrambling to take physical possession of files and seeking personal gain by
soliciting a firm's existing clients upon dissolution."
Id. at 265 (quotingJewel, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 18).
200. Id. at 266; see Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Death of Fiduciary Duty in Close Corporations,
138 U. PA. L. REV. 1675, 1724-30 (1990) (advocating application of a higher standard of
fiduciary duty to close corporations); cf. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d
505, 516 (Mass. 1975) (finding a higher level of fiduciary duty owed between members
of a close corporation) (later qualified by Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, 353
N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976)). See generally Dickinson, supra note 112, at 559 (encouraging
judicial recognition of incorporated partnerships as a unique form of business
association).
201. 286 N.W.2d 373 (Wis. 1979), cited in Langhoffv. Marr, P.C., 81 Md. App. at 46061, 568 A.2d at 855.
202. 286 N.W.2d at 374 ("[C]orporate standards should apply when a shareholder
withdraws from a service corporation.").
203. See MD. CORPS. & Ass'Ns CODE ANN. § 5-107 (1985).
204. Id. § 5-120(b). This section provides:
This subtitle does not alter any law of the State applicable to:
(1) The professional relationship and liabilities between a person performing
the professional service and a person receiving it; or
(2) The standards for professional conduct.
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this savings clause as ensuring that professional corporations are
"held to the same standards for professional conduct that prevail
regardless of corporate structure. "205 Then, without explanation,
the court concluded that corporate law applied unless there was
"some other law of [Maryland] in conflict with the Professional Ser20 6
vice Corporation Act."-

The Court of Special Appeals' interpretation of section 5120(b) of the Professional Service Corporation Act is questionable.
Because the main purpose of the savings clause was undoubtedly to
preserve the common-law liabilities of partners, 0 7 it would follow
that the legislature wanted to preserve the common-law standards
for professional conduct as well. The plain meaning of the section
is that the Professional Service Corporation Act does not alter any
existing law of the state, including the common law, with respect to
liability or professional standards of conduct. It can be argued that
the fiduciary duty owed between partners is an element of professional conduct and therefore was not intended to be altered by the
statute.20 8
Because the public policy analysis and the Court of Special Appeals' opinion contradict the statutory interpretation analysis as applied by the Court of Appeals, the Marr court should have answered
the "unanswered question." Unfortunately, the lack of guidance
will cause litigation and confusion until the court or the General Assembly confronts the issue of whether partnership law or corporate
law applies to the fiduciary duty among participants in professional
service corporations.

Id.
205. Langhoff v. Marr, P.C., 81 Md. App. at 453, 568 A.2d at 851.

206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Some insight into the legislative intent of the Maryland Professional Service Corporation Act was provided in a recent article co-authored by a sponsor of the bill that
became the Act. See Melvin A. Steinberg et al., Liability in a ProfessionalService Corporation,
23 MD. B.J., Mar.-Apr. 1990, at 33. According to the authors, the legislature's intent was

simply to afford professionals the same benefits enjoyed by corporate officers. Id. at 35.
The legislature's intent was not to alter the liability provisions relating to professionals depending upon which form of entity they choose, but merely to provide tax parity. There was a serious concern in the legislature that the Act in its
original form would enable professionals to relieve themselves from personal
liability to their clients or patients by practicing in the form of a corporation.
Id. Based on this article, however, it appears that the legislature focused only on maintaining the relationship between the professionals and their clients and not on the relationship among the professionals.

1992]

CORPORATE LAW

5. Conclusion.-The holding in Marr permits a shareholder in a
professional corporation to terminate his fiduciary duty to the corporation by contractually allocating the unfinished work of the corporation between the shareholders. The Court of Appeals used a
standard of objective reasonableness to give the Langhoff-Bennett
contract broad ramifications affecting the separation of the parties.
Because the contract specifically governed the allocation of work in
progress, the Court of Appeals interpreted the contract as finalizing
the winding up of ML&B and extinguishing any fiduciary duty owed
by Langhoff.
Although the trial court and the Court of Special Appeals split
on the issue of whether corporate or partnership law applied to the
professional corporation of ML&B, the Court of Appeals did not
resolve the issue. Rather, the contract analysis disposed of the case.
The Court of Appeals' inaction may have implicitly deferred the issue to the legislature, which should consider clarifying the law governing the dissolution of professional service corporations.
JONATHAN
CHRISTOPHER C.

P.

KAGAN

O'HARA

V.

A.

CRIMINAL LAW

Reading Mens Rea Into Statutory Offenses

The Court of Appeals granted certiorari in State v. McCallum' to
consider whether mens rea is an element of the statutory crime of
driving with a suspended license.2 The court held that in order to
convict a defendant of driving with a suspended license, the State
must prove that the defendant knowingly violated the relevant statute.3 With the court's ruling that scienter is required for a conviction of driving with a suspended license, Maryland joins a number of
states that require knowledge or criminal intent for conviction when
the statute prohibiting driving with a suspended license is silent as
to the mens rea element.4
Additionally, McCallum follows a trend in Maryland away from
imposing strict liability for offenses punishable with incarceration
when the statute providing the penalty does not specify a mens rea
element.5 Although the court read into the statute a legislative intent to require actual knowledge,6 it did not address the question of
whether a showing that a defendant had constructive knowledge 7 of
the license suspension would satisfy the State's burden. If actual
1. 321 Md. 451, 583 A.2d 250 (1991).
2. See id. at 452, 583 A.2d at 250. MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 16-303(h) (Supp.

1991) provides that "[a] person may not drive a motor vehicle on any highway or on any
[other specified] property . . . while his license or privilege to drive is suspended." Id.

3. See McCallum, 321 Md. at 457, 583 A.2d at 253.
4. See, e.g.,Jeffcoat v. State, 639 P.2d 308, 312 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982);Jolly v. People, 742 P.2d 891, 894-95 (Colo. 1987); Zamarripa v. FirstJudicial Dist. Court, 747 P.2d
1386, 1389 (Nev. 1987).
5. CompareJenkins v. State, 215 Md. 70, 75-77, 137 A.2d 115, 117-18 (1957) (holding that knowledge need not be proven to convict for drug possession, absent express
statutory language) and Ford v. State, 85 Md. 465, 475-76, 37 A. 172, 174 (1897) (upholding a statute that provided for incarceration upon conviction of possessing a lottery
ticket, without requiring proof of actual knowledge) and Carroll v. State, 63 Md. 551,
557, 3 A. 29, 32 (1885) (holding principal liable when agent sold alcohol to a minor,
despite principal's ignorance of the sale) with Dawkins v. State, 313 Md. 638, 649, 547
A.2d 1041, 1046 (1988) (interpreting a statute that does not mention mens rea but imposes incarceration for drug possession to include a knowledge element) and Comstock
v. State, 82 Md. App. 744, 755-56, 573 A.2d 117, 123 (1990) (construing a statute that
required an individual involved in an automobile accident to stop and assist injured
parties as requiring knowledge that an accident had occurred in order to sustain
conviction).
6. See McCallum, 321 Md. at 456-57, 583 A.2d at 252-53.
7. If one by exercise of reasonable care would have known a fact, he is deemed to
have had constructive knowledge of that fact. BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 284 (5th ed.
1979).
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knowledge must be shown, McCallum creates an incentive for defendants to avoid notification,8 thereby defeating the purpose of
provisions specifically designed to notify drivers of license suspension.9 Yet, the decision leaves unclear whether mere constructive
knowledge satisfies the mens rea requirement. Further, if actual
knowledge is required, it is unclear whether the State may shift the
burden of disproving actual knowledge to the defendant once constructive knowledge is proven; thus, the lower courts may have
problems applying the McCallum decision.'
1. The Case.-On October 12, 1987, Malcolm McCallum was
involved in an automobile accident." McCallum failed to produce
his driver's license upon the request of the investigating officer, who
subsequently determined that McCallum's license had been suspended.12 McCallum later explained at trial that his license was suspended because he had failed to pay a traffic fine.'" He further
explained that he had paid the fine prior to the accident and was on
his way to pick up his reinstated license when the accident
8. 321 Md. at 467, 583 A.2d at 258 (McAuliffe, J., dissenting).
9. See id. at 464-65, 583 A.2d at 256 (McAuliffe, J., dissenting). The notice provision states, in relevant part:
(a) Compliance required.-A person shall comply with the notice to appear
contained:
(1) In a traffic citation issued to the person under this subtitle;
(c) Action by District Court on failure to comply.-If a person fails to comply
with the notice to appear, the District Court or a circuit court may:
(2) After 5 days, notify the Administration of the person's noncompliance.
(d) Suspension of driving privileges.-On receipt of a notice of noncompliance
from the District Court or a circuit court, the Administration shall notify the
person that the person's driving privileges shall be suspended unless, by the
end of the 15th day after the date on which the notice is mailed, the person:
(1) Pays the fine on the original charge as provided for in the original
citations; or
(2) Posts bond or a penalty deposit and requests a new trial date.
(e) Failure to comply with subsection (d).-If a person fails to pay the fine or
post the bond or penalty deposit under subsection (d) of this section, the Administration may suspend the driving privileges of the person.
MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 26-204 (1987 & Supp. 1991).
10. 321 Md. at 458, 583 A.2d at 253 (Chasanow, J., concurring). Judge Chasanow
wrote a concurring opinion because of the court's failure to address what type of knowledge and evidence is required for a conviction. See id.
11. McCallum v. State, 81 Md. App. 403, 407, 567 A.2d 967, 969 (1990), aff'd, 321
Md. 451, 583 A.2d 250 (1991).
12. Id.
13. Id.
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occurred. 1
McCallum was charged with driving with a suspended license,
in addition to several other motor vehicle violations.' 5 At trial, he
stated that at the time of the accident he was not aware that his license had been suspended; he believed that once the fine had been
paid, the suspension was lifted.16 McCallum further alleged that he
never personally received a mailed notice of suspension from the
Motor Vehicle Administration (MVA). Apparently McCallum had
been in jail when the suspension notice arrived at the address listed
in his MVA records as his residence, and his landlord had thrown
away all his mail.' 7
The judge denied the defense request to instruct the jury that
in order to convict McCallum of any of the violations, they had to be
convinced that he committed the crimes knowingly.'" The jury
found McCallum guilty and convicted him of several traffic violations. 9 On the charge of driving with a suspended license, McCallum was sentenced to one year imprisonment with all but ninety
days of the sentence suspended.2 °
McCallum asserted on appeal that the trial judge erred by failing to give the requested defense instruction requiring mens rea as
an element of the offense of driving with a suspended license.2, The
14. Id. at 407-08, 567 A.2d at 969. Apparently, McCallum did not have his license
because at some earlier point another police officer had confiscated it. Id. at 408 n.1,
567 A.2d at 969 n. 1. Despite the fact that the license had been confiscated, McCallum
testified at trial that he had not been notified by the MVA, and had no knowledge of the
suspension. Id.
15. McCallum, 321 Md. at 452, 583 A.2d at 250.
16. Id. at 454, 583 A.2d at 251.
17. Id.
18. Id. In fact, the State's Attorney told the jury in his closing argument that "the
reason the court did not instruct you as to intent is that intent is not required." Id. at
453, 583 A.2d at 251.
19. McCallum v. State, 81 Md. App. at 406-07, 567 A.2d at 968-69. The violations
included: driving a motor vehicle with a suspended license, driving an unregistered vehicle, unauthorized use of a registration card, unauthorized use of a license plate, failure
to display a registration card to a police officer upon request, and failure to display a
driver's license to a police officer upon request. Id.
20. Id. at 407, 567 A.2d at 969.
21. Id. McCallum also raised two other issues on his initial appeal. First, McCallum
contended that the charges should have been dismissed because he was not tried within
the 180-day period as required by rule 4-271, which provides, in pertinent part:
The date for trial in the circuit court shall be set within 30 days after the
earlier of the appearance of counsel or the first appearance of the defendant
before the circuit court pursuant to Rule 4-213, and shall not be later than 180
days after the earlier of those events.
MD. R. 4-271. McCallum contended that by failing to transport him from a county detention center to a scheduled preliminary hearing on March 28, 1988, the state deprived
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Court of Special Appeals reversed the conviction, stating that "[t]he
overall statutory scheme leads us to hold that mens rea is an element of the crime of driving while a license is suspended. 22 The
court considered the notice provisions2 3 evidence that the legislature intended conviction to be predicated on actual knowledge of
the offense. 24 The Court of Appeals granted certiorari and
affirmed. 2 5
2. Legal Background.-The traditional common-law concept of
a crime couples a culpable state of mind-the mens rea-with a prohibited act-the actus reus. 26 Because all people are presumed to
know the law,2 7 the mental element may be satisfied if it can be
shown that the actor had some degree of awareness of the nature of
the proscribed conduct. 28 The conventionally immoral or unethical
nature of the act itself serves to put the actor on notice that it is
him of the right to have his preliminary hearing on the original date. McCallum v. State,
81 Md. App. at 408-09, 567 A.2d at 969-70. Because it was the state's fault that the
preliminary hearing was postponed, McCallum argued that the 180-day period started to
run on the day the hearing was scheduled. Id. at 409, 567 A.2d at 970. Reading the
Rule literally, the Court of Special Appeals rejected this argument. Id. at 409-10, 567
A.2d at 970. The court discussed the state's constitutional obligation to produce an
incarcerated individual for a speedy trial but held that the language of rule 4-271 requires that the period begin running either when the defendant actually appears in court
or when his counsel enters an appearance in the circuit court clerk's office, whichever is
earlier. See id. at 409, 567 A.2d at 970. Regardless of whether the state erred in not
bringing McCallum to court for the preliminary hearing, he had not appeared before the
court. The appropriate date from which to measure the 180 days was the date that
counsel entered his appearance. Given that initial date, the 180-day limit had not been
exceeded. Id. at 409-10, 583 A.2d at 970.
McCallum's second argument in the initial appeal was that the trial judge erred in
allowing the jury to have his entire driving record available for use during their deliberations. Id. at 407, 567 A.2d at 969. The intermediate appellate court held that under rule
4-323(a), McCallum had properly preserved his objection to the introduction of his entire driving record. See id. at 419, 567 A.2d at 975. The court further held that admitting the record was prejudicial error such that reversal and remand were required. See
id. Although not discussing the issue thoroughly, the Court of Appeals agreed with this
determination, noting that on remand, the trial court should redact all portions of the
MVA record "not relevant to the charge at issue." McCallum, 321 Md. at 453, 583 A.2d
at 251.
22. McCallum v. State, 81 Md. App. at 417, 567 A.2d at 974.
23. For the text of the notice provision, see supra note 9.
24. See McCallum v. State, 81 Md. App. at 417-18, 567 A.2d at 974.
25. McCallum, 321 Md. at 457, 583 A.2d at 253.
26. ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW § 10, at 932-33 (3d ed.
1982).
27. Rollin M. Perkins, Ignorance and Mistake in CriminalLaw, 88 U. PA. L. REV. 35, 3739 (1939).
28. Id. at 39.

616

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

51:612

illegal .29
Strict liability offenses, on the other hand, not only presume
that the actor knew the law, but also are punishable regardless of
whether the actor was aware that the act was prohibited.3 0 Strict
liability offenses arose in the nineteenth century, when the onset of
mass industrialization resulted in increased risks of harm to the public. 3 ' Legislatures felt that public welfare and safety would best be
served by punishing violations of the regulations governing certain
activities, regardless of whether the offenders had any awareness
that their conduct violated the regulatory statute.3 2 The abolition of
mens rea was based on a rationale of deterrence: punishing conduct
without requiring that the prosecution show a culpable state of mind
was thought to make people more careful. 33 A second rationale was
based on notions of efficiency: lessening the State's burden of proof
one element of the offense made conviction more
by eliminating
34
certain.
As a result of public welfare legislation, those who engaged in
certain potentially hazardous activities were deemed to have assumed the risk of being held strictly liable.3 5 The overall benefits to
29. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTr, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 1.6(b), at 32 & n.21
(2d ed. 1986). LaFave and Scott make a distinction between "crimes mala in se (wrong in
themselves; inherently evil) and crimes mala prohibita (not inherently evil; wrong only
because prohibited by legislation)." Id.
30. Id. § 3.8, at 242.
31. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 254 (1952) (reciting a brief history
of the factors that compelled legislatures to abolish mens rea for some statutory offenses). Strict liability was also recognized at common law. For example, it was irrelevant that one charged with bigamy reasonably and honestly believed that her first
husband was dead when she remarried. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Mash, 48 Mass. (7
Met.) 472, 474 (1844).
32. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 254-56.
33. In People v. Roby, 18 N.W. 365 (Mich. 1884), the court stated that
as a rule there can be no crime without a criminal intent, but this is not by any
Many statutes which are in the nature of police
means a universal rule ....
regulations . . . impose criminal penalties irrespective of any intent to violate
them, the purpose being to require a degree of diligence for the protection of
the public which shall render violation impossible.
Id. at 366.
34. See LAFAVE & ScoTt, supra note 29, § 3.8(a), at 245; Francis B. Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 58-59 (1933).
35. See Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57, 70 (1910) (finding that a
statute prohibiting the cutting of timber was constitutional under the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause based on the state's police powers). The Shevlin-Carpenter Court noted that
[t]he Supreme Court of the State ... decided that the legislation was in effect
an exercise of the police power, and cited a number of cases to sustain the
proposition that public policy may require that in the prohibition or punishment of particular acts it may be provided that he who shall do them shall do
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public health, welfare, and safety inuring from strict liability were
thought to outweigh the injustice of punishing an individual who
either did not know the nature of the act or who acted without
knowledge that a crime was committed.3 6
Traffic offenses are a classic example of statutory public welfare
offenses.3 7 The hazards associated with motor vehicle travel and the
sheer number of vehicles on the road make it impossible to prosecute traffic offenses in the same manner as other crimes.38 Offenses
such as speeding and parking violations are routine matters generally adjudicated without benefit of counsel or a jury.3 9 In Maryland,
failure to pay the fine assessed by a traffic ticket may result in the
stiffer penalty of license suspension.4 ° Driving with a suspended license escalates the possible punishment to a large fine and
imprisonment. 4 '
Suspension of an individual's driver's license in Maryland must
be preceded by a notice of suspension. 4 2 When an individual fails to
pay a fine or to comply with an order to appear in court, the district
court is required to mail a notice of noncompliance to the MVA. a3
The MVA, in turn, is required to notify the individual that driving
privileges will be suspended unless the individual takes action to
cure the delinquency within fifteen days from the date the notice
was mailed. 4 4 The purpose of the notification requirement is to ensure that drivers have an opportunity to be heard, which avoids pethem at his peril and will not be heard to plead in defense good faith or
ignorance.
Id.

36. Sayre, supra note 34, at 68; cf. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 254 (viewing the violation of
public welfare statutes as disruptive of social controls).
37. Sayre, supra note 34, at 73.
38. McCallum v. State, 81 Md. App. at 411-12, 567 A.2d at 971.
39. Maryland, for example, permits a driver who has been cited for a traffic violation
to pay a fine in lieu of appearing in court. See MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 26-204(b)
(1987 & Supp. 1991).
40. See id. § 26-204(e). For the pertinent text of this section, see supra note 9.
41. See MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 27-101(h). This section states in relevant part:
Any person who is convicted of a violation of any of the provisions of ... § 16303 ... ("Driving while license is canceled, suspended, refused, or revoked")
...is subject to:
(1) For a first offense, a fine of not more than $1,000, or imprisonment
for not more than 1 year, or both; and
(2) For any subsequent offense, a fine of not more than $1,000, or imprisonment for not more than 2 years, or both.
Id.
42. Id. § 26-204.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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nalizing drivers because of mistake or inadvertence in failing to
comply with traffic citations. 4" Noncompliant drivers who should be
on constructive notice of suspension by their failure to pay their
fines are thereby further alerted by the MVA notification.
Without mentioning a scienter requirement, section 16-303(h)
of the Transportation Article prohibits an individual from driving
with a suspended license.4 6 Section 27-101(h) imposes a fine and
the possibility of imprisonment for violation of section 16-303(h).4 7
Courts in other states with similar statutes are split over whether
their legislatures intended to include a knowledge requirement
when drafting the suspension provisions.4 8 Courts that have found
a scienter requirement regard the notice provisions as an indication
of legislative intent to require knowledge.4 9
Punishing defendants who act without adequate notice of the
criminality of their actions raises constitutional due process concerns.5 0 Although the Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of criminal liability without notice, 5 the Court has noted its
dislike for strict liability offenses. 2 In Liparota v. Calfornia,5" the
45. McCallum v. State, 81 Md. App. at 417, 567 A.2d at 974.
46. For the text of this provision, see supra note 2.
47. For the text of § 27-101(h), see supra note 41.
48. For cases in which courts have read a scienter requirement into statutes that punish driving with a suspended or revoked license, see supra note 4. See also McCallum v.
State, 81 Md. App. at 416 n.5, 567 A.2d at 973 n.5 (citing cases holding that scienter is
not a required element of such offenses).
49. See cased cited supra note 4. Some state statutes contain an explicit knowledge
requirement. For example, California's statute provides that:
[k]nowledge of the suspension or revocation of the driving privilege shall be
presumed if notice has been given by the department to the person and knowledge of restriction of the driving privilege shall be presumed if notice has been
given by the court to the person. The presumption established by this subdivision is a presumption affecting the burden of proof.
CAL. VEH. CODE § 14601.2(c) (West 1990 & Supp. 1992).
50. Herbert L. Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 SuP. CT. REV. 107, 10709; see also Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.
401, 431-36 (1958) (discussing the serious constitutional problems raised when courts
fail to read a criminal intent requirement into ambiguous statutory language); Alan
Saltzman, Strict CriminalLiability and the United States Constitution: Substantive Criminal Law
Due Process, 24 WAYNE L. REV. 1571, 1573-74 (1978) (arguing in favor of a constitutional
doctrine of mens rea as a substantive criminal law due process right).
51. See, e.g., United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 252 (1922) (holding that punishing
one ignorant of the facts that make an act illegal does not violate due process of law).
52. See Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 229 (1967) (holding unconstitutional a
conviction for violation of a city ordinance that required convicted felons to sign a register in order to stay within the city limits, when the defendant had no notice of the ordinance); see also Packer, supra note 50, at 127-37.
53. 471 U.S. 419 (1985) (reading a mens rea requirement into 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(2)
(1981), which prohibits food stamp fraud).
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Court noted that at common law, mens rea was assumed to be a
requirement of all penal offenses.5 4 Further, "the failure of Congress explicitly and unambiguously to indicate whether mens rea is
required does not signal a departure from this background assumption of our criminal laws." ' 55 Therefore, the Court acknowledged
that courts may have to infer the scienter requirement in light of
legislative silence.5 6
Likewise, the recent trend in Maryland has gone away from imposing strict liability for statutory offenses. 5 7 For example, in 1988,
the Court of Appeals held in Dawkins v. State5 8 that the State must
prove knowledge in order to convict a defendant of possessing controlled substances, even though the possession statute is silent as to
a mens rea requirement. 59 The Court of Special Appeals stated in
McCallum that it would presume a knowledge requirement absent
express statutory language explicitly excluding a mens rea element.6 0 Additionally, the Court of Special Appeals held in Comstock
v. State6 that in order to be convicted under Maryland's "hit-andrun" statute,6 2 the defendant must have either actually known or
had reason to know that an accident had occurred. 6' The court
noted that despite the absence of the term "knowingly" in the statute, scienter "is logically and legally necessary for one to be guilty of
leaving the scene of a personal injury accident under [the
statute].-64

3. The Court's Reasoning; Analysis.-In McCallum, the Court of
Appeals summarily disposed of the mens rea issue. Rather than exploring the purpose and ramifications of the notice provisions at issue, the majority instead applied the analysis that it had earlier used
in construing the drug possession statute in Dawkins. 5 In doing so,
the Court of Appeals signalled that a requirement of actual knowl54. See id. at 425.
55. Id. at 426.
56. See id. at 426-27.

57. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
58. 313 Md. 638, 547 A.2d 1041 (1988).

59. See id. at 651, 547 A.2d at 1047.
60. 81 Md. App. at 412, 567 A.2d at 971.
61. 82 Md. App. 744, 573 A.2d 117 (1990).
62. MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 20-102(a) (1987 & Supp. 1991) provides: "The driver
of each vehicle involved in an accident that results in bodily injury to or death of any
person immediately shall stop the vehicle as close as possible to the scene of the accident, without obstructing traffic more than necessary." Id.
63. 82 Md. App. at 756-57, 573 A.2d at 123.
64. Id. at 756, 573 A.2d at 123.
65. See McCallum, 321 Md. at 456-57, 583 A.2d at 252-53.
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edge will be read into statutes that do not expressly require mens
rea, despite the true nature of the offense.6 6
The court first observed that there was no clear consensus
among the states about whether driving with a suspended license
requires mens rea. 67 The court failed to note, however, that the majority of those states that have decided the issue have ruled against
reading a scienter requirement into a statute that proscribes driving
with a suspended license.68 In those jurisdictions that imply a mens
rea requirement, the notification scheme is usually considered an
indication that the legislature sought to ensure that any driver
whose license was or would be suspended had actual notice of the
suspension. 6 9
In McCallum, the court ignored the notice provision and employed a public welfare offense paradigm to discern the legislature's
intent. 70 Relying exclusively on three factors set forth in the
Dawkins decision, 7 ' the court concluded that the legislature did not
intend to make driving with a suspended license a public welfare
offense for which McCallum could be held strictly liable.7 2 First, the
court noted that public welfare offenses are generally regulatory
rather than punitive in nature.7" The court determined that the
main purpose of the suspension scheme was not to ensure public
safety, but instead to punish drivers for failing to pay fines. 7 4 Therefore, the statute had only an incidental regulatory effect on the driving population. 75 A statute created primarily to punish drivers for
failure to comply, in the court's view, removed it from the realm of
76
public welfare offenses.
The second factor considered by the court was that public welfare offenses usually carry a penalty which is "so slight that the
courts can afford to disregard the individual in protecting the social

66. See id.
67. See id. at 455, 583 A.2d at 252.
68. See, e.g., State v. Grotzky, 382 N.W.2d 20, 23 (Neb. 1986); State v. Wenof, 246
A.2d 59, 62 (NJ. 1968); State v. Fridley, 335 N.W.2d 785, 788 (N.D. 1983).
69. See, e.g., Jolly v. People, 742 P.2d 891, 894-95 (Colo. 1987).
70. 321 Md. at 456-57, 583 A.2d at 252-53.
71. See id. at 457, 583 A.2d at 253 (citing Dawkins v. State, 313 Md. 638, 547 A.2d
1041 (1988)); see also Sayre, supra note 34, at 70.
72. See McCallum, 321 Md. at 457, 583 A.2d at 252-53.
73. See id.
74. See id., 583 A.2d at 253.
75. Id.
76. See id.
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interest." 7' 7 Given that the possible penalties for driving with a suspended license are significant,7 the court assumed that the legislature did not intend to impose such severe punishment without
requiring a culpable state of mind.7 9
Finally, the court noted, as "[p]erhaps the most important consideration," that an individual charged with a regulatory offense is
typically in a position to prevent the violation from occurring. 0
However, if McCallum had no knowledge of the suspension, he
would have "no reason to avoid driving and no reason to suspect
that he was endangering the public by driving .. ..",8' Therefore,

the suspension offense is not a pure public welfare offense and mens
82
rea is an essential element of the crime.
The McCallum opinion leaves open the question of what type of
knowledge is required in order to convict the defendant of driving
with a suspended license. Although the per curiam opinion suggests that only actual knowledge will satisfy the implied mens rea
element of the suspension offense, Judge Chasanow maintained in
his concurrence that constructive knowledge should be sufficient.83
As Judge Chasanow noted, when a defendant ought to have been
aware that his behavior was illegal but instead chose to close his
'84
eyes, constructive notice in the form of "deliberate ignorance
should satisfy the knowledge element.8 5 A "deliberate ignorance"
instruction allows the trier of fact to infer knowledge from a defendant's behavior.8 6 Even though it allows for such an inference, the
constructive knowledge standard falls short of creating a presumption that notification was received when the State shows that the
requisite notice was mailed.8 7 Consequently, once a defendant
makes a prima facie showing that no notice was received, the State
carries the nearly insurmountable burden of adducing evidence that
tends to show that the defendant avoided notice because the de77. Dawkins v. State, 313 Md. 638, 645, 547 A.2d 1041, 1044 (1988), quoted in McCallum, 321 Md. at 456, 583 A.2d at 252; see Sayre, supra note 34, at 70.
78. See supra note 41 for the relevant text of § 27-101(h), enumerating penalties.
79. McCallum, 321 Md. at 457, 583 A.2d at 253.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See id. at 458-62, 583 A.2d at 253-55 (Chasanow, J., concurring). Chief Judge
Murphy joined in the concurrence. Id. at 461-62, 583 A.2d at 255 (Chasanow, J.,
concurring).
84. See PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 26, § 4, at 867-68.

85. McCallum, 321 Md. at 458-61, 583 A.2d at 253-55 (Chasanow, J., concurring).
86. Id. at 461, 583 A.2d at 255 (Chasanow, J., concurring).
87. Id. at 464-67, 583 A.2d at 256-58 (McAuliffe, J., dissenting).
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fendant had reason to know of the suspension.8 8
Rather than simply focusing on the punitive purposes of the
statute, the court might have looked at other violations punishable
under section 27-101(h) to gauge the legislature's intent. For instance, section 17-107 prohibits an individual from driving a motor
vehicle on public roads when the vehicle is not covered by insurance
or some other form of security, 89 an offense punishable under section 27-101.9o The purposes of sections 17-107 and 16-303(h) are
analogous in that the statutes proscribe similar types of conductfailure to meet a required condition for legally operating a motor
vehicle on the public highways. However, section 17-107 includes
explicit language indicating that knowledge is an element of the offense. 9 1 Moreover, that section contains a provision stating that the
introduction of MVA records showing the lack of required security
will be prima facie evidence of knowledge that the vehicle was not
covered by the required security.9 2 The explicit inclusion of a
knowledge requirement in section 17-107 and the inclusion of a
provision that allows MVA records to prove knowledge both are evidence that the legislature intentionally omitted the same requirement from section 16-303, an offense of a similar nature, punishable
under the same statute, and involving similar MVA records.
By restricting its analysis to the punitive aspects of the suspension provisions, the court essentially stripped the traffic statute of its
equally important regulatory purpose. Suspensions result not only
from failure to appear in court or failure to pay a fine, but also from
repeated convictions for driving while intoxicated or for moving vio-

88. Id.
89. Section 17-107 provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Vehicle not covered by required security.-A person who knows or has reason to know that a motor vehicle is not covered by the required security may
not:
(1) Drive the vehicle; or
(2) If he is an owner of the vehicle, knowingly permit another person to
drive it.
(b) Evidence of violation of subsection (a).-(1) In any prosecution under subsection (a) of this section the introduction of the official records of the Motor
Vehicle Administration showing the absence of a record that the vehicle is covered by the security required under § 17-104 of this subtitle shall be prima facie
evidence that a person knows or has reason to know that a motor vehicle is not
covered by the required security.
MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 17-107(a),(b) (1987 & Supp. 1991).
90. See id. § 27-101.
91. See id.
92. See id.
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lations.9 3 The latter offenses demonstrate a disregard for the traffic
laws and a threat to the public welfare that the legislature clearly
sought to regulate through license suspension, regardless of
whether an individual has notice of the suspension.
4. Conclusion.-McCallum reflects the Court of Appeals' growing disenchantment with the doctrine of strict liability. Although
the court sought to ensure that only culpable behavior is punished
by incarceration, it may have moved too far from legislative intent
by implicitly requiring actual notice.
The ruling in Dawkins left open to speculation the court's future
approach to other statutory violations not explicitly requiring mens
rea. But the fact that the court adopted its reasoning from Dawkins,
a drug possession case, is strong evidence that absent express language in the statute, the Court of Appeals will not presume a strict
liability offense if the statute permits incarceration for a violation.
B.

Affording Greater Protectionsfor Criminal Defendants in State Law

In Bowie v. State,94 the Court of Appeals overturned the death
sentence and conviction of Damon Alejandro-Christopher Bowie
based on the inadequacy of voir dire questioning and an improper
sentencing-phase instruction by the trial judge.9 5 Writing for a
unanimous court, Judge Bell concluded that the trial court erred in
four respects. First, the trial court erred by refusing to propound
voir dire questions designed to identify "police preference ' 9 6 in prospective jurors.9 7 Second, the failure to probe into the possibility of
racially biased jurors also constituted reversible error. 98 Third, the
93. This is the point that Judge McAuliffe makes in his dissent. See McCallum, 321
Md. at 467-68, 583 A.2d at 258 (McAuliffe, J., dissenting). He also criticizes the approach of the concurrence, stating that:
[tihe approach suggested by Judge Chasanow in his concurring opinion would
not necessarily change that result, because the State would still have to prove
the defendant believed it was probable that his license was suspended and that
he deliberately avoided contact with the MVA to evade notice of that fact.
Id.
94. 324 Md. 1, 595 A.2d 448 (1991).
95. See id. at 5, 595 A.2d at 450.
96. Prospective jurors exhibiting "police preference" are those who would favor the
testimony of police officers merely because of their official status. See infra text accompanying notes 129-136.
97. Bowie, 324 Md. at 11, 595 A.2d at 453. The court also discussed this type of
preference in regard to lay witnesses testifying for the State, noting that they might be
given more credence than defense witnesses merely because of their association with the
State. See id. at 10, 595 A.2d at 452.
98. Id. at 15-16, 595 A.2d at 455.
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trial court's inquiry into jurors' personal views regarding the death
penalty was inadequate.9 9 Finally, the trial court's sentencingphase t10 instruction improperly informed jurors that the Governor
of Maryland has the power to commute a death sentence or other
sentences.' 0 '
The court in Bowie preserved well-grounded rights in Maryland
law that provide a defendant with the opportunity to question jurors
on the possibility of police preference and racial bias in order to
assure juror impartiality.' 012 The trial judge's refusal to propound
the substance of Bowie's questions was an abuse of discretion requiring a new trial.'0° Relying on several Maryland decisions that
had addressed the acknowledgement of parole eligibility during the
sentencing phase, the court decided that instructing the jury about
the Governor's commutation powers was also erroneous.'0 4
Bowie's greatest impact results from the court's discussion of the
inadequacy of the trial judge's voir dire questioning of jurors' death
penalty views. Recognizing that appellate courts must give deference to a trial judge's decision to exclude a juror,'0 5 the Bowie court
emphasized that there should be a thorough record of the basis for
making that decision.'0 6 By emphasizing the need for a complete
record, Bowie forces trial judges to conduct more than superficial
0 7
inquiries into the death penalty views of prospective jurors.1

99. Id. at 23-24, 595 A.2d at 459.
100. Maryland's death penalty process is bifurcated. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413
(1992). Once a defendant is convicted of first degree murder, a separate sentencing
proceeding is conducted. Id. § 413(a). This proceeding typically occurs in front of the
jury that determined the defendant's guilt. Id. § 413(b). The defendant can waive the
jury sentencing proceeding and be sentenced by the court alone. Id. § 413(b)(3). Upon
the finding of aggravating circumstances requiring the imposition of a death sentence,
the sentencing proceeding provides the defendant the opportunity to introduce mitigating factors in an attempt to show that the death penalty should not be imposed. Id.
§ 413(g). For example, much of Bowie's sentencing proceeding focused on the fact that
Bowie's mother underwent a sex change operation when Bowie was a young child. The
defense argued that this experience caused Bowie great emotional problems and should
mitigate against the imposition of the death penalty. Appellant's Brief at 6, Bowie (No.
90-132). For further discussion of Maryland's capital sentencing procedure, see Jones v.
State, 310 Md. 569, 599-600, 530 A.2d 743, 758 (1987), vacated,Jones v. Maryland, 486
U.S. 1050 (1988).
101. Bowie, 324 Md. at 30, 595 A.2d at 462.
102. See infra notes 129-147 and accompanying text.
103. Bowie, 324 Md. at 11, 15-16, 595 A.2d at 453, 455.
104. See id. at 27-30, 595 A.2d at 460-62; infra notes 170-174 and accompanying text.
105. Bowie, 324 Md. at 21, 595 A.2d at 457.
106. See id. at 22-24, 595 A.2d at 458-59.
107. See infra text accompanying notes 205-219.
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1. The Case.-Shortly before midnight on October 11, 1989,108
Damon Bowie and James Edmonds, armed with handguns, entered
Stoney's Restaurant in Prince George's County and announced that
they were robbing the restaurant.'0 9 During the robbery, a bartender was forced to go to a back room and give the restaurant's
money to Edmonds." 0 Two other restaurant employees, Kevin
Shelley and Arnold Batson, were forced to lie face down on the floor
and were fatally shot in the back of the head."' The owner of the
restaurant was shot in the arm and Robert McDaniels, an off-duty
Prince George's County police officer, was shot in the face." 2 Officer McDaniels identified Bowie as the person who shot him in the
face and who held the gun to the back of Batson's head."' With the
exception of Batson, an African-American, all of the victims in the
robbery were white; Bowie is an African-American." 4
Bowie was tried by a jury in the Circuit Court for Prince
George's County."15 The defense submitted several questions to
the trial court for inclusion in the voir dire of prospective jurors.
These questions were designed to identify jurors with a racial bias
that would affect their impartiality" 6 and jurors who would give
more credence to the testimony of police officers or State witnesses
merely because of their status." 7 The court not only failed to ask
108. Appellant's Brief at 3, Bowie (No. 90-132).
109. Bowie, 324 Md. at 5, 595 A.2d at 450.
110. Id. at 6, 595 A.2d at 450.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 11, 595 A.2d at 453.
115. Id. at 4, 595 A.2d at 449.
116. Id. at 11, 595 A.2d at 453. Bowie requested the following questions designed to
identify racial bias:
1. Most of the victims in this case are white and Mr. Bowie and his alleged
accomplices are black. Do you feel uncomfortable sitting on a jury where a
black man is accused of shooting and robbing several white individuals?
2. Have you or any of your family been a member of any organization with a
stated philosophy on race?
Id. The court noted that these questions were arguably defective; neither of them asked
whether the jurors' ability fairly to judge the evidence would be affected by racial prejudice. Id. Nevertheless, the trial court's failure to "propound any questions designed to
elicit the essence of the information [Bowie] sought [was erroneous]." Id. at 1 1-12, 595
A.2d at 453 (emphasis added); see infra notes 142-145 and accompanying text.
117. Bowie, 324 Md. at 6, 595 A.2d at 450. Bowie requested the following questions
on this point:
1. Many of the State's witnesses will be police officers. Do you believe that a
police officer will tell the truth merely because he or she is a police officer?
2. Would any of you be more or less likely to believe a police officer than a
civilian witness, solely because he or she is a police officer?
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the requested questions,'
but also failed to ask any similar question to elicit this information." 9 Bowie's objections were overruled.' 2 ° Further, the trial court's voir dire into the jurors' views on
the death penalty was essentially a single question asking jurors to
stand if they felt that their views on the death penalty would interfere with their ability to judge the evidence fairly. 12 ' All those who
stood were dismissed for cause.' 2 2 Bowie's objection based on the
substance and
brevity of the examination was noted and
3
overruled.12
The jury convicted Bowie on two counts each of first degree
murder, attempted murder, assault with intent to murder, malicious
shooting, and robbery with a deadly weapon. 12 4 Bowie elected to be
sentenced by a jury, and a capital sentencing proceeding was
3. Would any of you tend to view the testimony of witnesses called by the Defense with more skepticism than witnesses called by the State, merely because
they were called by the Defense?
Id.
118. Id.
119. See id. at 11-12, 595 A.2d at 453.
120. Id. at 6, 11, 595 A.2d at 450, 453.
121. The trial court's entire voir dire on the death penalty views of the venire was:
Ladies and gentleman, the State of Maryland has filed a request before the
court that if found guilty, Mr. Damon Bowie be put to death. Is there any member of the prospective jury panel who has any feelings whatsoever about such a
request, and I don't care which way you feel about it, that it would interfere
with your ability to fairly and truly judge this matter based only on the evidence
before the court?
Said another way, is there anybody in this room who has such feelings
about the death penalty one way or the other that it would affect you emotionally or to the extent that it would override your ability to judge this matter
based only on the evidence brought out in the courtroom and the instructions
of the court to you and the application of that evidence to the law? If you have
a positive response, please stand in place.
Id.at 16, 595 A.2d at 455.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 16-18, 595 A.2d at 455-56. The defense sought a more thorough examination, arguing that
the most likely scenario is that people who have a fear of capital punishment are
the people who most likely ... stand up and say they cannot hear [the case],
which are precisely the very people that we would like to have an opportunity
to, one, discuss the matter with . . . and, two, attempt to . . . hear an
explanation.
Id. at 17-18, 595 A.2d at 456. The defense suggested that, given an opportunity to
explain their views, such persons might be able to serve on the jury. Id. at 17, 595 A.2d
at 455.
124. Id. at 4, 595 A.2d at 449. Bowie was also convicted of an additional count of
robbery with a deadly weapon and four counts of use of a handgun. Appellant's Brief at
2, Bowie (No. 90-132).
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held. 125 Over Bowie's objections, the trial court instructed the jury
concerning the gubernatorial power to commute sentences. 1 26 The
jury imposed two sentences of death and the trial judge imposed
additional sentences totalling 120 years.' 2 7 The case came before
to Maryland's automatic review prothe Court of Appeals pursuant
28
cases.'
capital
for
vision
2.

Legal Background.-

a. Police Preference.-Overa century ago in Waters v. State, 1 29 the
Court of Appeals enunciated the "fundamental principle underlying
the trial by jury, that each juror shall so far as it is possible be entirely impartial and unbiased, in order that he may hear the evidence, and decide the matter in controversy uninfluenced by any
extraneous considerations whatever."' 3 0 More recently, in Casey v.
Roman Catholic Archbishop,'' the Court of Appeals stated that "a
party is entitled to a jury free of all disqualifying bias or prejudice
without exception, and not merely a jury free of bias or prejudice of
a general or abstract nature." 132
Relying on these principles in Langley v. State,' 3 3 the Court of
Appeals reversed the defendant's robbery conviction, finding prejudicial error in the trial judge's failure to ask, during voir dire, whether
125. Bowie, 324 Md. at 4, 595 A.2d at 449. For a description of Maryland's capital
sentencing procedure, see supra note 100.
126. Bowie, 324 Md. at 24, 595 A.2d at 459; see MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 4-513 (1990)
("The Governor... may commute or change any sentence of death into penal confinement for such period as he shall think expedient. [He may also] remit any part of the
time for which any person may be sentenced to imprisonment.
127. Bowie, 324 Md. at 4, 595 A.2d at 449.
128. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 414 (1992).
129. 51 Md. 430 (1879).
130. Id. at 436; see Tichnell v. State, 297 Md. 432, 437-38, 468 A.2d 1, 3-4 (1983)
("The jury selection process must, of course, satisfy the essential demands of fairness
guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment in order to afford the accused his due process
right to an impartial jury. The voir dire examination of prospective jurors protects this
right by exposing the existence of grounds for disqualification." (citations omitted)),
cert. denied, 466 U.S. 993 (1984); Bryant v. State, 207 Md. 565, 583, 115 A.2d 502, 510
(1955) ("Any circumstances that may reasonably be regarded as rendering a person unfitted for jury service may be made the subject of questions and a challenge for cause.").
131. 217 Md. 595, 143 A.2d 627 (1958).
132. Id. at 607, 143 A.2d at 632. In Casey, a parishioner alleged personal injuries from
slipping on a church's waxed floor, a church to which the Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Baltimore (in his corporate capacity) held legal title. Id. at 600-01, 143 A.2d at 628. The
Court of Appeals held that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to probe
adequately into whether the religious affiliation of prospective jurors might prevent
them from arriving at a fair and impartial verdict. See id. at 607, 143 A.2d at 632.
133. 281 Md. 337, 378 A.2d 1338 (1977).
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any prospective juror "would give more credit to the testimony of a
police officer over that of a civilian, merely because of his status as a
police officer."' 3 4 Langley was a case of first impression and the
3 5
Court of Appeals noted that it was "writ[ing] on a clean slate.'1
On this slate, the court wrote: "[W]e hold that in a case such as this,
where a principal part of the State's evidence is testimony of a police
officer diametrically opposed to that of a defendant, it is prejudicial
error to fail to propound a question such as that requested in this
' 3 6

case."'

b. Racial Bias.-Maryland law makes clear that, when requested, voir dire questioning of prospective jurors with respect to
possible racial bias is required if racial prejudice may be a factor
given the facts of the case.' 3 7 In 1959, the Court of Appeals reversed the conviction and death sentence of an African-American
defendant for the murder of a police officer in Brown v. State,'" 8 because of the trial court's refusal to allow voir dire questions designed
3 9

to uncover racial prejudice.1

134. Id. at 338, 378 A.2d at 1338.
135. Id. at 347, 378 A.2d at 1343.
136. Id. at 349, 378 A.2d at 1344. While citing to Casey, the Langley decision also
relied upon two federal cases: Brown v. United States, 338 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1964),
and Sellers v. United States, 271 F.2d 475 (D.C. Cir. 1959). Brown and Sellers found an
abuse of discretion when the trial judge failed to inquire into whether any of the jurors
would give more weight to a law enforcement officer's testimony than to that of other
witnesses solely because of the officer's position. Brown, 338 F.2d at 545; Sellers, 271
F.2d at 476. Brown did not "read Sellers as having been narrowly decided ... [but] as
establishing that when important testimony is anticipated from certain categories of witnesses, whose official or semi-official status is such that a juror might reasonably be
more, or less, inclined to credit their testimony, a query as to whether a juror would
have such an inclination is not only appropriate but should be given if requested."
Brown, 338 F.2d at 545; see also State v. Rogers, 497 A.2d 387, 389-90 (Conn. 1985)
(concluding that it was vitally important to the defendant to explore whether prospective
jurors would credit police officers' testimony merely because they are police officers,
when police testimony was crucial in establishing the State's case); Commonwealth v.
Futch, 366 A.2d 246, 249-50 (Pa. 1976) (finding prejudicial error in the trial court's
failure to ask a question designed to determine whether a prospective juror would credit
testimony of a prison guard simply because of the guard's official status).
137. See Humphreys v. State, 227 Md. 115, 118, 175 A.2d 777, 778 (1961); Contee v.
State, 223 Md. 575, 579-81, 165 A.2d 889, 892-93 (1960); Brown v. State, 220 Md. 29,
34-36, 150 A.2d 895, 897-98 (1959); Holmes v. State, 65 Md. App. 428, 438-40, 501
A.2d 76, 81 (1985) (finding the trial judge's failure to voir dire the venire as to racial bias
to be error, but also finding waiver because the defendant failed to object), rev'd on other
grounds, 310 Md. 260, 528 A.2d 1279 (1987); Thornton v. State, 31 Md. App. 205, 214,
355 A.2d 767, 772 (1976).
138. 220 Md. 29, 150 A.2d 895 (1959).
139. Id. at 39, 150 A.2d at 900. Brown heavily relied upon a Connecticut case, State v.
Higgs, 120 A.2d 152 (Conn. 1956), in which an African-American defendant allegedly
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A year and a half later, in Contee v. State,' 4 ° the Court of Appeals
clarified the scope of Brown. In Contee, the court reversed an African-American defendant's conviction for the rape of a white woman.' 4 ' Although the questions submitted by the defendant were
improperly designed-"none was reasonably calculated to elicit or
ascertain such bias or prejudice as would disqualify a prospective
juror from rendering a fair and impartial verdict on the law and the
evidence"t 42 -their purpose was clearly to uncover racial bias that
would disqualify a venireperson. ' 43 The Contee court held that when
the nature of the defendant's questions as to racial basis is understood by the trial court, the court must ask "a proper question
designed to ascertain the existence of cause for disqualification on
account of racial bias or prejudice" 14 4 or allow the defendant to for45
mulate proper voir dire questions on the topic.'
Recently, in Holmes v. State, 14 6 the Court of Special Appeals reviewed Brown and Contee to ascertain the breadth of Maryland law
regarding voir dire questions on racial bias. The Holmes court concluded that "in a criminal case, prejudice may be a factor because of
the facts of the case when the complainant and the witnesses for the
State are of a different race than the defendant, and the crime in147
volves victimization of another person and the use of violence.'
raped a white woman. Higgs stated that "[s]o long as race prejudice exists, even in a
relatively few persons, there is a substantial chance that one of those few will appear in
court as a venireman." Id. at 154. Recognizing that voir dire examination is largely in the
discretion of the trial court, Higgs held that it was reversible error to exclude questions
designed to uncover prejudice against African-Americans to the extent that it might impair the defendant's right to an impartial jury guaranteed by the state constitution. Id. at
154-55.
140. 223 Md. 575, 165 A.2d 889 (1960).
141. See id. at 577-78, 165 A.2d at 891.
142. Id. at 580, 165 A.2d at 892. Likewise, Bowie's questions may have been defective. See supra note 116.
143. See Contee, 223 Md. at 580, 165 A.2d at 892-93.

144. Id., 165 A.2d at 893.
145. Id., 165 A.2d at 892-93.
146. 65 Md. App. 428, 501 A.2d 76 (1985), rev'don other grounds, 310 Md. 260, 528
A.2d 1279 (1987).

147. Id. at 438-39, 501 A.2d at 81 (footnote omitted). Although prejudice may have
been a factor in Holmes, the defendant's failure to object to the exclusion of voir dire
questions on racial bias resulted in a waiver of the error. Id. at 440, 501 A.2d at 81. In
Thornton v. State, 31 Md. App. 205, 355 A.2d 767 (1976), the Court of Special Appeals
also examined voir dire inquiries into racial prejudice. Id. at 210-20, 355 A.2d at 770-75.
The court enunciated that "absen[t] ...some special circumstance warranting an inquiry as

to racial prejudice, such examination is not mandated [by Maryland case law]." Id. at
215, 355 A.2d at 773 (emphasis added). In Thornton, the defendant and the only two
witnesses who testified on behalf of the State were all African-American; this was not
considered a special circumstance requiring inquiry. Id. at 216-17, 355 A.2d at 773-74.

630

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

51:612

Unlike Maryland courts, the Supreme Court has distinguished
between capital and noncapital cases in discussing the propriety of
voir dire questions designed to identify racially biased jurors. In R/staino v. Ross, 148 the Supreme Court held that voir dire examination on
racial bias in a noncapital case is not constitutionally mandated by
the Sixth Amendment guarantee of an impartial jury' 4 9 simply because the crime victim is white and the defendant is a person of
color.150 In Turner v. Murray,15' however, the Court held that a capi-

tal defendant accused of an interracial crime has the right to voir dire
questions on the issue of racial bias.' 52 Even though Ristaino did not
mandate voir dire inquiry into possible racial bias in noncapital cases,
the Court did state that "the wiser course generally is to propound
appropriate questions designed to identify racial prejudice if requested by the defendant."'' 53 More importantly, the Court noted
that states are free to permit or require questions not demanded by
54
the Constitution. 1

c. Death Qualification.-The practice of identifying and excluding venirepersons whose views on the death penalty would prevent
them from fulfilling their duty to be fair and impartial in a capital
case is generally known as death qualification.' 5 5 In 1964, the
Supreme Court, in Witherspoon v. Illinois,'5 6 decided that before jurors could be excused for cause, it must be "unmistakably clear"
that their views on the death penalty would cause them automatically to vote against imposing capital punishment or would prevent
148. 424 U.S. 589 (1976).
149. The Sixth Amendment states, in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed .... ." U.S. CoNsT.
amend. VI. The Maryland Declaration of Rights provides, in relevant part: "That in all
criminal prosecutions, every man hath a right ... to a speedy trial by an impartial jury,
without whose unanimous consent he ought not be found guilty." MD. CONST. DECL. OF
RTS., art. 21.
150. 424 U.S. at 594-98.
151. 476 U.S. 28 (1986).
152. See id. at 36-37.
153. 424 U.S. at 597 n.9.
154. Id.
155. See Karen T. Grisez, Note, Ross v. Oklahoma: A Reversal of the Reversible-ErrorStandard in Death-Qualification Cases, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 881, 883 (1989); see also Jones v.
State, 310 Md. 569, 593-94, 530 A.2d 743, 755 (1987) (explaining the process of death
qualification), vacated,Jones v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 1050 (1988); Poole v. State, 295 Md.
167, 186 n.5, 453 A.2d 1218, 1229 n.5 (1983). For a brief history of challenges for
cause, see Grisez, supra, at 883-84.
156. 391 U.S. 510 (1964).
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them from applying the law impartially.' 5 7 Over twenty years later,
in Wainwright v. Witt, 5 8 however, the Supreme Court set forth a new
standard for excluding prospective jurors for cause based on their
views on capital punishment. In Witt, the Court held that an excludable venireperson's views must "prevent or substantially impair the
performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath."' 159
Maryland followed the Witt standard in Grandison v. State.1 60 In
Grandison, the defendant argued that the beliefs of numerous prospective jurors excused for cause would not have prevented them
from rendering an impartial verdict. 6 ' After a careful review of a
thorough trial record, the Court of Appeals deferred to the trial
judge's decision to excuse for cause, satisfied that the Witt standard
1 62
had been met.
Recently in Hunt v. State,163 the Court of Appeals reiterated the
Witt holding, stating that "[t]his standard, essentially, is that jury impartiality requires only 'jurors who will conscientiously apply the law
and find the facts.' "6 Citing Grandison for the proposition that a
trial judge's decision to excuse for cause should be granted deference, Hunt upheld both the judge's decision to excuse one juror and
65
his refusal to excuse five other jurors.'
The Court of Special Appeals, in Wooten-Bey v. State,1 6 6 demon157. See id. at 522 n.21. This case is the source of the term "Witherspoon-excludable."

See Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 483 (1990).
158. 469 U.S. 412 (1985).
159. Id. at 424. The Witt Court upheld the defendant's death sentence based on the
standard articulated in Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980), rather than the prior standard of Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1964). The Adams Court, attempting to
rearticulate the Witherspoon standard, provided that a juror could be excluded for cause
when his "views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a
juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath." Adams, 448 U.S. at 45. By adopting the Adams test, the Witt Court clearly favored the prosecution over the defense. See
infra notes 217-219 and accompanying text. Under Witt, prospective jurors who express
problems with the death penalty are more likely to satisfy the substantial impairment
standard and be excused for cause, even when it is not "unmistakably clear" that their
ability to apply the law would be affected. See 469 U.S. at 424.
160. 305 Md. 685, 506 A.2d 580, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 873 (1986).
161. Id. at 724, 506 A.2d at 599.
162. See id. at 725, 506 A.2d at 599-600.
163. 321 Md. 387, 583 A.2d 218 (1990).
164. Id. at 415, 583 A.2d at 231 (quoting Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 423
(1985)).
165. See id. at 414-21, 583 A.2d at 231-34. Hunt involved the "reverse Witherspoon
situation"--certain prospective jurors may be so predisposed to vote for the death penalty that they will act impartially, either at the criminal liability phase or the sentencing
phase. See id. at 415, 583 A.2d at 231.
166. 76 Md. App. 603, 547 A.2d 1086 (1988), aff'd, 318 Md. 301, 568 A.2d 16 (1990).
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strated the considerable discretion accorded a trial judge's decision
to excuse prospective jurors for cause. In Wooten-Bey, the trial court
asked jurors to stand if they had any moral, ethical, religious, political, or other objection to the death penalty that would influence
67
their verdict, or prevent them from following court instructions.'
Jurors who stood were excused for cause by the trial judge without
any further inquiry.' 6 8 The intermediate appellate court approved
this extremely limited voir dire examination despite the defense's argument that such a limited inquiry could not have been "enlighten69
ing and fruitful."'
d. Executive Cemency.-In Shoemaker v. State,170 the Court of Appeals first considered whether a prosecutor's remark regarding the
possibility of parole constituted reversible error. In deciding that a
prosecutor's reference to a defendant's parole prospects was inappropriate, the court mentioned in dicta that reference to the possibility of executive clemency was also improper.' 7 ' The Shoemaker
court worried that the reference to parole "suggested to the jury
that it might in part shift its responsibility for a finding of the defendant's guilt to some other body."'17 2 Therefore, the court
3 Although Shoemaker
granted the defendant a new trial. 17
was a noncapital case dealing with the criminal liability phase of trial, numerous Maryland cases have followed Shoemaker's lead with regard to
comments on parole, work release, and automatic appellate review
during capital sentencing. 174 Until Bowie, the Court of Appeals had
167. Id. at 619, 547 A.2d at 1094.
168. Id. at 619-20, 547 A.2d at 1094.
169. Id. at 620, 547 A.2d at 1094.
170. 228 Md. 462, 180 A.2d 682 (1962).
171. See id. at 468, 180 A.2d at 685.
172. Id. at 469, 180 A.2d at 685.
173. See id. at 474, 180 A.2d at 688.
174. See, e.g., Harris v. State, 312 Md. 225, 249-52, 539 A.2d 637, 649-50 (1988) (finding the possibility of parole to be irrelevant to a capital sentencing decision); Booth v.
State, 306 Md. 172, 217, 507 A.2d 1098, 1121 (1986) (holding that testimony about
work release and parole was improper); Evans v. State, 304 Md. 487, 529-30, 499 A.2d
1261, 1283-84 (1985) (finding the possibility of parole to be neither an aggravating nor
a mitigating circumstance); Poole v. State, 295 Md. 167, 194-97, 453 A.2d 1218, 123233 (1983) (concluding that the prosecutor's arguments to the jury concerning the possibility of parole were "irrelevant and obviously prejudicial").
In Bowers v. State, 306 Md. 120, 507 A.2d 1072 (1986), the Court of Appeals held
that Shoemaker applies to the defense as well as the prosecution, and the fact that a defendant will not be eligible for parole for a long time cannot be introduced to mitigate
against the imposition of a death sentence. See id. at 151-53, 507 A.2d at 1087-89. In
Doering v. State, 313 Md. 384, 545 A.2d 1281 (1988), however, the court reconsidered
whether the ban on introducing the possibility of parole applied equally to the prosecu-
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not directly addressed the appropriateness of comments on executive clemency during capital sentencing.
The Supreme Court specifically addressed the propriety of
comments on gubernatorial commutation powers in California v. Ramos.' 7 5 In Ramos, the Court held that instructions permitting a capital sentencing jury to consider the Governor's power to commute a
life sentence without the possibility of parole did not offend the
Constitution. 76 The Ramos Court deferred to the state's decision
that the Governor's power to commute life sentences was a substan17 7
tive factor that the sentencing jury should be able to consider.
However, the Ramos Court acknowledged "that States are free to
provide greater protections in their criminal justice system than the
' 78
Federal Constitution requires."'
3. The Court's Reasoning; Analysis.-By allowing inquiry into police preference, racial bias, and death penalty views, the court in
Bowie maintained the integrity of voir dire examination as a means of
obtaining a fair and impartial jury. Further, by prohibiting instructions on executive clemency, the Bowie court prevented a sentencing
jury from being influenced by speculative considerations.
a. Police Preference.-In Langley v. State,179 the Court of Appeals
reversed the defendant's conviction because the trial judge refused,
despite the defendant's request, to voir dire prospective jurors on
possible police preference.' 8 0 In Bowie, the State attempted to distinguish Langley on two grounds.' 8 ' First, the State focused on the
tion and the defense. The court decided "that where . . . the defendant in a capital
sentencing proceeding seeks to place before the jury relevant and competent information concerning his eligibility for parole in the event a life sentence is imposed, [the]
request should be granted." Id. at 412, 545 A.2d at 1295. The court reasoned that
remote parole prospects might be a mitigating circumstance, causing the jury to deem a
life sentence adequate punishment. Id. at 411-12, 545 A.2d at 1295.
175. 463 U.S. 992 (1983).
176. See id. at 1010. Ramos challenged the instructions as violative of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 1001, 1013-14.
177. See id. at 1013.
178. Id. at 1013-14. In his dissent,Justice Marshall argued that such instructions may
lead jurors to impose the death sentence to prevent the Governor from commuting a life
sentence without the possibility of parole, ensuring that the defendant will not be released. Justice Marshall did point out, however, that the Governor also had the power to
commute a death sentence. See id. at 1016-17 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
179. 281 Md. 337, 378 A.2d 1338 (1977).
180. See id. at 349, 378 A.2d at 1344.
181. See Bowie, 324 Md. at 6-7, 595 A.2d at 450-51. The State in Bowie recognized that
at first glance, Langley "suggests that inquiry on [police preference] would have been
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"diametrically opposed" language in Langley's holding, 182 arguing
that because Bowie did not testify and the defense offered no other
"fact" witnesses, no "diametrically opposed" testimony existed between a police officer and the defendant or defense witnesses.'i 3
Second, the State contended that Bowie's failure to proffer the relevance of police testimony at the trial level meant that the issue was
not properly preserved for appellate review.' 4 Both of the proposed distinctions were rejected, and the Bowie court concluded that
86
Langley was dispositive.18 5 Because the error was not harmless,
8 7
the court reversed Bowie's conviction and death sentence.'
Langley's underpinning is that jurors who would give more
credence to the testimony of police officers than to that of other
witnesses have prejudged an issue of credibility in the case and thus
cannot serve as fair and impartial jurors. 8 Recognizing that the
State has the burden to prove its case against the defendant, the
Bowie court declared that credibility is at issue regardless of whether
the defendant testifies, and that it is improper for a juror to grant
police officers a "presumption of credibility" simply because of their
official status.'8 9 The Bowie court was concerned by the coercive,
burden-shifting element in the State's argument. The Bowie court
commented that according to the State,
to require voir dire into police preference, the defendant
must testify, and he or she must do so "diametrically opposed" to that of the police. The State would have a defendant in all cases put on a defense or fail in his or her
effort to have the jury questioned concerning the question
of police preference. 9 0
By refusing to find error only when a defendant testifies, Bowie requires an examination of the situation as faced by the trial judge
prior to the development of evidence rather than a hindsight approach to the issue.
appropriate under circumstances such as those present here." Brief of Appellee at 3-4,
Bowie (No. 90-132).
182. See supra text accompanying note 136.
183. Bowie, 324 Md. at 6-7, 595 A.2d at 450-51.
184. Id.
185. See id. at 8, 595 A.2d at 451.
186. Id. at 11, 595 A.2d at 453.
187. Id. at 32, 595 A.2d at 463.
188. See Langley v. State, 281 Md. 337, 348, 378 A.2d 1338, 1343 (1977).
189. See 324 Md. at 10, 595 A.2d at 452. It follows that defense witnesses should not
have a presumption of being less credible. This is closer to the essence of the third
question proffered by Bowie. See supra note 117.
190. 324 Md. at 10, 595 A.2d at 452.
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Furthermore, Bowie's review of Langley found no authority for
9
the State's argument that a proffer of relevance was necessary.'1
The court noted the obvious: "A trial judge trying a criminal case
can anticipate that one or more police witnesses will appear and testify.' 92 What emerges from the court's analysis in Bowie is the prophylactic rule that, in a criminal case, the failure to propound voir
dire questions similar to those submitted by Bowie will always be
93
error. 1
b. Racial Bias.-The Bowie court accepted the summary by the
Court of Special Appeals in Holmes v. State 194 as to when Maryland
case law requires inquiry into racial bias. Holmes concluded that inquiry is appropriate "when the complainant and the witnesses for
the State are of a different race than the defendant, and the crime
involves victimization of another person and the use of violence."' 9 5
Because racial bias can prevent a defendant from having a fair and
impartial trial, possible prejudice should be explored when circumstances indicate that racial bias could influence jurors' decisionmaking.
Following this rationale, the Bowie court found it "patent that
the trial court erred in refusing to inquire concerning possible racial
prejudice."' 96 The court noted that all but one victim and the majority of the State's witnesses were white, Bowie is an African-American, and the crime involved violent victimization.' 9 7 Once Bowie
submitted questions designed to discover racial bias, Maryland law
required inquiry by the trial court.' 9 8
Significantly, the Bowie court refused to follow the Supreme
Court's decision in Turner v. Murray,'9 9 relying instead on state precedent. In Turner, the Supreme Court held that the failure to inquire into racial bias only required the vacation of the death
191. See id.at 9, 595 A.2d at 452.
192. Id. at 9 n.5, 595 A.2d at 452 n.5. The court noted that in this case, "one of the
proposed voir dire questions contained a proffer of sorts; it advised the court that a
number of police witnesses would testify, a fact that the State did not contradict." Id.; see
supra note 117 (setting out Bowie's requested voir dire questions).
193. An error can only be harmless if it is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 659, 350 A.2d 665, 678 (1976). Bowie suggests that this will be
a very difficult hurdle for the State to clear. See 324 Md. at 10-11, 595 A.2d at 452-53.
194. 65 Md. App. 428, 501 A.2d 76 (1985), rev'd on other grounds, 310 Md. 260, 528
A.2d 1279 (1987).
195. Id. at 438-39, 501 A.2d at 81 (footnote omitted).
196. 324 Md. at 15, 595 A.2d at 455.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 15-16, 595 A.2d at 455; see supra notes 137-147 and accompanying text.
199. 476 U.S. 28 (1986); see supra text accompanying notes 151-152.
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sentence to satisfy the Constitution. 2 0 Bowie makes clear that regardless of the Turner decision, Maryland law also requires a new
trial .201
State courts typically rely on Supreme Court interpretations of
the Bill of Rights to construe similar provisions in their own constitutions.20 2 Because the significant Maryland decisions addressing
racial bias were decided over thirty years ago,20 3 the Court of Appeals easily could have followed Turner's lead by vacating only the
death sentence. Bowie, however, affirmed the broader scope of these
protections in Maryland law, granting Bowie a new trial in addition
to overturning his death sentence.20 4
c. Death Qualification.-TheCourt of Appeals in Bowie held that
appellate courts need not defer to a trial court's decision to dismiss
jurors because of their death penalty views, if the lower court asked
jurors "broad questions calling for . . . bottom line conclusions,
which [did] not themselves reveal automatically disqualifying biases
as to [the venire's] ability fairly and accurately to decide the case,
and indeed, which [did] not elucidate the bases for those conclusions."' 5 This holding rejects the superficial type of voir dire examination accepted in Wooten-Bey v. State.2" 6 Bowie's requirement of a
thorough record supporting a decision to excuse for cause clearly
would have changed Wooten-Bey's outcome.
The Bowie court recognized that Maryland law affords trial
judges considerable discretion in the manner and extent of the voir
dire examination of prospective jurors. 2 17 In limiting this discretion,
200. 476 U.S. at 37.
201. See Bowie, 324 Md. at 16 n.8, 595 A.2d at 455 n.8.
202. Valerie T. Rosenson, Note, Wainwright v. Witt: The Court Casts a False Light Backward, 66 B.U. L. REV. 311,339 (1986). Rosenson argues that states should provide more
stringent protections for the rights of capital defendants than those required by the federal constitution. See id. at 340.
203. See supra notes 138-145 and accompanying text.
204. 324 Md. at 16 n.8, 595 A.2d at 455 n.8. Similarly, Pennsylvania has relied on its
constitution to afford rights greater than those required by the federal constitution. In
Commonwealth v. Futch, 366 A.2d 246 (Pa. 1976), the right of a noncapital defendant
accused of an interracial crime to voir dire prospective jurors on racial prejudice was
upheld, notwithstanding the Supreme Court's decision in Ristaino. Id. at 248 n.4; see also
supra text accompanying notes 148-154 (discussing Ristaino).
205. See 324 Md. at 23-24, 595 A.2d at 459. The court in Bowie reiterated that in
noncapital cases, the use of questions designed to elicit jurors' bottom line conclusions
are usually appropriate. See id. at 24 n.10, 595 A.2d at 459 n.10.
206. 76 Md. App. 603, 619, 547 A.2d 1086, 1094 (1988), aft'd, 318 Md. 301, 568 A.2d
16 (1990); see supra notes 166-169 and accompanying text.
207. See 324 Md. at 21, 595 A.2d at 457; see also Grandison v. State, 305 Md. 685, 720,
506 A.2d 580, 597 (finding individual voir dire not required), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 873
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the Bowie court focused on the language in Hunt v. State 20 8 and
Grandison v. State,2 °9 which emphasized the thoroughness of the respective trial courts' voir dire examinations of prospective jurors'
views on the death penalty.21 °
In Grandison, the trial judge was "painstakingly thorough" in his
questioning of prospective jurors and gave Grandison and his
standby attorney "ample opportunity" for voir dire examination . 2 1t
Again, in Hunt, the trial judge gave counsel "virtually unlimited opportunity" to voir dire individual jurors on their personal views regarding the death penalty. 2
By approving the extensive
questioning in Grandisonand Hunt, Bowie rejects general questions to
which jurors respond by standing or raising their hands and are
thereby dismissed.
Bowie's requirement of a thorough record supporting the trial
judge's basis for excluding prospective jurors provides defendants
with an important opportunity to challenge the propriety of exclusions for cause, thus removing some of the advantages in death penalty voir dire that Wainwright v. Witt 2 ' offered to the State. t4 Before
Witt, Witherspoon v. Illinois21 5 required "an unambiguous[ly] stated
prediction of certain partiality [as] a prerequisite for disqualification
... . [placing] the risk of error [in identifying excludable jurors]
largely on the State, for 'many veniremen simply cannot be asked
enough questions to reach the point where their bias has been made
'unmistakably clear.' ,216 Witt's lower standard of substantial impairment, together with the judge's discretion in the manner of conducting voir dire examinations,21 7 and the deference given to the trial
(1986); Evans v. State, 304 Md. 487, 514-15, 499 A.2d 1261, 1275 (1985); Colvin v.
State, 299 Md. 88, 102, 472 A.2d 953, 960 (1984); Wooten-Bey v. State, 76 Md. App. at
621-22, 547 A.2d at 1095.
208. 321 Md. 387, 583 A.2d 218 (1990).
209. 305 Md. 685, 506 A.2d 580, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 873 (1986).
210. See Bowie, 324 Md. at 21-22, 595 A.2d at 457-58.
211. 305 Md. at 726, 506 A.2d at 600.
212. 321 Md. at 415, 583 A.2d at 232; see Poole v. State, 295 Md. 167, 187, 453 A.2d
1218, 1229 (1983) (finding no abuse of discretion when voir dire was "extensive and
probing").
213. 469 U.S. 412 (1985).
214. See supra notes 158-159 and accompanying text. It remains to be seen whether
Bowie will allow defendants a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel, not
the court, conducts a superficial voir dire examination as to death penalty views.
215. 391 U.S. 510 (1964).
216. Stanton S. Krauss, The Witherspoon Doctrine at Witt's End: Death-QualificationReexamined, 24 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 77-78 (1987) (quoting Witt, 469 U.S. at 424-25).

217. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
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judge's factual findings,2 t8 made a judge's decision to exclude ajuror virtually impossible to challenge.21 9
By requiring a thorough factual record, Bowie now forces judges
to explore more fully venirepersons' views before the decision to
dismiss a particular juror will be upheld on appeal. To some extent,
individual voir dire questioning will be necessary sufficiently to "elucidate the bases" of "jurors' bottom line conclusions" 2 20 in determining whether they should be excused for cause because of their
death penalty views. Bowie's limitation on a trial judge's discretion
in conducting voir dire examinations waters down the harshness of
Witt, making it more likely that jurors will serve on capital sentencing juries when they are personally opposed to the death penalty but
could impose it if the case fit into the court's instructions.
d. Executive Clemency.-The Supreme Court in California v. Ramos 2 2 1 expressed the belief that instructions regarding a Governor's
commutation power provided relevant and accurate sentencing information to the jury. 2 2 The Court found unpersuasive the argument that such instructions "deflect the jury's focus from its central
task." ' 2 23 However, in holding that such comments were inoffensive
to the Constitution, the Court did not intend to override contrary
state judgments that capital sentencing juries should not consider
2 24
the Governor's power to commute a sentence.
In Bowie, the Court of Appeals recognized that Maryland law
supported a judgment contrary to Ramos. Informing the jury about
commutation powers is likely to distract the jury from its primary
task of determining aggravating and mitigating factors and balancing them against each other before imposing the death penalty.2 2 5
Shoemaker v. State 2 26 and its progeny provided clear support for the
Bowie court's decision to afford defendants greater rights grounded
218. "[D]eterminations of demeanor and credibility . . . are peculiarly within a trial
judge's province." Witt, 469 U.S. at 428.
219. See Krauss, supra note 216, at 77-79; Rosenson, supra note 202, at 313.
220. Bowie, 324 Md. at 23, 595 A.2d at 459.
221. 463 U.S. 992 (1983).
222. See id. at 1009.
223. Id. at 1005.
224. Id. at 1013-14. Upon remand in Ramos, the California Supreme Court held that
the instruction was "incompatible with [the state constitution's] guarantee of 'fundamental fairness' both because it is seriously and prejudicially misleading and because it
invites the jury to be influenced by speculative and improper considerations." People v.
Ramos, 689 P.2d 430, 438-39 (Cal. 1984).
225. Poole v. State, 295 Md. 167, 197, 453 A.2d 1218, 1233 (1983).
226. 228 Md. 462, 180 A.2d 682 (1962).
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in Maryland law than they would receive under federal law. 2 27
Such instructions "diminish[] the seriousness and finality of the
jury's task" by leading jurors to believe that they do not have the
last word.22 s Jurors may be more likely to take the "awesome step"
of imposing a death sentence knowing that if they err, the Governor
may correct them. 2 9 Furthermore, a gubernatorial pardon or commutation is "neither a sentencing option nor a possible mitigating
circumstance. "230
Bowie demonstrates willingness by the Court of Appeals to reject Supreme Court decisions providing a defendant with lesser protections. 23 ' The rationale underlying the Bowie court's decision
prohibiting instructions on executive clemency-that such instructions might cause jury speculation and diminish the seriousness of
the jury's task-is clearly more persuasive than the Supreme Court's
reasoning that such instructions give the jury an "accurate state23 2
ment of a potential sentencing alternative.
4. Conclusion.-The court in Bowie affirmed the fundamental
importance to Maryland's criminal justice system of a fair and impartial jury.23 3 Juries should always decide the case before them
"uninfluenced by any extraneous considerations whatever. "234
Clearly, a juror's impartiality is undermined if undue respect is
given to the testimony of police and state witnesses or if racial bias is
present.
227. See supra notes 170-174 and accompanying text.
228. Bowie, 324 Md. at 26, 595 A.2d at 460 (quoting Appellant's Brief at 41, Bowie (No.
90-132)).
229. Id. (quoting Appellant's Brief at 41, Bowie (No. 90-132)).
230. Id. at 30, 595 A.2d at 462. In Bruce v. State, 318 Md. 706, 569 A.2d 1254 (1990),
the Court of Appeals held that, when requested by the defendant, the trial court should
"instruct[] thejury that a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole
means that a defendant cannot be released on parole at any time during his natural life."
Id. at 735, 569 A.2d at 1269. Because life without parole is an alternative sentencing
option, see MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 4-516(b)(3)(i) (1992), which the jury may deem
adequate punishment mitigating against imposing the death penalty, the court vacated
the defendant's death sentence. Bruce, 318 Md. at 735, 569 A.2d at 1269.
231. Likewise, the Maryland legislature has afforded criminal defendants greater protections that those constitutionally mandated by the Supreme Court. In Penry v.
Lynaugh, 109 S.Ct. 2934 (1989), the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment
does not per se bar states from executing mentally retarded defendants. However, the
Maryland legislature has provided that mentally retarded defendants convicted of first
degree murder may not be sentenced to death. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 412(f)(1)
(1992).
232. California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1009 (1983).
233. See supra notes 129-132 and accompanying text.
234. Waters v. State, 51 Md. 430, 436 (1879).
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Furthermore, a fair and impartial jury is of the utmost importance in a capital case. A trial court's decision to exclude jurors
for cause should only be upheld when there is a sufficient factual
basis for that decision, not simply because jurors respond to a general question indicating they may have problems with capital
punishment.
Finally, jurors must respect the importance of their decisions.
The implication that a jury's decision will be remedied if jurors
make a mistake cannot be permitted. When a defendant's life is at
issue, any possibility of diminishing the seriousness of the jury's task
is intolerable.
By allowing voir dire inquiry into the possibility of racial bias and
police preference, by requiring thoroughness in voir dire questioning
on the venire's death penalty views, and by prohibiting sentencingphase instructions on executive clemency, Bowie accounts for all of
the above considerations. Bowie signals that Maryland will not
blindly follow Supreme Court decisions restricting defendants'
rights2 35 when greater protections are rooted in state law.
C.

Specific Intent Requiredfor Assault With Intent to Maim

In Hammond v. State,23 6 the Court of Appeals held that to convict
a defendant of assault with intent to maim, the State must prove that
the defendant intended to permanently injure the victim. 237 Because the trial judge had instructed the jury that it was "immaterial"
whether the injury intended by the defendant was temporary or permanent, 2 38 the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a new
trial, interpreting article 27, section 386 to require intent to permanently injure. 239
235. Justice Brennan viewed the majority's decision in Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S.
412 (1985), as indicative of the Supreme Court's disturbing trend respecting constitutional rights:
These trends all reflect the same desolate truth: we have lost our sense of the
transcendent importance of the Bill of Rights to our society. We have lost too
our sense of our own role as Madisonian "guardians" of these rights. Like the
death-qualified juries that the prosecution can now mold to its will to enhance
the chances of victory, this Court increasingly acts as the adjunct of the State
and its prosecutors in facilitating efficient and expedient conviction and execution irrespective of the Constitution's fundamental guarantees. One can only
hope that this day too will soon pass.
Id. at 463 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
236. 322 Md. 451, 588 A.2d 345 (1991).
237. See id. at 458-59, 588 A.2d at 348.
238. Id. at 454, 588 A.2d at 346.
239. Id. at 458-59, 588 A.2d at 348.
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On its face, Hammond appears to stretch the requirements of the
statute beyond its language. In light of the common-law and statutory development of mayhem and maiming,2 40 however, the Hammond decision is logical and appears to be correct. Further, the
court's decision was necessary in light of the legislative silence regarding the permanence of the injury.
1. The Case.-Walter Hammond lived with Peggy McElroy for
approximately eighteen months. 2 4 ' The couple separated in June of
1985, but McElroy continued to date Hammond.2 42 McElroy also
started dating David Schoene, who lived with her from January to
May of 1989.243 On July 9, 1989, Schoene visited McElroy at her
home.2 4 4 While Schoene was temporarily away from McElroy's
home, however, Hammond telephoned McElroy and asked to see
her. Hammond testified at trial that McElroy consented to the visit,
but she denied consenting.24 5 Later that evening, Schoene returned
to McElroy's home and the two retired for the night in McElroy's
bedroom. 4 6
Hammond arrived at McElroy's home at about 3:00 a.m., but he
was unable to enter through the front door because he had a key
only to one of two locks on the door. 24 7 The back entrance was
unlocked, however, and Hammond entered the home through that
door.2 48 In the second floor bedroom he found McElroy and
Schoene in bed, both asleep and completely uncovered. 24 9 According to his testimony, Hammond became confused and upset, thinking that Schoene had taken advantage of McElroy. 2 50 He wanted to
make Schoene leave, but he had been warned in the past by McElroy
240. "Mayhem" and "maim" are interchangeable terms. "'Maim' is the modern
equivalent of the old word 'mayhem,' and some have long been inclined to abandon the
earlier word entirely." PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 26, at 238.
241. Hammond, 322 Md. at 459, 588 A.2d at 349.
242. Id. at 459-60, 588 A.2d at 349.
243. Id. at 460, 588 A.2d at 349. "The catalyst in the sordid affair, which the trial
brought to light, was Peggy McElroy. She was enamored of Hammond and David
Schoene, and she bestowed her affections from time to time on each of them." Id. at
459, 588 A.2d at 349.
244. Id. at 460, 588 A.2d at 349.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. Hammond explained his late arrival, stating that his car broke down and he
had to wait for a ride from a friend. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
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that Schoene was a "black belt and kick box champion." 2 5 '
Hammond left the bedroom in search of something with which
to protect himself. 25 2 Hammond testified that although he could

have easily obtained a knife or a rake in McElroy's house, he chose
not to because he was afraid that the sharpness of those instruments
might cause serious injury to Schoene or himself.2 '" After locating a
shovel in the basement, Hammond proceeded to the bedroom
25 4
where McElroy and Schoene were sleeping.
Although armed with the shovel, Hammond was still worried
that Schoene would resist leaving and attempt to harm him.2 55
Therefore, Hammond decided to hit Schoene once with the flat end
of the shovel to startle him. 2 56 Hammond brought the flat end of
the shovel's blade down on Schoene's chest and yelled at him to get
out of the house.25 7 While Schoene got up startled and moved toward the door, Hammond repeatedly hit Schoene with the shovel
until Schoene finally fled.2 5 8 Hammond explained at trial that he
was afraid that Schoene would retaliate against him throughout the
entire episode.2 5 9
Schoene fled in his van and was stopped by police after he went
through a red light. The officers testified that Schoene was covered
with blood and in obvious pain.2 60 Schoene spent a few hours in a
hospital and was treated for a variety of lacerations and other injuries. 26 ' None of the injuries proved to be permanent, with the ex2 62
ception of a few scars.
At Hammond's trial, the trial judge instructed the jury that to
be convicted of assault with intent to maim, the defendant must
251. Id.
252. Id. at 461, 588 A.2d at 349.
253. Id. Hammond testified that he did not get a knife because "he did not want
anybody to get hurt" and that he did not choose the rake because "it had all these points
on it," which could put out someone's eye or otherwise seriously injure someone. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id., 588 A.2d at 350.
258. Id. at 462, 588 A.2d at 350. Schoene testified that Hammond struck him with the
shovel approximately 20 to 30 times. Id. Photographs produced at trial tracked
Schoene's progress from the bedroom door, down the stairs, and out the front door by
blood spatterings. Id.
259. Id. Although he did not estimate how many blows he inflicted on Schoene, Hammond "seriously doubted" that it was 20 or 30. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 462-63, 588 A.2d at 350.
262. See id. at 463, 588 A.2d at 350-51.
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have had "the specific intent to either disfigure or disable." ' After
some deliberation, the jury sent a written question to the judge
questioning whether the disablement had to be permanent or could
be temporary. 264 The judge replied in writing: "Whether any disablement is permanent or temporary is immaterial as long as there
is a disablement. ' 26 5 Defense counsel objected to the judge's response and, following the jury's verdict of guilty, Hammond appealed. 2 66 The Court of Appeals granted certiorari on its own
motion before decision by the Court of Special Appeals.2 6 7
2.

Legal Background.-

a. The Common Law.-Assault with intent to maim originated
from common-law mayhem. 2 68 The elements of the common-law
crime were established early in English law. 269 Originally, mayhem
was defined as "maliciously depriving another of the use of such of
his members as may render him less able, in fighting, either to defend himself or to annoy his adversary. ' 27 ° Injuries that met the
definition included dismemberment and permanent disablement,
because both had the effect of reducing the victim's ability to
fight.2 7 1
The early definition, however, excluded any disfigurement that
did not impair the fighting ability of the victim. 2 72 For instance, cutting or biting off a victim's ears and nose did not constitute mayhem
263. Id. at 454, 588 A.2d at 346. The trial judge instructed the jury in general accord
with a pattern jury instruction for assault with intent to maim. Id. at 454 n.2, 588 A.2d at
346 n.2. Although the instruction is suggested by the Maryland State Bar Association, it
nevertheless presents a problem. The instruction states in part that "disfigure has its

common, ordinary meaning." Id. at 454 & n.2, 588 A.2d at 346 & n.2 (citing Maryland
Pattern Jury Instructions-Criminal § 4:21.1 (1987)). However, the central question is
whether disfigurement ordinarily means permanent or temporary injury.
264. Hammond, 322 Md. at 454, 588 A.2d at 346.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 454-55, 588 A.2d at 346.
267. Id. at 454, 588 A.2d at 346.
268. RICHARD P. GILBERT & CHARLES E. MOYLAN, JR.,
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3.9, at 55-58 (1983).
269. LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 29, § 7.17(a), at 696.

270.

PERKINS
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CRIMINAL

LAW:

& BOYCE, supra note 26, at 239. The punishment of this crime was

designed to preserve the King's right to the usefulness of his subjects in battle. LAFAVE
& SCOTT,supra note 29, § 7.17(a), at 696. Any injury that rendered a subject of the King

less valuable in battle was considered an offense against the King. Id. The earliest punishment for this crime was therefore severe; the perpetrator was subjected to the same
harm he inflicted upon his victim. Id.
271. LAFAvE & SCOTr, supra note 29, § 7.17(a), at 696.
272. Id.
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at common law.2 7 3 This deficiency in the common law was rectified

in 1670 by the Coventry Act, 27 4 which punished a wider range of
conduct including any permanent dismemberment, disablement, or
intentional disfigurement of a person.2 7 5

b.

Maryland Law.-Maryland law has followed the course of

the English common law. 2 76 In 1809, the legislature enacted two
statutes 27 7 under the heading "Maiming," which are now codified in

article 27, sections 384 and 385. Section 384 furnishes the penalty
for common-law mayhem.2 7 8 Section 385 expanded the commonlaw crime in language very similar to the Coventry Act of 1670.279

In 1853, the legislature added section 386,280 punishing assault
with intent to maim. 28 ' The courts have interpreted this section as a
273. PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 26, at 239.
274. Id. The English statute was enacted in response to a brutal attack on Sir John
Coventry, a member of Parliament. Id. Coventry's nose was slit with a knife, supposedly
in retaliation for statements he had made in Parliament. Id. Under common law, even if
Coventry's nose had been dismembered, it would not have constituted mayhem. See id.
The new statute, however, extended the common law by punishing anyone who maliciously "cut out or disable[d] the tongue, put out an eye, slit the nose, cut off a nose or
lip, or cut off or disable[d] any limb or member of any subject; with the intention in so
doing to maim or disfigure him." Id. at 240.
275. Id. at 240.
276. See GILBERT & MOYLAN, supra note 268, § 3.9, at 57.
277. The original acts were passed by Acts of Jan. 6, 1810, ch. 138, 1809 Md. Laws.
278. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 384 (1987) provides:
Every person, his aiders and abettors, who shall be convicted of the crime of
mayhem, or of tarring and feathering, shall be sentenced to the penitentiary for
not more than ten years nor less than eighteen months.
Id.
279. Armstrong v. State, 51 Md. App. 508, 514, 444 A.2d 1049, 1052 (1982) ("Section 385 unmistakably is patterned after the 'Act of Coventry.' "). MD. ANN. CODE art.
27, § 385 (1987) states:
Every person, his aiders, abettors and counsellors, who shall be convicted of
the crime of cutting out or disabling the tongue, putting out an eye, slitting the
nose, cutting or biting off the nose, ear or lip, or cutting or biting off or disabling any limb or member of any person, of malice aforethought, with intention
in so doing to mark or disfigure such person, shall be guilty of a felony and
upon conviction thereof be sentenced to the penitentiary for not less than two
nor more than ten years.
Id.
280. Act of March 31, 1853, ch. 99, 1853 Md. Laws. Now codified in article 27, § 386,
this section has remained virtually unchanged since 1853. See Hammond, 322 Md. at 45759, 588 A.2d at 347-48.
281. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 386 (1987) provides as follows:
If any person shall unlawfully shoot at any person, or shall in any manner unlawfully and maliciously attempt to discharge any kind of loaded arms at any
person, or shall unlawfully and maliciously stab, cut or wound any person, or
shall assault or beat any person, with intent to maim, disfigure or disable such
person, or with intent to prevent the lawful apprehension or detainer of any
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statutory extension of the common-law crime of mayhem. In Biggs
v. State,2 8 2 the Court of Special Appeals found that the prohibition
codified in section 386 "is considerably broader than the crime of
mayhem" because it targets a wider range of conduct for punishment.2 8 3 The court further found that assault with intent to maim
remained separate and distinct from common-law mayhem because
the two offenses were codified in two different sections, namely sections 384 and 386.284

The tendency of the Court of Special Appeals to differentiate
between the maiming statutes is further demonstrated by Armstrong
v. State.2 8 5 In Armstrong, the defendant was convicted and sentenced
to two consecutive ten year prison terms for violations of sections
384 and 385.286 The convictions of common-law mayhem and statutory maiming both stemmed from a single incident during which
the defendant threw acid on the victim. 28

7

Upon conviction, Arm-

strong appealed on the ground that he was being punished twice for
the same crime.2 8 8 The Court of Special Appeals found that the legislature codified common-law mayhem in section 384 of article 27289
and that "[s]ection 385 unmistakably is patterned after the 'Act of
Coventry.' "290 The court concluded that Maryland law, like English
common law, distinguishes between the offense of maiming and the
common-law crime of mayhem. 291' Although the court vacated the
conviction of common-law mayhem on other grounds,2 92 it concluded that a single act, such as throwing harmful acid on a person,
could in some circumstances support a conviction under both section 384 and section 385.293
party for any offense for which the said party may be legally apprehended or
detained, every such offender, and every person counselling, aiding or abetting
such offender shall be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, be punished by confinement in the penitentiary for a period not less than eighteen
months nor more than ten years.
Id.
282. 56 Md. App. 638, 468 A.2d 669 (1983), cert. denied, 299 Md. 425, 474 A.2d 218
(1984).
283. Id. at 653, 468 A.2d at 676.
284. See id.
285. 51 Md. App. 508, 444 A.2d 1049 (1982).
286. Id. at 512, 444 A.2d at 1051.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id.

290. Id.at 514, 444 A.2d at 1052.
291. See id.at 514-15, 444 A.2d at 1052.
292. See id. at 516, 444 A.2d at 1053.
293. See id.
at 515, 444 A.2d at 1052. The Armstrong court stated in dicta that
[i]f the record were clear as to any specific act of disfigurement and clear that
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Biggs and Armstrong indicate that the English common law of
mayhem is codified in section 384, with the statutory extension of
the Coventry Act codified in section 385. Section 386, therefore,
represents a further extension of the common law. In Jenkins v.
State,29 4 the court discussed section 386 in depth, noting that there
was scant caselaw construing the section, and that assault with intent
to maim is "proscribed, but not defined, by statute. "295 Ordinarily,
when the legislature uses a common-law term of art in a statute,
courts look to the common-law meaning of those terms.29 6 TheJenkins court pointed out, however, that although "maim, disfigure or
disable" might have been included in the common-law definition of
mayhem, the court did not believe that those terms were limited to
the injuries and disablements proscribed by sections 384 and
385.297 The court distinguished between assault with intent to murder and assault with intent to maim, stating that "[a]n intent to
maim, disfigure, or disable necessarily falls short of, and thus excludes, an intent to kill. The actor's object in such a case is not to
end the victim's life, but to have him linger on, either temporarily or
permanently, in a disabled or disfigured condition. "298
Accordingly, the Court of Special Appeals concluded that a
conviction for both assault with intent to murder and assault with
intent to maim could not stand,29 9 and reversed the conviction for
assault with intent to murder.' ° The Court of Appeals reversed the
the jury concluded the disfigurement was a violation of section 385 and the
blinding of one eye was a violation of the common law, separate convictions
might stand.
Id.

294. 59 Md. App. 612, 477 A.2d 791 (1984), aff'd in partand rev'd in part, 307 Md. 501,
515 A.2d 465 (1986).

295. Id. at 616-17, 477 A.2d at 793.
296. LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 29, § 2.2(d), at 79.
297. 59 Md. App. at 617, 477 A.2d at 793. Writing for the court, Judge Wilner stated:
As § 386 makes no reference to either § 384 or § 385, as it was first enacted
forty-four years after those other sections, and as the words "disfigure" and
"disable," in their ordinary signification, would clearly include injuries other
than those encompassed within §§ 384 and 385, we do not believe that the
terms "maim, disfigure or disable" as used in § 386 are limited only to those
injuries and disablements proscribed by §§ 384 and 385. Thus, to sustain a
conviction under § 386, it is not necessary to prove an intent to commit an act
which, if completed, would be punishable under § 384 or § 385. Any intent to
disfigure or disable will suffice.
Id.

298. Id. at 618, 477 A.2d at 794 (emphasis added).
299. See id.

300. See id. at 624, 477 A.2d at 797.
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intermediate appellate court in State v. Jenkins,3 0 1 reinstating the
conviction of assault with intent to murder and holding that assault
with intent to maim was a lesser-included offense that merged with
the offense of assault with intent to murder.3 0 2 The Court of Appeals did not review the Court of Special Appeals' statement of the
law concerning assault with intent to maim, however. Therefore,
the intermediate court's interpretation remained the law in Maryland concerning assault with intent to maim.
c. OtherJurisdictions.-In their treatise on criminal law, Professors Perkins and Boyce assert that "[flor either maim or disfigurement the injury must be permanent in its nature. '3 0 3 Several
jurisdictions support this interpretation of the common law, 30 4 especially when state statutes are silent as to the nature of the requisite
injury. In Goodman v. Superior Court, 0 5 the defendant sought a writ
of mandamus from the California Court of Appeal on the ground
that the evidence to be adduced at trial would be legally insufficient
to convict him of mayhem.30 6 In denying the petition,30 7 the court
made two important observations. First, the court stated that it
would presume that the legislature intended to retain the commonlaw rules and definitions of mayhem when it used common-law
terms in its mayhem statute. 0 8 Second, although the California
maiming statute, like the Maryland statute, did not explicitly require
a resultant permanent injury, the court specifically noted, based on
principles of statutory construction, that the statute required proof
301. 307 Md. 501, 515 A.2d 465 (1986).
302. See id. at 517, 515 A.2d at 473.
303. PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 26, at 242; see also LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 29,
§ 7.17(c), at 698 ("It is a requirement for mayhem that the disabling injury be permanent, so that the temporary disablement of a finger, arm, eye, or other member will not

do.").
304. The early cases clearly required a permanent injury. In Lee v. Commonwealth,
115 S.E. 671 (Va. 1923), the court stated that "[tlhe word 'disfigure' in the maiming
statute ... means a permanent and not merely a temporary and inconsequential disfigurement." Id. at 673; see also State v. Taylor, 142 S.E. 254, 256 (W. Va. 1928).
305. 148 Cal. Rptr. 799 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978).
306. See id. at 800.
307. See id.at 801.
308. See id. at 800. The court stated:
As required by settled principles of statutory construction, we will presume thai
in enacting section 203, the Legislature was familiar with the common law concept of mayhem, and that, when it couched its enactment in common law language, it intended to carry over such rules as were part of the common law
crime into statutory form.
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that the defendant inflicted a permanent injury. 0 9
Likewise, in United States v. Cook,"' ° the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit construed a statute prohibiting disfigurement as requiring, "like common law mayhem, . . . permanence
of injury or disfigurement in some appreciable form." '' In its discussion of the origins of mayhem and statutory maiming, the court
expressed no doubt as to the permanency element that persisted
after codification. 1 2
3. The Court's Reasoning.-The trial judge in Hammond apparently relied upon the Court of Special Appeals' interpretation of assault with intent to maim. In Jenkins, the intermediate appellate
court determined that "[a]ny intent to disfigure or disable will suf3 ,3
fice" to support a conviction of assault with intent to maim.
Moreover, the court explained that the aggressor must intend that
the victim "linger on" in a disabled or disfigured condition, "either
temporarily or permanently. 3' 1 4 Thus, the Court of Special Appeals'Jenkins opinion supported the trial judge's jury instruction in
Hammond that it was "immaterial" whether the defendant intended
the injury to be temporary or permanent, as long as the jury found
3 15
that he intended "a disablement.
The Hammond court correctly noticed, however, that the Jenkins
court's interpretation of assault with intent to maim contradicted
the prevailing interpretation of the common law, which requires the
intent to permanently injure.
There is no disagreement among the scholars that mayhem
as it was known in ancient times and as it is known today
requires a permanent injury. This is so whether the offense
is spoken of in terms of maiming, disfigurement, or disablement and despite the fact that the emphasis in modern
times is on the completeness and integrity of the body,
rather than its efficacy in battle. 1 6
309. See id. at 801. The court found that "[clases decided under the Coventry Act,
and statutes like our own which obviously derive from it, have found mayhem for disfigurement alone only where the injury is permanent." Id.
310. 462 F.2d 301 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
311. Id. at 303.
312. Id. The court held, however, that less than total deterioration of a body organ
may constitute disfigurement. Id. at 304.
313. 59 Md. App. 612, 617,477 A.2d 791, 793 (1984), aff'd in part and rev d in part, 307
Md. 501, 515 A.2d 465 (1986).
314. Id. at 618, 477 A.2d at 794.
315. Hammond, 322 Md. at 454, 588 A.2d at 346.
316. Id. at 458, 588 A.2d at 348.
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Thus, to commit assault with intent to maim, the defendant must
intend to cause permanent injury to the victim.
The inquiry made in Goodman v. Superior Court 1 17 parallels that
in Hammond. Both courts addressed maiming statutes that were silent on the permanency requirement. Standard principles of statutory construction led both courts to find the requirement of a
permanent injury implicit in the codification of the common-law
crime of mayhem. 1 8
The Hammond court relied on the prevailing interpretation by
other jurisdictions, that, despite the lack of explicit language, the
legislature intended to require a permanent injury for violations of
common-law mayhem and statutory maiming.3 1 9 The court reasoned that it would be incongruous to interpret the legislature's silence on the matter to indicate an intent that "maim, disfigurement
and disablement" only include temporary injury.320 Because maiming requires a permanent injury, a necessary element of the intent to
3
maim offense is the intent to permanently injure the victim.

21

Whereas the Court of Special Appeals in Jenkins had based its interpretation merely on the facts that section 386 was passed at a different time than sections 384 and 385 and that "disfigure" and
"disable" were broader terms than those of sections 384 and 385,22
the Court of Appeals in Hammond relied on common-law precedent
and the legislature's silence to interpret the three statutes together
in accordance with the common law.3 23
4. Analysis.-The Hammond court's interpretation is supported
by Maryland case law. Maryland courts have held that sections 384
and 385 derive directly from the common-law offense of mayhem
and the Coventry Act, respectively, and that both offenses require
317. 148 Cal. Rptr. 799 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978).
318. In language similar to that in Goodman, the Court of Appeals stated in Hammond:
We have no reason to assume that when the Legislature created the offense of
assault with intent to maim, disfigure or disable a hundred and thirty-eight
years ago and reviewed the statute, twenty-five years ago, it was not fully aware
of the requirement at the common law that maiming, disfigurement or disablement be permanent.
322 Md. at 458, 588 A.2d at 348. For a thorough discussion of the Goodman case, see
supra notes 305-309 and accompanying text.
319. See 322 Md. at 458-59, 588 A.2d at 348.
320. Id. at 459, 588 A.2d at 348.
321. Id.
322. See 59 Md. App. 612, 617, 477 A.2d 791, 793 (1984), aff d in part and rev'd i part,
307 Md. 501, 515 A.2d 465 (1986).
323. See 322 Md. at 458-59, 588 A.2d at 348.
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permanent injuries. 24 The newest section in the subtitle, section
386, does not, however, define the terms maim, disfigure, or disable.3 25 The Court of Appeals in Booth v. State3 26 therefore con-

cluded that "[a]n assault with intent to maim is an assault
perpetrated with the intent to inflict one or more of the injuries described in [section] 385. -327 If section 386 is to be interpreted consistently with section 385, then it must also contain the common-law
requirement of a permanent injury, meaning the intent must be to
permanently injure the victim.
Hammond and Booth illustrate a difference in approach between
the Court of Appeals and the Court of Special Appeals in interpreting the maiming statutes. The Court of Special Appeals has leaned
toward extending the offense of maiming beyond its common-law
definition.3 2 ' The Court of Appeals, on the other hand, has retained the common law as a strong foundation for the interpretation
of Maryland statutes.3

29

This may explain why the Court granted

certiorari to hear Hammond on its own motion, bypassing the Court
of Special Appeals.3 3
Although it is plausible that the legislature intended to broaden
the scope of mayhem with section 386, there is simply no extrinsic
support for this position. Where statutes employ common-law
terms of art, the courts must resort to the common law when the
legislature makes no attempt to define those terms.3 3 It is clear
that for over three hundred years, the common law has required a
permanent injury to support a conviction for mayhem. 3 2 Thus to
intend to maim, the defendant must intend to permanently injure
the victim.
Finally, although it is perhaps not a bad idea to punish temporary maimings as harshly as permanent ones, this decision is one for
the legislature and not the courts. It is possible that the Court of
324. See Armstrong v. State, 51 Md. App. 508, 514, 444 A.2d 1049, 1052 (1982).
325. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 386 (1987).
326. 306 Md. 172, 507 A.2d 1098 (1986), rev'd in part on other grounds, 482 U.S. 496
(1987).
327. Id. at 212, 507 A.2d at 1118.
328. See, e.g., Biggs v. State, 56 Md. App. 638, 652-53, 468 A.2d 669, 676 (1983), cert.
denied, 299 Md. 425, 474 A.2d 218 (1984);Armstrong, 51 Md. App. at 513-15, 444 A.2d at
1051-53.
329. See, e.g., Hammond, 322 Md. at 459, 588 A.2d at 348; Booth, 306 Md. at 212, 507
A.2d at 1118.
330. See 322 Md. at 454, 588 A.2d at 346.
331. LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 29, § 2.2(d), at 79.
332. See id. § 7.17, at 696.
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Appeals considered this as well, because it practiced judicial restraint and refused to change the law when the legislature was silent.
5. Conclusion.-The decision of the Hammond court to interpret
section 386 of article 27 as including the common-law requirement
of a permanent injury to sustain a conviction of assault with intent to
maim is in accord with the majority ofjurisdictions and the common
law. Hammond is only remarkable because it diverted a trend to
broaden the offense, which was developing in the Court of Special
Appeals. The decision fills a gap in the law of Maryland. Unless the
legislature acts unequivocally in this area, it is now clear that the law
requires a permanent injury for conviction under the maiming statutes and an intent to permanently injure for an assault with intent to
maim conviction. It remains unclear, however, how this decision
may affect other codifications of common-law crimes and whether it
will mark the beginning of a retreat to stricter common-law interpretation of crimes.
Louis A.

AMBROSE
DARRELL F. COOK

VAN

C.

DURRER,

II

VI.
A.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

The Court of Appeals' Attempt to Return Fourth Amendment
Rights to Defendants

In Owens v. State,' the Court of Appeals held that an individual
has a reasonable expectation of privacy as to the interior contents of
a bag left at a friend's apartment, 2 even though the individual has no
expectation of privacy as to the friend's apartment in general.3 Specifically, the court ruled that the friend could not validly consent to a
search of the bag because the friend lacked common authority over
the defendant's bag and its contents.4 In a four to three decision,
the Court of Appeals reversed the Court of Special Appeals' affirmance of the defendant's conviction and remanded for a new trial because the warrantless search of the defendant's bag was
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 5
1. The Case.-On February 1, 1988, Lenard Owens, a resident
of Fort Pierce, Florida, arrived in Hagerstown, Maryland.6 Owens,
along with three other men, proceeded to the apartment of a friend,
Marla Gardin. 7 Owens had stayed at Gardin's apartment on six or
seven previous occasions, and on this particular visit, the four men
arrived with three pieces of luggage.8 Owens and the other men
asked Gardin if they could leave their bags in Gardin's apartment
while they looked for another place to stay. 9 Gardin permitted them
to leave their bags in her apartment.1 0 Owens's bag was zippered
closed and a tag bearing his name was attached." At no time did
1. 322 Md. 616, 589 A.2d 59, cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 452 (1991).
2. See id. at 630, 589 A.2d at 65.
3. See id. at 627, 589 A.2d at 64.
4. See id. at 633, 589 A.2d at 67.
5. See id. at 634, 589 A.2d at 67-68. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
6. Owens, 322 Md. at 619-20, 589 A.2d at 60.
7. Id. at 620, 589 A.2d at 60.
8. Id. at 619-20, 589 A.2d at 60.
9. Id., 589 A.2d at 61.
10. Id.
I1. Id. at 619, 589 A.2d at 60.
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2
Owens give Gardin permission to open the bag.1
Later that day, police officers appeared at Gardin's apartment
and asked Gardin if they could search the apartment. The police
indicated to Gardin that they had received information that four
men, who had arrived at her apartment the same morning, had left
drugs in her apartment.'" Although the officers did not have a
search warrant, Gardin consented to the search of her apartment,' 4
pointing to the bags in the living room and stating "if there's any
drugs it would be in there."'" Gardin also informed the officers that
Owens had visited her in the past when he came to town to sell crack
6
cocaine, often leaving some of the drugs in her apartment.'
Although Owens's bag was closed and a tag bearing his name
and address was attached to the outside of the bag, the officers
searched the bag and found $1800 in cash and 973 pieces of crack
cocaine valued between $78,000 and $97,000. t 7 Owens was
charged in the Circuit Court for Washington County with numerous
8
violations of the controlled dangerous substance laws.'

Owens filed a pretrial motion to suppress the evidence found in
his bag; 9 the motions judge denied the motion at a subsequent
hearing.2 0 The case proceeded to trial and a jury convicted Owens

12. Id. at 620, 589 A.2d at 61.
13. Id.
14. There was no dispute over the fact that Gardin had the authority to consent to
the search of her own apartment, or that her consent was voluntarily given. See id. at
627, 589 A.2d at 64.
15. Id. at 621, 589 A.2d at 61. This is Detective Sheppard's version of the events that
took place on February 1, 1988. Gardin, however, testified that she did not point the
bag out to the officers-"[t]hey were setting right there for [the officers] to see them."
Id. at 620, 589 A.2d at 61. Interestingly, the Court of Appeals did not discuss this discrepancy and, thus, it is unclear whom the trial court actually believed. Apparently, the
Court of Appeals considered it unnecessary to address the issue.
16. Id. at 621, 589 A.2d at 61.
17. Id. at 619-21, 589 A.2d at 60-61.
18. Id. at 618, 589 A.2d at 60.
19. Id.
20. Id. The judge hearing the motion found that no one but Gardin had a proprietary interest in the apartment, concluding that Gardin gave the officers permission to
search the premises and that the consent was voluntarily given. Id. at 623, 589 A.2d at
62. The judge likened Owens's leaving the bag in Gardin's apartment to a "gratuitous
bailment." Id.
A "bailment" is defined as
[d]elivery of personalty for some particular use, or on mere depository upon a
contract, express or implied, that after the purpose has been fulfilled it shall be
redelivered to the person who delivered it or otherwise dealt with according to
his directions, or kept until he reclaims it, as the case may be.
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of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. 2' The Court of
Special Appeals affirmed the judgment and the trial court's determination that the search of Owens's bag was valid under the Fourth
Amendment. 22 The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to determine whether the trial court erred in holding that Owens did not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the bag he temporarily
2
left in the possession of a friend. 1
2.

Legal Background.-

a. The Fourth Amendment and the Exclusionary Rule.-Owens's
motion to suppress was founded on the Fourth Amendment,2 4
which is applicable to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment.2 5 The Supreme Court has interpreted the amendment to require that a search of private property by police be performed
pursuant to a properly issued search warrant. 26 The mere reasonableness of a search is never a substitute for the Fourth Amendment's
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 129 (5th ed. 1987). Specifically, a "gratuitous bailment" is a
bailment made only for the benefit of the bailor (Owens, in this case). Id.
Under the circumstances of the bailment, the judge found that Owens did not exhibit a "reasonable legitimate expectation of privacy" in his bag. Owens, 322 Md. at 624,
589 A.2d at 62. Furthermore, the judge concluded that the police did not violate any
personal Fourth Amendment right of Owens because they had Gardin's consent to
search her apartment and everything therein. Id., 589 A.2d at 62-63.
21. Owens, 322 Md. at 618, 589 A.2d at 60.
22. See Owens v. State, 83 Md. App. 353, 370, 574 A.2d 362, 370 (1990), rev'd, 322
Md. 616, 589 A.2d 59, cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 452 (1991). Specifically, the Court of Special Appeals held:
[A] third-party gratuitous bailee of a container may give valid consent to police
to search that container where the bailee has exclusive control over the item,
where the bailee is in a position to deny the owner of the item physical access to
it, and where the bailee is in an inculpatory position as a result of the bailment.
Under these circumstances, the owner of the item has relinquished control over
the item to a sufficient degree to undermine his or her expectation of privacy in
the item. With the expectation of privacy eroded, the owner has no valid
Fourth Amendment search and seizure complaint regarding the legality of the
search of the item.
Id.
23. Owens, 322 Md. at 624, 589 A.2d at 63.
24. See supra note 5 for the text of the Fourth Amendment. Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights is in pai materia with the Fourth Amendment. Gamble v.
State, 318 Md. 120, 123 n.2, 567 A.2d 95, 97 n.2 (1990). Therefore, the defendant's
rights under the Maryland Constitution do not differ from his rights under the United
States Constitution.
25. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (holding that evidence obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment is, by virtue of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, inadmissible in state court).
26. See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 758 (1979), ovenruded on other grounds by
California v. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. 1982, 1991 (1991).
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warrant requirement.2 7 Consequently, a search of private property
ordinarily must be both reasonable and conducted pursuant to a
valid search warrant. 2 8 A search or seizure conducted without the
benefit of a warrant is per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment, subject to only a few exceptions.2 9
b. The Consent Exception to the Warrant Requirement.-A well-established exception to the warrant requirement is a search based on
consent.3 ° Moreover, one other than the owner may consent to a
search if the third party "possesse[s] common authority over or
other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be
inspected."'" Recently, the Supreme Court expanded the consent
exception to include situations in which a third party lacks actual
authority to consent, but has apparent authority to consent.3 2 Specifically, the Supreme Court held that a warrantless search is valid
when based upon consent of a third party whom police reasonably
believed at the time of the search to process common authority over
33
the premises, but who in fact lacks the actual authority to consent.
3. The Court's Reasoning; Analysis.-The Court of Appeals found
that Owens had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the bag and
specifically concluded that Owens's friend, a gratuitous bailee, did
not have common authority over the bag. Therefore, she could not
validly consent to a search of its interior contents.3 4
a. Owens's Reasonable Expectation of Privacy.-Analyzing the circumstances under which Owens left his bag in Gardin's apartment,
the Court of Appeals likened the situation to a gratuitous bailment. 5 Generally, in a bailment relationship, the bailor retains an
expectation of privacy because he places his possessions in a place
27. Id.
28. Id.

29. Acevedo, 111 S.Ct.at 1991 (citations omitted); Riddick v. State, 319 Md. 180, 192,
571 A.2d 1239, 1245 (1990). For some examples of exceptions to the warrant requirement recognized by the Court, see Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 295-96 (1973) (exigent circumstances exception); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (search
incident to arrest exception); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 151 (1925) (automobile exception).
30. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973).
31. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974).
32. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 110 S.Ct. 2793 (1990).
33. Id. at 2800-01.
34. Owens, 322 Md. at 663, 589 A.2d at 67.
35. See id. at 630, 589 A.2d at 65-66. For a definition of gratuitous bailment, see
supra note 20.
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he regards as safe for storage. 6
Some courts have held that if the bailor voluntarily puts property under the control of another (the bailee), the property becomes
subject to public disclosure on the whim of the bailee.1 7 Consequently, the bailor is viewed as having relinquished his prior legitimate expectation of privacy with regard to that property. 8 On the
other hand, a majority of decisions find that the bailor retains an
expectation of privacy in the bailed item. 9
In the instant case, the controversial search involved a piece of
luggage. It is well established that a heightened expectation of privacy attaches to luggage because it is a common repository for one's
personal belongings.4" Therefore, Owens likely enjoyed a reasonable expectation of privacy in his bag, which was zippered closed
and marked with his name.
The fact that Owens's bag was unlocked may suggest that
36. 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE,

SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMEND-

§ 11.3(c), at 305 (2d ed. 1987 & Supp. 1991).
37. See, e.g., Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980) (holding that the defendant, who put his effects in a female companion's purse with her consent and remained in
her presence, had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the purse); State v. Jordan, 252
S.E.2d 857, 859 (N.C. App. 1979) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy by a
car's driver as to the pocketbook of a passenger).
MENT

38. See Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 104;Jordan,252 S.E.2d at 859. Rawlings, however, has

been sharply criticized. See United States v. Most, 876 F.2d 191, 198 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(urging that Rawlings should not be read as "establish[ing] any general rule that an individual forfeits his reasonable expectation of privacy in his belongings simply by entrusting them to the care of another"). Professor LaFave, in his treatise, discusses the
extenuating circumstances surrounding the Rawlings decision. In particular, LaFave
notes that the Court likely based the Rawlings decision on the fact that it truly believed
Rawlings's companion was, in fact, not a consensual bailee. See 4 LAFAvE, supra note 36,
§ 11.3(c), at 311.
39. See, e.g., United States v. Johns, 707 F.2d 1093, 1099-1100 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd
on other grounds, 469 U.S. 478 (1985). InJohns, the defendant had standing to object to a
search of the packages at issue because he shared a bailor-bailee relationship with the
possessor. Id. This case was unlike Rawlings because it did "not involve a 'precipitous'
bailment to which the bailee had not consented." Id. at 1100; see also In re B.K.C., 413
A.2d 894, 898-902 (D.C. 1980) (holding that the defendant retained an expectation of
privacy in his briefcase even though his friend temporarily had custody of the case);
State v. Pinegar, 583 S.W.2d 217, 220 (Mo. App. 1979) (holding that the defendant, an
adult, had a protected expectation of privacy in an unlocked footlocker in the room he
occasionally used in his parents' home).
40. See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 762 (1979), overruled on other grounds by
California v. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. 1982, 1991 (1991); see also United States v. Block, 590
F.2d 535, 541 (4th Cir. 1978) (stating that valises and suitcases are frequently the objects of heightened privacy expectations, and these expectations may well be at their
greatest when the objects are temporarily placed under the general control of another).
"Luggage" is commonly defined as suitcases, valises, or footlockers. See Sanders, 442
U.S. at 762.
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Owens "assumed the risk" that the bailee, Gardin, would look inside
his bag or consent to a search of its contents. 4 Bailment-ofcontainer cases, however, are not necessarily decided on the single
issue of whether the container is locked or otherwise secured.42
"The nature of the bailment, especially whether it was contemplated
that the bailee would have occasion to open the container, is important."' 43 Thus, because Gardin testified that she had not received
permission from Owens to open the bag, 44 the Court of Appeals
found that Owens retained a reasonable expectation of privacy in
his unlocked, but closed, bag.4 5
b. Gardin'sLack of Actual Authority to Consent to a Search of Owens's
Bag.-Clearly, Owens did not give Gardin express authority to consent to a search of his bag.4 6 Nevertheless, some courts have held
that a third party's authority to consent may be implied from the
circumstances and need not be express.4 7 In the instant case,
Owens simply left his bag in Gardin's apartment for a brief time
period. Without a more substantial understanding between the two
parties, it is unlikely that these circumstances warrant a finding that
Gardin was impliedly authorized to consent to a search of Owens's
bag.
In certain circumstances, a third party who otherwise lacks au41. See 3 LAFAVE, supra note 36, § 8.6(a), at 312 ("Ofobvious importance is ... the
extent to which the bailor made efforts to secure, even as against the bailee, the privacy
of his effects.").
42. Id. § 8.6(a), at 313-14 n.6.
43. Id.; see also United States v. Wilson, 536 F.2d 883, 884-85 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding that consent by the bailee was invalid when the defendants, who had just robbed a
bank, left suitcases in the bailee's apartment, apparently intending to return for them
after the robbery); United States v. Prescott, 480 F. Supp. 554, 560 (W.D. Pa. 1979)
(finding that the YMCA could not lawfully consent to the search of a duffel bag left
behind by the defendant, because the defendant "had ajustifiable expectation of privacy
in his belongings").
44. Owens, 322 Md. at 631, 589 A.2d at 66.
45. See id. It is interesting to note that the dissent in Owens, written by Judge Chasanow, concedes that "current law generally provides one with an expectation of privacy in
a bag, like the one in the instant case, even if it is unlocked." Id. at 640, 589 A.2d at 71
(Chasanow, J., dissenting). Judge Chasanow, however, argued that Owens's expectation
of privacy was unreasonable based on the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 641-42,
589 A.2d at 71.
46. Id. at 619-20, 589 A.2d at 60-61.
47. See, e.g., United States v. Buettner-Januch, 646 F.2d 759, 765-66 (2d Cir.) (citing
United States v. Gradowski, 502 F.2d 563, 564 (2d Cir. 1974)), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 830
(1981); see also Corngold v. United States, 367 F.2d 1, 7 (9th Cir. 1966) (concluding that
the owner of personal property may impliedly authorize another to consent to an invasion of his right to privacy by giving the third party unrestricted freedom over the
property).
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thority to consent may legally consent to a search if his primary motivation is to exculpate himself from suspicion of criminal
wrongdoing.4" Gardin's consent to the search of her apartment and
Owens's bag was most likely not motivated by an interest in exculpating herself. Rather, she probably consented to the search simply
because the police asked for her consent.4 9 Furthermore, there is
no indication that she exhibited any fear that she would be implicated in the drug-dealing activities of the defendant. Even if Gardin
had permitted the search in order to exculpate herself, it can be argued that her authority to consent was limited to seizure of the bag
and its removal from her home.5" Therefore, Gardin lacked actual
authority to consent to a search of Owens's bag under any theory. 5 '
c. The Court's Disregardfor the Apparent Authority Doctrine.-Inexplicably, the Owens majority failed to address the issue of apparent
authority. In Illinois v. Rodrguez,5 2 the Supreme Court held that
when the police mistakenly believe that a third party has the authority to consent to a search, the search will nevertheless be upheld if
the officers' actions in relying on such authority were reasonable.5 3
48. See United States v. Diggs, 441 F. Supp. 407, 410-11 (M.D. Pa. 1977).
49. According to Gardin's testimony, she did not object to the search of her apartment after the police requested her permission. Owens, 322 Md. at 620, 589 A.2d at 61.
She also testified that she did not point out Owens's bag to the police; rather, the bag
was in plain view and the police noticed it themselves. Id. If Gardin's true motive was to
exculpate herself, she would have pointed out the luggage to the police. But see supra
note 15 and accompanying text.
50. See Gieffels v. State, 590 P.2d 55, 62 (Alaska 1979). In Gieffels, the defendant's
brother, a bailee of the defendant's suitcase, validly consented to a seizure of the suitcase. Id. The court reasoned that when property is seized, the bailee's "right to exculpate" himself outweighs the defendant's right to privacy in the property bailed. Id. The
court explicitly declined to addresss the issue of the bailee's authority to consent to a
search.
51. If Gardin privately searched the bag and then brought it to the attention of the
police, a third party consensual search based on the right-to-exculpate theory may have
been valid. In this hypothetical situation, however, the government would not have violated the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights because a private party search does not
constitute governmental intrusion. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113-14
(1984).
52. 110 S. Ct. 2793 (1990).
53. Id. at 2800-01. In Rodiguez, a woman consented to a search of the defendant's
apartment, with the apparent authority to consent exhibited by her holding a key to the
door and referring to the apartment as "our apartment." Id. at 2797. In fact, the woman had no actual authority to consent to the search of the defendant's apartment. The
Supreme Court concluded that if the police reasonably believed that the woman had the
authority to consent, then the warrantless search was valid, regardless of the woman's
true authority. Id. at 2801. Consequently, the Court remanded the case for a determination of whether the police reasonably believed the woman could consent. Id. at 280002.
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When the Court of Special Appeals decided this case, Rodriguez
had not yet been decided. Therefore, the Court of Special Appeals'
decision to affirm the trial court's finding was likely erroneous, given
existing case law. In contrast, by the time Owens reached the Court
of Appeals, the Supreme Court had decided Rodriguez; and the
Court of Appeals improperly chose to ignore Rodriguez, reaching
54
what may be an incorrect result.
The facts in Rodriguez centered on a third party's apparent authority to consent to the search of a home.5 5 It logically follows that
if the apparent authority doctrine applies to the most intrusive of all
searches, a search of one's home, then the doctrine certainly applies
56
with equal force to a somewhat less intrusive search of one's bag.
Consequently, the Owens majority incompletely analyzed the current
law by omitting a discussion of Rodriguez. Therefore, it appears that
the Court of Appeals should have remanded the case to the lower
court to make a factual determination as to whether the police could
reasonably have believed that Gardin had authority to consent to a
57
search of Owens's bag.
However, a recent decision by the Supreme Court, Californiav.
Acevedo, 5" may be interpreted as eliminating the necessity of applying the apparent authority doctrine to the specific facts of Owens. In
Acevedo, the Supreme Court held that police may conduct a warrantless search of a container within an automobile, even though they
54. Although the Court of Appeals is required to follow Rodriguez, the Supreme
Court's decision to adopt the apparent authority doctrine seems flawed, because it ignores the fact that a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights have been violated by the
police intrusion. Specifically, Rodriguez fails to perceive that when the police mistakenly
rely on a third party's apparent authority to consent, the government nonetheless intrudes on the defendant's Fourth Amendment right to a legitimate expectation of privacy, regardless of reasonableness. See 110 S. Ct. at 2806 (Marshall, J., dissenting). For
an excellent discussion of Rodriguez, see Gregory S. Fisher, Search and Seizure, Third-Party
Consent: Rethinking Police Conduct and the Fourth Amendment, 66 WASH. L. REV. 189, 198-200
(1990).
55. See 110 S. Ct. at 2081.
56. Rodriguez, however, may be distinguishable from the instant case. In United
States v. Whitfield, 939 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1991), the court read Rodriguez as applying
only to warrantless searches based on reasonable mistakes of fact, as distinguished from
mistakes of law. Id. at 1074-75. Therefore, if a court concludes that the police had the
facts straight but were mistaken about the law, then according to the Whitfield court's
interpretation of Rodriguez, the evidence would have to be suppressed.
57. Under the circumstances as described by the Court of Appeals (i.e., that the police knew the bag belonged to Owens, that Owens had just dropped the bag off the same
morning, and that Owens's name tag clearly appeared on the outside of the bag), a trier
of fact might conclude that the police could not reasonably believe Gardin had authority
to consent.
58. 111 S. Ct. 1982 (1990).
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lack probable cause to search the vehicle as a whole and only believe
that the container itself holds contraband or evidence. 59 Because
the Court reached the Acevedo decision by applying the "automobile
exception" to the warrant requirement,6 ° the scope of Acevedo may
be limited to vehicle searches. Thus, Acevedo is not explicitly controlling in the case of luggage searches such as the search in Owens.
Nevertheless, if Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in Acevedo is
given consideration in the future, then a warrantless search of a bag,
based upon probable cause, is valid regardless of the location of the
bag. 6 Under Justice Scalia's view, once Gardin consented to a
search of her apartment, the police could have searched Owens's
bag without a warrant so long as there was probable cause to believe
the bag contained narcotics.
Justice Scalia seems to interpret the Warrant Clause of the
Fourth Amendment as applying only to the home.6 2 This argument
was rejected by the Supreme Court, however, in United States v. Chadwick. 63 The majority view in Acevedo appears to be in accord with
Chadwick on this point, as the Acevedo majority justified its decision
using the automobile exception, rather than Scalia's interpretation
that a piece of luggage, as a movable object, may be searched without a warrant anywhere and anytime, if probable cause to search the
luggage exists.
59. See id. at 1989-9 1. By this determination, the Supreme Court, for all intents and
purposes, overruled Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979), as Acevedo eliminates the
distinction between probable cause to search an entire vehicle and probable cause to
search only a container that has been placed in an vehicle. Under Sanders, if the police
have probable cause to search an entire vehicle, they can search any container found
within the vehicle. On the other hand, if police have probable cause to search only a
container, they can seize only the container because the automobile exception does not
apply when a container by chance is located inside the vehicle. Id. at 763-64.
60. See 111 S. Ct. at 1984.
61. See id. at 1994 (Scalia, J., concurring). Of course, such approval of a warrantless
search presupposes either proper consent or exigent circumstances.
62. See id. ("[T]he search of a closed container, outside a privately owned building, with
probable cause to believe that the container contains contraband and when it in fact
does contain contraband, is not one of those searches whose Fourth Amendment reasonableness depends upon a warrant." (emphasis added)).
63. 433 U.S. 1, 8 (1977), overruled on other grounds by Acevado, 111 S. Ct. at 1991. The
Chadwick Court stated:
The Warrant Clause does not in terms distinguish between searches conducted
in private homes and other searches. There is also a strong historical connection between the Warrant Clause and the initial clause of the Fourth Amendment, which draws no distinctions among "persons, houses, papers, and
effects" in safeguarding against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Id. The Acevedo Court overruled distinctions made by the Chadwick and Sanders Courts.
See supra note 59.
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As evidenced by Rodriguez, the Supreme Court is capable of substantially narrowing the protection provided by the Fourth Amendment. Thus, if the State's petition for certiorari had been granted,
Owens may have found himself facing certain conviction if the Court
had chosen to extend Acevedo.
4. Conclusion.-In Owens, the Court of Appeals attempted to return Fourth Amendment protection to its former scope. Unfortunately, the Court of Appeals failed to incorporate a recent Supreme
Court decision applying the apparent authority doctrine and, thus,
erroneously concluded that the evidence must be suppressed.
Although the Owens decision adheres to the true principles of the
Fourth Amendment, it appears to be incomplete and possibly
mistaken.
B. Arrest is the Only Justification Needed for the Search
of an Arrestee's Luggage
In Ricks v. State,' the Court of Appeals held that a warrantless
search of a suitcase conducted "essentially contemporaneously"
with a lawful arrest was valid under the Fourth Amendment.6 5 The
court's holding was predicated on potential threats to both the
66
safety of the arresting officers and the preservation of evidence.
However, in the Ricks case, any threat to the safety of the police or
the preservation of evidence was negligible, easily averted, and
seems to have been constructed in hindsight by the court. 6 7 Under
Ricks, a warrantless search of the area within the immediate control
of an arrestee 68 is valid even if no exigent circumstances exist.6 9
Further, Ricks suggests that a legitimate expectation of privacy is no
bar to a warrantless search under the Fourth Amendment. 70 Ricks
affirms Maryland's place in the forefront ofjurisdictions that accord
more respect to the possible exigencies of police work than to the
established protections of the Fourth Amendment.

64. 322 Md. 183, 586 A.2d 740 (1991).
65. See id. at 195, 586 A.2d at 746.
66. See id. at 191, 586 A.2d at 744.
67. See infra notes 147-152 and accompanying text.
68. This area is commonly called the "Chimel perimeter," referring to the decision in
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). See infra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
69. See 322 Md. at 191, 586 A.2d at 744.
70. See id. at 194, 586 A.2d at 746 (noting the Supreme Court's recognition of an
expectation of privacy in luggage).
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1. The Case.-On October 14, 1988, the Maryland State Police
received an anonymous telephone tip that Gilbert Ricks would be
traveling that day by bus and carrying crack cocaine for distribution
in the Salisbury area. 7 ' The caller gave a very detailed description
of Ricks, including the fact that he would be carrying a soft foldover
luggage bag, brownish to maroon in color.7 2 The police ran a criminal check on Ricks and found that he had prior convictions, including a controlled dangerous substance violation.7"
Ricks was stopped by Sergeant Bacon of the Maryland State Police as he alighted from a Trailways bus in Salisbury.7 4 After Bacon
identified himself to Ricks as a state trooper, Bacon and Ricks realized they were acquainted. 7 5 Bacon asked Ricks to accompany him
to his police car and to put his suitcase on the car's trunk.7 6 Bacon
radioed his superior officer, Trooper Aaron, who informed him that
he had the right suspect.7 7 With Ricks's consent, Bacon patted him
down, finding no weapons. 7 8 When Trooper Aaron arrived on the
scene about a minute and a half later, three officers in addition to
Bacon were already there. 79 Ricks was then given Miranda warnings
and informed why he had been stopped.80 An officer asked Ricks
for permission to search his suitcase, but Ricks refused.8 ' According to Ricks's testimony, Aaron then informed him that they could
bring in a narcotics dog to sniff the bag, and that they were not going to leave until the bag was searched.8 2 When the dog arrived,
Ricks's suitcase was taken off the car trunk and placed on the sidewalk.8" Ricks was still unrestrained.8 4 The dog immediately indi71. Id. at 186, 586 A.2d at 742.
72. Id.
73. Id.; see Maryland Controlled Dangerous Substances Act, MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§§ 276-304 (1987 & Supp. 1991).
74. Ricks, 322 Md. at 186, 586 A.2d at 742.
75. Ricks was formerly a custodial worker at the Berlin Barrack, where Bacon had
previously been assigned. Bacon testified that he remembered that Ricks had washed
his car. Transcript of Motion Hearing at 38-39, Ricks (No. 90-67).
76. Ricks, 322 Md. at 187, 586 A.2d at 742. When asked if he ever pulled his gun or
raised his voice to Ricks, Bacon testified, "No. I mean I knew the guy." Transcript of
Motion Hearing at 41, Ricks (No. 90-67). Sergeant Bacon described the conversation
that ensued as other officers arrived as "[s]tanding around talking like you are talking to
anybody else you meet on the street corner." Id.
77. Ricks v. State, 82 Md. App. 369, 372, 571 A.2d 887, 888 (1990), aff'd, 322 Md.
183, 586 A.2d 740 (1991).
78. Ricks, 322 Md. at 187, 586 A.2d at 742.
79. Transcript of Motion Hearing at 21, Ricks (No. 90-67).
80. Ricks v. State, 82 Md. App. at 372, 571 A.2d at 888.
81. Id.
82. Ricks, 322 Md. at 187, 586 A.2d at 742.
83. Id.
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cated the presence of drugs in the suitcase, 5 and the officers
informed Ricks that the dog's actions established probable cause to
search the bag.16 After the officers searched the bag and found
87
drugs and paraphernalia, they placed Ricks under arrest.
Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied Ricks's
motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the search. 8 A
bench trial was held on an agreed statement of facts and Ricks was
convicted.8 9 Ricks contended on appeal that the search was illegal,
and that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. 90
The Court of Special Appeals upheld the trial court's ruling.9'
The Court of Appeals granted certiorari "to determine whether, in
the circumstances, a warrantless police search of a piece of luggage,
conducted essentially contemporaneously with a valid arrest of the
9 2
owner of the luggage, violated Fourth Amendment precepts.
2.

Legal Background.-

a. Search Incident to Lawful Arrest.-A warrantless search is per
se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, 93 unless it falls
84. Transcript of Motion Hearing at 41, Ricks (No. 90-67).

85. The deputy who accompanied the dog testified that he and the dog were trained
in the identification and seizure of drugs, including cocaine and marijuana. Ricks, 322
Md. at 187 n.i, 586 A.2d at 742 n.l. The dog indicated the presence of drugs by a
scratching motion and "had never falsely indicated the presence of [drugs]." Id.
86. Id. at 187, 586 A.2d at 742.
87. Ricks v. State, 82 Md. App. at 373, 571 A.2d at 888.
88. Id. at 371, 571 A.2d at 887.
89. Id. Ricks was convicted of possession of marijuana and cocaine, possession with
intent to distribute cocaine, and possession of paraphernalia with intent to use the paraphernalia in conjunction with a controlled dangerous substance. Id.
90. See id.

91. Id. at 380, 571 A.2d at 892. The Court of Special Appeals also upheld the trial
court's determination that the requisite probable cause existed to stop and arrest Ricks.
Id.at 376, 571 A.2d at 890. Maryland uses the Supreme Court's "totality of the circumstances" test to determine whether probable cause exists to arrest. See, e.g., Malcolm v.
State, 314 Md. 221, 550 A.2d 670 (1989). Ricks did not appeal the lawfulness of his stop
or arrest to the Court of Appeals; the only issue before the court was the lawfulness of
the search. See Ricks, 322 Md. at 188, 586 A.2d at 742.
92. Ricks, 322 Md. at 185, 586 A.2d at 741.
93. California v. Acevedo, 111 S.Ct. 1982, 1991 (1991) (citations omitted); Gamble
v. State, 318 Md. 120, 123, 567 A.2d 95, 96 (1989). For the text of the Fourth Amendment, see supra note 5. Ricks's appeal was based solely on the Fourth Amendment.
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), established that the Fourth Amendment is applicable to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 655. The Court of Appeals has
"consistently" held that Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights is in pari materia
with the Fourth Amendment, and that decisions of the Supreme Court interpreting the
Fourth Amendment are entitled to great respect, even though the state constitutionally
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within one of the limited exceptions to the warrant requirement. 9 4
In Chimel v. California,95 the Supreme Court designated a search incident to a lawful arrest as one of those limited exceptions. 9 6 Chimel
defined the "proper extent" of a search incident to arrest as "the
area from within which [an arrestee] might gain possession of a
weapon or destructible evidence.""' A warrantless search incident
to a lawful arrest serves two purposes: Safeguarding the arresting
officers' safety, and preserving any suspected or unsuspected evidence of crime from destruction or concealment by the arrestee. 98
For a search incident to arrest to be valid, it must be preceded by a
lawful arrest.9 9 However, both the Supreme Court and Maryland
courts have held that the arrest and search need only be "essentially
contemporaneous," so long as the justification, such as probable
cause to arrest, exists prior to the arrest and its incident search.OO
New York v. Belton,'0 t ostensibly based on the principles of
Chimel, established a bright-line rule that a search incident to the
lawful arrest of an occupant of an automobile may encompass the
entire passenger compartment and any containers therein; 1 2 a
search of any container found is not prohibited even if police have
exclusive control over the container.'
The Belton Court, however,
noted that its "holding ... does no more . . . than determine the
meaning of Chimel's principles in [the] particular and problematic
context [of automobile searches]. It in no way alters the fundamental principles established in the Chimel case regarding the basic
scope of searches incident to lawful custodial arrests."' 4
Two decisions regarding searches incident to arrest, handed
down prior to Ricks, illustrate Maryland's interpretation of the permay expand the protections accorded under the federal constitution. Trusty v. State,
308 Md. 658, 660 n.1, 521 A.2d 749, 750 n.I (1988).
94. See Acevedo, III S. Ct. at 1992 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Craig M. Bradley,
Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1468, 1473-74 (1985) (listing over

20 exceptions)).
95. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
96. See id. at 762-63.
97. Id.; see RICHARD P. GILBERT & CHARLES E. MOYLAN,JR., MARYLAND CRIMINAL LAW:
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 29.3, at 327 (1983).
98. See Anderson v. State, 78 Md. App. 471, 479, 553 A.2d 1296, 1300 (1988); GILBERT & MOYLAN, supra note 97, § 29.3, at 327.
99. See GILBERT & MOYLAN, supra note 97, § 29.1.
100. See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980); Anderson, 78 Md. App. at 48, 553
A.2d at 1301; accord Lee v. State, 311 Md. 642, 537 A.2d 235 (1988).
101. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
102. Id. at 460.
103. Id. at 462-63.
104. Id. at 460 n.3.
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missible extent of such searches. In Foster v. State,'0 5 the Court of
Appeals held that the search of an area beyond an arrestee's person
may be permissible even when the arrestee is handcuffed.1 0 6 In Lee
v. State, 0 7 police received an anonymous tip that a gun used in a
robbery could be found in a blue gym bag carried by one of the
robbers.'0 8 Six police officers went to the suggested location with
weapons drawn and ordered the suspects and their three companions to lie face down on the ground.'0 9 One of the officers located a
blue gym bag hanging on a fence a few feet from where the suspects
were lying." 0 The officer lifted the bag, which felt heavy, and
searched it, finding the gun; the suspects were immediately placed
under arrest."' The Court of Appeals found the search to be valid
as incident to arrest, and upheld the trial court's refusal to exclude
the gun as evidence. 1 2 Lee clearly indicates that the court views the
permissible scope of a search incident to arrest as elastic and not
dependent on the existence of real, or even realistically potential,
threats to police safety or to the preservation of evidence at the time
3
of the arrest."1

Before Lee, the Court of Appeals' interpretation had not been
so broad. In 1983, in Stackhouse v. State,' the Court of Appeals
explicitly rejected a broad reading of Belton: "[W]e will not apply
the generalization concerning the arrestee's reach, that was necessary in Belton because of the recurring problem of automobile
105. 297 Md. 191, 464 A.2d 986 (1983).
106. Id. at 220, 464 A.2d at 1001. The court explained that
[t]he fact that the accused was handcuffed necessarily restricted her freedom of
movement and, consequently, the area within her reach, but did not necessarily
eliminate the possibility of her gaining access to the contents of the nightstand's partially open top drawer .... [It] remained an area of easy access for
the accused, particularly if she had been able to break free of restraint.
Id.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

311 Md. 642, 537 A.2d 235 (1988).
Id. at 642, 537 A.2d at 238.
Id. at 651, 537 A.2d at 239.
Id.
Id. at 651-52, 537 A.2d at 234.
See id. at 645, 537 A.2d at 235.

113. See id.at 670, 537 A.2d at 248. Lee states that even if the Belton bright-line test
were confined to analysis of car searches, it "nevertheless demonstrates that Chimel's
concept of an area of control is quite flexible." Id. at 671, 537 A.2d at 249; see Note,
Exclusionary Rule, Developments in Maryland Law, 1987-88, 48 MD. L. REV. 612, 615 (1989)

("Once probable cause exists Lee makes clear that an arrestee and those possessions
within his or her control prior to seizure can be searched when an arrest immediately
follows."); see also GILBERT & MOYLAN, supra note 97, § 29.3 n.17 (Supp. 1988) (observing that Lee gives a very broad reading to the Chimel perimeter).
114. 298 Md. 203, 468 A.2d 333 (1983).
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searches, to the dwelling house, which always has been accorded the
highest degree of fourth amendment protection." ' 5 The court
read Chimel to require that the police make "a showing that the exigencies of the situation made the policeman's course of conduct imperative.""' 6 Exigency was defined as "urgency, immediacy, and
compelling need.""t7 Further, when the exigent circumstance is the
destruction of evidence, "the officers must reasonably believe that...
the removal or destruction of evidence is imminent."'1 18 Stackhouse's
language is not limiting, but the subsequent holdings in Lee and
Ricks indicate that the traditionally favored privacy interest in the
home' i9 may have heightened the court's demand for demonstrable
exigency in the Stackhouse case.
b. Warrantless Search of Luggage.-In United States v. Chadwick,'"0
the Supreme Court found unconstitutional the search of a footlocker seized by police from the open trunk of a suspect's car and
impounded upon his arrest.' 2 ' The Court held that if no exigency is
shown to support the need for an immediate search, a warrant is
needed to search property held in the exclusive control of the police
even if the issuance of a warrant by a judicial officer is reasonably
predictable. 122
The Court dismissed the Government's argument that the inherent mobility of luggage justifies an exception to the warrant requirement analogous to that for automobile searches.i 23 Justice
115. Id. at 211, 468 A.2d at 337. The court also stated that although the Belton rule
does not rely on the automobile exception, it is nevertheless limited to the context of
automobiles. Id. at 213-14, 468 A.2d at 341.
116. Id. at 214, 468 A.2d at 339.
117. Id. at 212, 468 A.2d at 338.
118. Id. at 214, 468 A.2d at 339 (emphasis added); see also Howell v. State, 271 Md.
378, 318 A.2d 189 (1974). Howell, a pre-Belton decision, interpreted Chimel to require
that the State
affirmatively establish that the evidence offered for admission was found either
on the person of the arrestee or in a place so perilously close ... that had the
discovered item been a weapon it might reasonably be employed by the person in
custody to the detriment of the officer or had it been concealable or destructible evidence it would be readily susceptible to being demolished by the arrestee.
Id. at 384-85, 318 A.2d at 192 (emphasis added).
119. See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
120. 433 U.S. 1 (1977), overruled on other grounds by Calfiornia v. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct.
1982, 1991 (1991).
121. See id. at 4.
122. See id. at 15.
123. See id. at 13. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), established an exception to the warrant requirement for automobiles based on their mobility and the inherently diminished expectation of privacy one has as to them. Id. at 153. The Chadwick
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Brennan stated that "[u]nlike searches of the person, searches of
possessions within an arrestee's immediate control cannot be justified by any reduced expectations of privacy caused by the arrest.
Respondents' privacy interest in the contents of the footlocker was
not eliminated simply because they were under arrest."124 The
Court also noted that luggage, unlike automobiles, is easily immobi25
lized, and that seizure is less intrusive than searching.'
New York v. Belton 126 undercut the applicability of Chadwick to
containers found during a legitimate auto search by holding that if a
container falls within the Chimel perimeter as defined in automobile
cases (i.e., the passenger area), then the container is no longer protected from a warrantless search. 127 Some courts have interpreted
Belton to enlarge the scope of Chimel and allow into evidence the
contents of any containers coincidentally encountered during a permissible automobile search.' 2 ' On the other hand, Belton has been
criticized,' 29 and some state courts have declined to adopt its hold30
ing, finding it impermissible under their state constitutions.
Court reasoned that "[u]nlike an automobile, whose primary function is transportation,
luggage is intended as a repository of personal effects. In sum, a person's expectations
of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile." 433
U.S. at 13.
124. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 16 n.10 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
Before Chadwick, some courts justified searches of personal effects by reasoning that a
container carried by an arrestee was an extension of the arrestee's person, and therefore
subject to search under United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), which held that
a search of the arrestee's person incident to arrest meets the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment, id.at 235. See 2 LAFAVE, supra note 36, § 5.5(a), at 53034. Even after Chadwick, many courts allowed purses and wallets to be searched because
those items served a function analogous to pockets. Id. § 5.5(a), at 534 & nn.24-25.
125. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 13 & n.7. See generally 2 LAFAVE, supra note 36, § 5.5(a), at
532-33 (discussing Chadwick's rationale and subsequent lower court application).
126. 453 U.S. 454 (1981); see supra notes 101-104 and accompanying text.
127. Belton, 453 U.S. at 467-68.
128. See United States v. Johnson, 846 F.2d 279, 282 (5th Cir. 1988) ("Belton eradicates any differences between the searches of the person and searches within the arrestee's immediate control."); Commonwealth v. Madera, 521 N.E.2d 738, 739 (Mass.
1988) (stating that most courts since Belton have generally found proper the search of
any container carried by a lawfully arrested person). See generally GILBERT & MOYLAN,
supra note 97, § 31.3 (discussing the Court's analysis of the "Automobile-Suitcase
overlap").
129. See 2 LAFAVE, supra note 36, § 5.5(a), at 535-36; see also People v. Brosnan, 298
N.E.2d 78, 86 (N.Y. 1973) (Wachtler,J., dissenting) ("[S]earch and seizure law became
uncontrollable when the rubric was adopted and the rationale discarded.").
130. See People v. Torres, 543 N.E.2d 61, 64 (N.Y. 1989) (reiterating the New York
Court of Appeals' position that the Supreme Court's holding in Belton was untenable
under New York's constitution and was a "drastic departure from Chimel"); State v.
Stroud, 720 P.2d 436, 441 (Wash. 1986) (holding that a locked compartment in an automobile may not be searched incident to arrest because it evinces a reasonable expecta-
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The most recent Supreme Court decision in this area is Califorwhich held that the Fourth Amendment does not
require police to obtain a warrant to search a container as to which
they have probable cause when they lack probable cause to search
the vehicle in which the container is located. 13 2 Before Acevedo, if
probable cause extended only to the container, Chadwick governed
the search, and a warrant was required before the container could
33
be searched.1
Justice Scalia's concurrence in Acevedo underscores that the majority's holding is limited to automobile searches, and that Chadwick
remains good law for searches of luggage outside the automobile
setting.'3 4 In his dissent, Justice Stevens noted the paradox inherent in the majority's rationale: "[S]urely it is anomalous to prohibit
a search of a briefcase while the owner is carrying it exposed on a
public street yet to permit a search once the owner has placed the
briefcase in the locked trunk of his car."' 3 5 He observed that "[i]n
either location, if the police have probable cause, they are authorized to seize the luggage and to detain it until they obtain judicial
approval for a search."' 3 6 Most lower courts have interpreted

nia v. Acevedo,'

tion of privacy, and the danger that an individual could either destroy evidence or grab a
weapon hidden in a locked compartment is minimal).
131. 111 S. Ct. 1982 (1991).
132. Id. at 1991.
133. See Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 11-13. After Chadwick and before Acevedo, the Supreme
Court applied Chadwick in Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979), overruled by California v. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. 1982 (1991), and United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 708 (1982),
to protect luggage from the warrant exception for automobile searches established in
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). In Sanders, the Court held that personal
luggage cannot be searched without a warrant merely because it was being transported
in a lawfully stopped automobile. See 442 U.S. at 766. Ross modified Sanders by holding
that if there is probable cause to search the entire car, any container found within the car
may also be searched without a warrant. See Ross, 452 U.S. at 825.
134. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. at 1992-94 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia noted that
"the search of a closed container, outside a privately owned building, with probable
cause to believe the container contains contraband, and when it in fact does contain
contraband, is not one of those searches whose Fourth Amendment reasonableness depends upon a warrant." Id. at 1994. Scalia lamented the "confusion" in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, and pleaded for a return to "reasonableness" as the standard. Id.
at 1993. In his view, an arcane profusion of law has resulted from the imposition of a
categorical warrant requirement, which "does not appear to have any basis in the common law," and the concomitant ineluctable carving out of exceptions to that requirement. Id. at 1992-93.
135. Id. at 2001 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice White's dissent in Belton presaged
Steven's dissent inAcevedo. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 472 (1981) (White,J.,
dissenting) (pointing out the paradox in reasoning, and emphasizing the enduring principle of Chadwick).

136. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. at 2001 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

1992]

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

669

Acevedo as abrogating Chadwick's applicability only as to searches of
1 37
luggage within automobiles.
3. Analysis.-The threshold question in analyzing the Ricks decision is why the court granted certiorari. In light of the Court of
Special Appeals' statement that "[w]ith both Foster and Lee . . . as
precedent, we have no difficulty holding that at the time appellant
Ricks's luggage was searched it remained within the area of his immediate control,"' 3 8 the Court of Appeals might easily have declined to hear the case. Not surprisingly, the Court of Appeals itself
relied extensively on both cases as dispositive precedents for its
3 9
decision.'
Nevertheless, certiorari may have been granted because finding
support for the search of Ricks's bag required the court to stretch
the principles of Chimel, even as expanded by Lee and Foster.
Although the court pays lip service to the underlying standards of
Chimel, the inherent result of the Court of Appeals' decision in Ricks
is the establishment of a bright-line rule: any containers within the
Chimel perimeter, including locked luggage, may be searched contemporaneously with a warrantless arrest.' 40 Many other state and
federal jurisdictions endorse a similarly broad view of the Chimel peas the prevailing view of
rimeter, 4 l which the Court of Appeals cites
42
arrest.'
to
incident
searches
on
law
the
The Court of Appeals purported to distinguish Chadwick as not
based on "an arguably valid search incident to a lawful custodial
arrest."' 143 Far from just distinguishing Chadwick, however, Ricks
137. See State v. Search, 472 N.W.2d 850, 853 (Minn. 1991) (stating that Chadwick no
longer applies to searches of bags in automobiles, even if probable cause extends only to
the bag); State v. Demeter, 590 A.2d 1179, 1181 (N.J. 1991) (maintaining that Acevedo
eliminated the Sanders warrant requirement for closed containers in automobiles); cf.
State v. Lugo, 592 A.2d 1234, 1236 (NJ. Super. 1991) (finding that Chadwick and Sanders
no longer apply when police have the right to conduct a warrantless search of an auto).
138. Ricks v. State, 82 Md. App. at 380, 571 A.2d at 892.
139. See Ricks, 322 Md. at 190-94, 586 A.2d at 743-46.
140. Id. at 194, 586 A.2d at 746 ("Any container within an arrestee's immediate control at the time of arrest is subject to a contemporaneous search incident to that
arrest.").
141. See, e.g., United States v. Tavolacci, 895 F.2d 1423, 1429 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (upholding the search of a locked suitcase in which a dog detected drugs, even though it
was obvious that an immediate search was not necessary to assure police safety); United
States v. Andersson, 813 F.2d 1450, 1455 (9th Cir. 1987) (permitting the search of a
suitcase incident to arrest because containers found within an arrestee's reach can be
searched contemporaneously with the arrest); see also supra note 128.
142. See Ricks, 322 Md. at 195, 586 A.2d at 746.
143. Id. at 194, 586 A.2d at 746.
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largely eradicates Chadwick's applicability to searches incident to
arrest, 4 4 at least in arrests not in a dwelling house. 145 Contrary to
Ricks, the Supreme Court in Acevedo maintained the overall viability
46
of Chadwick, except as to automobile searches.'
The Court of Appeals ignored the evidence and weakly hypothesized in hindsight that because the arresting officers were aware
that Ricks had prior robbery and drug violations, he posed a conceivable threat to their safety. The evidence given at the motion
hearing, however, demonstrated that the officers arresting Ricks
were never in danger, nor did they perceive any threat from
Ricks.' 4 7 Ricks and the officer who stopped him were acquaintances, and were chatting amiably.' 14 Even after probable cause to
arrest was established by the dog detecting drugs in Ricks's suitcase,
the officers never bothered to handcuff Ricks or restrain him in any
way. 1 4 9 Disregarding the testimony of two of the arresting officers
at the motion hearing and failing to apply any standard of reasonableness required by Stackhouse, the Court of Appeals irrationally justified the search of Ricks's bag by the fact that he was not restrained:
"It was possible for Ricks to grab the bag, intending either to de' 50
stroy evidence or gain access to a weapon."'
The court invoked Lee by noting that "the area of immediate
control is determined by potential for harm and not the actual physical control by the arrestee."'' 5 Despite all the evidence in the record indicating that the situation unquestionably was safe, 1 52 the
Court of Appeals, in retrospect, found the potential for harm. Contrary to the demands of Chadwick, the Court of Appeals never con-

144. See id.
145. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
146. See Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. at 1989-91.
147. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
148. Transcript of Motion Hearing at 41, Ricks (No. 90-67).
149. See id. at 41-42.
150. Ricks, 322 Md. at 191, 586 A.2d at 744. Professor LaFave finds "questionable"
this appellate tendency to assume that persons arrested or restrained by police nevertheless have great freedom of movement. 2 LAFAVE, supra note 36, § 5.5(a), at 530. He
further states that
[t]his attitude is manifested by a reluctance to give particular consideration to
the likelihood that the arrestee would have any opportunity to reach the
container and manipulate . . . fastening devices. That is, the courts generally
fail to assess these cases in terms of whether the interior of the container is ...
an area from which the arrestee might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.
Id.
151. Ricks, 322 Md. at 192, 586 A.2d at 744-45.
152. See supra notes 75-87 and accompanying text.
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sidered whether the alleged "potential for harm" could have been
eliminated by less intrusive means, such as having one of the officers
secure the bag somewhere away from Ricks. Nor did the court consider that Ricks was surrounded by five officers and his suitcase was
locked, which effectively removed the bag from Ricks's immediate
area and gave the police dominion over it. This evisceration of
Chadwick leaves no doubt that in searches incident to arrest, Maryland will interpret the scope of the Chimel perimeter according to an
expansive reading of Belton.
4. Conclusion.-By its decision in Ricks, the Court of Appeals
maintains the construct of the Chimel perimeter without respecting
its principled foundations. Ricks does not make "new" law, but
rather expands the permissible extent of a search incident to arrest.
The court justified this expansion of the search incident exception
on the basis of remarkably dubious exigencies. Ricks effectively
removes luggage within the Chimel perimeter from Fourth Amendment protection. In light of the Supreme Court's recent consideration of this area in Acevedo, Maryland and like-minded jurisdictions
seem to be, at least for now, distinguishably ahead of the Supreme
Court in interpreting its decisions to vitiate Fourth Amendment
protections in searches incident to arrest.
C. Maryland's Restrictive Statutory InterpretationProtects Privacy
In Mustafa v. State,' the Court of Appeals held that a recording
that fails to comply with the Maryland Wiretapping and Electronic
Surveillance Act ("Maryland Act")' 5 4 is not admissible in a Maryland court, regardless of whether the recording was permitted
under the laws of the jurisdiction in which the calls were recorded.' 5 5 The State argued that the incriminating telephone conversations were lawfully intercepted in the District of Columbia,
which is governed by Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act ("Title III"),56 and thus were admissible in a Mary-

land court.' 5 7 Writing for the majority, Chief Judge Murphy noted
that the Maryland Act is more restrictive than its federal counter153. 323 Md. 65, 591 A.2d 481 (1991).
154. MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 10-401 to -413 (1989 & Supp. 1991).
155. See 323 Md. at 76, 591 A.2d at 486.
156. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521 (1988 & Supp. 1991). Title III was part of a revision of
federal criminal procedure enacted in response to the perception of rising crime in
America. See Thomas M. Messana, Note, Ricks v. State: Big Brother Has Arrived in Maryland, 48 MD. L. REV. 435, 435 n.5 (1989).
157. See Alustafa, 323 Md. at 72, 591 A.2d at 484.
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part158 and that Maryland courts are entitled to control the admissibility of evidence pursuant60 to Maryland law;' 59 therefore, the State's
contention was rejected.'

1. The Case.--Corporal John Bartlett of the Prince George's
County Police wanted to set up a drug purchase as a "sting operation.'' 6 1 In April 1989, he recruited Peter Dilliner, a paid informant
who lived in the District of Columbia, to help him. 162 Dilliner
agreed to set up a purchase of two kilograms of cocaine in Prince
George's County.'16 Dilliner contacted Andarge Asfaw, a known
drug dealer, to set up the exchange.'6
In order to make the necessary arrangements to obtain the cocaine, Dilliner made numerous telephone calls to Asfaw at his business in Prince George's County.' 6 5 He also spoke with a man
known as 'Maurice,' whom Dilliner believed to be Mohummed Mustafa.' 6 6 Dilliner also received calls at his home in the District of Columbia from both men.' 6 7 All the telephone conversations from
Asfaw and Mustafa originated in Maryland.' 68
On his own initiative, Dilliner recorded each telephone conversation he had with Asfaw and Mustafa.' 6 9 Although Dilliner was
never authorized or directed by Corporal Bartlett to make any recordings, he gave the tapes of his conversations to the officer when
Asfaw and Mustafa were arrested. 70 The recorded conversations
158. See id. at 69, 591 A.2d at 483. Although the Maryland Act was patterned after
Title III, many of the state statute's provisions are more rigorous. Id.; see infra notes

188-197 and accompanying text.
159. Mustafa, 323 Md. at 75, 591 A.2d at 485.
160. Id. at 76, 591 A.2d at 486. The State's additional argument that because the
statute could not reach beyond the borders of Maryland, the recordings could not violate the Maryland Act, was likewise rejected. Id. at 72, 591 A.2d at 484.
161. Id. at 67, 591 A.2d at 482.
162. Id. An FBI agent introduced Corporal Bartlett to Dilliner. Id.
163. Id. Dilliner received $2500 in exchange for arranging the drug sale. Id.
164. Id. at 68, 591 A.2d at 482. Dilliner did not apprise Asfaw that the police were
involved. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. Although Dilliner taped incoming calls from the defendants and was unsure
of the location from which they originated, Corporal Bartlett testified that all the calls
were between the District of Columbia and Prince George's County. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. Dilliner claimed that he had informed Bartlett that he was making recordings
of all his telephone conversations as early as two days after he first spoke to Asfaw. d.
Corporal Bartlett testified that he had no knowledge of Dilliner's recordings until after
Asfaw and Mustafa had been arrested. Id.
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were admitted into evidence at the trial of Asfaw and Mustafa, over
the objections of both defendants.' 7 '
Mustafa was convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to
distribute and conspiracy to distribute cocaine. 1 72 Asfaw was convicted of conspiracy to distribute cocaine.' 73 Mustafa and Asfaw appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, arguing that the recordings
of telephone conversations were made in violation of the Maryland
Act, and therefore should not have been introduced at trial. 1 74 The
Court of Special Appeals certified the question75of the admissibility
of the conversations to the Court of Appeals.
2.

Legal Background.-

a. The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act.-In 1968 Con76
gress enacted the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act'
to protect the privacy of individuals engaging in wire communications, while at the same time authorizing the use of electronic
surveillance as a weapon against organized crime.' 7 7 Title III of the
Act was "designed to provide a uniform minimum national standard
oral
of
wire
and
interception
electronic
governing
78
communications." '
171. Id. Asfaw and Mustafa both filed pretrial motions to suppress the telephone recordings, but these motions were denied. Id.
172. Id. Mustafa was also convicted of simple possession of cocaine; however, this
conviction was merged into the conviction for possession with intent to distribute. Id.

173. Id.
174. See id., 591 A.2d at 483.

175. See id. at 67, 591 A.2d at 481. The case was certified to the Court of Appeals
pursuant to Maryland Rule 8-304(a). Under this Rule, the Court of Special Appeals
,may certify questions of law or the entire action to the Court of Appeals." MD. R. 8304(a).
176. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 212 (1968) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521
(1988 & Supp. 1991)).
177. See United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 150 (1974); see also Ricks v. State, 312
Md. 11, 13, 537 A.2d 612, 613 (1988) ("The purpose of the Federal Act was to protect
the privacy of the individual while at the same time aiding in the enforcement of the
criminal laws.").
Title III permits "wiretapping only in carefully controlled circumstances, predicated
upon court orders and on specified preconditions. [Congress] deliberately decided to
forbid the use of the fruits of illegal wiretaps in law enforcement proceedings." In re
GrandJury Proceedings (Katsouros), 613 F.2d 1171, 1175 (D.C. Cir. 1979). This exclusionary provision protects the integrity of the court by ensuring that the court does not
become a partner to illegal conduct. See id. (citing Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41,
51 (1972)).
178. Messana, supra note 156, at 444. "Title III of the Act prohibits the nonconsensual interception of wire or oral communications by the use of electronic devices except
when the law enforcement activity carefully follows the prescribed criteria." Id.
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Title III not only sets forth the required procedure to obtain
authorization to use electronic surveillance; it also provides for
criminal sanctions when these requirements are not met.179 Title III
does not automatically govern electronic interceptions within a
state; rather, each state must adopt its own statute, which, in conjunction with Title III, governs electronic surveillance.' 80 A state
may impose more restrictions on surveillance than does Title III,
but may not lessen the restrictions.' 8 '
b. The Maryland Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Act.-In
the early 1970s, the Maryland General Assembly realized the "need
for intelligence-gathering activities to protect society." 8 2 However,
the legislature also determined that activities such as electronic surveillance "must be kept strictly within the constraints established by
[the state's] constitution and laws, lest ... the very liberties sought
to be protected are themselves trampled in the process." '
The
protection of society and the safeguarding of the individual became
the framework within which the legislature passed the Maryland
84
Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Act.
The purpose of the Maryland Act, therefore, is twofold: " 1) to
be a useful tool in crime detection, and 2) to assure that the interception of private communications is limited."' 8 5 Although the
Maryland Act closely parallels the provisions of Title III,86 in some
87
respects it is more restrictive than its federal counterpart.
The Maryland legislature used specific and exacting language
to set forth the conditions for wiretapping and electronic surveil179. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511. This section specifically provides for a fine of not more
than $10,000 or imprisonment of not more than 5 years, or both. Id.
180. State v. Siegel, 266 Md. 256, 271, 292 A.2d 86, 94 (1972); see 18 U.S.C.
§ 2516(2).
181. Siegel, 266 Md. at 271-72, 292 A.2d at 94.
182. SENATE INVESTIGATING COMMITFEE, REPORT TO THE SENATE OF MARYLAND 1
(1975) [hereinafter SENATE INVESTIGATING COMMITrEE]. The Investigating Committee

was organized to investigate the extent of improper electronic surveillance in Maryland
and to recommend legislative reform to correct any discovered abuses of surveillance.
Id. The special committee believed that "no free society can long hope to survive if it
sees only with a blind eye, and hears only with a deaf ear, the insidious plots and
schemes of those elements within it who seek to destroy that society and, with it, the
freedoms for which it stands." Id.
183. Id. at 2.
184. See id.

185. State
309 Md. 48,
186. Ricks
187. Id. at

v. Maddox, 69 Md. App. 296, 300, 517 A.2d 370, 372 (1986), cert. denied,
522 A.2d 393 (1987).
v. State, 312 Md. 11, 24, 537 A.2d 612, 618 (1988).
15, 537 A.2d at 614.

19921

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

675

lance.' 8 In general, the Maryland Act is more restrictive than Title
III, providing more protection against abusive surveillance.' 8 9 First,
the Maryland Act mandates that ajudge who issues an order authorizing a wiretap must require the interceptor to file reports describing the progress of the surveillance and articulating the need for
further surveillance.' 90 Title III, on the other hand, leaves to the
discretion of the trial judge whether to require such reports.' 9 ' The
objective of Maryland's more exacting language is to guarantee "to
the people of Maryland, insofar as the state, itself, is concerned,
wiretapgreater protection from surreptitious eavesdropping 1and
92
Congress."'
the
by
people
the
afforded
that
than
ping
Further, the definition of "oral communications" in the Maryland Act extends to a broader class of communications than Title
III. '9 In addition, communications may not be lawfully intercepted
under the Maryland Act unless all parties consent, whereas the Federal Act requires the consent of only one party. 19 4 Finally, the Maryland courts have demanded strict compliance with the procedures
outlined in the statute.' 9 5 Under Section 10-408 of the Maryland
Act, an interception will not be authorized unless it can be shown
188. Maddox, 69 Md. App. at 300, 517 A.2d at 372.
189. Id. Although there are many differences between the two Acts, only four distinctions are relevant to this Note. For a more detailed comparison of Title III and the
Maryland Act, see Richard P. Gilbert, A Diagnosis, Dissection, and Prognosis of Maryland's
New Wiretap and Electronic Surveillance Law, 8 U. BALT. L. REV. 183 (1979).
190. See MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-408(f) (1989).

191. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(b) (1988).
192. Gilbert, supra note 189, at 221. The court in State v. Siegel, 266 Md. 256, 292
A.2d 86 (1972), dramatically stated that Maryland adopted a stricter statute because allowing conversations to be monitored "without the strictest of controls would utterly
destroy the basis of this nation's existence." Id. at 262, 292 A.2d at 89.
193. Gilbert, supra note 189, at 192. The Maryland Act defines an oral communication as "any conversation or words spoken to or by any person in private conversation."
MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-401(2)(i). Title III defines oral communications
as "any oral communication uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such
communication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying such expectation." 18 U.S.C. § 2510.
194. Gilbert, supra note 189, at 194. The Maryland Act authorizes a law enforcement
officer or person acting under the direction and supervision of an officer to intercept
communications based on the consent of one party. This use is limited, however, to
investigations of several specifically enumerated crimes: "murder, kidnapping, rape, a
sexual offense in the first or second degree, child abuse, gambling, robbery, any felony
punishable under the 'Arson and Burning' subheading of Article 27, bribery, extortion,
or dealing in controlled dangerous substances." MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN.
§ 10-402(c)(2). For crimes other than those specified, all parties must give consent
prior to the interception. Id. § 10-402.
195. See, e.g., Siegel, 266 Md. at 274, 292 A.2d at 95. The court stated that the requirements of the statute must be followed; it would "not abide any deviation, no matter how
slight, from the prescribed path." Id.
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that normal investigative procedures have failed or appear unlikely
to succeed if attempted.1 9 6 Some federal courts, however, have required only that applications for authorization "substantially com97
ply" with the statutory mandate.
3. The Court's Reasoning.-Although Dilliner's interception was
lawful under Title III,198 it was not a lawful interception under the
Maryland Act.' 99 In determining whether Dilliner's tapes were admissible, the Mustafa court stated that the question was one to be
answered by statutory construction of the Maryland Act. 20 0 A cardinal rule of statutory construction is to determine legislative intent. 2 1' The court focused on the purpose of and policy behind the
20 2
Maryland Act in order to determine legislative intent.
To discover the purpose, aim, and policy of the statute, the
court examined the words of the statute "because what the legislature has written in an effort to achieve a goal is a natural ingredient
of analysis to determine that goal. ' 20 3 The words are to be given
their "ordinary and natural import, since the language of the statute
is the primary source for determining the legislative intent. "204
The Mustafa court found that the clear purpose of the exclu196. See MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-408(a)(3).
197. See, e.g., United States v. Steinberg, 525 F.2d 1126, 1130 (2d Cir. 1975) (upholding the use of surveillance even though affidavit of police only "substantially complied"
with Title III's requirements), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971 (1976); In re Dunn, 507 F.2d 195,
197 (1st Cir. 1974) (stating that the court will take a "practical and commonsense" approach to determining whether an order permitting electronic surveillance was properly
issued); see also Gilbert, supra note 189, at 205-07.
198. Mustafa, 323 Md. at 71, 591 A.2d at 484; see also 18 U.S.C. § 251 l(c),(d) (1988).
199. Mustafa, 323 Md. at 71-72, 591 A.2d at 484. To be lawful, the interception must
be under the direction of a law enforcement officer acting in a criminal investigation, or
the interceptor must be a party to the communication in which all the parties to the
communication have given prior consent to the interception. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC.
CODE ANN. § 10-402(c).
200. See 323 Md. at 72-73, 591 A.2d at 484.
201. Harford County v. University of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 318 Md. 525, 529, 569
A.2d 649, 651 (1990); Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Mohler, 318 Md. 219, 225, 567 A.2d
929, 932 (1990) ("When construing a statute, the duty of the reviewing court is to determine the goal of the legislature and to effectuate that objective.").
202. See Mustafa, 323 Md. at 73, 591 A.2d at 484.
203. Kaczorowski v. Mayor of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 513, 525 A.2d 628, 632
(1987).
204. University ofMd. Med. Sys. Corp., 318 Md. at 529, 569 A.2d at 651 (citations omitted). "[A]s a general principle of statutory construction, the words of a statute are to be
given their ordinary signification absent a manifest contrary intent on the part of the
legislature." Tatum v. Gigliotti, 321 Md. 623, 628, 583 A.2d 1062, 1064 (1991). Thus,
"if the words of the legislature are unambiguous, they are to be accorded their natural
connotation." Trimble v. State, 321 Md. 248, 265, 582 A.2d 794, 802 (1990).
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sionary provision of the Maryland Act 20 5 was "to prevent 'the unau-

thorized interception of communications where one of the parties
has a reasonable expectation of privacy.' ",206 Further, there was no
indication that the legislature intended to provide for any exceptions to the exclusionary rule.20 7
After commenting that the Maryland legislature clearly has the
20 8
authority to "regulate the admissibility of evidence in its courts,
the court concluded that "evidence intercepted pursuant to more
lenient statutory enactments of other jurisdictions must comply with
Maryland's more restrictive standards before it may be lawfully disclosed in a Maryland court. "209
4. Analysis.-Two public policy issues were central to the Mustafa court's interpretation of the Maryland Act. First, the court
sought to avoid the use of evidence procured in violation of a citizen's constitutional rights. Second, the court recognized the important right to privacy of all persons.
a. Deterrence.-The majority reasoned that the purpose of the
exclusionary provision is to deter law enforcement officers from violating constitutional rights by ensuring that the courts will not admit
evidence gained from illegal police conduct. 210 The majority concluded that by deterring overreaching police activity, the Maryland
Act protects the privacy of communications. 2 i
The dissent also examined the issue of deterrence. In his dissent, Judge McAuliffe acknowledged that deterrence is a goal of the
exclusionary rule, but concluded that this goal was not advanced in
Mustafa.2 12 Dilliner did not "violate the Maryland Act when he
205. MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-405 (1989); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2515
(1988). "Both the state and federal laws contain an exclusionary rule for evidence
seized in violation of their provisions." Mustafa, 323 Md. at 73, 591 A.2d at 485. The
purpose of these rules is "to deter law enforcement officers from violating personal privacy rights." Sanders v. State, 57 Md. App. 156, 167, 469 A.2d 476, 482 (citing People
v. Fidler, 391 N.E.2d 210, 211 (Il1. App. Ct. 1979)), cert. denied, 299 Md. 656, 474 A.2d
1345 (1984).
206. 323 Md. at 74, 591 A.2d at 485 (quoting Benford v. American Broadcasting Cos.,
554 F. Supp. 145, 151 (D. Md. 1982)).
207. Id. at 73-74, 591 A.2d at 485. The court found that the language of § 10-405
was not ambiguous. Id. at 73, 591 A.2d at 485.
208. Id. at 75, 591 A.2d at 485.
209. Id. at 74, 591 A.2d at 485.
210. See id. at 73, 591 A.2d at 485.
211. See id.
212. See id. at 78, 591 A.2d at 487 (McAuliffe, J., dissenting).
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made an interception in the District of Columbia. ' 21 3 Because the
interception was lawful, Dilliner could not be prosecuted under the
Maryland statute, which provides that a violation of the statute is a
felony.2 1 4 Judge McAuliffe argued that the public policy of deterrence is not served in a situation such as Mustafa, in which the surveillance was lawful when made. 21 5 The lower court did not become
a "partner in crime" by admitting the tape because no crime was
committed; thus the exclusion of the recording was unnecessary. 6
The dissent's argument is flawed, however, as it relies on cases
in which the courts construed exclusionary provisions less restrictive
than that in the Maryland Act.2 1 7 The majority specifically noted
that the dissent was unable to find any jurisdiction with a statute
with provisions comparable to section 10-407 of the Maryland Act,
"which links the admissibility of evidence.., to compliance with the
218

Act."-

The dissent also failed to contemplate the broader policy behind the Maryland Act. The dissent's analysis of the deterrent function is too narrow because it does not address the privacy rights that
deterrence protects. This protection of privacy was at the nucleus of
the majority's argument.
b. The Right to Privacy.-The majority's interpretation of the
Maryland Act emphasized the important right to privacy. Surveillance equipment is becoming more sophisticated. 2 19 The potential
for abuse of this technology is continually growing, while the public
remains virtually powerless to protect itself.2 20 The Senate Investi213. Id. at 77, 591 A.2d 487 (McAuliffe, J., dissenting).
214. Id.; see MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-402(b) (1989). Because the interception was made in the District of Columbia, it fell under the jurisdiction of Title III.
Mustafa, 323 Md. at 77, 591 A.2d at 484 (McAuliffe, J., dissenting).
215. 323 Md. at 77, 591 A.2d at 484 (McAuliffe, J., dissenting).
216. See id.at 78-79, 591 A.2d at 487-88 (McAuliffe, J., dissenting).
217. See id. at 78, 591 A.2d at 487 (McAuliffe, J., dissenting). The dissent relied on
1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3257 (1990), and
People v. Barrow, 549 N.E.2d 240 (Ill.
Commonwealth v. Bennett, 369 A.2d 493 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976). Both of these cases,
however, permitted the admission of surveillance tapes that were in violation of the statute of the state in which the conversations were recorded, but did not violate the forum
state's statute. See Barrow, 549 N.E.2d at 253-54; Bennett, 369 A.2d at 493-95.
218. Mustafa, 323 Md. at 75, 591 A.2d at 486.
219. SENATE INVESTIGATING COMMITrEE, supra note 182, at 67.
220. Id. The Senate Investigating Committee felt that there was
no question but that the privacy of citizens is directly affected by the collection,
maintenance, use and dissemination of personal information especially when
one considers that information gathered by intelligence agencies as well as
other governmental departments is widely disseminated to local, state and federal agencies. The opportunity for an individual to secure employment, gov-
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gating Committee could not find a "valid reason for the use and
possession of eavesdropping equipment by anyone other than law
enforcement personnel, employees of common communications
carriers, and manufacturers of such devices for sale or distribution
to persons authorized to possess this equipment." ' 22 ' Thus, if the

court were to admit Dilliner's recordings, it would serve to condone
both abusive behavior and the potential harm resulting from the improper use of information gathered by surveillance.
The majority of people involved in surveillance work and intel22 2
ligence gathering are not held directly accountable to the public.
For this reason, "it is absolutely essential that intelligence-gathering
22
activities be strictly confined within legal and ethical parameters.1 1
If the court had allowed Dilliner's intercepted conversations to
be admitted, it would have set a precedent with potentially dangerous and far-reaching effects. Allowing the admission of the recordings might have indicated that the current, strict guidelines were
being relaxed. If the records were admissible, police officers could
go to the District of Columbia in order to "lawfully" intercept communications and return to Maryland to prosecute the unaware and
nonconsenting party in a Maryland court. Such an interpretation
surely would frustrate the purpose of the Maryland Act.
5. Conclusion.-The majority opinion recognized that while
Maryland strives to enforce the criminal laws, a more important goal
is the protection of the citizens' rights of privacy. Thus, because
there was no clear indication that the legislature did not intend an
all-encompassing exclusionary rule, the court held that the Maryland Act prohibits the use of intercepted communications that
would have been unlawful if made in Maryland.
A court must, of necessity, be careful in determining the intent
of the legislature. The recognition of an "otherwise undeclared
public policy as a basis for a judicial decision involves the application of a very nebulous concept to the facts of a given case, and that
declaration of public policy is normally the function of the legislaernmental appointments, insurance, or credit may well be endangered by the
dissemination of improper or erroneous personal information. The increasing
use of sophisticated computer hardware has magnified the harm which can accrue to an individual.
Id. at 73.
221. Id. at 69.
222. Id. at 2. Those who are involved in this type of work perform out of the public
view and thus are not subject to public scrutiny. Id.
223. Id.
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tive branch. '2 24 In Mustafa, the court was subtle in its determination that the state is prioritizing privacy rights. In effect, the
majority used this legislative prioritization to support its interpretation of the Maryland Act. Most importantly, the court refused to
allow the circumvention of a Maryland statute to facilitate the admission of evidence, even though that evidence was lawfully obtained in
another jurisdiction.
JONATHAN

D.

EISNER

MELISA M.C. MOONAN
JANE S. POLAND

224. Adler v. American Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31, 45, 432 A.2d 464, 472 (1981).

VII.
A.

EMPLOYMENT

Opening the Closed Doors of the Retaliatory DischargeDoctrine

In Finch v. Holladay-Tyler Printing, Inc.,' the Court of Appeals
unanimously held that an employee may file an action for retaliatory
discharge based on state law without first exhausting grievance procedures outlined in the employee's collective bargaining agreement,
so long as construction of the agreement is not necessary to resolve
the dispute. 2 Further, the court found that even if an employer follows all layoff procedures enumerated in the collective bargaining
agreement, an employee may still have a cause of action for retaliatory discharge if the employer followed the procedures with the intent to circumvent Maryland public policy.3
The Court of Appeals in Finch clarified Maryland law regarding
retaliatory discharge tort actions. The decision also makes clear that
federal labor law does not preempt a state action for retaliatory discharge when there is no need to construe the collective bargaining
agreement to resolve the dispute.4 Finch brings Maryland law in line
with the Supreme Court decision of Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic
Chef, Inc. ,' which held that "an application of state law is pre-empted
by [section] 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ...only if
such application requires the interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement." 6
1. The Case.-From 1976 to 1987, Lorenzo J.D. Finch was an
employee of Holladay-Tyler Printing, Inc. (Holladay-Tyler),7 and
was a union member covered under a collective bargaining agreement.8 Finch had filed claims for various injuries under Maryland's
workers' compensation provisions 9 in 1977, 1981, 1984, and
1.322 Md. 197, 586 A.2d 1275 (1991).
2. See id. at 207, 586 A.2d at 1280.
3. Id. The public policy at issue in Finch was the protection of workers' rights under
the workers' compensation laws of Maryland. Id. at 205-07, 586 A.2d at 1279-80.
4. See id. at 207, 586 A.2d at 1280.
5.486 U.S. 399 (1988).
6. Id. at 413 (footnote omitted); see also Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley)
Act, § 301 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1989)).
7. Brief for Petitioners at 2, Finch (No. 90-31).
8. Finch, 322 Md. at 198, 586 A.2d at 1276. Finch belonged to Local 285 of the
Graphic Communications International Union. Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 4, Finch
(No. 90-31).
9. MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, §§ I to 102 (1985), repealed bvAct of April 9, 1991, ch. 8,
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1986.10 Because of an injury caused by an on-the-job accident in
November of 1986, Finch took a four month leave of absence."
When he returned to work on March 30, 1987, his name was on a
list of employees marked for layoff at the end of the week.' 2
The layoff provision of the collective bargaining agreement covering Finch's employment specified that workers should be laid off
in "inverse order of seniority.'1 3 According to Holladay-Tyler's
own documents, Finch was the most senior worker in the "General
Worker" category as of February 9, 1987.1' Finch alleged that he
also was the third most senior worker overall.' 5 Shortly after the
layoff, Finch learned that workers with less seniority had been retained or rehired by Holladay-Tyler. 6 Although Holladay-Tyler
claimed that they had attempted to recall Finch but he had refused
re-employment, Finch alleged that the company did not offer him a
7
permanent recall. '
Finch filed multiple claims in the Circuit Court for Montgomery
County, 8 alleging that he was discharged from Holladay-Tyler in
retaliation for filing workers' compensation claims.' 9 The circuit
court granted summary judgment in favor of Holladay-Tyler on the
ground that Finch had failed to follow all grievance procedures outlined in the collective bargaining agreement. 20 Therefore, according to the circuit court, Finch was barred by federal labor law from
1991 Md. Laws 248. The current workers' compensation provisions appear in MD. EMP.
& LABOR CODE ANN. §§ 9-101 to -1201 (1991).
10. Finch, 322 Md. at 198, 586 A.2d at 1276.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 5, Finch (No. 90-3 1).
14. Brief for Petitioner, Finch (No. 90-3 1) (Seniority List from Holladay-Tyler Printing Co. dated February 9, 1987, submitted during discovery and attached to the brief as
Attachment No. 4).
15. Finch, 322 Md. at 198, 586 A.2d at 1276.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Finch filed claims for "wrongful discharge, breach of covenant of good faith and
fair dealing and civil conspiracy to contravene Maryland public policy, as well as an
amended complaint adding claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress and loss of consortium." Id. at 199 n.l, 586 A.2d at
1276 n. 1. Courts have used the terms "retaliatory discharge." "abusive discharge," and
"wrongful discharge" interchangeably. See Thomas Bean, Note, NLRA Preemption of State
Law Actions for Wrongful Discharge in Violation of Public Policy, 19 U. MicH.J.L. REF. 441, 441
n. 1 (1986). In Finch, the court used the term "retaliatory discharge"; however, the court
used the term "abusive discharge" in Adler v. American Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31,
432 A.2d 464 (1981), and "wrongful discharge" in Ewing v. Koppers Co., 312 Md. 45,
537 A.2d 1173 (1988).
19. Finch, 322 Md. at 199, 586 A.2d at 1276.
20. Id. at 200, 586 A.2d at 1277.
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bringing a state claim. 2 ' The Court of Appeals granted certiorari
prior to consideration by the Court of Special Appeals 22 solely to
address "whether a union employee who charges an employer with
retaliatory discharge for filing workers' compensation claims must
first exhaust grievance procedures under a Collective Bargaining
Agreement before pursuing a state tort action in court. "23
2.

Legal Background.-

a. History of the Tort.-The doctrine of at-will employment provides that the employment relationship may be terminated by either
party at any time for any reason.2 4 Support for the doctrine has
slowly eroded, however, and there are now exceptions to the rule in
most jurisdictions. These exceptions to the at-will doctrine have
been both judicially and legislatively created. 2 5
Federal and state legislatures have enacted laws that restrict the
ability of an employer to terminate an employee. Federal legislative
26
enactments such as the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA)
and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 27 specifically prohibit discharge
from employment in violation of federal statutes. 2 8 Article 49B of
the Civil Rights Act of Maryland 2 9 is an example of a similar legislative enactment in Maryland.
The judiciary has created exceptions to the at-will rule, primarily to lessen the harsh results that application of the rule causes in
some circumstances.3 0 Such exceptions include: "when the termination violated some expressed public policy, when the employer
acted in bad faith without justification, or when the employer violated a duty of good faith and fair dealing implied in every at-will
employment contract."'" Of these, the public policy exception has
21. See id.
22. Id.
23. Id.

24. Adler v. American Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31, 35, 432 A.2d 464, 467 (1981); see
Gil A. Abramson & Stephen M. Silvestri, Recognition of a Cause of Action for Abusive Discharge in Maryland, 10 U. BALT. L. REV. 257, 257-58 (1981).
25. S. Richard Pincus & Steven L. Gillman, The Common Law Contract and Tort Rights of
Union Employees: What Effect After the Demise of the "At Will" Doctrine?, 59 Cm.-KENT L. REV.

1007, 1008 (1983).
26. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1988).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982 & Supp. 1987).
28. Patricia A. Gillis, Limiting the Tort of Abusive Discharge,Developments inMaryland Law,
1988-89, 49 MD. L. REV. 691, 706 (1990).
29. MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, §§ 7-8 (1991).

30. Abramson & Silvestri, supra note 24, at 262.
31. Id. (citations omitted).
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been employed most often by judges, 2 particularly in Maryland."
The Supreme Court of Indiana produced the seminal opinion
holding that an employee has a cause of action for retaliatory discharge on the basis that the discharge violated public policy.3" In
Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co. , the Indiana court held that an
employee who alleges that she has been discharged for exercising a
"statutorily conferred right" has a legally cognizable cause of action
against her employer.3 6 The court explained that this doctrine provides a cause of action to an employee who seeks to bring a suit for
retaliatory discharge for exercising her rights under the workers'
compensation laws. 3 7 The Indiana court held that "[rletaliatory discharge for filing a workmen's compensation claim is a wrongful, unconscionable act and should be actionable in a court of law."3 8 The
Frampton court clearly recognized the provision of workers' compensation as an important public policy covered under the public policy
exception to the at-will rule of employment.3 9
b. Retaliatory Dischargeunder Maryland Law.-In Adler v. American
Standard Corp.,4 the Court of Appeals, in response to a certified
question, addressed whether Maryland recognized a cause of action
for retaliatory discharge." The court noted that some jurisdictions
had "flatly refused to recognize a cause of action for wrongful discharge"" 2 on any basis, while others had either recognized the action, or indicated a willingness to recognize it in the future. 3 The
Adler court stated that "[w]ith few exceptions, courts recognizing a
cause of action for wrongful discharge have to some extent relied on
statutory expressions of public policy as a basis for the employee's
32. Id.

33. See infra notes 40-49 and accompanying text.
34. Abramson & Silvestri, supra note 24, at 263.
35. 297 N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 1973).
36. See id. at 428.

37. See id.
38. Id.

39. See id. The Frampton court used the parallel development of retaliatory eviction
in landlord and tenant law to support its reasoning. The court wrote: "Retaliatory discharge and retaliatory eviction are clearly analogous. Housing codes are promulgated
to improve the quality of housing. The fear of retaliation for reporting violations inhibits reporting and, like the fear of retaliation for filing a claim, ultimately undermines a
critically important public policy." Id.
40. 291 Md. 31, 432 A.2d 464 (1981).
41. See id. at 31, 432 A.2d at 465.
42. Id. at 36, 432 A.2d at 467. The court mentioned the following jurisdictions: Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, Missouri, and North Carolina. See id.
43. Id. The court cited Colorado, Idaho, Kentucky, Montana, Vermont, and Wisconsin. See id.
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claim." 4 4
Although the Adler court found that the particular plaintiff-employee's allegations did not implicate a public policy of the state, the
court explicitly stated that an action for abusive discharge will lie
when an employer's termination of the employment relationship violates a clear mandate of public policy.4 5 The Adler decision was
praised for its recognition of the abusive discharge tort but criticized for the ambiguity and vagueness of the meaning of "public
policy" in the context of such torts.4"
In Ewing v. Koppers Co. ,47 the Court of Appeals clarified the Adze?
decision, at least in the context of a retaliatory discharge claim premised on the allegation that the employer fired the employee for
filing a workers' compensation claim. The Ewing court held that it
was within the public policy exception to recognize a cause of action
based on such an allegation.4" Additionally, the Ewing court indicated that the General Assembly clearly mandated that discharging
an employee for filing a workers' compensation claim is repugnant
to important public policies.4 9
c. Federal Preemption.-Employers have often argued that the
doctrine of federal preemption protected them against state-based
wrongful discharge claims. 5 ' Generally, all applicable arbitration
avenues and grievance procedures must be exhausted before an ag-

44. Id. at 40, 432 A.2d at 469.
45. Id. at 47, 432 A.2d at 473. Adler claimed that his employer terminated the employment relationship because of Adler's refusal to participate in "commercial bribery"
or "falsification of corporate documents." Id. at 46-47, 432 A.2d at 472-73. The court
found these allegations to be legally insufficient to state a claim for wrongful discharge;
there was no adequate public policy that was offended by the discharge. Id.
46. See Abramson & Silvestri, supra note 24, at 270-71. The authors suggest that
"[t]he public policy exception should be based upon commission of some act prohibited
by a state or federal statute and the Maryland courts should adopt a single process for
determining whether a private cause of action by a discharged employee should be allowed." Id. at 271.
47. 312 Md. 45, 537 A.2d 1173 (1988).
48. See id. at 50, 537 A.2d at 1175.
49. See id. The court was persuaded to reach this conclusion based on MD. ANN.
CODE art. 101, § 39A (1985). See Ewing, 312 Md. at 48-50, 537 A.2d at 1174-75. The
statute provides that "[a]n employee entitled to benefits under this article may not be
discharged from employment solely because he files a claim for compensation under this
article." MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 39A(a). The statute labels any violation of § 39A a
misdemeanor. See id. § 39A(b).
50. Jane Byeff Korn, Collective Bargaining Rights and Individual Remedies: Rebalancing the
Balance of Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 41 HASTINGS L. J. 1149, 1164
(1990); see Pincus & Gillman, supra note 25, at 1017.
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grieved employee or employer may bring a state tort action. 5 ' Specifically, the LMRA provides that such avenues and procedures must
be exhausted before a dissatisfied employee can seek legal redress
in the courts.5 2 In interpreting the pertinent provision of the
LMRA, the Supreme Court has noted that "it is the arbitrator, not
the court, who has the responsibility to interpret the labor contract
53
in the first instance.

'

In Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck,5 4 the Supreme Court held that
section 301 of the LMRA preempts a state law claim for retaliatory
discharge when a term of the collective bargaining agreement is a
substantial issue in resolving the state law claim.5 5 However, the
Allis-Chalmers Court made it equally clear that whether a term of a
collective bargaining agreement is at issue should be decided on a
case-by-case basis. 5 6 The Supreme Court provided guidance to the
lower courts as to how this case-by-case analysis should be done in
Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc. "
The Lingle case presented an opportunity for the Court to resolve whether the LMRA precludes an action for retaliatory discharge by a union employee. 8 The Court held that section 301 of
the LMRA did not preempt a state tort action for retaliatory discharge as long as the construction of the collective bargaining
agreement was not at issue. 9 The Court clarified its opinion by noting that Lingle "should make clear that interpretation of collectivebargaining agreements remains firmly in the arbitral realm." 60
Therefore, the supremacy of federal labor law in other labor disputes was maintained.
Lingle also stressed that the "independent" nature of the state
law claim is an important consideration in determining the preemption issue. 6 ' Justice Stevens wrote:
[W]hile there may be instances in which the National Labor
51. Korn, supra note 50, at 1162-63; see also Allis-Chalmers v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202,
204 (1985) (refusing to allow a cause of action for abusive discharge to proceed because
the employee did not exhaust the remedies provided in the collective bargaining
agreement).
52. See 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1988).
53. Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 220.

54. 471 U.S. 202 (1988).
55. See id. at 220.
56. See id.

57. 486 U.S. 399 (1988).
58. See id. at 401.

59. See id. at 410.
60. Id. at 411.
61. See id. at 410.
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Relations Act pre-empts state law on the basis of the subject matter of the law in question, [section] 301 pre-emption merely ensures that federal law will be the basis for
interpreting collective bargaining agreements, and says
nothing about the substantive rights a state may provide to
workers when adjudication of those rights does not depend
upon the interpretation of such agreements .... [A]s long
as the state-law claim can be resolved without interpreting
the agreement itself, the claim is "independent" of the
agreement for [section] 301 pre-emption purposes.62
3. The Court's Reasoning.-The Court of Appeals' decision in
Finch rested upon Maryland and federal precedent. Finch combines
the reasoning of Adler, Ewing, and Lingle to decide that an employee
is not precluded from bringing a cause of action for wrongful discharge against an employer based on an allegation that the discharge was in retaliation for the employee's filing of a workers'
compensation claim, as long as disposition of the lawsuit does not
require interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement.63
The Finch court's reasoning rested initially on the Adler holding
that a retaliatory discharge action will survive when the motivation
for the discharge is a clear violation of public policy. 64 The court
relied on Ewing for the proposition that the right to file workers'
compensation claims is a strictly protected right as a matter of public policy. 65 The Finch court reasoned that, taken together, Adler and
Ewing clearly lead to the conclusion that it is a violation of public
solely in retaliapolicy for "an employer [to] discharge an employee
66
tion for filing a workers' compensation claim."
The court further held that federal law does not preempt a state
law action for retaliatory discharge, as long as resolution of the dispute does not require the court to construe the collective bargaining
agreement." 7 This outcome is based almost exclusively on the rea62. Id. at 408-10. Several of the circuits have delivered decisions adhering to Lingle.
See, e.g., Smolarek v. Chrysler Corp., 879 F.2d 1326 (6th Cir. 1989); Bettis v. Oscar
Mayer Foods Corp., 878 F.2d 192 (7th Cir. 1989); Wolfe v. Central Mine Equip. Co.,
850 F.2d 469 (8th Cir. 1988).
63. See Finch, 322 Md. at 206-07, 586 A.2d at 1280.
64. See id.
at 200, 586 A.2d at 1277 (citing Adler v. American Standard Corp., 291
Md. 31, 432 A.2d 464 (1981)).
65. See id. at 201, 586 A.2d at 1277 (citing Ewing v. Koppers Co., 312 Md. 45, 537
A.2d 1173 (1988)).
66. Id. at 202, 586 A.2d at 1278.
67. See id. at 207, 586 A.2d at 1280.
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soning and holding of the Supreme Court in Lingle. 68 Applying the
Lingle rule, the court found that, because Holladay-Tyler's comportment with Finch's collective bargaining agreement was not at issue,
no preemption problems were presented. 69 Therefore, Finch could
maintain a state tort action for retaliatory discharge against his employer, Holladay-Tyler. Further, the court reasoned that even if
Holladay-Tyler had followed all layoff procedures outlined in the
collective bargaining agreement, it did not follow that the discharge
was necessarily not abusive and
that Finch's claim was therefore pre70
empted by federal labor law.
4. Analysis.-Because the Finch court and courts similarly situated must determine whether a public policy issue is presented, it is
important to examine the definition of public policy. Public policy
has been classified as a "vague and indefinite concept,- 7 1 and as:
[c]ommunity common sense and common conscience, extended and applied throughout the state to matters of public morals, health, safety, welfare, and the like; it is that
general and well-settled public opinion relating to man's
plain, palpable duty to his fellowmen, having due regard to
all circumstances of each particular relation and situation.7 2
Clearly, there is no precise definition of public policy. This lack of
cohesiveness creates problems for courts faced with defining public
policy.
Legislatively defined public policy poses no problem for courts.
If an employer violates a statute, there is a violation of public policy. 73 Judicially defined public policy, on the other hand, can cause
confusion. In Adler, the Maryland decision that first recognized a
common-law action for retaliatory discharge, 74 the Court of Appeals
grappled with the origins of public policy:
We have always been aware . . . that recognition of an
otherwise undeclared public policy as a basis for a judicial
decision involves the application of a very nebulous con68. See supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
69. See Finch, 322 Md. at 207, 586 A.2d at 1280.
70. Id. at 206, 586 A.2d at 1280.
71. 2A

1972).
72.
73.
Corp.,
public
74.

NORMAN SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §

56.01 (4th ed.

1231 (6th ed. 1990).
Abramson & Silvestri, supra note 24, at 259; see also Adler v. American Standard
291 Md. 31, 40, 45, 432 A.2d 464, 469, 472 (1981) (intimating that statutory
policy is the only reliable kind).
291 Md. at 37, 432 A.2d at 473.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
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cept to the facts of a given case, and that declaration of
is normally the function of the legislative
public policy
branch.' 5
The Finch decision does little to eliminate this lack of specificity
defining
public policy. Although the Finch court correctly folin
lowed the precedent set in Adler, Ewing, and Lingle by holding that
Finch's action was legally cognizable and was not preempted by federal law, the court did not seize the opportunity to further define
public policy. While the court may have intended to leave the definition of public policy open to case-by-case interpretation as it had
in Adler, 76 an open-ended definition of public policy does not help
courts that will face similar cases in the future.
Another issue surrounding Finch is the reconciliation of the private rights of the individual with the collective rights of the union.
Common situations in which individual and collective rights conflict
include the filing of a discrimination suit against the employer based
on state law, 77 the filing of an action for wage discrimination under
the doctrine of comparable worth, 78 and the filing of an action alleging a workplace condition dangerous to the employee's health.7 9
Though all these actions address an individual's rights and provide
a remedy, they fail to address the current status of employer action
toward all union employees.
The notion of public policy proffered by the court in Finch
squares more with individual than collective rights. By leaving the
determination of public policy to case-by-case analysis, Finch does
not address the tension between collective and individual rights.8 °
Protection of individual rights is paramount; however, the protection of the collective bargaining process is also a substantial interest.
75. Id. at 45, 432 A.2d at 472.
76. 291 Md. at 46, 432 A.2d at 472.
"The truth is that the theory of public policy embodies a doctrine of vague
and variable quality, and, unless deducible in the given circumstances from
constitutional or statutory provisions, should be accepted as the basis of ajudicial determination, if at all, only with the utmost circumspection. The public policy
of one generation may not, under changed conditions, be the public policy of
another."
Id. (quoting Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 306 (1930)) (emphasis added).
77. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, §§ 7-8 (1991).
78. "Comparable worth" has been defined as "a class of wage discrimination claims
based on the employer's use of different criteria in establishing the wage rates for maleand female-dominated jobs. Several states have enacted laws establishing comparable
worth policies and processes for implementing pay adjustments for state employees."
BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 282 (6th ed. 1990).
79. See Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1988).
80. See Korn, supra note 50, at 1153.
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Finally, the aims of the collective bargaining process may be
thwarted by Finch and cases like it.8 ' Allowing employees to file
state claims despite the existence of a private collective bargaining
agreement may hurt union members and employers alike.8 2 The
policy behind collective bargaining agreements-to protect all parties' rights and to encourage arbitration rather than traditional lawsuits-is slowly being eroded to the point that no state action will be
preempted by federal labor law.8 3 As one commentator has stated:
Employees can engage in forum shopping, deciding between arbitration and court, or try the arbitration process
and then get a second bite of the apple by filing a tort action. Employers, as a result of Lingle, have no reason to
agree or cooperate with arbitration procedures if an employee can, at her discretion, sidestep arbitration. 4
5. Conclusion.-Finch succinctly follows the precedent set by
the Supreme Court in Lingle, providing the last decision in a trio of
cases bringing Maryland into line with Supreme Court precedent.
The decision confirms the right to file a retaliatory discharge action
in Maryland when the discharge is a clear violation of public policy.
Further, the court made clear that so long as construction of the
collective bargaining agreement is not necessary for resolution of
the state claim, no preemption issue is presented. Although the
court did not clear up any ambiguities inherent in the "case-bycase" approach, the decision made clear that terminating an employee for filing a workers' compensation claim violates a clear mandate of public policy.
B. Abusive Discharge: A New Outcome
The Court of Appeals granted certiorari in Watson v. Peoples Security Life Insurance Co. 8 5 to decide whether an action for abusive discharge can survive a motion for judgment when the alleged
improper motivation for the discharge is retaliation against the employee for filing sexual harassment charges against the employer
and one of its employees.8 6 Although noting Maryland's recogni81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 1173.
Id. at 1156.
Id. at 1171.
Id. at 1171-72.
322 Md. 467, 588 A.2d 760 (1991).
Id. at 475-76, 588 A.2d at 764.
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tion of the tort of abusive discharge,8 7 the court nonetheless held
that, absent a statute expressing a clear mandate of public policy,
the tort does not lie when an employee is discharged for seeking
legal redress against her employer.8 8 The court did conclude, however, that an employee can obtain relief under an abusive discharge
action if the employee was discharged in retaliation for filing workplace sexual harassment charges against a coworker.8 9
1. The Case.-Patricia Watson was employed as a sales agent at
Peoples Security Life Insurance Company (Peoples) in Hagerstown,
Maryland. 9" She worked for sales manager Michael Leidhecker. 9 '
Beginning in November 1985, another sales manager for the company, John Strausser, repeatedly asked Watson to join his staff.9 2
Watson repeatedly declined, and Strausser became more insistent
and threatening in his request.9" Strausser then began calling Watson at home, often making sexual suggestions to her. 94 Watson reported these incidents to Leidhecker and to Harold Shoemaker,
Strausser's supervisor. Shoemaker laughed and told her "not to
worry about it." 95
On the evening of January 29, 1986, Watson went to the office
with Leidhecker and found Strausser already there.9 6 Strausser approached Watson from behind, placed his hands on her shoulders

87. See id. at 476, 588 A.2d at 764. The Court of Appeals first adopted a cause of
action for abusive discharge in Adler v. American Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31, 432 A.2d
464 (1981), stating:
Maryland does recognize a cause of action for abusive discharge by an employer of an at will employee when the motivation for the discharge contravenes some clear mandate of public policy ....
Id. at 47, 432 A.2d at 473.
88. Watson, 322 Md. at 478-80, 588 A.2d at 765-66.
89. Id. at 481-83, 588 A.2d at 766-67.
The clear mandate of public policy which Watson's discharge could be found to
have violated was the individual's interest in preserving bodily integrity and
personality, reinforced by the state's interest in preventing breaches of the
peace, and reinforced by statutory policies intended to assure protection from
workplace sexual harassment.
Id. at 481, 588 A.2d at 767.
90. Id. at 469, 588 A.2d at 761.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. Strausser's threatening statements included the declaration:

"You're going

to work for me whether you like it or not." Id.
94. Id. Strausser asked Watson to come sleep on the floor of his office with him,
stating: "You can make a lot of money if you do this." Id.
95. Id. at 469-70, 588 A.2d at 761.
96. Id. at 470, 588 A.2d at 761.
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and "tried to take a bite of [her] breast."9 7 Leidhecker reported the
incident to Shoemaker, who warned Strausser to stay away from
Watson.9 8 Strausser ignored the warning, however, and continued
to harass Watson both verbally and physically.9 9
Consequently, on March 13, 1986, Watson filed a three-count
complaint against Peoples and Strausser.' 0 0 The next day, Watson
requested a two-week leave of absence, which Leidhecker approved.''
After learning that a suit had been filed, Robert Williams, a company vice-president, visited the Hagerstown location to
gather information concerning Watson's claim.'° 2 Williams phoned
Watson and asked her to come to work to meet with him. Watson
refused to speak to Williams without her attorney present and Williams was not willing to speak with the lawyer.' 0 3 Williams then informed Watson that she would be terminated if she did not attend
the regular office meeting the next day; Watson did not attend and
her employment was terminated. 0 4 Watson then amended her
complaint to include a claim against Peoples for abusive
0 5
discharge.'
At the end of the trial, Peoples moved for judgment on the first
three counts and the trial court granted the motion.'0 6 The jury
then found Strausser liable for assault and battery and Peoples liable for wrongful discharge.' 0 7 On appeal, the Court of Special Ap-

97. Id.

98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 472, 588 A.2d at 762. Count I asserted a claim against both defendants for
the assault and battery that took place on January 29. Count II claimed intentional infliction of emotional distress against both defendants. Count III was only against Peoples, claiming that it had negligently retained or supervised Strausser. Id.
101. Id. at 470-71, 588 A.2d at 761. Watson made this request on the advice of her
doctor, whom she had seen that day. Id.
102. Id. at 471, 588 A.2d at 761-62.
103. Id., 588 A.2d at 762.
104. Id. The termination notice sent to Watson stated insubordination and failure to
attend the meeting as the bases for the action. Id. At the time, however, Watson was
still on her approved two-week leave. Id. at 470-71, 588 A.2d at 761.
105. Id. at 472, 588 A.2d at 762.
106. Id. at 473, 588 A.2d at 763. The trial court found that the workers' compensation laws protected Peoples from liability for the assault and battery. Id. This claim was
submitted to the jury with respect to Strausser. Id. The motion was granted as to count

II because the emotional distress suffered was not sufficiently severe. Id. Finally, because Watson did not adequately prove that Peoples could have prevented the assault
and battery, the motion was granted as to count III. Id.
107. Id. at 475, 588 A.2d at 764. Strausser satisfied the $300 judgment against him.
Peoples appealed. Id. at 475 & n.3, 588 A.2d at 764 & n.3.
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peals surveyed the law in other jurisdictions l 0s and held that no
clear mandate of public policy is violated when an employer fires an
at-will employee for seeking legal redress for alleged wrongs by the
employer.' 0 9 Therefore, the court reversed the judgment of the
trial court." 0 The dissenting opinion pointed to the "intensely personal" nature of Watson's original suit, and argued that the public
policy against sexual harassment in the workplace was transgressed
in this case."' The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to consider
whether an action for abusive discharge lies when an employer fires
an at-will employee in retaliation for the employee suing the

employer." 12
2. Legal Background.-Under the common law, an at-will employment contract could be legally terminated by either party at any
time for any reason."' The Maryland legislature created the first
exception to this rule when it passed the Maryland Fair Employment
Practices Act." 4 This Act declares that it is unlawful for an employer to terminate an employee "because of [the employee's] race,
color, religion, sex, age, national origin, marital status, or physical
reasonably preclude the peror mental handicap [that does' not]
5
"
employment."
the
of
formance
In ,dler v. American Standard Corp., 16 the Court of Appeals further expanded the deviation from the common-law rule by permitting an action for abusive discharge when the termination of an
employee contravenes a clear mandate of public policy. )' 7 Once the
tort was recognized in Maryland, the difficult question became how
108. See Peoples Security Life Ins. Co. v. Watson, 81 Md. App. 420, 429-31, 568 A.2d
835, 839-40 (1990) (citing Kavanagh v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 566 F. Supp. 242
(N.D. Ill.1983); Alexander v. Kay Finlay Jewelers, Inc., 506 A.2d 379 (N.J. Super.

1986)), vacated and remanded, 322 Md. 467, 588 A.2d 760 (1991).
109. Id. at 431-32, 568 A.2d at 840.

110. Id. at 432, 568 A.2d at 840.
111. See id. at 434, 568 A.2d at 842 (Bishop, J., dissenting).
112. Watson, 322 Md. at 475, 588 A.2d at 764.
113. Adler v. American Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31, 35, 432 A.2d 464, 467 (1981)
(citations omitted).
114. Act of May 4, 1965, ch. 717, 1965 Md. Laws 1043 (codified at MD. ANN. CODE art.
49B, §§ 14-18 (1957 & Supp. 1991)).
115. MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 16(a)(1). The parallel federal legislation, Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, declares it an unlawful employment practice to discharge
an employee "because of ...race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a)(l) (1988).
116. 291 Md. 31, 432 A.2d 464.
117. See id. at 47, 432 A.2d at 473. Adler's survey of the law in other jurisdictions
showed that this judicial exception had already been approved by other states. See id.at
36-42, 432 A'2d at 467-70.
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to determine "where the line is to be drawn that separates a wrongful from a legally permissible discharge." ' 8 The Adler court declared the focal point to be "whether the public policy allegedly
violated is sufficiently clear to provide [a] basis . . . for wrongful
discharge." 19
The scope of the abusive discharge tort was refined in Makovi v.
Sherwin-Williams Co. 120 The Court of Appeals disallowed an abusive
discharge action in Makovi because statutory remedies already existed to redress the wrongs claimed by the plaintiff.' 2 ' The court
based its finding on what it considered to be the nature of the tort
itself, concluding that the tort of abusive discharge provides a remedy only to an employee whose discharge violates a clear mandate of
public policy and for whom no alternative course of redress is
available. 22
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In her claim of abusive discharge,
Watson asserted that she was dismissed in retaliation for "exercising
her right of redress to the courts."' 2 3 According to the Court of
Appeals, however, allegations of discharge in violation of such a
general and abstract right are insufficient to support a claim of abusive discharge. 1 24 The court noted that in Adler, "allegations of discharge in retaliation for refusing to conceal 'commercial bribery'
and 'falsification of corporate documents' were too general to state
a cause of action."' 125 Likewise, Watson's allegation that her "right
to redress" was violated could not support her claim. 1 26 "The par118. Id. at 42, 432 A.2d at 470.
119. Id., 432 A.2d at 470-71; accordEwing v. Koppers Co., 312 Md. 45, 537 A.2d 1173
(1988). "The tort action as we have recognized it is not intended to reach every wrong-

ful discharge. It is applicable only where the discharge contravenes some clear mandate
of public policy." Id. at 49, 537 A.2d at 1175.
120. 316 Md. 603, 561 A.2d 179 (1989).
121. See id. at 626, 561 A.2d at 190. The plaintiff in Makovi asserted sexual discrimination by her employer as a basis for her claim. Id. at 605-06, 561 A.2d at 180. The Court
of Appeals found that the existence of a right and remedy under Title VII and the Fair
Employment Practices Act barred a common-law action for abusive discharge. Id. at
626, 561 A.2d at 190.
122. See id. at 626, 561 A.2d at 190.
123. Watson, 322 Md. at 474, 588 A.2d at 763. Specifically, Watson alleged that the
discharge was in violation of her rights under the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution, the Civil Rights Act, and the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Id. at 47273, 588 A.2d at 762; see U.S. CONST. amend. I; 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988); MD. CONST.
DECL. OF RTS. arts. 19, 40.

124.
125.
472-73
126.

See Watson, 322 Md. at 477, 588 A.2d at 764-65.
Id. (citing Adler v. American Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31, 46-47, 432 A.2d 464,
(1981)).
Id., 588 A.2d at 765.
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ticular claim asserted which motivates the retaliatory discharge must
be considered."'' 27 Further, the Court of Special Appeals had noted
that Peoples did not and could not impede Watson from proceeding
with her claims against it in the courts. 12 In fact, Watson pursued
her claims to the fullest extent by presenting her case at trial.
Therefore, Watson's right of redress was in no way impeded by the
29
discharge.'
The Court of Appeals did consider the nature of Watson's suit,
which alleged facts amounting to sexual discrimination, as a possible foundation for an abusive discharge action.13 0 The opinion did
no more than mention this possibility, however, before discarding it
under the rule set forth in Makovi :131 if a statutory remedy exists,
the common-law action cannot be maintained. 13 2 Because Title VII
provides a remedy for sexual discrimination claims, an abusive discharge claim premised on sexual discrimination is unnecessary and
is inconsistent with the purpose behind recognizing abusive dis33
charge claims.'
127. Id.
128. Peoples Security Life Ins. Co. v. Watson, 81 Md. App. at 429, 568 A.2d at 839; see
also Kavanagh v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 566 F. Supp. 242, 244 (N.D. Ill. 1983) ("[A]
party does not violate another party's right to counsel or to free access to the courts by
taking measures, even though retaliatory and spiteful in nature, which lawfully are available to him simply because resort to these measures somehow penalizes the other party
for suing.").
129. Peoples Security Life Ins. Co. v. Watson, 81 Md. App. at 429, 569 A.2d at 839.
130. See Watson, 322 Md. at 469, 588 A.2d at 766; see also Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson,
477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) ("Without question, when a supervisor sexually harasses a
subordinate because of the subordinate's sex, that supervisor 'discriminates' on the basis of sex.").
131. See Watson, 322 Md. at 480, 588 A.2d at 766.
132. Makovi v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 316 Md. 603, 626, 561 A.2d 179, 190 (1989).
Makovi sets forth three justifications for adopting this policy. First, if a statutory remedy
exists, "the generally accepted reason for recognizing the tort, that of vindicating an
otherwise civilly unremedied public policy violation, does not apply." Id.; accordWehr v.
Burroughs Corp., 438 F. Supp. 1052, 1055 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Melley v. Gillette Corp., 475
N.E.2d 1227, 1229 (Mass. App. 1985). Second, if a court allows a plaintiff to recover full
tort damages "in the name of vindicating the statutory public policy goals," it will have
upset the "balance between right and remedy struck by the Legislature in establishing
the very policy relied upon." Makovi, 316 Md. at 626, 561 A.2d at 190. Finally, the
Makovi court pointed out that allowing a plaintiff to recover tort damages based on the
public policy set forth in employment discrimination statutes would encourage all employees with possible claims to circumvent those very statutes in search of a larger
award. Id. (quoting 1 LEx K. LARSEN, UNJUST DISMISSAL § 6.10[6][e] (1989)).
133. See Watson, 322 Md. at 480, 588 A.2d at 766. Title VII's remedial scheme provides for reinstatement of an employee with or without backpay or any other equitable
relief the court deems appropriate. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988). In Vinson, the
Supreme Court declared that the "kinds of workplace conduct that may be actionable
under Title VII . . .include '[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors,

696

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 51:681

Finally, the court held that an employer violates a clear mandate
of public policy by discharging an employee for filing an action
against a coworker for workplace sexual harassment that rises to the
level of assault and battery. 3 4 The court noted that the torts of assault and battery are premised on the individual's right to bodily
integrity and the right to be free from the apprehension of violence. 13 5 Further, the assault and battery in the Watson case "were a
part of a pattern of sexual harassment by Strausser both at the workplace and elsewhere."' 1 6 Because both Title VII and the Maryland
Fair Employment Practices Act' 3 7 prohibit discharges in retaliation
for sexual harassment, there is a clear mandate of public policy that
such discharges are improper and actionable. 3 ' Thus, although an
abusive discharge claim cannot survive if based solely on an allegation that the discharge was in retaliation for filing a claim against the
employer, the claim is proper if based on the employer's retaliation
for the employee filing a sexual harassment claim against a coworker.'i 9 Therefore, the trial court's granting of Peoples' motion
for judgment on all counts was improper. 4 °
4. Analysis: Defining a Clear Mandate of Public Policy.-The Court
of Appeals has adopted the English doctrine as a general guideline
for determining the public policy in Maryland:
"Public policy is that principle of the law which holds that
no subject can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be
injurious to the public, or against the public good, which
may be termed, as it sometimes has been, the policy of the
and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature.' " 477 U.S. at 65 (quoting 29
C.F.R. 1604.11(a) (1985)). Watson's claims clearly fall under this description and,
therefore, Title VII may provide a remedy for Watson.
134. See Watson, 322 Md. at 480-81, 588 A.2d at 766.
135. See id. at 481-82, 588 A.2d at 766-67.
136. Id. at 482, 588 A.2d at 767.
137. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, §§ 14-18
(1957 & Supp. 1991).
138. Watson, 322 Md. at 483, 588 A.2d at 767. Watson's failure to argue at trial that
sexual discrimination violates a clear mandate of public policy did not constitute a
waiver of the issue on appeal. Id., 588 A.2d at 768.
Further, the court noted that Title VII and the Maryland Fair Employment Practices
Act did not preempt the abusive discharge claim premised on the retaliation for filing
against a coworker. See id. at 485, 588 A.2d at 769. Absent these statutes, a clear public
policy against actions like those taken by Strausser would still exist. "The same clear
public policy which encourages Watson's legal recourse against one who degradingly
assaulted her makes tortious a discharge that retaliates against that recourse." Id. at
486, 588 A.2d at 769.
139. See id. at 486, 588 A.2d at 769.
140. Id.
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law, or public policy in relation to the administration of the
law." 141
This definition suggests that the public policy of the state is
formed by guarding against conduct that is contrary to the welfare
of the people. 14 2 In keeping with this broad definition, the Court of
Appeals has stated that recognition of the tort of wrongful discharge, a public policy restriction on employers' rights, will "foster
the State's interest in deterring particularly reprehensible
14 3
conduct."'

Applying this view of public policy to Watson, it follows that
elimination of workplace sexual harassment is a clear policy goal in
Maryland. 144 In his dissent in Watson, Judge Eldridge correctly observed that Article 46 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights mandates equality of the sexes in the state.' 4 5 The Watson dissent
further noted the Supreme Court's espousal of a policy against sexual discrimination, 146 suggesting that Maryland would certainly concur with this policy.' 4 7
In spite of the personal affront of sexual harassment14 " and the
141. Maryland-Nat'l Capital Park & Planning Comm'n v. Washington Nat'l Arena, 282
Md. 588, 605, 386 A.2d 1216, 1228 (1978) (quoting Egerton v. Earl Brownlow, 4 H.L.
Cas. 1, 196 (1853)).
142. See generally Townsend v. L.W.M. Management, Inc., 64 Md. App. 55, 61, 494
A.2d 239, 242 (asserting that the primary focus in determining whether a policy may
serve as a source of the clear mandate required for success under an abusive discharge
theory must be the interests of society), cert. denied, 304 Md. 300, 498 A.2d 1186 (1985).
143. Ewing v. Koppers Co., 312 Md. 45, 49, 537 A.2d 1173, 1175 (1988). The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has declared that the "genesis of [the
public policy] exception [to the traditional common-law rule] is in the courts' repugnance to granting civil immunity for actions that 'defile' and 'corrupt' the system of laws
the courts enforce." Harrison v. Edison Bros. Apparel Stores, Inc., 924 F.2d 530, 534
(4th Cir. 1991) (citing McLaughlin v. Barclays Am. Corp., 382 S.E.2d 836, 839- 40 (N.C.
Ct. App.), cert. denied, 385 S.E.2d 498 (N.C. 1989)).
144. See supra note 89. See generally Watson, 322 Md. at 490, 588 A.2d at 771 (Eldridge,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Makovi v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 316 Md.
603, 627, 561 A.2d 179, 191 (1989) (Adkins, J., dissenting); Peoples Security Life Ins.
Co. v. Watson, 81 Md. App. at 434, 568 A.2d at 842 (Bishop, J., dissenting).
145. See 322 Md. at 490, 588 A.2d at 771 (Eldridge,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Eldridge concurred with the majority as to the lack of a constitutional
issue in the case, and the existence of the abusive discharge tort in the context of Watson's claims against Strausser. He disagreed with the court as to the existence of the
abusive discharge claim in the context of Watson's claims against Peoples. See id. at 487,
588 A.2d at 770. The pertinent text of Article 46 provides that "[e]quality of rights
under the law shall not be abridged or denied because of sex." MD.CONST. DECL. OF
RTS. art. 46.
146. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66-67 (1986).
147. See 322 Md. at 490, 588 A.2d at 771 (Eldridge, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
148. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit stated that "sexual
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state's public policy proscribing it, the Watson court deferred to statutory remedies for sexual discrimination. t4 9 The United States
Congress has implicitly indicated, however, that because of the high
priority of shaping anti-discrimination policy, discrimination claims
may be heard in several forums.' 5 ' The Fourth Circuit stated that in
drafting Title VII, Congress understood that "no single approach to
the problem of employment discrimination could be a panacea";
rather, a "battery of remedies" is necessary to counter ingrained
discrimination."'5 Certainly, this battery of remedies should include
common-law relief.' 52 Further, the court failed to realize that,
although relief under Title VII may be adequate for an employee
who was merely terminated on the basis of the employee's status, it
does not adequately compensate an employee who has endured any
53
type of status-related degradation from the employer.
The Watson court, however, following Makovi, reasoned that allowing a common-law remedy to prevail when a statutory remedy is
available would upset the legislative balance between right and remedy. "5' 4 The court ignored the fact that the balance struck in the
advance or insult almost always will represent 'an intentional assault on an individual's
innermost privacy.' " Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 255 (4th Cir. 1983) (quoting Bundy v.
Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 945 (D.C. Cir. 1981)). Katz further advised that sexual harassment establishes barriers to women's involvement in the workplace. Id. at 254. See generally Rojo v. Kliger, 801 P.2d 373, 389 (Cal. 1990) (stating that "we are all demeaned"
through the practice of sexual discrimination in the workplace); Holien v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 689 P.2d 1292, 1300 (Or. 1984) (noting the importance of the legal right of
an employee not to be discharged for resisting sexual discrimination).
149. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
150. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974). The Court further
explained that the relationship between the several forums that hear discrimination
claims is "complimentary" because each works toward promoting the policy goals of the
other. Id. at 50-51.
151. Keller v. Prince George's County, 827 F.2d 952, 957 (4th Cir. 1987). Although
these statements and the Fourth Circuit quote refer to Title VII as it relates to other
sections of the Civil Rights Act, the argument they make is similarly applicable to workplace sexual discrimination.
152. See generally Rojo, 801 P.2d at 377 (recognizing the various theories of relief that
the state provides for employment discrimination); Holien, 689 P.2d at 1303 (declaring
that "[t]here is no inherent inconsistency" in allowing both statutory and common-law
remedies). The position is stated more broadly in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency,
421 U.S. 454 (1975): "Despite Title VII's range and its design as a comprehensive solution ...the aggrieved individual clearly is not deprived of other remedies he possesses
and is not limited to Title VII in his search for relief." Id. at 459.
153. The term "status-related degradation" is used to refer to any type of personal
affront to the employee committed by the employer or coworkers that is based upon the
employee's status (i.e., sex, race, religion). The indignity inflicted on an employee in
such a case is worthy of tort damages and is not redressed by reinstating the employee.
See infra note 157.

154. Watson, 322 Md. at 486, 588 A.2d at 769.
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Maryland Fair Employment Practices Act preceded the development
of the tort of abusive discharge in Maryland by sixteen years.' 55
Furthermore, the existence of legislative remedies does not preclude courts from supplementing those remedies with newly created
56
common-law relief. 1
An examination of the public policy of the state and the power
of the court to effectuate that policy therefore leads to the conclusion that an employee should have available a tort action against an
employer who fires the employee for suing the employer for workplace harassment, particularly when the employer knew of the harassment and did little to stop it. 157 Although the Watson court did
not adopt this conclusion, it did find a possible policy basis for the
tort that does not conflict with any statutory scheme: the employee's suit against her coworker.'
Thus, if on remand the jury
finds that Watson's discharge was motivated by the institution of
this suit, as opposed to the suit against her employer, Peoples will
1 59
be liable for abusive discharge.
4. Conclusion.-In Watson, the Court of Appeals had a chance
to expand the tort of abusive discharge by allowing workplace sexual harassment in violation of statutory and constitutional principles
to serve as a policy goal for maintenance of the tort action against
the employer. Instead, the court relied on the Makovi precedent to
limit the application of the tort by noting that statutes provide remedies for people in Watson's circumstances. By restricting rather
than expanding the tort, the court makes vindication of the policy
155. See Recent Case, Court Refuses to Recognize Discrimination-BasedAbusive Discharge
Claim, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1732, 1735 (1990) (noting that the Fair Employment Practices
Act was adopted in 1965, but the tort of abusive discharge was not recognized in Maryland until 1981); see also Holien, 689 P.2d at 1303 (asserting that a legislative body must
be aware of the existence of a remedy before it can intend to eliminate it).
156. Changing and developing the common law is the main function of courts. See
Recent Case, supra note 155, at 1736. "[Clourts act with maximum legitimacy within the
realm of the common law and have traditionally played the primary role in formulating
tort law in general and measures of damages in particular." Id. The Maryland court has
the power to allow an abusive discharge action despite the existence of Title VII and its
state counterpart, the Fair Employment Practices Act; moreover, exercise of this power
would not be inconsistent with the goals of the legislature to outlaw workplace sexual
harassment. See Watson, 322 Md. at 771, 588 A.2d at 490 (Eldridge, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
157. Common-law tort suits are filed for the precise reason that the remedial scheme
of the civil rights statutes does not effectively carry out its objectives. Reinstatement,
with or without back pay, arguably cannot compensate Patricia Watson for having endured unwelcome sexual advances from a company officer for two years.
158. See Watson, 322 Md. at 480-81, 588 A.2d at 766.
159. Id.
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against sexual harassment less likely. In view of the clarity of this
state policy, it may be time to reevaluate the decision in Makovi.
LORA HOLMBERG HESS
LISA J. KAHN

VIII.
A.

EVIDENCE

Admissibility of Refusal to Submit to a Breathalyzer Test

In Krauss v. State,' the Court of Appeals granted certiorari to
consider whether a court may admit evidence of a suspected drunk
driver's refusal to take a breathalyzer test.' A Maryland statute purports to allow the admission of such evidence;' nevertheless, after
review of the statute, the Krauss court held that the trial judge had
committed error by admitting evidence of Krauss's refusal to submit
to the test.4 The court determined that the legislature intended the
refusal to be admissible only when it is material and relevant to a
matter other than the defendant's guilt or innocence. 5 Thus, the
court's holding preserves the admissibility of a refusal, but subjects
the admission to a "material and relevant" restriction.6
1. The Case.-On September 3, 1988, Frank Leroy Krauss was
arrested for driving while intoxicated and failing to drive to the right
of the center line.7 The arrest was based on information given to
the police by David Dean, who had witnessed Krauss driving on the
wrong side of the road and had had a brief altercation with Krauss
after Krauss had forced Dean off the road. Dean testified that
Krauss smelled of alcohol and appeared to be drunk. 8 Krauss fled
the scene of the altercation but was quickly located by police and
brought back to his car.9 The smell of alcohol permeated the car,
which contained empty beer cans and a cooler of beer. Police performed several field sobriety tests and then informed Krauss of his
right to take a chemical breath test. Krauss refused to submit to the
breathalyzer test.'"
Before trial on the merits began, "defense counsel moved in
1. 322 Md. 376, 587 A.2d 1102 (1991).
2. See id. at 382, 587 A.2d at 1105.
3. See MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-309(a) (1989). See infra note 14 for
the pertinent text of the statute. The statute was amended in 1989 and 1990 for stylistic
reasons that do not affect the analysis or holding of the Krauss court. See Act of May 29,
1990, ch. 413, 1990 Md. Laws 1706; Act of May 19, 1989, ch. 284, 1989 Md. Laws 2331.
4. See 322 Md. at 390, 587 A.2d at 1109.
5. See id. at 386, 587 A.2d at 1106.
6. See id. at 386-87, 587 A.2d at 1107.
7. Id. at 382 n.3, 587 A.2d at 1105 n.3.
8. Krauss v. State, 82 Md. App. 1, 2-3, 569 A.2d 1284, 1284-85 (1990), vacated and
remanded, 322 Md. 376, 587 A.2d 1102 (1991).
9. Id. at 3, 569 A.2d at 1285.
10. Id.
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limine to prevent the State from introducing any evidence concerning [Krauss's] refusal to submit to the breath test."" The defense
motion was based on relevance grounds. 1 2 Defense counsel first
made it clear that Krauss was not contesting the fact that the arrest3
ing officer followed the statutory procedures in offering the test.'
Krauss referred to section 10-309 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, 4 which permits admission of a refusal to take the
breathalyzer test, but declares that "no inference or presumption
concerning either guilt or innocence arises because of the refusal to
submit."' 5 Krauss argued that the legislature placed the "inference
or presumption" clause in the statute to limit the State's ability to
introduce a refusal to cases in which the state must rebut allegations that the police officer violated part of the statute.' 6 He argued
that because he was not challenging the police procedure, the refusal was not relevant.' 7 Disagreeing with Krauss's interpretation of
the statute, the trial judge allowed the refusal to be entered into
evidence. 18
A jury found Krauss guilty of driving a motor vehicle while
under the influence of alcohol.' 9 The Court of Special Appeals af11. Krauss, 322 Md. at 383, 587 A.2d at 1105.
12. Id.

13. Id. The defense stipulated and agreed that the trooper who arrested Krauss followed all the procedures outlined in the statute; specifically, Krauss was offered an opportunity to take a breath test, and he refused to take the test. Id.
14. Section 10-309(a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article provides, in relevant part:
Except as provided in § 16-205.1(c) of the Transportation Article, a person
may not be compelled to submit to a chemical analysis provided for in this
subtitle. Evidence of chemical analysis is not admissible in a prosecution for a
violation of § 21-902 of the Transportation Article [making it illegal to drive
while intoxicated or under the influence of alcohol or drugs] if obtained contrary to its provisions. No inference or presumption concerning either guilt or
innocence arises because of refusal to submit. The fact of refusal to submit is
admissible in evidence at the trial.
MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-309(a) (1989). This is the statute as it appeared
prior to the 1989 and 1990 stylistic changes, see supra note 3, and how it appeared before
the Krauss court.
15. MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-309(a).

16. Krauss, 322 Md. at 383, 587 A.2d at 1105. Under § 16-205.1 of the Transportation Article, a police officer is required to "request that [an] individual permit a
[breathalyzer] test to be taken [and] advise the individual of the .

.

. penalties .

..

im-

posed for refusal ....
MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 16-205.1(b)(2)(ii)-(iii) (1987). If a
defendant were to argue that the officer failed to perform these duties, then the State
would be allowed to offer evidence of the defendant's refusal to submit to a
breathalyzer.
17. Krauss, 322 Md. at 383, 587 A.2d at 1105.
18. Id. at 384, 587 A.2d at 1105.
19. Id. at 382, 587 A.2d at 1105. The jury found Krauss not guilty of driving while
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2
firmed the conviction. 2' The Court of Appeals granted certiorari '
erred in admitting Krauss's reto consider whether the trial judge
22
fusal to take a breathalyzer test.
In concluding that the trial judge committed error, the Court of
Appeals examined the relevance of Krauss's refusal in light of the
"no inference or presumption" clause of section 10-309(a). 2' The
court's ruling has the effect of restricting the permissible use of a
defendant's refusal to take a chemical breath test, therefore narrowing the scope of the section.

2.

Legal Background.-

a. General.-Because the Federal Rules of Evidence are exhaustive and codified, they provide a good starting point for a general analysis of the law of evidence. It is a fundamental evidentiary
principle that only relevant evidence is admissible. 4 Two factors
determine whether evidence is relevant: materiality and probative
value. 25 Evidence is material if it logically relates to the issues of a
case. 26 For evidence to be probative, it must have a natural tendency to establish the proposition for which it is offered;2 7 it must
affect the probability that a fact is as a party claims it to be. 2 ' To be
deemed probative, however, the evidence need not conclusively
prove the proposition, or even make the proposition appear more
is not
likely true than not.2 9 Under the Federal Rules, evidence that
30
inadmissible.
thus
and
irrelevant
is
probative
and
material
intoxicated and not guilty of failing to drive to the right of the center of the road. Id. at
382 n.3, 587 A.2d at 1105 n.3.
20. Krauss v. State, 82 Md. App. at 7, 569 A.2d at 1287.
21. See Krauss v. State, 320 Md. 87, 576 A.2d 220 (1990).
22. See Krauss, 322 Md. at 382, 587 A.2d at 1105.
23. See id. at 387, 587 A.2d at 1107.
24. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 184, at 540-41 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 3d ed.
1984). The Federal Rules of Evidence state: "All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress,
by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory
authority. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible." FED. R. EvID. 402; see also
Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 643, 350 A.2d 665, 669 (1976) (stating that to be admissible, evidence must be relevant to the issues).
25. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 24, § 185, at 541; see Dorsey, 276 Md. at 643,
350 A.2d at 669.
26. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 24, § 185, at 541.
27. Id.; see Dorsey, 276 Md. at 643, 350 A.2d at 668.
28. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 24, § 185, at 542.
29. Id.
30. See FED. R. EVID. 402; MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 24, § 185, at 541.
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b. Maryland Law.-Maryland's rules of evidence are not codified; rather, they are found in common-law decisions, legislative enactments, and court rules. 3 In Dorsey v. State, 2 the Court of
Appeals clarified the test for the admissibility of evidence.3 3 The
Dorsey court addressed materiality and probative value in essentially
the same manner as the Federal Rules.3 4
35
The court reaffirmed the Dorsey decision in State v. Joynes.
Joynes was charged with battery,3 6 and sought to introduce evidence
of the battery conviction of her accuser, Handy, in connection with
the same incident.3 The trial court held that Handy's earlier battery conviction was irrelevant to Joynes's claim of self-defense
against an aggressor.3 " Relying on the Dorsey test, the Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's decision, 39 finding that the evidence
was not probative. 40 The court concluded that the witness's battery
conviction would not assist the jury in determining who the aggressor was in each phase of the altercation. 4 ' The Dorsey rule stands as
the relevancy test for Maryland trial courts to follow.
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Krauss, the Court of Appeals applied the test outlined in Dorsey andJoynes to restrict the admissibility
of a refusal to take a breathalyzer test. 42 The court first considered
section 10-309(a) in light of the principles of statutory interpretation applied in Maryland.4 3
The primary objective of statutory interpretation is to ascertain
the legislative purpose or goal behind a statute. 44 A court should
31. See LYNN McLAIN, MARYLAND EVIDENCE § 5, at vii (1st ed. 1987).

32. 276 Md. 638, 350 A.2d 665 (1976).
33. See id. at 643-44, 350 A.2d at 668-69; see also State v. Joynes, 314 Md. 113, 119,
549 A.2d 380, 383 (1988) (citing the Dorsey test for admissibility); Leeson v. State, 293
Md. 425, 433-34, 445 A.2d 21, 25 (1982).
34. See supra text accompanying notes 24-30. According to Dorsey, the materiality
component to relevant evidence is satisfied by a " 'connection of the fact proved with the
offense charged.' " 276 Md. at 643, 350 A.2d at 668-69 (quoting MacEwen v. State, 194
Md. 492, 501, 71 A.2d 464, 468 (1950); Pearson v. State, 182 Md. 1, 13, 31 A.2d 624,
629 (1943)). Evidence has probative value if it tends "either to establish or disprove"
the material issues. Id. at 643, 350 A.2d at 669.
35. 314 Md. 113, 119, 549 A.2d 380, 383 (1988).
36. Id. at 115, 549 A.2d at 381.
37. Id. at 117, 549 A.2d at 382.
38. Id. at 118, 549 A.2d at 382.
39. Id. at 120, 549 A.2d at 383.
40. Id. at 119, 549 A.2d at 383.
41. Id. at 120, 549 A.2d at 383.
42. See 322 Md. at 387, 587 A.2d at 1107.
43. See id. at 386, 587 A.2d at 1107.
44. Kaczorowski v. City of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 513, 525 A.2d 628, 632 (1987).
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first look at the words of the statute.4 5 However, the court is not
limited to a strict, literalist interpretation of the words of the statute
as they are printed. 46 The court may consider the consequences resulting from different interpretations and meanings, and adopt the
47
construction that avoids an illogical or unreasonable result.
The Krauss court determined that the legislature had recognized that the mere fact of refusal to take a breathalyzer test is collateral to the issue of whether a driver was intoxicated or under the
influence of alcohol. 48 A refusal is not material or relevant to the
issue of guilt or innocence. 4 9 Because the fact of refusal may be
material and relevant to collateral matters,5 ' however, the legislature permitted the admission of a refusal subject to the restriction
that no inference or presumption of guilt or innocence was to be
drawn from the refusal.5 1
The Krauss court applied this interpretation of section 10309(a) to the facts of the case. 5' The court focused on the point that
Krauss did not contest the facts presented by the State; in particular,
he did not challenge the fact that he was provided an opportunity to

take a breathalyzer test but refused to do so. 53 Because of Krauss's
acceptance of the facts, there was no collateral matter in question,
and there was no valid reason for the State to introduce evidence of
the refusal. The only purpose behind introducing this evidence was
to push the jury toward a guilty verdict, and the legislature forbade
the introduction of such evidence for this purpose.5 4 Because the
refusal was not probative of the accused's guilt,5 5 the court held that
evidence of the refusal was irrelevant and inadmissible.5 6

45. Id.

46. Id. at 514-15, 525 A.2d at 632.
47. Id. at 513, 525 A.2d at 632.
48. See 322 Md. at 386, 587 A.2d at 1107. The court relied on reports from the state
Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee in reaching its decision. See id., 587 A.2d at
1106-07.
49. Id., 587 A.2d at 1106-07.
50. Id. at 386-87, 587 A.2d at 1107. The court referred to collateral matters as issues
other than guilt or innocence, such as a defendant's claim that the enforcement authorities did not properly afford an opportunity to take the test. See id.
51. Id. at 387, 587 A.2d at 1107.
52. See id. at 388, 587 A.2d at 1107.
53. Id. As stated earlier, the defense stipulated that the investigating officers properly performed the procedures outlined in the statute. Id. at 383, 587 A.2d at 1105.
54. See id. at 388, 587 A.2d at 1107-08.
55. Id.
56. See id.
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4. Analysis .- Under Maryland law, a driver has the statutory
right to refuse to take a breathalyzer test.5 7 In addition, the refusal,
although admissible as evidence, may not be used as a "presumption of guilt." 5 8 In Krauss, the Court of Appeals clarified how the
right and the evidentiary rule affect each other.5 9 To admit an accused's refusal into evidence invites pure speculation by the jury as
to what the refusal means. A refusal neither tends to establish nor
tends to disprove the State's intoxication claim. A refusal, unlike
blood-shot eyes, slurred speech, and a loss of balance, does not suggest that a person has been drinking. Therefore, the court determined that evidence of a refusal must be excluded in order to
prevent jurors from associating the accused's refusal to take the test
with the question of guilt or innocence.6 ° Otherwise, the right provided in the statute allowing citizens to refuse to take a breathalyzer
test would be rendered meaningless.
While not a watershed opinion on statutory interpretation of
the definition of relevance, Krauss has a major impact on Maryland's
drunk driving enforcement. The Krauss decision joins Maryland
with a minority of states that have held, for different reasons, that
evidence of a driver's refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test is not
admissible at trial. 6 ' Because of the Krauss decision, it will often be
in the arrestee's best interest to refuse to take a breathalyzer test.
The penalty for refusal is civil in nature-a temporary suspension of
the person's license;6 2 however, if the arrestee permits testing, he or
57. MD.CTS. &JuD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-309(a) (1989). For the pertinent text of
the statute, see supra note 14.
58. See MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-309(a).
59. See 322 Md. at 386, 587 A.2d at 1107.
60. See id. at 389, 587 A.2d at 1108.
61. See Phillip T. Bruns, Note, Driving While Intoxicated and the Right to Counsel: The
Case Against Implied Consent, 58 TEX. L. REV. 935, 945 (1980) (discussing how different
courts have approached the admissibility issue).
62. See MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 16-205.1(b)(i)(2), (b)(ii)(2) (Supp. 1991). A
driver's refusal to submit leads to suspension of his or her license for a period ranging
from 120 days to 1 year. Id.
Maryland's implied consent law is codified in § 16-205.1(a) of the Transportation
Article, which provides:
Any person who drives or attempts to drive a motor vehicle on a highway or on
any private property that is used by the public in general in this State is deemed
to have consented, subject to the provisions of §§ 10-302 through 10-309, inclusive, of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, to take a test if the person should be detained on suspicion of driving or attempting to drive while
intoxicated [or] while under the influence of alcohol ....
Id. § 16-205.1 (a).
Many states passed implied consent laws during the 1950s to encourage drivers to
submit to chemical testing. Christopher W. Nicholson, Comment, Maryland's Drunk
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she may be offering the State additional evidence of criminal activity, as well as risking revocation or suspension of his or her driver's
license.6" Therefore, it may benefit the arrestee to refuse the
breathalyzer test unless the results of the testing are known to be
favorable."'
5. Conclusion.-The Court of Appeals' analysis of Maryland's
evidence law is at the center of the Krauss opinion. Although the
decision reaffirms the decisions in Dorsey65 and Joynes6 6 and has little effect on Maryland's evidence law, the decision, as applied to the
facts of the case, will have a far-reaching effect on future drunk driving cases. By applying the "material and relevant" restriction to
section 10-309(a),6 7 the Court of Appeals limited the reach of the
statute. In the process, the court stripped Maryland law enforcement officials of one "weapon" in their fight against drunk driving.
FRANK

M. CARPENTER,JR.

Driving Laws: An Overview, 11 U. BALT. L. REV. 357, 359 (1982). These statutes were

based on the rationale that a condition precedent for the privilege of driving was a
driver's consent to permit chemical testing whenever properly requested. Id. If the
driver refused the test, he was deemed to have withdrawn his consent, which resulted in
a failure of the condition precedent to a license; hence, the state revoked the conditional
privilege of driving. Id. This implied consent rule tends to mitigate the advantage
gained from refusal, especially by drivers who would test below the level that establishes
the presumption of intoxication.
63. See MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 27-101 (1987).
64. Nicholson, supra note 62, at 362. A motorist's refusal to permit blood alcohol
content (BAC) testing does not prohibit the police from proceeding with criminal
charges. In fact, it is a standard procedure of the Maryland State Police to seek a conviction for drunk driving regardless of whether the motorist consents to BAC testing. Id. at
362 n.39. In the absence of chemical evidence, the State may meet its burden of proof
by having the arresting officer testify as to the defendant's demeanor at the time of the
arrest. Id.
65. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
66. See supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
67. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.

IX.
A.

FAMILY LAW

Spendthrift Trust Pensions May Be Partitionedto Ex-Spouses in
Divorce Proceedings

Acknowledging that pension plan funds are marital property,
the Court of Appeals held in Prince George's County Police Pension Plan
v. Burke' that a trial judge has the authority to transfer an interest in
one spouse's government pension plan to the other spouse as part
of a divorce settlement.' The court further determined that pension
plan trustees may be ordered to make direct payment to the other
spouse when the pension becomes payable. 3 This ruling extends a
line of Maryland divorce decisions and determines that all nonfederally regulated pensions are marital property subject to equitable distribution. In addition, the case removes any distinctions between
private pension plans and local government plans.
1. The Case.-On April 4, 1986, the Prince George's County
Circuit Court granted Edward C. Burke, Jr. a divorce from Maureen
M. Burke. 4 Mr. Burke, a county police officer, had a vested pension'
in the Prince George's County Police Pension Plan ("Pension
Plan"). 6 On September 19, 1989, the court awarded Mrs. Burke a
share of her ex-husband's pension equal to half of the benefits accrued during their marriage. 7 The trial court ordered the Trustees
of the Pension Plan to pay Mrs. Burke's share directly to her when
the benefits became payable. 8 The Trustees were permitted to intervene in the case on October 18, 1989, and thereafter appealed
the trial court's ruling. 9
1. 321 Md. 699, 584 A.2d 702 (1991). The Burke proceeding was consolidated with
a divorce case involving the transfer of disability retirement benefits paid by the Prince
George's County Police Pension Plan. See infra note 10.

2. See 321 Md. at 708, 584 A.2d at 707.
3. See id.
4. Id. at 701, 584 A.2d at 703.
5. A pension is vested "when the minimum terms of employment necessary to receive retirement pay has [sic] been completed." Deering v. Deering, 292 Md. 115, 118
n.3, 437 A.2d 883, 885 n.3 (1981). Once it is vested, the pension will not be extinguished if the pension recipient's employment is terminated. Id.
6. Burke, 321 Md. at 701, 584 A.2d at 703.
7. Id., 584 A.2d at 704.
8. Id.
9. Id. The Trustees argued that although a court has the authority to order the
transfer of an interest in a private pension plan, that authority does not extend to government pension plans. Id., 584 A.2d at 703.
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A similar case involving the distribution of disability retirement
benefits from the Pension Plan following a divorce arose at the same
time.' The two cases were consolidated for purposes of appeal."
The Court of Appeals granted certiorari prior to consideration
by the Court of Special Appeals to address the question of whether
the intended recipient's interest in the Pension Plan was protected
under section 11-504(h) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article12 or under Maryland common law.'"
2. Legal Background.-Priorto 1978, Maryland's divorce laws
operated under the antiquated title system." 4 Under that system,
ownership of property upon divorce was determined not by any
concept of joint contribution to the marriage, but by which spouse
had purchased the item and acquired title to it.' 5 Any property
brought into the marriage by a spouse was also exempt from distribution to the other spouse upon divorce. 16 Because at that time the
husband was typically the wage-earning spouse, he would make
many significant investments in his name only. If there was no recorded evidence ofjoint ownership by the wife, she17would be denied
an award of the property in divorce proceedings.
10. Id. at 702, 584 A.2d at 704. The second case involved the divorce of Richard and
Marie Harman. At the time of the Harmans' divorce, Mr. Harman was collecting disability retirement benefits from the Pension Plan. Id.The trial judge presiding over the
Harmans' divorce had ordered the Trustees to pay directly to Mrs. Harman 50% of Mr.
Harman's pension. Id.
11. Id.
12. Section 11-504(h) provides, in pertinent part:
(1) . . . [A]ny money or other assets payable to a participant or beneficiary
from, or any interest of any participant or beneficiary in, a [qualified] retirement plan . . . shall be exempt from any and all claims of the creditors of the
beneficiary or participant ....
(2) Paragraph (1) of this subsection does not apply to:
(i) An alternate payee under a qualified domestic relations order, as defined in § 414(p) of the United States Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as
amended.
MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-504(h) (1989).

13. See Burke, 321 Md. at 701-02, 584 A.2d at 704.
14. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 25 (repealed 1984); see also MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC.

CODE ANN. § 3-603(c) (repealed 1978) (containing additional provisions explaining the
title system).
15. See Bender v. Bender, 282 Md. 525, 533, 386 A.2d 772, 778 (1978) ("[P]ersonal
property paid for with one spouse's funds belongs to that spouse."); Lopez v. Lopez,
206 Md. 509, 518, 112 A.2d 466, 470 (1955) ("[T]he court obviously cannot make an
adjustment of property rights where the wife never contributed anything toward the
purchase of the husband's property.").
16. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 25 (repealed 1984).

17. See, e.g., Gebhard v. Gebhard, 253 Md. 125, 130, 252 A.2d 171, 174 (1969) (denying wife partial ownership of stocks purchased by her husband during their marriage).
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Maryland remedied this inequity in 1978 by enacting the Property Disposition in Divorce and Annulment Act.' 8 The new law provided for "marital property"' 9 to be distributed fairly and equitably
between the spouses. 20 Among other factors, courts are required
after the Act to consider the spouses' monetary and nonmonetary
contributions to the marriage. 2 ' The rationale behind equitable distribution, as expressed by the General Assembly, is that by entering
into a marriage, both spouses promise to contribute fully toward the
marriage, in both economic and noneconomic terms.22 Because
both spouses have contributed some combination of labor and assets for the benefit of the marriage, both are entitled to a fair return
on their contributions. In 1986, the General Assembly amended the
23
equitable distribution statute by passing the Marital Property Act,
which allows the court to allocate ownership interests in a pension
plan between the spouses in order to achieve equitable
distribution.2 4
In 1981, the Court of Appeals held in a landmark case that pension benefits are marital assets. 2 5 In Deering v. Deering, the Court of
18. Act of May 29, 1978, ch. 794, 1978 Md. Laws 2304. This Act was codified at MD.
CTS. &JuD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-6A-05 (1978), repealed by Marital Property Act of 1986,
Act of May 27, 1986, ch. 765, 1986 Md. Laws 2920. The current version was enacted by
the same Act and is codified at MD. FAM. LAw CODE ANN. §§ 8-201 to -213 (1990).
19. Section 8-201(e) of the Family Law Article, which is identical to the correlating
provision of the old statute, states that:
(1) "Marital Property" means the property, however titled, acquired by 1 or
both parties during the marriage.
(2) "Marital Property" does not include property:
(i) acquired before the marriage;
(ii) acquired by inheritance or gift from a third party;
(iii) excluded by valid agreement; or
(iv) directly traceable to any of these sources.
MD. FAM. LAw CODE ANN. § 8-201(e).
20. Maryland is thus considered an equitable distribution state, requiring that the
property be divided between the spouses in a fair manner. Community property states,
the other type ofjurisdiction (aside from those still using the old title system), require
that the marital assets be split evenly between the spouses. See Grace G. Blumberg,
Marital Property Treatment of Pensions, Disability Pay, Workers' Compensation, and Other Wage
Substitutes: An Insurance, or Replacement, Analysis, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1250, 1251-54 (1986).
For a list of community property states and supporting cases, see id.at 1251 n.4.
21. See Bender v. Bender, 282 Md. 525, 535 n.7, 386 A.2d 772, 778 n.7 (1978); see
also MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. §§ 8-201 to -213.
22. Deering v. Deering, 292 Md. 115, 122, 437 A.2d 883, 887 (1981) (citing Act of
May 29, 1978, ch. 794, 1978 Md. Laws 2304).
23. See Act of May 27, 1986, ch. 765, 1986 Md. Laws 2920 (codified at MD. FAM. LAw
CODE ANN. § 8-205).
24. See MD. FAM. LAw CODE ANN. § 8-205.
25. See Deering v. Deering, 292 Md. 115, 124, 437 A.2d 883, 888 (1981). Interestingly, the Deering opinion was rendered prior to enactment of the Marital Property Act,
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Appeals held that pension benefits are "an economic resource acquired with the fruits of the wage earner spouse's labors which
would otherwise have been utilized ...

to purchase other deferred

income assets. ' 2 6 Because a deferred income asset such as an annuity trust would be a marital asset, a pension, which serves the same
function, is also a marital asset. Even if pension benefits have not
matured, 2 7 they are not "a mere expectancy of gain," '2 ' but a con-

tractual right to receive a salary in the future, or a property right
that can be equitably divided and distributed by the trial court in a
divorce proceeding. 29 In Niroo v. Niroo,3 ° the Court of Appeals commented that "it was clear in Deering that both spouses were relying
on the pension benefits to provide for their future, so that an equitable distribution of benefits was indeed proper. '""1
In Lookingbill v. Lookingbill, the court expanded the Deering line
of reasoning to include disability retirement benefits. 3 The Lookingbill court affirmed the trial court's decision to include disability
retirement benefits as marital property for settlement purposes,
stating that pension interests are partial consideration for work already completed, whether triggered by age and amount of service or
by disability. 4 A disability pension is therefore property that may
35
be considered a marital asset in a divorce proceeding.
On appeal, the Trustees in Burke relied on Hoffman Chevrolet, Inc.
v. Washington County National Savings Bank. 36 In Hoffman, a commercial creditor sought to attach a benefits check the debtor received
from a pension fund,3 7 but the Court of Appeals ruled that "a
which made clear that pension plans could be considered marital property. It appears
that the General Assembly concurred in the Deering opinion.
26. Id.

27. A mature pension is one in which the employee has satisfied all the conditions
necessary for payment of the pension and in which the employee has an immediate right
to the benefits. Blumberg, supra note 20, at 1259-60.
28. Deering, 292 Md. at 127, 437 A.2d at 890.
29. Id. According to the Deering court, the right may fairly be characterized as a
property right or a contract right. See id.
30. 313 Md. 226, 545 A.2d 35 (1987).
31. Id. at 233, 545 A.2d at 39.
32. 301 Md. 283, 483 A.2d 1 (1984). The Lookingbill case was decided prior to enactment of the Marital Property Act, sending the Deering message to the legislature a second
time.
33. See id. at 288-89, 483 A.2d at 3-4.
34. See id. at 289, 483 A.2d at 4.
35. Id.

36. 297 Md. 691, 467 A.2d 758 (1983); see Burke, 321 Md. at 704, 584 A.2d at 705.
37. 297 Md. at 694, 467 A.2d at 760. The Hoffman pension plan had a provision
proscribing alienation of benefits that was similar to the provision in the Burke Pension
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spendthrift trust can effectively protect retirement benefits." 3 The
court reasoned that the employer's purpose in setting aside the trust
was to provide for the employee after retirement, and that this interest outweighed the creditor's interest in obtaining the assets to satisfy a debt.3 9 The Trustees asserted that Hoffman was controlling
and further stated that the pensions were exempted from execution
on judgment by section 11-504(h) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. 4' Thus, the Burke court had to decide whether the
policy of protecting spouses involved in a divorce property settlement or the principles protecting pension participants and beneficiaries from creditors would prevail when the doctrines clash. 4 '
3. Analysis.-By its terms, section 11-504(h) of the Courts and
Judicial Proceedings Article exempts pension benefits from claims
by creditors of the pension beneficiary. 4 2 Because the common-law
definition of "spendthrift trust" requires a nonalienation provision,
any pension plan that meets the definition is protected from attachment by creditors.4 3 Although the court assumed that the pension
plan at issue was a spendthrift trust, it determined that a spouse
entitled to share in marital property is not a creditor, thereby eliminating any common-law protection and rendering section 11-504(h)
inapplicable.4 4 There being no other reason to protect the pension
benefits from the nonemployee spouse's marital property claim, the
court affirmed the decision of the trial court.4 5
The court's holding turned on the decision of whether to
equate a spouse involved in a divorce proceeding to a creditor.
Rather than addressing the question of supremacy between section
11-504(h) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article and section
8-205 of the Family Law Article, the court avoided the conflict altoPlan, which was qualified as a spendthrift trust due to the provision. See id. at 705-06,
467 A.2d at 766.
38. Id. at 706, 467 A.2d at 766. A spendthrift trust is "[a] trust in which by the terms
of the trust or by statute a valid restraint on the voluntary and involuntary transfer of the
interest of the beneficiary is imposed." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 152(1)
(1959).
39. Hoffman, 297 Md. at 706, 467 A.2d at 766.
40. For the relevant text of § 11-504(h) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, see supra note 12.
41. Although it appears that the Lookingbill and Deering courts addressed this issue,
both cases were decided before the Marital Property Act. Thus, it was necessary for the
Burke court to reaffirm these opinions in light of the new statute.
42. See MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-504(h) (1989).
43. See Hoffman, 297 Md. at 706, 467 A.2d at 766.
44. See Burke, 321 Md. at 707, 584 A.2d at 706.
45. See id., 584 A.2d at 707.
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gether by stating that section 11-504(h) did not apply to the facts
presented because the ex-spouse was not a creditor, but a part
owner of the pension. 4 6 The language of section 8-205(a) expressly
supports this holding: "[T]he court may transfer ownership of an
interest in a pension, retirement, profit sharing, or deferred compensation plan from [one] party to either or both parties. ' 4 7 Given
this language, the court may confer not merely judgment rights, but
also ownership rights, to a portion of the pension. Because section
11-504(h) concerns only creditors, not owners, the statute does not
apply to the ex-spouse. Further, the payments received by the exspouse are not part of the employee-spouse's portion of the 4pension, but rather are the ex-spouse's partial ownership interest. 1
The determination that former spouses are not creditors had
already been made by the Court of Appeals in Safe Deposit & Trust Co.
v. Robertson.49 Although the circumstances of Robertson differed
slightly,5 ° the Court of Appeals stated in that case that the purpose
of a spendthrift trust is not to deprive the beneficiary's dependents:5 1 "[The dependents] are not 'creditors' of the beneficiary,
and the liability of the beneficiary to support them is not a debt."5 2
The Trustees' argument that spouses are creditors was doomed to
fail because of the earlier Robertson decision. Once the Burke trial
court correctly concluded that the ex-spouses were part owners of
the Pension Plan rather than creditors, section 8-205(a) gave the
trial judge authority to transfer interest in the Pension Plan and to
order the Trustees to make direct payment of that share to the exspouse.
The Burke court made a sound decision from a public policy
standpoint. First, although the Trustees argued that a court cannot
validly transfer interests in local government pensions,53 there are
no significant reasons for distinguishing between private and government pensions. The functions of private, government, and even
military pensions are the same: providing income for the worker
46. See id., 584 A.2d at 706-07.
47. MD. FAM. LAw CODE ANN. § 8-205(a) (1990).
48. MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-504(h) (1989).
49. 192 Md. 653, 65 A.2d 292 (1949).
50. The spendthrift trust in Robertson was actually a trust, not a pension; the wife's
claim was for alimony, not marital assets. See id. at 655-57, 65 A.2d at 292-93.
51. Id. at 660, 65 A.2d at 295. Ironically, while the Trustees relied primarily on
Hoffman, they ignored the section of the decision that cites Robertson for the proposition
that the state does not always completely protect a spendthrift trust.
52. Id.
53. Burke, 321 Md. at 701, 584 A.2d at 703.
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after retirement.5 4 In fact, Lookingbill and Deering, both decided
before the passage of the Marital Property Act, approved the granting of a monetary award based in part on the benefits from a local
government pension. 55 Therefore, without specific justification,
there is no reason why a local government pension should be
treated differently than any other civil pension for the purposes of
transferring part ownership in the plan.
Second, the holding in Burke realistically acknowledges that
spouses are part of a marital unit that acts for the benefit of both
spouses, rather than a mere confederacy in which each spouse acts
solely with self-motivation. In fact, many pension plans allow provisions for spouses as well as for the beneficiary, acknowledging the
unity of the marital relationship.5 6 Moreover, as the Burke opinion
states, it would be illogical to assume that the wages of one spouse
should benefit both spouses, yet the pension (retirement wages)
should benefit only the wage-earning spouse.
The Court of Appeals joined other jurisdictions in deciding that
spendthrift provisions should not prevent division of pension benefits as marital assets. In Young v. Young, 5 7 the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court observed that income deferred to a pension was income that a
family otherwise would have used. The court found that it would be
54. Employees with certain occupations have been exempted from the normal rule,
including railroad workers and, formerly, military personnel. For example,
§ 231d(c)(3).1 of the Railroad Retirement Act of 1974, 45 U.S.C. §§ 231-231v (1983),
specifically excludes ex-spouses of railroad workers from receiving ownership in any
part of the employee's pension annuity. There is a strong policy reason for this
exception:
The 1972 Report of the Commission on Railroad Retirement said that
industry employment, 1.68 million during World War II, had fallen to 582,000
by the first quarter of 1972. The system's beneficiaries already outnumbered
the employees who were contributing. The Commission said that, without the
changes that it had suggested and that Congress had embodied in the 1974 Act,
the system's funds would be consumed by 1988.
Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 585 n.18 (1979). The Supreme Court held in
McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981), that military pensions could not be apportioned to an ex-spouse, in part because of the quasi-active status and additional responsibilities of retired military personnel. See id. at 233-36. Congress has since passed the
Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act, 10 U.S.C. § 1408 (1982 & Supp.
1990), which does allow military pensions to be distributed as marital property between
the spouses with certain conditions. See id
55. See Lookingbill v. Lookingbill, 301 Md. 283, 284, 483 A.2d 1, 1 (1984) (fire department pension plan); Deering v. Deering, 292 Md. 115, 118, 437 A.2d 883, 885
(1981) (park police pension plan).
56. For example, all pension plans covered under the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461, must provide for surviving spouse benefits. 29 U.S.C. § 1055 (1974 & Supp. 1991).
57. 488 A.2d 264 (Pa. 1985).
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inequitable and illogical to hold that a statutory exemption protecting such funds from attachment would place those assets saved for
the benefit of the family completely out of the reach of the family
members.5 8 If the protective provision was held to exclude the
claims of the ex-spouse, the result would be a double denial of those
funds: the family would be denied the use of the income at the time
of earning, as well as its use upon the maturity of the pension. 59
Other states have also held nonalienation provisions invalid as to
divorce settlements.60
Nevertheless, the court's reasoning with regard to the Harman
companion case is problematic. The court blithely adopted the
holding of Lookingbill that a disability pension also constitutes marital property. 6 Although the statute supports this holding by defining marital property as "the property, however titled, acquired by
[one] or both parties during the marriage,"6 2 the court gave no consideration to the practical aspects of the differences between disability and retirement benefits.
Retirement benefits accrue during the time the employee is
working and are intended to serve as deferred compensation. Disability benefits, however, are a different matter. A disabling accident
can occur at any point in the course of a worker's career, before he
or she has acquired sufficient economic support for the future. An
equal split of disability pension benefits might prove to be highly
unfair to the disabled spouse, who not only has inadequately prepared for this predicament, but also will have little opportunity to
supplement future income. In addition, the disability might generate considerable expenses, such as medical treatment. Although the
trial court may take these factors into consideration when arriving at
an equitable distribution of the marital assets,6" the real life disparity between retirement and disability pensions might be so great
58. See id. at 269.
59. Id.
60. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Nelson, 746 P.2d 1346, 1349 (Colo. 1987); Contributory Retirement Bd. v. Mangiacotti, 547 N.E.2d 21, 22 (Mass. 1989); Stevenson v. Stevenson, 511 A.2d 961, 965 (R.I. 1986).
61. See Burke, 321 Md. at 705, 584 A.2d at 705 (citing Lookingbill v. Lookingbill, 301
Md. 283, 289, 483 A.2d 1, 4 (1984)).
62. MD.FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 8-201(e) (1990).
63. For specific factors to be considered, see id. § 8-205(b)(1)-(b)(10). The Lookingbill court acknowledged these concerns, commenting that an equal distribution may
not be required in every case. It is the responsibility of the trial court to select the
appropriate allocation after considering all relevant factors. Lookingbill v. Lookingbill,
301 Md. 283, 292, 483 A.2d 1, 5-6 (1984) (citing Deering v. Deering, 292 Md. 115, 13031, 437 A.2d 883, 891-92 (1981)).
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that the court should not have casually declared them equal. The
court should have cautioned that although disability pensions may
constitute marital property, they must be partitioned to the nondisabled spouse with a much higher level of scrutiny than a traditional
service-based retirement pension; otherwise, the disabled spouse
might be unfairly disadvantaged. Thus, the Trustees might have
fared better, at least in the Harman case, by relying less on Hoffman
and more on principles of fairness.
4. Conclusion.-Burke is a consistent link in a developing chain
of marital property distribution cases. It wisely allows a spouse to
share in an ex-spouse's pension plan, government or private, even
though the plan purports to be protected by a nonalienation provision. The Court of Appeals correctly held that section 11-504(h) of
the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article did not apply to the case
because the ex-spouse is not a creditor, but a co-owner of the pension. The decision is logically supported and follows the trend in
other jurisdictions.
B.

Permissible Reimbursement of Birth Mothers' Expenses
in Direct Adoptions

In In re Adoption No. 9979," the Court of Appeals held that section 5-327 of the Family Law Article6 5 prohibits adoptive parents
from reimbursing a birth mother for the cost of maternity clothes.6 6
On procedural grounds, however, the court vacated the lower
court's order directing the natural parents to return the payment to
the adoptive parents. 6 7 The court's opinion will have profound effects on adoption and surrogacy law.
Section 5-327 prohibits anyone who renders a service in connection with an adoptive placement from receiving any compensa68
tion with the exception of reasonable medical and legal expenses.
In practice, application of this exception has varied widely. 69 The
64. 323 Md. 39, 591 A.2d 468 (1991).
65. MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 5-327 (1984). See infra text accompanying note 83

for the relevant text of the statute.
66. 323 Md. at 50, 591 A.2d at 473.
67. Id. at 52, 591 A.2d at 474.
68. See MD. FAM. LAw CODE ANN. § 5-327(a). The section does provide a limited
exception for licensed adoption agencies. See id. § 5-327(b).
69. COMMITTEE ON JUVENILE AND FAMILY LAW OF THE MARYLAND JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE TO STUDY UNIFORM PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING
INDEPENDENT ADOPTIONS 58 (1988) [hereinafter SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT] (on file with

the state law library, Annapolis). The committee noted:
[Slome practitioners as well as judges take a narrow view and permit payment
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Adoption No. 9979 court construed this exception narrowly, 70 sending a clear message that Maryland law permits only very limited
types of payments in connection with independent adoptions. The
concurrence, however, argued that the statute should not be construed so narrowly as to prohibit reimbursement to the birth mother
for maternity clothes. 7'
1. The Case.-In 1988, a New Jersey woman contacted a Maryland couple to inquire whether they would be interested in adopting
her unborn child. 72 The couple had adopted a child from the woman in 1987, and all parties were pleased with the placement.73 The
second baby was born in February 1989, and in March of that year
the adoptive parents filed a petition for adoption in the Circuit
Court for Montgomery County.7 4 In response to an inquiry by the
circuit judge, the adoptive parents filed a statement of expenses they
had paid, including attorneys' fees, court costs, hospital expenses,
and a $488 reimbursement to the natural mother for "maternity
75
clothes and related expenses."

The adoption hearing was held in October 1989; neither the
only of those items that are strictly of a hospital, medical or legal nature and
only in amounts that are "reasonable and customary." Other practitioners take
a more expansive view, reading the law to allow payments to the natural mother
for anything from maternity clothes to her room and board to interstate travel
to lost wages. To the extent that expenditures of this type are brought to the
attention of judges at all, the Committee survey showed that some approve
them and others do not.
Id. This subcommittee was created in response to a request from the conference of
circuit court judges for a study of the handling of independent adoptions in Maryland.
Id. at 1. The subcommittee identified what fees and expenses are allowed by current
law, see id. at 2, concluding that the court should determine "whether [section 5-327]
regarding prohibited compensation should be read narrowly or expansively." Id. at 64.
70. See 323 Md. at 50, 591 A.2d at 473.
71. Id. at 64-65, 591 A.2d at 481 (Eldridge, J., concurring). Although disagreeing
with the majority on the substantive issues, Judge Eldridge agreed that the order was
invalid on procedural grounds. See id. at 52, 591 A.2d at 475.
72. Id. at 53, 591 A.2d at 475 (Eldridge, J., concurring).
73. Id. at 52-53, 591 A.2d at 475 (Eldridge, J., concurring). Although married at the
time of the second adoption, the natural parents gave up their child due to strained
financial resources. Id.
74. Id. at 53, 591 A.2d at 475 (Eldridge, J., concurring).
75. Id. at 40, 591 A.2d at 469. Subsequently, the adoptive parents' attorney filed an
affidavit from the natural mother detailing the composition of the $488, which included
eight maternity blouses, nine pairs of maternity slacks, two maternity dresses, a winter
coat, and maternity bras and underwear. Id. at 40 n.1, 591 A.2d at 469 n. I.
The concurrence questioned the circuit judge's requirement that the adoptive parents file a certification of the expenses paid. According to the concurring opinion, this
practice is of "doubtful validity" given the pertinent statutes and legislative history. See
id. at 54 n.3, 591 A.2d at 475 n.3 (Eldridge, J., concurring).
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natural parents nor their attorney were present. 76 The trial judge
expressed his doubts about the legality of the $488 payment at the
hearing, but he entered a final adoption decree. 7 7 Although the decree did not mention either the maternity clothes or the possibility
that the $488 payment was unlawful, the trial judge ordered the
adoptive parents' attorney to find legal authority for allowing the
78
payment.
In December 1989, the judge ordered the natural mother to return the $488 payment to the adoptive parents. 79 There was no in80
dication in the record that she was ever notified of this decree.
The adoptive parents appealed the order, presumably to settle any
lingering questions surrounding the adoption. The Court of Appeals issued a writ of certiorari on its own motion before the Court
of Special Appeals heard the case. 8 '
2. The Court's Reasoning.-In holding that section 5-327 does
not permit the payment of expenses for maternity clothes, the court
relied primarily on the statute's language and contemporary application.8 2 Section 5-327 reads, in pertinent part:
(1) An agency, institution, or individual who renders any
service in connection with the placement of an individual for adoption may not charge or receive from or on
behalf of either the natural parent of the individual to
be adopted, or from or on behalf of the individual who
is adopting the individual, any compensation for the
placement.
(2) This subsection does not prohibit the payment, by any
interested person, of reasonable and customary
charges or fees for hospital or medical or legal
services .83
a. Application to Natural Parents.-The appellants argued that
the General Assembly intended the statute prohibiting compensa76. Id. at 50, 591 A.2d at 474.
77. Id.
78. See id. at 50-51, 591 A.2d at 474. Thejudge directed, "I am signing the decree of
adoption. I am going to give you 10 days to give me authority to justify the payment of
the maternity clothes expense and if I am not convinced, I am going to order you to
reimburse the [adoptive parents] the $488." Id.
79. Id. at 56, 591 A.2d at 476 (Eldridge, J., concurring).
80. Id.
81. See id.at 42, 591 A.2d at 469.
82. See id. at 50, 591 A.2d at 473.
83. MD. FAM. LAw CODE ANN. § 5-327(a) (1984).
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tion to apply only to payments to doctors, lawyers, and other third
parties involved with the adoption.8 4 To support this idea, they asserted that the natural mother does not render a "service in connection with the placement of an individual for adoption."85 They
argued further that the legislature did not intend to prohibit the receipt of compensation by the birth mother.8 6
Writing for the majority, Judge McAuliffe disagreed with both
interpretations of section 5-327.87 He stated that a parent who signs
a consent agreement and gives up a child for adoption in fact renders a service.8 8 The court insisted that the legislature intended the
groups named in the statute-"an agency, institution, or individual
who renders any service" -to include natural parents. 89 The court
also found that whatever the legislative intent, the contemporary
use and interpretation of the statute support its application to natural parents.9 0 The majority used as support for its conclusion a report of a committee of Maryland judges, which had made no
suggestion that section 5-327 does not apply to payments to natural
parents. 9 '

The court also concluded that recent legislative activity evidenced the General Assembly's intent that this statute apply to natural parents. The majority pointed to Senate Bill 436,92 which was
introduced but not passed in 1988. That Bill would have explicitly
legalized the payment of reasonable living expenses to the natural
mother.9 3 The court also posited that because article 27, section
84.
85.
86.
87.

See Adoption No. 9979, 323 Md. at 43, 591 A.2d at 470.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 44, 591 A.2d at 470.

88. See id., 591 A.2d at 471. The majority conceded that this characterization of the
adoption process "may not be the warmest possible prose." Id.
89. See id. at 48, 591 A.2d at 473.
90. See id. at 45, 591 A.2d at 471.
91. See id.; SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 69. The majority bolstered this asser-

tion with a reference to a student law review comment. See Adoption No. 9979, 323 Md. at
45, 591 A.2d at 471 (citing Carol L. Nicolette & Libby C. Reamer, Comment, Regulatory
Optionsfor Surrogate Arrangements in Maryland, 18 U. BALT. L. REv. 110, 119 (1988) (citing

MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35B as an example of a state law which prohibits "payment in
exchange for a biological parent's consent to adoption")).
92. Md. S.B. 436, 1988 Sess.
93. See id.; Adoption No. 9979, 323 Md. at 46, 591 A.2d at 471-72. Senator Barbara
Hoffman introduced Bill 436, and in a letter requesting a draft of the proposed legislation, wrote, "[Wihat I want to accomplish is that the natural mother in an adoption
could receive payments that are now forbidden by Maryland law." Letter from Barbara
A. Hoffman, State Senator, to Carvel Payne, Department of Legislative Reference (Jan.
4, 1988) (on file with the Department of Legislative Reference, Annapolis).
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35C of the Annotated Code94 was enacted to forbid baby selling in
Maryland, as distinguished from limiting payments made in connection with adoptive placement, section 5-327 must have been intended to address the type of payment made in this case. 9 5
b. Illegality of the Payment.-The court rejected the appellants'
assertion that the statute allows payments that are purely compensatory in nature, and prohibits only payments to the natural mother
that result in profit.9 6 According to the majority, compensation in
the statutory context includes but is not limited to profit, and clearly
encompasses payments made for maternity clothes.9 7
Perhaps most importantly, the court declared that maternity
clothes do not constitute a reasonable medical expense within the
context of the statute. 9 8 Because the statute contains a broad prohibition against payments with a relatively narrow exception, the court
wrote: "We will not, by artificially stretching the definition of commonly understood terms, broaden the exception." 9 9
3. Analysis.-Baby selling is almost universally abhorred.'t °
With this in mind, the court's construction of section 5-327 may be
seen as strictly proscribing permissible payments in the adoption
context in an attempt to prevent any statutory loopholes from allowing adoption for profit.
94. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35C (1989).
95. See Adoption No. 9979, 323 Md. at 47, 591 A.2d at 472. Two incidents of alleged
baby selling in 1988 prompted Senator Paula C. Hollinger to introduce Senate Bill 58.
See Adoption-Prohibited Compensation-Penalty, 1989: Hearings on Md. S.B. 58, 1988 Sess.
Before the Senate JudicialProceedings Comm., 1989 Sess. 1-2 (1989) (statement of Paula C.
Hollinger) (on file with Department of Legislative Reference, Annapolis) [hereinafter
Hearings]; Md. S.B. 58, 1988 Sess. Hollinger called the measure "a very simple bill...
[which] stiffens the penalty for natural parents, or a broker attempting to gain illegal
compensation in return for allowing adoption of their child." Hearings, supra, at 1. As
originally introduced, the Bill would have repealed and re-enacted § 5-237 of the Family
Law Article with penalties for a violation increased to $10,000 in fines and 5 years imprisonment. Id. As finally enacted, the Bill was codified at MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§ 35C. Although reasons for this codification are unclear, Senator Hollinger's testimony
and the timing of the Bill's introduction do indicate that the General Assembly intended
to strengthen the penalties for baby selling, not for adoption situations. This history
gives credence to the majority's assertion that § 35C did not apply in the Adoption No.
9979 situation.
96. See Adoption No. 9979, 323 Md. at 48-49, 591 A.2d at 473.
97. See id.
98. See id. at 49-50, 591 A.2d at 473.
99. Id. at 50, 591 A.2d at 473.
100. See generally Alvi Katz, Surrogate Motherhood and the Baby-Selling Laws, 20 COLUM.
J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 1, 6-17 (1986) (discussing the relevant policy considerations and
general discouragement of baby selling).
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a. Application to Natural Parents.-(1) Service Analysis .- The majority's characterization of a parent's consent to the adoption of her
baby as a "service" is a rather startling approach having potentially
unforeseen consequences. In his concurring opinion, Judge Eldridge took issue with this characterization.'"' Noting that adoptive
placement may be an economic necessity, Judge Eldridge wrote that
it "stretches the bounds of credulity" to view this often heart10 2
wrenching decision as a service.
10 3
Indeed, when it defined a "service" as including adoption,
the majority may have been playing with fire. Given the highly publicized cases of the last few years' 4 and the rapid development of
reproductive technology, 1°5 it is difficult to predict the effect of this
characterization on future court decisions.
For example, by applying the term "service" in this context, the
court seems to have issued a preemptive strike against an argument
proffered by those seeking to obtain enforcement of surrogacy contracts. Proponents of surrogacy arrangements generally characterize the birth mother's involvement as a service for which she is
compensated.' 0 6 Given the court's interpretation of the term "service" in the adoption context, section 5-327 would presumably
10 7
make payments to the surrogate mother illegal.
(2) Legislative Intent, Pre- and Post-Enactment.-Themajority also
analyzed recent General Assembly activity to infer the legislative intent behind section 5-327. In response to the majority's assertion
that the legislative intent favored their conclusion, the concurrence
construed the same legislative language to reach a contrary re101. See Adoption No. 9979, 323 Md. at 61, 591 A.2d at 479 (Eldridge, J., concurring).
Judge Eldridge was joined by Judge Rodowsky in the concurrence. See id. at 52, 591
A.2d at 474.
102. Id. at 61, 591 A.2d at 479 (Eldridge, J., concurring).
103. See supra text accompanying notes 88-89.
104. See, e.g., In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
105. See generally Karen H. Rothenberg, Gestational Surrogacy and the Health Care Provider:
Put Part of the 'IVF Genie' Back Into the Bottle, 18 LAw, MED. & HEALTH CARE 345 (1990).
106. See Noel P. Keane, Legal Problems of Surrogate Motherhood, 1980 S. ILL. U. L.J. 147,

147, 157, 162 (1980) (stating that the birth mother renders "services in exchange for
money"); see also Nicolette & Reamer, supra note 91, at 121.
107. The typical surrogacy arrangement involves a woman being artificially inseminated after agreeing that she will give her consent to the adoption of the baby after it is
born; the surrogate is generally paid a monetary sum. Katz, supra note 100, at 2. It is
widely recognized that this practice is dependent upon large payments to the natural
mother. See Keane, supra note 106, at 153. One can only assume that if § 5-327 does in
fact limit these payments, surrogacy arrangements will virtually cease in Maryland.
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suit.' 0 8 In the concurring opinion, Judge Eldridge argued that, by
its plain terms, section 5-327 does not apply to natural parents, and
that the legislature must have intended such a result.' 0 9 He also
asserted that commentators and other courts have agreed that the
statute applies only to third parties, and not to natural parents as
the majority suggests." 0
Whatever the merits of the competing assertions, it should be
noted that these opinions and the judicial subcommittee report are
merely modern interpretations and do not necessarily reflect the
original legislative intent. Additionally, Senator Hoffman's introduction of Senate Bill 436, while evidencing a belief that Maryland
law does not permit payments of living expenses to the natural
mother,"' t only reflects the current General Assembly's construction of section 5-327.
More pertinent is the recent enactment of article 27, section
12
35C, which prohibits the selling, bartering, and trading of babies."
The concurring opinion argued that the separate codification of this
law "underscores that the two provisions address different problems
and are aimed at different classes of violators." ' 1 3 Indeed, Judge
Eldridge argued, if section 5-327 covers payments to natural par4
ents, section 35C would be superfluous."1
There had been no suggestion in this particular case, however,
that the birth mother was selling or bartering her baby for a $488
payment, nor was the birth mother charged with any criminal violations. Although clearly a difference of degree, small payments like
the one at issue more logically belong in the context of adoption law
than baby selling. Considering the difference between impermissible payments and baby selling, and the legislative origins of section
35C,"' 5 it is possible to view the two statutes as addressing distinct
108. See Adoption No. 9979, 323 Md. at 62-64, 591 A.2d at 479-80 (Eldridge, J.,
concurring).
109. See id. at 64-65, 591 A.2d at 481 (Eldridge, J., concurring).
110. Id. at 61, 591 A.2d at 479 (Eldridge, J., concurring); see Katz, supra note 100, at 8
n.34 (listing § 5-327 among state laws enacted to prohibit baby brokering); Nicolette &
Reamer, supra note 91, at 120 ("The discouragement of contracts arranged by thirdparty intermediaries... would appear to be one of the explicit objectives of[§ 5-327].");
John S. Strahorn,Jr., Changes Made by the New Adoption Law, 10 MD. L. REV. 20, 27 (1949)
(stating that § 5-327's predecessor "makes criminal the receiving of compensation for
arrangingan adoption"). But see supra note 93 and accompanying text.
111. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
112. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35C (1987 & Supp. 1990).
113. Adoption No. 9979, 323 Md. at 63, 591 A.2d at 480 (Eldridge, J., concurring).
114. Id.
115. See supra note 95.
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scenarios. Thus, the applicability of section 5-327 to the present
facts seems preferable.
b. Paymentsfor Maternity Clothes Prohibited.-Courtsand legislatures frown on the exchange of consideration for babies, based on
the simple notion that human beings cannot be sold.'" 6 Accordingly, Adoption No. 9979 issues a clear statement that only the most
limited types of payments for adoptive placement will be permitted
7
in Maryland." 1
Other states vary widely as to whether payments for maternity
clothes are permitted in connection with independent adoptions.' 1
While some do not allow such expenditures,'
others go so far as to
permit adoptive parents to pay for the birth mother's living expenses during and immediately following her pregnancy. 2 ° Maryland now joins the more restrictive group.
In fact, the court intimated in dicta that like maternity clothes,
food and shelter may be necessary to the health of a pregnant woman but cannot be an included expense of an independent adoption.1 2 1 Because the court strictly construed "reasonable legal and
medical expenses," it appears that the policy decision of what payments will be permitted has been left to the General Assembly. Because so many considerations are involved, and given that other

116. See Katz, supra note 100, at 17; see, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35C (1987 &
Supp. 1990).
117. Although arrangements such as the one in this case are private agreements between two parties, it is well-established law in Maryland that "adoption is not a contract
alone between the parties. It requires judicial determination of the advisability of permitting such action." Besche v. Murphy, 190 Md. 539, 544, 59 A.2d 499, 501 (1948).
118. See generallyJOAN H. HOLLINGER ET AL., ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE § IA (1991)
(setting out a complete list of states' treatment of payments made to natural mothers in

independent adoptions).
119. See, e.g., TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 25.11 (West 1989) (a person may not "accept[]
a thing of value for the delivery of [a] child .. . for purposes of adoption ... [except] a
reimbursement of legal or medical expenses incurred by a person for the benefit of the
child"); see also Kingsley v. State, 744 S.W.2d 191, 193 (Tex. 1987) (declaring that taxi
rides, maternity clothes, gasoline, electricity, rent, groceries, cigarettes, and cosmetics

are not legal or medical expenses). For a recent list, see Katz, supra note 100, at 2 n.34.
120. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.212 (West 1991) (prohibiting payments in connection with adoptions, but stating that "nothing herein shall be construed as prohibiting
the person who is contemplating adopting the child from paying the actual prenatal care
and living expenses of the mother of the child to be adopted, .. . for a reasonable time,
not to exceed 6 weeks"); see also In re Brod, 522 So. 2d 973, 978 (Fla. 1988) (allowing an
intermediary to pay documented living expenses to birth mother on behalf of adoptive
parents).
121. See Adoption No. 9979, 323 Md. at 49, 591 A.2d at 473.
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states permitting the compensation of living expenses have statutes
explicitly allowing their payment, this was a prudent decision.
4. Procedural Issues.-Although the court held that section 5327 prohibits the payment of expenses for maternity clothes for the
birth mother, it vacated the trial judge's order directing the natural
mother to reimburse the adoptive parents.' 2 2 The court stated that
because the natural mother had no notice of a potential claim
23
against her, the requirements of due process were not met.'
The concurring opinion agreed with the result on these
grounds, but was more explicit in its reasoning. In addition to echoing the majority's emphasis on the lack of notice, 124 the concurrence
pointed to several procedural deficiencies that supported the reversal of the repayment order. Specifically, the order was void because
the pleadings did not include a claim for the $488, and because the
court no longer had jurisdiction and thus had no authority to order
the repayment of the money once the final adoption decree had
25

been issued.1

Notice and sufficient pleadings are fundamental requirements
of due process and clearly are required before parties can be held
accountable for claims made against them.' 26 It is not surprising
that the court refused to uphold an order issued without the presence of either element.
The concurring opinion also argued, most notably, that the trial
judge's authority over the adoption ended once he issued a final decree. 127 Because adoption is authorized in Maryland solely by statute 2 8 and because Maryland gives final adoption decrees the force
and effect of finaljudgments,St 129 once a trial court has entered a decree, its authority and jurisdiction are at an end.'1 ° The order in
122. See id. at 52, 591 A.2d at 474.
123. See id. at 51-52, 591 A.2d at 474.
124. See id. at 55, 591 A.2d at 476 (Eldridge, J., concurring).
125. Id. at 57-60, 591 A.2d at 476-78 (Eldridge, J., concurring).
126. Blue Cross of Md., Inc. v. Franklin Square Hosp., 277 Md. 93, 101, 352 A.2d
798, 804 (1976) ("Generally, due process requires that a party ... is entitled to both
notice and an opportunity to be heard on the issues to be decided in a case."); Travelers
Indem. Co. v. Nationwide Constr. Corp., 244 Md. 401, 406, 224 A.2d 285, 288 (1966)
("A basic requirement of fairness is that the defendant be given notice of and an adequate opportunity to defend against the claim on which the judgment is based.").
127. See Adoption No. 9979, 323 Md. at 57, 591 A.2d at 477 (Eldridge, J., concurring).
128. See In re Lynn M., 312 Md. 461, 463, 540 A.2d 799, 803 (1988).
129. See Ross v. Pick, 199 Md. 341, 348, 86 A.2d 463, 467 (1952).
130. The concurring opinion supports this idea by indicating that the primary concern of the court is the status of the child and that the relevant statutes do not extend
the judge's authority beyond the final entry of this determination. See Adoption No. 9979,
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this case was void because it was issued after the final decree. 13 1
This result reinforces what the Court of Appeals has called "the
foundation underlying all adoptions: the need to surround the final
decree with a high degree of certainty." 132
5. Conclusion.- The Court of Appeals has stated that adoption
statutes should be construed liberally "to aid, rather than hamper
and frustrate, their benevolent purpose, and their application
' 33
should not be restricted by any forced or narrow construction."'
Because small payments made to the birth mother may in fact
greatly benefit her without harm to the child or societal interests,
one must wonder whether the Adoption No. 9979 court has done
more harm than good.
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals correctly restricted permissible payments given the statutory provisions of section 5-327 and
left the fundamental policy decision at issue to the General Assembly. The General Assembly would do well to reconsider this question. For the time being, though, the law is clear: adoptive parents
may not reimburse natural mothers for the cost of maternity clothes.
BRETr
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323 Md. at 58-59, 591 A.2d at 477-78 (Eldridge, J., concurring). See generally Palmisano
v. Baltimore County Welfare Bd., 249 Md. 94, 98, 238 A.2d 251, 253-54 ("The Maryland rules provide that a court shall have revisory power over an enrolled decree only in
cases of fraud, mistake, or irregularity."), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 853 (1968); Falck v. Chadwick, 190 Md. 461, 467, 59 A.2d 187, 189 (1948) (noting that "[t]he court is not invested
with continuous authority"); Waller v. Ellis, 169 Md. 15, 25, 179 A.2d 289, 293 (1935)
("[O]nce the issues involved in [a case] are adjudicated, the jurisdiction of the court
under the statute is at an end.").
131. Adoption No. 9979, 323 Md. at 57-59, 591 A.2d at 477-78 (Eldridge, J., concurring). The trial judge issued the adoption decree on October 25, 1989. He ordered the
repayment on December 14, 1989, seven weeks later. Id. at 54-55, 591 A.2d at 476
(Eldridge, J., concurring).
132. Palmisano, 249 Md. at 103, 238 A.2d at 256.
133. Valler, 169 Md. at 24, 179 A. at 293.

X. HEALTH CARE

A.

The Medical Peer Review Privilege: A Misguided Attempt
to Promote Quality Care

In Baltimore Sun v. University of Maryland Medical System Corp.,' the
Court of Appeals held that there is no statutory bar to access by the
press to records of medical peer review committees, when such
records are discoverable under a statutory exception to the general
rule that protects against their use in civil litigation. 2 The issue
came before the Court of Appeals of Maryland as a question certified by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.'
The Baltimore Sun decision will affect the potential usefulness of
the privilege to promote candid exchange among physicians. The
peer review statute and subsequent case law have created a privilege
that is not only ineffective in assuring confidentiality, but also frustrates the opposing goal of free public access to information. Moreover, an alternative to the current peer review statute exists that
would more effectively serve its underlying purpose.
1. The Case.-In 1986, several malpractice actions were filed
against Dr. Harlan Stone, Chief of General Surgery of the University
of Maryland Hospital and Professor at the University of Maryland
Medical School.4 At the request of Hospital officials, internal and
external peer review committees investigated the allegations of the
malpractice actions and reported their findings. 5 Based on information revealed by the committees, 6 Stone's superiors sought his resig1. 321 Md. 659, 584 A.2d 683 (1991).
2. See id. at 669, 584 A.2d at 688.
3. Id. at 661, 584 A.2d at 684.
4. See Stone v. University of Md. Medical Sys. Corp., 855 F.2d 167, 169 (4th Cir.
1988) (Stone I) (affirming summary judgment against Stone). The University of Maryland Medical System Corporation is the parent company of the University of Maryland
Hospital. Id.
5. See id. at 169-70. The hospital referred the matter to its in-house Peer Review
Committee and a specially appointed External Review Committee. Id.
6. The in-house Peer Review Committee concluded that "while there was no evidence of actual incompetence or deliberate falsification of patient records in the cases
investigated, there were 'significant deficiencies' in Stone's supervision of residents and
his maintenance of patient records." Id. at 169. The External Review Committee found
more serious violations, concluding that Stone had sometimes left residents "virtually
unsupervised," that he did not permit residents to question his orders, that he followed
a practice of "two-tiered" medical care in which patients received varying levels of quality of care depending upon their ability to pay, and that he had deliberately made "self-
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nation, and Stone complied.7 Five months later, Stone sued the
University of Maryland Medical System Corporation (parent of the
Hospital) and several of its officials. Stone brought suit in the
United States District Court for the District of Maryland, alleging
that he was forced to resign without due process.8
A motion for summary judgment was filed by all the defendants
in the case and Stone filed a motion in opposition. 9 Exhibits consisting of peer review records were attached to the motions.'" At
the request of all parties and without a public hearing, the district
court sealed the entire record, giving no reasons for the seal order. t" The district court then granted the defendants' motion for
summary judgment and Stone appealed to the United States Court
12
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
At this stage, the Baltimore Sun was permitted to intervene to
challenge the seal order. 13 Two physicians also intervened to oppose the Sun; the physicians had been named as codefendants in
some of the pending malpractice actions involving Stone.' 4 The Sun
contended that the seal order violated its First Amendment and
common-law right of access to judicial records.' 5 The intervening
doctors argued that any right of access by the press was outweighed
by the state's compelling interest in protecting the confidentiality of
serving misrepresentations" to his superiors in order to cover up irregularities in the
care of a particular patient. Id. at 170.
7. Id. at 170-71.
8. Id.at 171.
9. Id.at 171-72.

10. Baltimore Sun, 321 Md. at 662, 584 A.2d at 684.
11. See Stone v. University of Md. Medical Sys. Corp., 855 F.2d 178, 180 (4th Cir.
1988) (Stone I) (remanding case to district court for reconsideration of seal order). Excepted from the seal order were the complaint, amended complaint, and answers. Id.
12. Stone I, 855 F.2d at 171-72.
13. Stone 11, 855 F.2d at 180.
14. Baltimore Sun, 321 Md. at 662, 584 A.2d at 684.
15. Stone H,855 F.2d at 180. Courts have recognized a common-law presumption of
public access to all judicial records. See, e.g., Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc.,
435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978). However, the presumption can be rebutted if countervailing
interests heavily outweigh the public interest in access. See, e.g., Rushford v. New Yorker
Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir. 1988). The burden of proof is borne by the
party seeking to overcome the presumption, and the trial court's denial of access to
documents is reviewable only for abuse of discretion. Id.
On the other hand, a First Amendment right of access by the press has been extended only to specific judicial records, such as documents filed in connection with summary judgment motions in civil cases, or plea hearings and sentencing hearings in
criminal cases. See Stone II, 855 F.2d at 180-81. When a right of access is found to exist
under the First Amendment, access may be denied only by demonstration of a compelling government interest, and only if the denial is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. Id.
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peer review committee proceedings, as reflected in section 14-501
of the Health Occupations Article.1 6
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the entry of summary judgment in
favor of the University of Maryland Medical System and its officers, 1 7 but remanded the case to the district court to reconsider the
appropriateness of the seal order in accordance with procedures established in the Fourth Circuit.'" On remand, the district court
modified its order, lifting the seal on all but three documents containing peer review material. 9 The court concluded that these protected documents were covered by section 14-501(d)(1) of the
Health Occupations Article, which seeks to protect the confidentiality of peer review records.20 Although the court found that the Sun
had a First Amendment right of access, 2 ' that right was outweighed
by the compelling government interest in assuring quality patient
care by protecting the confidentiality of medical peer review
16. Stone II, 855 F.2d at 181. The courts in Stone I and Baltimore Sun discussed MD.
HEALTH OCC. CODE ANN. § 14-601 (1986) (recodified at § 14-501). No substantive
changes that affect the Stone holding have been made to the pertinent sections during
recodification. References to the Maryland Code follow the current codification, not
that used by the various courts in this case. See infra note 40 for a summary of changes.
17. See Stone 1, 855 F.2d at 178.
18. See Stone 11, 855 F.2d at 180. The court referred the district court to the procedures outlined in In re Knight Publishing Co., 743 F.2d 231 (4th Cir. 1984). Specifically,
the district court was directed first to determine whether the Sun's right of access was
grounded in common law or First Amendment guarantees, because "[o]nly then can it
accurately weigh the competing interests at stake." Stone H, 855 F.2d at 181; see supra
note 15. Following that determination, Knight requires that the court docket the motion
for a reasonable time before deciding the issue in order to provide public notice of the
request to seal and an opportunity to challenge it. 743 F.2d at 235. The court must
consider less drastic alternatives to sealing, and if the seal is upheld, it must be supported by specific findings to facilitate appellate review. Id. Finally, the Fourth Circuit
directed the district court to determine whether § 14-501(d)(1), which bars discovery or
admission of peer review records, was applicable, and, if so, whether the right of public
access nevertheless outweighed the public policy expressed in the statute. See Stone H,
855 F.2d at 181.
19. See Baltimore Sun, 321 Md. at 663, 584 A.2d at 684-85.
20. See id. MD. HEALTH OCC. CODE ANN. § 14-501(d)(1) (1991) states:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, the proceedings, records, and files
of a medical review committee are not discoverable and are not admissible in
evidence in any civil action arising out of matters that are being reviewed and
evaluated by the medical review committee.
Id.
21. See Baltimore Sun, 321 Md. at 663, 584 A.2d at 685; Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir. 1988) (finding First Amendment applicable to documents filed in connection with a summary judgment motion in a civil case); see also In re
Washington Post Co., 807 F.2d 383, 389 (4th Cir. 1986) (citing historical tradition and
the function of public access in serving important public purposes as two factors typically considered in deciding whether a right of access is extended by the First
Amendment).
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committees.2 2
The Sun appealed from the district court's order, maintaining
that press access to peer review material was not barred in this case
because of the applicability of section 14-501(e)(1), 21 which provides an exception to the peer review privilege granted in section
14-501 (d)(1).

24

The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit certi-

fied a question to the Maryland Court of Appeals to determine
"whether [section 14-501(d)(1)] bars press access to confidential
records of a hospital's peer review committee when they are discoverable under section [14-501(e)] and have been filed with and considered by the court in connection with a dispositive motion such as
a motion for summary judgment. '25 The Maryland court answered
in the negative; however, the court stated that it was expressing no
opinion as to the legality of the trial judge's action in sealing the
26

records.

2. Legal Background.-Most commentators agree that ensuring
high quality, cost-effective medical care depends in large part upon
the willingness of physicians to police themselves by engaging in
honest and critical peer review. 27 To this end, nearly all hospitals in
the United States have established systems of peer review committees that are given responsibility for such functions as quality assurance, utilization review, the granting of staff privileges to physicians,
and physician discipline. 28 Many of these committees operate under
22. Baltimore Sun, 321 Md. at 663, 584 A.2d at 685.
23. MD. HEALTH 0cC. CODE ANN. § 14-501(e) states:
Subsection (d)(l) of this section does not apply to: (1) A civil action brought by
a party to the proceedings of the medical review committee who claims to be
aggrieved by the decision of the medical review committee; or (2) Any record
or document that is considered by the medical review committee and that
otherwise would be subject to discovery and introduction into evidence in a
civil trial.
Id.
24. Baltimore Sun, 321 Md. at 664, 584 A.2d at 685.

25. Id. at 661, 584 A.2d at 684.
26. See id. at 669-70, 584 A.2d at 688.
27. Charles D. Creech, Comment, The Medical Review Committee Privilege: A Jurisdictional Survey, 67 N.C. L. REv. 179, 179 (1988); see, e.g., Reed E. Hall, Hospital Committee
Proceedings and Reports: Their Legal Status, I Am. J.L. & MED. 245, 246, 282 (1975).

Although this principle is often repeated, its truth is unproved. See Gregory G. Gosfield,
Comment, Medical Peer Review Protectionin the Health Care Industry, 52 TEMP. L.Q. 552, 575

(1979) ("[Elven if peer review activity is increased, it is unclear whether the result will be
lower cost and higher quality of health care.").
28. See Hall, supra note 27, at 247-50; see also MD. HEALTH OCc. CODE ANN. §§ 14501(b), (c) (1991) (describing the types of groups recognized as peer review organizations and the functions they perform).
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state statutes, 29 federal law, 3° or conditions imposed by the Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations. 3 ' The
problem in achieving effective peer review, however, is that participants are often unwilling to engage in meaningful deliberations for
fear of losing referrals and professional friends, becoming entangled in patients' malpractice claims, and exposing themselves to liability for defamation actions brought by physicians receiving bad
32
reviews.
Heeding these concerns, many laws have been promulgated by
legislatures and expanded by the judiciary to protect the confidentiality of medical review committees. The major opinion in the line of
cases upholding the nondiscoverability of peer review records, and
the only one not based on the existence of a statute, is Bredice v.
Doctor's Hospital, Inc.3"
Bredice involved a malpractice action in which the plaintiff
sought to discover peer review documents. The court held that the
public welfare was better served by a policy of confidentiality:
Candid and conscientious evaluation of clinical practices is
a sine qua non of adequate hospital care. To subject these
discussions and deliberations to the discovery process,
without a showing of exceptional necessity, would result in
terminating such deliberations. Constructive professional
criticism cannot occur in an atmosphere of apprehension
that one doctor's suggestion will be used as a denunciation
of a colleague's conduct in a malpractice suit.3 4
Despite Bredice, common-law support for a medical review privilege has been sparse, as several courts have found the general policy
favoring openness in judicial proceedings more compelling. 5 Nev29. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 805 (West 1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 395.001
(West 1986 & Supp. 1991); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-7-15 (Michie 1991); ME. HEALTH-GEN.
CODE ANN. § 19-319 (1991); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-2046 (1990).
30. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395(e),(k) (1988) (requiring the establishment of peer review
committees to conduct utilization review of hospital services to promote the delivery of
high quality health care); see also Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 42
U.S.C. §§ 11101-52 (1988) (seeking to protect public health and safety by protecting
peer review members from suit).
31. See JOINT COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGANIZATIONS, 1991
ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS 99-120 (1991).
32. See Creech, supra note 27, at 179; Hall, supra note 27, at 254.
33. 50 F.R.D. 249 (D.D.C. 1970), aff'd, 479 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
34. Id. at 250.
35. See, e.g., Gillman v. United States, 53 F.R.D. 316, 319 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (limiting
the holding in Bredice to provide a privilege for the opinions expressed by review board
members, but not for testimony presented to the board); Kenney v. Superior Court, 63
Cal. Rptr. 84, 87-88 (1967) (holding that hospital review committee records concerning
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ertheless, nearly every state legislature in the nation has implemented a policy consistent with Bredice,36 and judicial opinions to
the contrary have since been overruled by statutes." Although the
scope of the privilege afforded peer review committees varies by
state, the Maryland statute is typical, protecting records from discovery and admission into evidence in civil 9trials, 8 and providing
3
immunity from suit to committee members.
In the fifteen years since the Maryland peer review statute was
enacted,40 judicial construction of the privilege it created has been
scarce. In Unnamed Physician v. Commission on Medical Discipline,4 the
Maryland Court of Appeals held that the words "civil action" in the
statute refer only to a tort action for medical malpractice. 42 In Kappas v. Chestnut Lodge, Inc., 4 1 the Fourth Circuit held that the protection against discovery applied not only to committees engaged in
discipline, but also to those involved with staffing, quality assurance,
and performance review.4 4 The Maryland court has stated that the
"fundamental reason for preserving confidentiality in these [coindisciplinary proceedings against a physician were discoverable in malpractice action
upon a showing of good cause); Nazareth Literary & Benevolent Inst. v. Stephenson,
503 S.W.2d 177, 179 (Ky. 1973) (rejecting Bredice and stating that judicially granted
privileges from discovery of peer review records impede the search for truth).
36. See IIA HOSPITAL LAw MANUAL: MEDICAL RECORDS 85-1 17 (1991) (providing a
state-by-state list of statutes limiting the discoverability and admissibility of medical staff

committee records). For a discussion of federal legislation aimed at protecting peer
review records and committee members in order to promote active self-policing by physicians, see Charity Scott, Medical Peer Review, Antitrust, and the Effect of Statutory Reform, 50

MD. L. REV. 316 (1991) (discussing the effects of the Health Care Quality Improvement
Act of 1986, supra note 30).
37. See, e.g., CAL. EvID. CODE § 1157 (West 1991) (overruling Kenney, 63 Cal. Rptr.

84); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.377 (Baldwin 1991) (overruling Nazareth, 503 S.W.2d
177).
38. See MD. HEALTH OCC. CODE ANN. § 14-501(d)(1) (1991).
39. See id. § 14-501(f). Personal immunity is outside the scope of the Stone decision,
and is mentioned only to reference another major aspect of the privileges typically associated with peer review activities. For case law on this part of the Maryland statute, see
DeLeon v. Saint Joseph Hosp., Inc., 871 F.2d 1229 (4th Cir.) (allowing qualified immunity granted to peer review committee members to be overcome only with a showing of
malice), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 87 (1989); Sibley v. Lutheran Hosp., 871 F.2d 479 (4th
Cir. 1989).
40. See Act of May 17, 1976, ch. 722, 1976 Md. Laws 1995. What is now MD. HEALTH
Occ. CODE ANN. § 14-501(d)(1) was codified as § 14-601(d) from 1981 to 1991, and
from 1976 to 1981 was article 43, § 134A(d); similarly, current § 14-501(f) was § 14601(f) and, previously, article 43, § 134A(e). There was no change in substance
through the recodification. See Baltimore Sun, 321 Md. at 664-65, 584 A.2d at 685-86.
41. 285 Md. 1, 400 A.2d 396 (1979).
42. See id. at 11-12, 400 A.2d at 402.
43. 709 F.2d 878 (4th Cir. 1983).
44. Id. at 881.
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mittee] proceedings is to ensure a high quality of peer review activity leading to the primary goal of this legislation-to provide better
45
health care."
The degree to which the peer review statute in Maryland or any
state actually serves to improve medical services, however, remains
unclear. Moreover, the potential impact of the confidentiality policy
is weakened to the extent that exceptions to the privilege are
granted. Nevertheless, courts and legislatures commonly allow certain exceptions to the peer review privilege based on perceived constitutional requirements and notions of fairness.
For example, in Maryland and many other states, an exception
to the privilege against discovery is recognized for physicians aggrieved by the actions of a review committee. 46 Although not recognized in all states,4 7 this exception has been upheld against claims of
equal protection violations made by malpractice plaintiffs for whom
discovery was barred. 48 The theory is that the malpractice plaintiff
is generally able to prove her case with evidence available from
other, unprotected sources, but physician-plaintiffs may have only
the peer review records to demonstrate an unjust discharge or denial of staff privileges. 49 In fact, without this exception, the physician's ability to seek redress for a wrong may be unduly limited, and
the statute's validity might be questioned under the Due Process

45. Unnamed Physician, 285 Md. at 13, 400 A.2d at 403.
46. See MD. HEALTH OCC. CODE ANN. § 14-501(e) (1991); see also Jenkins v. Wu, 468
N.E.2d 1162, 1168 (Ill. 1984) (listing state statutes containing this exception).
47. A few states have broadly construed peer review statutes in order to maximize
the benefits of the privilege, to the detriment of individual rights. See, e.g., Franco v.
District Court, 641 P.2d 922, 927-30 (Colo. 1982) (interpreting statutory language that
barred subpoena of peer review records "in any civil suit against the physician" as demonstrating intent by the legislature to bar discovery even in an action brought by an
aggrieved physician); Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 221 (Fla. 1984) (finding that peer
review privilege bars discovery not only in malpractice actions, but also in defamation
actions brought by physicians, even though physician may have no other means to prove
his case); Cardwell v. Rockford Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 555 N.E.2d 6, 10 (Ill. 1990)
(holding that hospital and administrator were absolutely immune from civil liability for
conduct of hospital's peer review committee, even if conduct was willful or wanton);
Atkins v. Walker, 445 N.E.2d 1132, 1136 (Ohio Ct. App. 1981) (holding that peer review
privilege barred admission of allegedly slanderous letter even though it was the only
evidence the plaintiff had to prove his case).
48. See Jenkins, 468 N.E.2d at 1167-68.
49. See Holly, 450 So. 2d at 223 (Shaw, J., dissenting). The crucial distinction lies in
the fact that the conduct that is the subject of the malpractice action occurred outside
the peer review committee; but in the case of defamation, antitrust, or due process
claims brought by physicians, the conduct in question occurred as a part of the peer
review process. Id.; see also Creech, supra note 27, at 204-05.
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Clause. 50
Unfortunately, the policy in favor of confidentiality to promote
candid critiques of physician conduct suffers whether the discovering party is an aggrieved physician or a patient with a malpractice
claim. 5 Furthermore, in construing peer review statutes, courts
often follow the rule that privileges, in general, are not favored in
the law and therefore should be strictly construed. 5 2 This tendency
may serve to frustrate the underlying policy considerations that
prompted the statute in the first place. Finally, under the Federal
Rules of Evidence, federal courts sitting in nondiversity cases look
to federal common law to determine if a privilege exists and, therefore, may not apply the state's statutory privilege even if one clearly
pertains. 53
In all, state and federal legislation has endorsed a policy that
seeks to promote peer review by ensuring its confidentiality, based
on the belief that the public's right to information and potential
harm to plaintiffs' actions are outweighed by the perceived benefit
of improved quality of care. Despite this policy, other considerations have limited the application of the privilege, raising serious
questions regarding its potential effectiveness. As noted by one
commentator: "Nothing is worse than a half-hearted privilege.
When the courts or the legislature attempt to give a privilege too
narrow a scope, they may destroy its reason for existing."5 4
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Baltimore Sun, the issue was
whether peer review documents that had been discovered and admitted under the statutory exception to confidentiality for a civil action brought by an aggrieved physician were also subject to access
by the press. The Sun argued that although section 14-501(d)(1)
protects the confidentiality of peer review records, section 1450. Jenkins, 468 N.E.2d at 1168; see Baltimore Sun, 321 Md. at 668, 584 A.2d at 687
("Undoubtedly, the exception is premised on the due process rights of a physician aggrieved by the decision of the medical review committee."). But see Holly, 450 So. 2d at
220 (stating that the inevitable impingement on some civil litigants' rights must be balanced against the overriding policy of ensuring confidentiality to promote better health
care).
51. A statute that protects the records of a peer reviewer from discovery in a malpractice action, but allows the colleague to use the records in a defamation action, surely
cannot provide much incentive for candor.
52. See, e.g., Moretti v. Lowe, 592 A.2d 855, 857 (R.I. 1991). See generally Creech,
supra note 27, at 189-91.
53. See B. Abbott Goldberg, The Peer Review Privilege: A Law in Search of a Valid Policy,
10 AM.J.L. & MED. 151, 159 (1984); see also Creech, supra note 27, at 191.
54. Creech, supra note 27, at 182.
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501(e)(1) provides an exception that should apply. 5 5 "There is no
middle ground permitted by the statute." 5 6 The privilege either applies, or it does not.
The University of Maryland responded that the prevailing intent of the statute is to protect the confidentiality of peer review
records, and section 14-501 (e)(1) provides an exception intended to
benefit only the aggrieved physician bringing suit.5 7 Complete
waiver of confidentiality would be wholly inconsistent with the statutory objective of improving patient care by promoting candid exchange among peer reviewers.5 8
Writing for the majority, Chief Judge Murphy recognized the
legislative decision reflected in section 14-501(d)(1) that the need
for complete public disclosure is outweighed by the goal of preserving confidentiality ultimately to effectuate better health care.5 9 Nevertheless, he strictly construed section 14-501(e)(1), 6" which states
that the privilege created by section 14-501(d)(1) "does not apply"
when an action is brought by an aggrieved physician. 6 ' He found
nothing in the statute to suggest that once peer review documents
are properly subject to pretrial discovery, they must remain "insulated from public disclosure for all other purposes." 6 2
Therefore, the court held that no statutory bar to press access
to peer review records exists once the records are revealed in discovery.63 The court also found that in this case the documents were
properly discovered under section 14-501(e)(1). It declined to express an opinion, however, as to the legality of the trial judge's action in sealing the records. 64
Judge Rodowsky, in his concurring opinion, interpreted Maryland's peer review statute from a broader policy perspective, insisting that the exception granted to aggrieved physicians suspends the
rule of confidentiality only to the extent necessary to protect that
individual's right to due process. 65 Accordingly, the statute's strong
55. Baltimore Sun, 321 Md. at 664, 584 A.2d at 685.
56. Id.

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id.
Id.
See id. at 666-69, 584 A.2d at 686-88.
See id. at 668, 584 A.2d at 687.

62.
63.
64.
65.

Baltimore Sun, 321 Md. at 668, 584 A.2d at 687.
Id. at 669, 584 A.2d at 688.
Id. at 669-70, 584 A.2d at 688.
See id. at 670-71, 584 A.2d at 688-89 (Rodowsky, J., concurring). Judge Rodow-

For the text of MD. HEALTH OCc. CODE ANN. § 14-501(e) (1991), see supra note

23.

sky's concurring opinion borders on actual dissent. He seems to be saying that although
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policy of confidentiality continues to the greatest extent possible
even when the exception applies. Judge Rodowsky concluded that
the state's compelling interest in protecting peer review records
must be weighed against the claimed First Amendment right of access by the press.6 6 Because this issue was not within the certified
question, Judge Rodowsky found it to be a question for the federal
67

court.

4. Analysis.-When certifying the question at issue, the Fourth
Circuit stated that the Maryland court "might determine that the
statute is not applicable to this case, and thus alleviate any conflict
between the statute and the right to access provided by the First
Amendment."6 8 The disposition by the Maryland Court of Appeals
left the Fourth Circuit free to unseal all peer review materials in the
court records.69 The implications of this outcome, however, go well
beyond the "chilling effect" on the free exchange among peer review committee members anticipated by the Maryland court.70
In particular, a paradox is created by the privilege and the exception, the ramifications of which are aptly illustrated in Henry
Mayo Newhall Memorial Hospital v. Superior Court.7 ' The case involved
a mandamus proceeding to review the suspension of a physician by
a hospital. 72 In the physician's wrongful suspension action, the hospital submitted a full transcript of the suspension hearing conducted
before its Judicial Review Committee, making the transcript a matter of public record. 7 ' A patient-plaintiff who was bringing an action against the physician and hospital for malpractice and
corporate negligence, 74 respectively, obtained a copy of the tranthe plain words of the statute may indicate otherwise, obeying the obvious intent of the
legislature requires the conclusion that the statute continues to bar public access, even
when peer review records are discoverable under the exception granted for aggrieved
physicians. He avoids completely rejecting the majority opinion by finding the issue of
balancing the legislative intent of ensuring confidentiality against the Sun's First Amendment right to access to be outside the scope of the certified question.
66. See id. at 671, 584 A.2d at 688-89 (Rodowsky, J., concurring).
67. See id.

68. Id. at 664, 584 A.2d at 685.
69. See Stone v. University of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 948 F.2d 128 (4th Cir. 1991)
(unsealing records).
70. See Baltimore Sun, 321 Md. at 668, 584 A.2d at 687.
71. 146 Cal. Rptr. 542 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978); see Goldberg, supra note 53, at 158-59.
72. Henry Mayo, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 544.
73. Id.

74. See Hall, supra note 27, at 252 (describing the premise of corporate negligence as
being that the hospital, by virtue of its custody of the patient, owes a duty to exercise
care in the construction, maintenance, and operation of the hospital); see also Darling v.
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script. 75 When the patient sought to discover whether references in
the transcript to an unidentified surgical patient pertained to her,
the hospital asserted the peer review privilege, which the Henry Mayo
court upheld.7 6
In this situation, the confidentiality of the peer review documents had already been compromised, yet the patient-plaintiff was
statutorily barred from discovering whether the peer review material pertained to her. Under these circumstances, the peer review
privilege did not protect confidentiality, as the transcript was already public. Rather, the court permitted the privilege to operate as
nothing more than a mechanism for hospitals and physicians to hide
evidence from plaintiffs.7 7
Furthermore, the facts of Baltimore Sun make clear that this situation can occur in Maryland. The two doctors who opposed the
opening of the records were also named defendants in malpractice
actions, and their cases were still pending. 78 Because the Fourth
Circuit decided to open the peer review documents, 79 the malpractice plaintiffs in these cases could find themselves in a situation similar to that of the patient-plaintiff in Henry Mayo. That is, even after
the peer review documents concerning the care of particular patients become a matter of public record, malpractice plaintiffs seeking to discover the documents would be limited by section 14501(d)(1).
Several related issues cast further doubt on the blanket protection from discovery in malpractice actions and the automatic exception in actions brought by aggrieved physicians. Specifically, as
noted above, the rationale for the statutory exception to the privilege granted in actions brought by aggrieved physicians is that, unlike malpractice plaintiffs, the physician-plaintiffs would otherwise
be unable to prove their cases.8 ° But the physician need not show
that he requires an exception to the privilege to bring his action; the
Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253 (Ill. 1965) (first case holding
hospital liable under corporate liability theory), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966).
75. Henry Mayo, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 544.
76. See id. Interestingly, the plaintiff argued that the transcript in the mandamus proceeding could have been sealed, and that the hospital waived its privilege by failing to
make such a request. The court rejected this contention, stating that "[i]f the legislature
intended to impose upon a hospital the requirement to routinely request that such transcripts be sealed it would have so provided in [the California peer review statute]." Id.
at 548.
77. See Goldberg, supra note 53, at 157-58.
78. See Baltimore Sun, 321 Md. at 662, 584 A.2d at 684.
79. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
80. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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exception is automatic and applies even when the physician-plaintiff
has other means to prove his cause of action. 8
Moreover, a malpractice plaintiff may face a situation in which
her burden of proof can be sustained only by discovering peer review material and admitting it into evidence, particularly when she
seeks to prove corporate negligence on part of the hospital.8 2 For
example, a plaintiff attempting to establish that a hospital negligently granted staff privileges to an incompetent physician may be
without redress if she cannot use records of the committee that
granted the privileges to establish her case.8 3
The questionable ability of hospitals to waive the peer review
privilege raises yet another set of issues that cast doubt on the advisability of protecting peer review materials at all. A literal interpretation of some peer review statutes, including Maryland's, leads to the
conclusion that hospitals are not empowered to waive the privilege
against discovery.8 4 This creates the paradoxical situation in which
the institution has engaged in peer review to ensure quality of care,
but is barred from introducing into evidence in a negligence or
other action the very records that may prove that it acted
appropriately.
On the other hand, at least one court appears unwilling to allow
unilateral use of peer review records by hospitals, which would give
the latter an unfair advantage. 5 The more likely scenario is that if
hospitals are able to waive the privilege, access would also be
granted to plaintiffs, thus destroying the confidentiality of the peer
review process.
In sum, despite the widely held belief that confidentiality is necessary to promote effective peer review, the legislatively created
privilege is inconsistently applied and often excepted. The resulting
81. See MD. HEALTH OCC. CODE ANN. § 14-501(e) (1991).
82. A few state statutes allow the privilege to be overcome by a showing of "excep-

tional necessity," which alleviates this problem. See infra note 88 and accompanying text.
83. See Goldberg, supra note 53, at 162 ("[C]ourts have continued to recognize new
theories of corporate liability while state legislatures have shrouded in secrecy the most
obvious source of evidence against the hospitals-the peer review records."). But see
Wheeler v. Central Vt. Medical Ctr., Inc., 582 A.2d 165 (Vt. 1990). The plaintiff in
Wheeler successfully proved corporate negligence without discovering peer review
records by establishing a record of improper care rendered by a certain physician, lack
of knowledge of this substandard care by hospital trustees, and the failure of a peer
review committee in its duty adequately to police physicians. See id at 166-67.
84. See Wheeler, 582 A.2d at 167 n.3; Goldberg, supra note 53, at 153 n.9.
85. See generally Wheeler, 582 A.2d 165 (barring plaintiff who sued hospital for corporate negligence from discovering peer review records, and also barring hospital from
questioning witness regarding contents of such records).

738

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 51:726

policy follows a wavering course that favors confidentiality in some
circumstances, and openness in others. Such an approach defeats
the advantages of either goal.
The decision of the Court of Appeals in Baltimore Sun further
widens the breach of confidentiality when exceptions to the privilege are granted, by finding no statutory bar to press access once
peer review documents are discovered. The decision to seal the
records from public inspection at this point is apparently within the
trial judge's discretion, but the press's First Amendment rights
make closure unlikely. Indeed, the records concerning Stone were
opened by the Fourth Circuit subsequent to the Baltimore Sun pronouncement.8 6 The ramifications of Baltimore Sun make apparent
the inherent anomalies of the typical peer review privilege and its
inability adequately to ensure confidentiality.
5. Proposed Solution.-There are sufficient grounds to debate
the basic premise that confidentiality is a necessary precondition to
encouraging effective peer review. Physicians are, as a general rule,
required by law to engage in peer review,8 7 whether openly or behind closed doors. Furthermore, the pressure of public scrutiny
could very well be a more effective method of motivating physicians
to police themselves than is the current shield of secrecy. In fact, at
least one commentator has argued that particularly outrageous examples of malpractice that occurred under the noses of hospital
committees indicate the ineffectiveness of self-critique by physicians
in confidential review proceedings.8 8 In these cases, active policing
of aberrant physician behavior did not occur until after rumors of
gross malpractice had gained public attention.
Despite the cogency of these arguments, it is doubtful that a
policy of openness will be implemented in Maryland or elsewhere in
the near future. The perceived need for confidentiality appears
deeply entrenched in the minds of physicians and legislators, making radical change unlikely. Reform of the peer review privilege is
nonetheless necessary if any potential benefit from the confidentiality policy is to be realized.
Such reform must target several aspects of the statute. First,
86. See Stone v. University of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 948 F.2d 128 (4th Cir. 1991).
87. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
88. See Goldberg, supra note 53, at 162-66 (citing a serious of cases in which peer

review was ineffective: surgeon continued to operate despite bad results in more than
30 cases; physician privileges not curtailed despite injury to over 70 patients; anesthesiologist not investigated or dismissed despite knowledge that he was sexually battering
patients during surgery).
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the statute should be modified to make the privilege applicable regardless of whether a civil action is initiated by a malpractice plaintiff or an aggrieved physician. Second, in order to address due
process concerns, the legislature should lift the privilege only upon
a showing of "exceptional necessity" by the plaintiff.89 That is,
courts would determine on a case-by-case basis whether the plaintiff
would effectively be barred from pursuing her cause of action if not
granted access to peer review documents. This determination
would be made after in camera review of such records by the court.
Third, if the court decides that a showing of exceptional necessity has been made, then discovery of peer review records would be
allowed. The statute, however, should explicitly direct that the confidentiality of such records be preserved to the greatest extent possible, meaning that they be placed under seal by the trial judge.
Finally, courts must broadly construe peer review statutes consistently with the underlying principles of the legislature, to maximize
the goals of confidentiality. 90
6. Conclusion.-In Baltimore Sun, the Court of Appeals strictly
construed the peer review statute, further eroding a privilege already undermined by the recognition of a broad exception. By continuing along this path, the court seriously compromised the goal of
protecting confidentiality to enhance peer review and ultimately improve health care. The legislature and courts must work together to
pursue one course or the other: confidentiality or openness. When
this does not occur, as under the current circumstances in Maryland,
the peer review privilege becomes little more than "a shield behind
which a physician's incompetence . . .or institutional malfeasance
'9
... can be hidden from parties who have suffered." i
PAULA

B.

GRANT

D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-505 (1988) (deeming peer review material privi89. See, e.g.,
leged absent a showing of extraordinary necessity); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 71-2046, -2048
(1990) (attaching the privilege absent a showing of good cause arising from extraordinary circumstances); VA. CODE ANN. § § 8.01-581.16 to. 17 (Michie 1991) (requiring peer
review materials to be privileged from discovery unless the circuit court orders disclosure following hearing and showing of good cause arising from extraordinary circumstances); see also Southwest Community Health Servs. v. Smith, 755 P.2d 40 (N.M. 1988)
(upholding constitutionality of peer review statute, but holding that when plaintiff is
able to demonstrate that privileged information is critical to the case, the court may, in
its discretion, declare such evidence admissible).
90. For a discussion of this final point, see Creech, supra note 27, at 191-92.
91. Moretti v. Lowe, 592 A.2d 855, 857-58 (R.I. 1991).

XI. INSURANCE

A.

Stretching the Limits of Uninsured Motorist Insurance

In Forbes v. Harleysville Mutual Insurance Co.,' the Court of Appeals held that statutorily mandated uninsured motorist (UM) provisions in automobile liability insurance policies encompass coverage
for wrongful death claims. 2 The court held more specifically that an
insurer must compensate minor children insured under their father's policy' for the wrongful death of their mother-even when
the mother was married to but not living with the father at the time
she was killed in an accident caused by an uninsured motorist.4
Forbes repudiates the position taken by the Court of Special Appeals in Globe American Casualty Co. v. Chung.5 Chung held that the
statutorily mandated UM coverage in automobile liability insurance
policies encompasses coverage for claims brought by the decedent's
legal representative posthumously on behalf of the decedent, but
does not cover claims for wrongful death.6 Forbes overrules the
Chung decision and extends the coverage of Maryland's UM insurance provisions to wrongful death claims brought by a victim's relatives,7 even when the decedent was not an "insured" as defined by
the insurer's policy or the UM statute.' The court's decision to extend the coverage of the UM statute to persons with a legitimate
wrongful death claim against an uninsured negligent motorist ne1. 322 Md. 689, 589 A.2d 944 (1991).
2. See id. at 701, 589 A.2d at 949.
3. See id. at 701 n.6, 589 A.2d at 951 n.6 (establishing the fact that the children were
"insureds" under the terms of the policy at the time of the accident). The court noted
that in cases factually similar to Forbes, authorities maintain that "the children remain
residents of the household of the parent listed as the named insured on the policy." Id.
Due to the language of most automobile liability insurance policies, the determination of
whether a claimant-other than the named insured-is an "insured" and can therefore
recover under the policy turns on whether such a claimant is a "resident" of the named
insured's household as defined by the policy. See infra note 72. This issue was irrelevant
as to the Forbes children because the insurer conceded that the minor children were
"insureds" at the time of the accident. See Forbes, 322 Md. at 701 n.6, 589 A.2d at 951
n.6.
4. Forbes, 322 Md. at 702, 589 A.2d at 950.
5. 76 Md. App. 524, 547 A.2d 654 (1988), vacated, 322 Md. 713, 589 A.2d 956
(1991).
6. See id. at 532-33, 547 A.2d at 657-58; infra note 48 and accompanying text.
7. The Maryland wrongful death statute provides in part: "An action under this
subtitle shall be for the benefit of the wife, husband, parent, and child of the deceased
person." MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-904 (1989).
8. See Forbes, 322 Md. at 708-09, 589 A.2d at 953-54.
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cessitated a broad reading of the UM statute, and is likely to have a
significant effect on the insurance industry.
1. The Case.-Carol and Robin Forbes were married and had
two children.' On August 4, 1984, Carol Forbes left her husband
and moved into an apartment with Delbert Dean, leasing on a
month-to-month basis.' 0 Several weeks after she moved, and without Mr. Forbes's consent, Carol removed the children, Connie and
George, from their father's home and brought them to the apartment she was sharing with Dean." Less than two months after separating from her husband, Carol Forbes was killed in an automobile
accident.' 2 Carol and her children had been riding as passengers in
Dean's uninsured automobile; the accident was caused by Dean's
negligent driving.'"
Robin Forbes, as husband of Carol Forbes and next friend of
Connie and George, commenced an action against Dean and the
Forbes' uninsured motorist carrier, Harleysville Mutual Insurance
Company.' 4 The complaint contained five separate counts: the first
two were personal injury claims on behalf of the children, and the
latter three were wrongful death claims on behalf of Connie,
George, and Robin Forbes respectively.' 5 Harleysville filed a motion for summary judgment on all counts. The circuit court granted
the motion as to the wrongful death claims only,' 6 finding that at
the time of the accident Carol Forbes was no longer an insured or
"covered person"'" under Robin Forbes's policy.' s Therefore, the
9. Id. at 692, 589 A.2d at 945.
10. Id.
11. Id. It is noteworthy that the evidence produced at trial revealed that Carol
Forbes at no time discussed with her husband the possibility of a divorce. See id. In
addition, the court noted that she never changed her voter registration, nor did she
notify the Motor Vehicle Administration of any change in her address. See id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 693, 589 A.2d at 945-46.
16. Id. The court denied the motion as to the personal injury claims, and the court
granted judgment against both Dean and Harleysville for the children's personal injuries. See id. Dean had fled the jurisdiction; therefore, default judgments were entered
against him on all five counts pleaded by Robin Forbes. See id.
17. The Harleysville policy defined "covered person" as follows:
1. You [the named insured] or any family member.
2. Any other person occupying your covered auto.
3. Any person for damages that person is entitled to recover because of bodily
injury to which this coverage applies sustained by a person described in I or 2
above.
Id. at 703, 589 A.2d at 951.
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court denied any recovery for wrongful death. 19
Robin Forbes subsequently filed a notice of appeal to the Court
of Special Appeals.2 ° While Forbes's appeal was pending, the Court
of Special Appeals rendered its decision in Chung.2 t This prompted
Forbes to file a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Court of Appeals.22 Prior to argument in the intermediate court, the Court of
Appeals granted certiorari to consider the scope of Maryland's UM
statute and to determine whether the statute includes coverage for
2
wrongful death claims, contrary to the holding in Chung. 1
2. Legal Background.-The Evolution of the UM Statute.-Uninsured motorist insurance is a byproduct of the successful push for
compulsory automobile liability insurance that began in the 1950s.2 4
While legislators were structuring compulsory insurance laws, insurance companies-under pressure to reform the motor vehicle accident reparations system-began offering UM insurance as a policy
option.2 5 Subsequently, many state legislatures enacted an array of
statutory schemes that included UM provisions designed to encourage motorists to insure themselves.2 6 In 1972, the Maryland
legislature set forth the state's initial statutory provisions for
mandatory automobile insurance policies.2 7 The Maryland General
18. See id. at 693, 589 A.2d at 946. The Court of Appeals did not explain why the
lower court found that Carol Forbes was not a "covered person." However, it seems
evident that such a conclusion was based on the determination that, at the time of the
accident, Carol Forbes was neither a "named insured," see infra note 72, nor a "family
member" under the terms of the policy. The policy defined "family member" as "a
person related to you by blood, marriage or adoption who is a resident of your household." Forbes, 322 Md. at 704, 589 A.2d at 951. The circuit court apparently stripped
Carol Forbes of her status as a resident because she moved away from her husband's
household. Because she was not a "family member," she was no longer a "covered
person.
19. Forbes, 322 Md. at 693, 589 A.2d at 946.
20. Id. at 694, 589 A.2d at 946.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.

24. ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAw: A GUIDE To FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, LEGAL DOCTRINES, AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICES § 4.9(e) n.3 (1988).
25. See id. § 4.9(e).

26. See id.
27. See Act of Apr. 26, 1972, ch. 73, 1972 Md. Laws 281. In Jennings v. Government
Employees Ins. Co., 302 Md. 352, 488 A.2d 166 (1985), the Court of Appeals noted:
In addition to mandating compulsory automobile insurance with required coverages, Ch. 73 of the Acts of 1972 effected many other changes, such as creating the Maryland Automobile Insurance Fund, a state-owned automobile
insurance company, to insure persons having difficulty obtaining automobile
insurance policies in the private sector, abolishing the former assigned risk pro-
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Assembly has since enacted a comprehensive network of statutes to
induce financial responsibility on the part of automobile owners and
operators. 2 8
In Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty Insurance Co. v.
Gartelman,2 9 the Court of Appeals explained the policy objectives behind this web of automobile insurance statutes:
In Maryland, there is an established legislative policy
designed to make certain that those who own and operate
motor vehicles in this State are financially responsible.
This legislative policy has the overall remedial purpose of
protecting the public by assuring that operators and owners of motor vehicles are financially able to pay compensation for damages resulting from motor vehicle accidents."0
A minimum amount of UM coverage is mandated through section 541 of the Maryland Insurance Code.3 Whether this statute
covers wrongful death claims is an issue that was never squarely
before the court prior to Forbes.3 2 Although the Forbes court maintained that in the past it implicitly interpreted section 541 to encomgram, abolishing the former Unsatisfied Claims and Judgment Fund and transferring to some extent its functions to the Maryland Automobile Insurance
Fund, enacting new procedures for the cancellation and nonrenewal of automobile insurance policies, and authorization under some circumstances for prejudgment interest in money judgments in automobile personal injury cases.
Id. at 357-58 n.3, 488 A.2d at 169 n.3.
28. See Forbes, 322 Md. at 695, 589 A.2d at 947 (citing MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. §§ 17-

101 to -110 (1977 & Supp. 1990); MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, §§ 240AA to 242, 243 to
243N, 539 to 547 (1990), as the various provisions that comprise this network of
mandatory insurance provisions).
29. 288 Md. 151, 416 A.2d 734 (1980).
30. Id. at 154, 416 A.2d at 736 (citations omitted).
31. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 541 (1990). Section 541(c) provides, in pertinent
part:
(1) In this subsection "uninsured motor vehicle" means a motor vehicle
whose ownership, maintenance, or use has resulted in the bodily injury or
death of an insured, and for which the sum of the limits of liability under all
valid and collectible liability insurance policies, bonds, and securities applicable
to the bodily injury or death is less than the amount of coverage provided to
the insured under this subsection.
(2) In addition to any other coverage required by this subtitle, every policy of
motor vehicle liability insurance issued, sold, or delivered in this State afterJuly
1, 1975 shall contain coverage, in at least the amounts required under Title 17
of the Transportation Article, for damages which the insured is entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle because of
bodily injuries sustained in an accident arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of such uninsured motor vehicle.
Id.
32. 322 Md. at 700, 589 A.2d at 949.
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pass wrongful death claims, 3 the court did not rely on Maryland
case law, but looked to other states with similar UM provisions to
4
support its holding.a
Regardless of the particular language of the statute, courts in
most jurisdictions have interpreted their states' UM provisions "to
provide uninsured motorist protection to persons insured under the
policy and [persons] legally entitled to recover damages from the
uninsured tortfeasor. ' " '" For example, in In re Estate of Reeck, 3 6 the
Supreme Court of Ohio was asked to decide whether a settlement
recovered under the UM provision of an insurance policy "is to be
considered the proceeds of an insurance contract payable to the deceased insured's estate or as damages distributable under [Ohio's]
Wrongful Death Act." ' The Ohio court interpreted its UM statute
broadly, and held that anyone legally entitled to maintain a wrongful death action may recover damages under the UM provisions of
the decedent's motor vehicle insurance policy."8 After Forbes, Maryland joins Ohio and other jurisdictions that eschew a narrow interpretation of the UM statute and render unenforceable any insurance
policy that contravenes the broad coverage of the statute."9
3. The Court's Reasoning; Analysis.-Before addressing the facts
of the case, the Forbes court first disposed of the Chung decision,4"
which held that the coverage mandated in the UM statute does not

33. See id.
34. See id. (citing several cases from other jurisdictions holding that wrongful death
claims are covered by the state's statutorily mandated uninsured motorist (UM)
provisions).
35. 2 IRVIN E. SCHERMER, AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE § 25.06 (2d ed. 1991).
36. 488 N.E.2d 195 (Ohio 1986).
37. Id. at 197.
38. See id.
39. See 322 Md. at 698, 589 A.2d at 948. The court has noted that "the remedial
nature of the [UM statute] .

.

. dictates a liberal construction in order to effectuate its

purpose of assuring recovery for innocent victims of motor vehicle accidents .... " State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Maryland Auto. Ins. Fund, 277 Md. 602, 605, 356 A.2d 560,
562 (1976). Moreover, the statute's purpose has been defined as compensating the victim in an amount " 'to exactly the same extent as would have been available had the
tortfeasor complied with the minimum requirements of the financial responsibility
Law.'" Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Webb, 291 Md. 721, 737, 436 A.2d 465,474 (1981)
(quoting Webb v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 479 S.W.2d 148, 152 (Mo. App.
1972)). The Forbes court declared that "limitations on coverage or exclusions in insurance policies, which are inconsistent with the purpose of the uninsured motorist statutory provisions, are unenforceable." 322 Md. at 698, 589 A.2d at 948.
40. See Forbes, 322 Md. at 694, 589 A.2d at 946.
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encompass claims for wrongful death. 4 In repudiating this holding,
the Court of Appeals focused on what it considered Chung's misinterpretation of the language of section 54 1.42 The court criticized
Chung's narrow construction of the UM statute. 43 Therefore, by disposing of Chung on statutory interpretation grounds, the court was
left with an open judicial slate with which to effectuate its goal of
broadening the scope of statutorily mandated UM coverage in
Maryland.
a. Ignoring Chung.-In overruling Chung, the court essentially
ignored the legal analysis employed by the Court of Special Appeals.4 4 In Chung, the Court of Special Appeals was confronted with
defining the scope of coverage under the UM statute. 4 5 The decedent, Bo Hyun Chung, had been killed by a negligent uninsured
motorist." His relatives, as well as representatives of his estate,
sought compensation from an insurer that had issued Chung a motor vehicle liability insurance policy containing UM coverage.4 7 The
court held that the claim arising from the UM provision in Chung's
policy inured to the benefit of his personal representatives and not
to his familial relatives. 4 8 The court offered the following rationale:
That the statutorily required Uninsured Motorist provisions of liability policies should provide for the injured
insured or his personal representative but not for the sur41. See Globe Am. Casualty Co. v. Chung, 76 Md. App. 524, 541, 547 A.2d 654, 662,
vacated, 322 Md. 713, 589 A.2d 956 (1991).
42. See Forbes, 322 Md. at 694, 589 A.2d at 946. In noting the Chung court's reliance
on § 541(c)(2), the Forbes court stated, "the use of the phrase 'bodily injuries' without
any reference to 'death,' and the use of the word 'insured' without any reference to 'the
surviving next-of-kin,' led the Court of Special Appeals to conclude that wrongful death
claims were not encompassed by the statutorily mandated uninsured motorist coverage." Id.
43. See id. at 697, 589 A.2d at 948; see also infra note 53.
44. The court in Forbes never discussed the distinction between survival claims and
wrongful death claims. This distinction was the linchpin of the Chung decision. See 76
Md. App. at 538-41, 547 A.2d at 660-62; see also infra note 48.
45. See 76 Md. App. at 529-30, 547 A.2d at 656.
46. Id. at 528, 547 A.2d at 655.
47. Id. at 530, 547 A.2d at 656.
48. Id. at 532, 547 A.2d at 657. The Chung court distinguished between two distinct
claims that may arise upon the death of an insured caused by the negligence of an uninsured motorist. The first is a "survival" claim brought by the personal representative of
the decedent "seeking recovery for the injuries suffered by the victim;" the second is a
claim for wrongful death commenced by the relatives of the decedent "seeking recovery
for their loss by virtue of the victim's death." Id. at 526, 547 A.2d at 654-55. The court
opined that the language in the statutorily mandated UM provision refers to coverage of
the "survival claim and not the wrongful death claim." Id. at 541, 547 A.2d at 662.
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viving next-of-kin is not hard to explain. The provision is
primarily for the benefit of the injured insured, who in
most cases will still be alive, to compensate him for his
physical loss, pain, and suffering. The proviso that in the
case of his death, his personal representative may initiate
or continue to press his claim is but a routine recognition
of the now familiar principle that the injured insured's
claim will not abate with his death. It is a claim with which
the surviving relatives have nothing to do except to the extent that they are coincidentally the legatees of his estate.4 9
This holding was derived from the distinction between survival
claims and wrongful death claims "meticulously maintained" in
Maryland since the Court of Appeals decided Stewart v. United Electric
and Power Co. 50 in 1906."' This distinction, blurred or completely
lost in many other jurisdictions, 2 was conspicuously avoided by the
court in Forbes. The Forbes court evaluated Chung myopically and
overruled the decision in large part because it felt that the Chung
court failed to construe the pivotal "statutory language in light of
the legislature's general purpose and in the context of the statute as
a whole." 5 3
b. The Forbes Decision.-In Forbes, the court attributed its finding of coverage for a wrongful death action to the fact that section

49. Id. at 541-42, 547 A.2d at 662.
50. 104 Md. 332, 65 A. 49 (1906).
51. See Chung, 76 Md. App. at 527, 547 A.2d at 655. The Chung court quoted Stewart
as follows:
"The points of difference between [the wrongful death statute] and the provisions of the Code giving to executors and administrators full power to commence and prosecute any personal action whatever which the testator or
intestate might have commenced and prosecuted (except actions of slander and
an action where the person causing the injury is dead) are striking and marked
even upon a casual comparison of the two enactments. The suits are by different persons, the damages go into different channels, and are recovered upon
different grounds, and the causes of action though growing out of the same
wrongful act or neglect, are entirely distinct."
Id. at 533, 547 A.2d at 658 (quoting Stewart, 104 Md. at 338-39, 65 A. at 52).
52. See 2 SCHERMER, supra note 35, § 25.0 IA. Although most UM provisions technically refer to recovery for the representatives of the decedent's estate, "courts have held
that the statutes contemplate recovery for wrongful death ... even though an insuring
agreement limits coverage to injuries 'sustained by the insured.' " Id.
53. Forbes, 322 Md. at 697, 589 A.2d at 948. "[T]he Court of Special Appeals ...
seized upon certain words in one sentence of § 541(c)(2), without regard to the legislative purpose reflected in § 541(c) and without regard to the other language in the section." Id. at 696, 589 A.2d at 947.
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541(c) explicitly extends coverage to "bodily injury or death."5 4
The court also noted that wrongful death claims are incorporated in
the liability coverage mandated by both Maryland financial responsibility law and standard automobile insurance policies by virtue of
the inclusion of the term "death.1 5 Additionally, claims not covered by insurance and therefore payable by the Maryland Automobile Insurance Fund (MAIF) include wrongful death claims for the
same reason, according to the Forbes court. 6 The court emphasized
the need to construe these statutory liability provisions liberally to
effectuate the policy objectives of the legislature.5 7 However, without any further explanation of why the inclusion of the term "death"
automatically connotes the existence of a wrongful death claim, the
Forbes decision seems merely to beg the question answered by the
lower court in Chung. In particular, the Forbes court failed to articulate any legal rationale for determining that the existence of the
term "death" in section 541 gives rise to an action for wrongful
death.58
The inclusion of the word "death" in pertinent MAIF provisions 59 does not indicate in any unambiguous way what cause of action the legislature intended to be available to the family of a
54. See id. at 699, 589 A.2d at 949; see also MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 541(c) (1990).
For the pertinent portion of § 541 (c), see supra note 31.
55. See Forbes, 322 Md. at 698, 589 A.2d at 948. The Forbes court emphasized that the
purpose of required UM coverage is "to make available the same coverage as would
have been available had the tortfeasor complied with the liability insurance requirements of the financial responsibility law." Id.; see MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 17-103
(1977 & Supp. 1990). Section 17-103 sets the minimum required benefits for a vehicle
liability insurance policy, stating that every policy must provide for at least "[t]he payment of claims for bodily injury or death arising from an accident." Id. § 17-103(b) (emphasis added).
56. See 322 Md. at 699, 589 A.2d at 949. The Maryland Automobile Insurance Fund
(MAIF) was created as the successor to the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund for the
purpose of providing insurance "to those eligible persons who are unable to obtain it in
the private market." MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 243B(a) (1990). Section 541(c)(2) of
the Annotated Code states that "[iun no case shall the uninsured motorist coverage be
less than the coverage afforded a qualified person under Article 48A, §§ 243H and 243I." MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 541(c)(2) (1990). Further, § 243H states that "[c]laims
for the death of or personal injury to a qualified person" shall be covered, id. § 243H
(emphasis added), and § 243-I sets the maximum amount payable for the injury or death
of an individual at $20,000. Id. § 243-I.
57. See Forbes, 322 Md. at 698, 589 A.2d at 948; see also supra note 39.
58. See 322 Md. at 699, 589 A.2d at 949. The court declared that the inclusion of the
phrase "bodily injury or death of the insured" in §§ 541(c)(1) and (c)(3) "obviously
reflects the General Assembly's contemplation that uninsured motorist coverage ... is
Iapplicable to the ... death of the insured' and, like liability coverage, embraces wrongful death claims." Id.
59. See supra note 56.
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decedent negligently killed by an uninsured motorist. At the very
least, the inclusion is no more telling than is the existence of the
term "bodily injury or death of an insured" in section 541. To
bridge this obvious gap, the court noted that section 541 mandates
coverage that is at least commensurate with the coverage provided
by MAIF.6 ° The court subsequently asserted that in Unsatisfied Claim
and Judgment Fund v. Hamilton,6 ' it had taken "the position that
[MAIF] encompass[es] wrongful death claims."62
In Hamilton, however, the task before the court was to determine the meaning of the term "personal representative" with regard
to the statute. 6 3 Moreover, the facts in Hamilton were quite inapposite to those in Forbes. In Hamilton, the deceased was killed in an
accident while driving his own uninsured vehicle, and his surviving
family members sought payment from the Unsatisfied Claim and
Judgment Fund, the predecessor to MAIF.
The court held that
just as an uninsured owner is denied recovery from MAIF, so is his
executor and "all those who stand in his place or could become entitled to recover by reason of the accident because of their relation65
ship to him."
Only by reference to holdings in other jurisdictions did Hamilton touch upon the coverage of wrongful death claims in circumstances similar to Forbes.6 6 Thus, the Forbes court's claim that
Hamilton is dispositive on the issue is tenuous at best.
The Forbes court further stated that although it has not had occasion to discuss the issue directly, it has in previous cases "treated
wrongful death claims as covered under [section] 541(c)." 6 7 However, both cases cited by the court involved survival actions-not
wrongful death actions-arising out of the death of a victim of a

60. See Forbes, 322 Md. at 599, 589 A.2d at 949.
61. 256 Md. 56, 259 A.2d 303 (1969).
62. Forbes, 322 Md. at 700, 589 A.2d at 949.
63. See 256 Md. at 58, 259 A.2d 304-05. The court concluded "that the meaning the
legislature intended to convey by the use of the term personal representative in the
context in which it is found was the broader meaning that the cases have said it may
have." Id. at 63, 259 A.2d at 307.
64. See id. at 58, 259 A.2d at 304.
65. Id. at 63, 259 A.2d at 307.
66. See id. at 61-62, 259 A.2d at 306-07 (citing Zeagler v. Commercial Union Ins. Co.,
166 So. 2d 616 (Fla. App. 1964), cert. denied, 172 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 1965); Sterns v. M.F.A.
Mut. Ins. Co., 401 S.W.2d 510 (Mo. App. 1966), for the proposition that the term "legal
representative" in a UM statute includes those persons entitled to bring wrongful death
claims).
67. 322 Md. at 700, 589 A.2d at 949.
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negligent uninsured motorist.6" Thus, in this context, the court's
reliance on prior cases involving issues concerning the UM statute
was misplaced.
Absent any solid legal justification for inferring a wrongful
death action out of such language, the court's reasoning seems to
pale in the face of the analysis set forth in Chung-an analysis more
squarely grounded in precedent. Consequently, the public policy
objectives lurking beneath the surface of Forbes best explain the
court's decision to expand the scope of UM coverage. The predominant public policy agenda at work in Forbes is that of efficient redress for persons injured-directly or indirectly-by financially
irresponsible motorists. In Forbes, for example, the tortfeasor fled
the jurisdiction. Therefore, the only possible way to compensate
the Forbes children for their loss at the hands of a missing uninsured motorist was to extend the coverage of the UM statute to encompass their claims. Thus, the court's result-oriented decision to
find coverage for wrongful death claims seems to cut evenly between judicial legislation and legal pragmatism.
c. The Scope of Coverage in Mayland.-In addition to addressing
whether the Maryland UM statute encompasses wrongful death
claims, Forbes confronted the issue of how far to extend the statutory
coverage in light of restrictions included in an insurance policy. 69
Because Carol Forbes was arguably not a "named insured" on her
husband's policy,7 ° the court looked to whether she qualified as a
"family member."'" The Harleysville policy defined "family member" as "a person related to [the named insured] by blood, marriage
or adoption who is a resident of [the named insured's] house68. See id. In Hoffman v. United States Auto Ass'n, 309 Md. 167, 522 A.2d 1320
(1967), the plaintiff, on his own behalf and on behalf of his deceased wife's estate,
sought compensation for his personal injuries and his wife's death, caused by a negligent uninsured driver. Id. at 170, 522 A.2d at 1321. Similarly, in Yarmuth v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 286 Md. 256, 407 A.2d 315 (1979), the personal
representative of the estates of Albert Starr, his wife, and their son, after recovering
damages under one policy covering the Starrs, sought further compensation under yet
another policy insuring the decedents against uninsured motorists. Id. at 259, 407 A.2d
at 316. Neither case involved wrongful death claims.
69. Coverage under the Harleysville policy was restricted to a "covered person [who]
is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle
because of... [b]odily injury sustained by a covered person and caused by an accident."
Forbes, 322 Md. at 703, 589 A.2d at 951. For the definition of a "covered person" under
the policy, see supra note 17.
70. See infra note 72.

71. See Forbes, 322 Md. at 703-08, 589 A.2d at 951-53.
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hold."-72 Harleysville argued that because Carol Forbes had moved
away from her husband's household, she was no longer a "resident"
and therefore no longer qualified as a "covered person"
under the
73
"family member" provision of her husband's policy.
In finding that Carol Forbes was a "resident" and therefore a
"covered person" within the policy definition, the court reasoned
that marital difficulties and temporary separations are commonplace
in today's society and thus do not result in the loss of "resident"
status.7 4 Declining to adopt a bright-line test for determining residency, the court opted instead for a case-specific factual analysis,
thus allowing for further expansion of UM coverage in the future.7 5
72. Id. at 704, 589 A.2d at 951. The court recognized that the "critical issue" based
on language in the Harleysville policy was whether Carol Forbes, who was co-owner and
co-operator of the insured vehicle, was a "resident" of Robin Forbes's household.
Before confronting the issue of residency, the court offered support for the notion that
Carol Forbes was actually a "named insured" on the policy. See id. at 702-03, 589 A.2d
at 950-51. Harleysville admitted that the premiums on the policy would have been the
same if both spouses were "named insureds" instead of just the husband. See id. Furthermore, the Maryland Insurance Code defines a "named insured" as "the person denominated in the declarations in a policy of motor vehicle liability insurance." MD. ANN.
CODE art. 48A, § 538(c) (1990). Carol Forbes was listed on the declaration page of the
Harleysville policy. Forbes, 322 Md. at 703, 589 A.2d at 951. Nevertheless, as evidence
of its agenda to affirm the expansive scope of UM coverage in Maryland, the court purposefully confronted the residency issue by assuming that Carol Forbes was not a
"named insured." See id.
73. See Forbes, 322 Md. at 701, 589 A.2d at 950. Although Harleysville conceded that
the children were "insureds," it maintained that due to Carol Forbes's status and the
attendant language in the policy, Robin Forbes was precluded from recovering damages
on behalf of the children. See id. The fact that the children had also moved from their
father's home was of no consequence. See id. The court noted a line of cases from other
jurisdictions supporting the notion that even when parents are separated or divorced,
the children of those parents may remain residents of the household of the parent listed
as the named insured. See id. at 701 n.6, 589 A.2d at 951 n.6. "Some courts have held
that the children can be residents of both parents' households for purposes of insurance." Id. (citations omitted).
74. See id. at 705, 589 A.2d at 952 ("Adoption of Harleysville's theory would result in
the creation of a large class of uninsureds who obtained such status simply by leaving
the residence of the named insured, even for a temporary period."); see also 1 ALAN I.
WIDISS, UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED MOTORIST INSURANCE § 4.7 n.6 (2d ed. 1985)
("[W]here ... courts have decided that [policy] provisions should be liberally construed
in favor of the claimants in order to achieve the objectives of the uninsured motorist
statutes, it is probable that the courts may be less demanding in regard to what is necessary to satisfy the residency requirement.").
75. Some courts have implemented bright-line tests to determine residency in situations similar to Forbes. See Sanders v. Wausau Underwriters Ins. Co., 392 So. 2d 343, 344
(Fla. App. 1981) ("The test for whether a wife is no longer a member of her husband's
household is not just physical absence, but physical absence coupled with an intent not
to return."). The Forbes court, however, assessed the facts surrounding the marriage at
the time of the accident rather than applying any predetermined test. See 322 Md. at
708, 589 A.2d 953. If the court had applied the Sanders test, it is questionable whether
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Additionally, the court found that the intent of Robin and Carol
Forbes when contracting with Harleysville was "that both of them as
co-owners and co-operators would be insured with respect to their
vehicle." 7' 6
Although most jurisdictions interpret their UM statutes liberally
to encompass wrongful death claims, 7 7 several courts restrict such
claims to incidents in which the decedent is an "insured" or "covered person" under the terms of the insurance policy. 78 In Zeagler v.
Commercial Union Insurance Co.,7° a case often cited on this subject,
the District Court of Appeal of Florida held that "the surviving
spouse has a right to recover for the wrongful death of the insured
which was occasioned by the wrongful activity of an uninsured motorist."' 80

Yet, recently in Valiant Insurance Co. v. Webster, 8

the

Supreme Court of Florida held that "a survivor in a wrongful death
claim does not have a claim against the survivor's own uninsured
motorist carrier when the person who suffered the bodily injury (the
decedent) was not an insured under the policy."8 " Similar limitations have been adopted by the courts of California.8 3
The policy rationale behind such recovery restrictions seems
obvious. That a person in Florida may recover damages under the
UM provisions of her automobile liability insurance policy for the
Carol Forbes would have been deemed a "resident" of her husband's household; her
intent not to return seemed evident regardless of the fact that she had not changed her
voter registration or the address on her driver's license. See id. Carol Forbes took her
children from her husband's home and leased an apartment with another man. See id. at
692, 589 A.2d 945. Such actions cannot readily be disposed of as merely temporary.
76. Forbes, 322 Md. at 705, 589 A.2d at 952.
77. See 1 WIDISS, supra note 74, § 6.2; see also Sterns v. M.F.A. Mut. Ins. Co., 401
S.W.2d 510, 517 (Mo. App. 1966) ("[Ulninsuredmotorist coverage in its standardform includes
indemnity to such survivors of deceased victims of uninsured automobiles as are legally entitled to sue
for damages under wrongful death statutes-without regard to whether the coverage is pro-

vided under compulsion by statute or by voluntary contract."); Sexton v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 433 N.E.2d 555, 560 (Ohio 1982) (holding that the UM statute
"protects insureds who are legally entitled to recover damages related to injury or death
caused by an uninsured motorist" regardless of the deceased's status under the insurance policy).
78. See, e.g., Gaddis v. Safeco Ins. Co., 794 P.2d 533, 537 (Wash. App.) ("We do not
perceive that such broad coverage of losses arising from death or injury to noninsured
persons was expected or intended by the average reasonable purchaser of insurance."),
review denied sub nom. Estate of Bowers v. Safeco Ins. Co., 803 P.2d 324 (Wash. 1990).
79. 166 So. 2d 616 (Fla. App. 1964), cert. denied, 172 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 1965).
80. Id. at 618.
81. 567 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 1990).
82. Id. at 411.
83. See, e.g., Smith v. Royal Ins. Co., 230 Cal. Rptr. 495, 497 (1986) (holding that
recovery cannot be had for wrongful death under the state's UM statute when "neither
the decedent nor the car in which he was riding was insured by respondent").
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wrongful death of her mother living in Alaska seems beyond the reasonable expectations of the parties on either side of the insurance
contract.8 4 Nonetheless, the Forbes court overlooked the recent decisions in jurisdictions that have accepted restricted coverage of
wrongful death actions and rendered an alternative holding specifically designed to effectuate the most liberal construction of Maryland's UM statute.8 5 The court held that because the children were
"insureds" under the Harleysville policy, their "wrongful death
claims squarely fall within [section 541(c)(2)] even if their mother at
the time of the accident was not an 'insured.' "86
With its alternative holding, the court deemed the purpose of
the statutorily mandated UM coverage paramount to any limitations
in the insurance policy that might preclude recovery. 7 However,
such an all-encompassing interpretation of Maryland's UM statute
will more than likely catch the insurance industry in a state of unpreparedness. Insurers will no doubt react by adjusting their premiums
to account for the additional risk thrust upon them in Forbes.
4. Conclusion.-The court in Forbes noted that the UM statute
"embodies a public policy 'to assure financial compensation to the
innocent victims of motor vehicle accidents who are unable to recover from financially irresponsible uninsured motorists.' "88 In addition to quashing the long-established distinction between survival
claims and wrongful death claims, Forbes sends a powerful message
to the insurance industry in Maryland. Insurance policies will be
construed favorably to the insurer only to the extent that they conform to the UM statute, and the statute will be construed broadly to
protect all those who are legally entitled to a wrongful death claim
84. See Karen K. Shinevar, A ReasonableApproach to the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations
as Applied to Insurance Contracts, 13 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 603, 608 (1980). In explaining the
application of the reasonable expectations doctrine as it relates to insurance contracts,
Shinevar noted, "[t]his doctrine requires that insurance contracts provide that coverage
which an insured could reasonably expect after reading the policy." Id.
85. See 322 Md. at 708-09, 589 A.2d at 953-54.
86. Id. at 709, 589 A.2d at 954.
87. See id. at 710, 589 A.2d at 954.
If the tortfeasor in this case had maintained liability insurance, the children's
wrongful death claims would have been paid up to the limits of that liability
coverage. Since the tortfeasor failed to have liability insurance, and since the
children did have uninsured motorist coverage, their claims should similarly be
covered up to the limits of the uninsured motorist insurance.
Id.
88. Id. at 697, 589 A.2d at 948 (quoting Lane v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 321 Md.
165, 169, 582 A.2d 501, 503 .(1990)).
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against the uninsured tortfeasor, regardless of the decedent's status
under the insurance policy.
B.

Subrogee's Right to Settlement Proceeds

In GEICO v. Group Hospitalization Medical Services, Inc.,89 the
Court of Appeals responded to three questions certified by the District of Columbia Superior Court. The gravamen of the court's response was that a medical services insurer subrogated to its
insured's rights could not recover medical expenses paid to its insured by a third party once a settlement agreement had been executed between the insured and the third party.9 ° The court
concluded that the subrogee had not acquired a lien against the settlement funds, 9 nor had a contractual obligation arisen requiring
the third party to pay the subrogated amount.9 2 Further, the court
found that the settlement between the third party-a liability insurer-and the subrogor did not constitute a waiver by the liability
insurer of its right to raise the defense of contributory negligence,
or any other defense related to liability, in response to a later action
brought by the subrogee.9a
1. The Case.-On May 25, 1985, a motorcycle operated by
Frederick Proctor struck an automobile driven by Louise Thompson
as the automobile emerged from a driveway and entered the road
on which Proctor was travelling.9 4 As a result of the accident, Proctor incurred medical bills totalling $21,518.26, which were paid by
his medical services insurance provider, Group Hospitalization
Medical Services, Inc. (GHI).9 5 GHI's contract with Proctor provided that GHI would be subrogated to Proctor's rights against
89. 322 Md. 645, 589 A.2d 464 (1991).
90. Id. at 657, 589 A.2d at 470. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals certified
questions of law to the Maryland Court of Appeals pursuant to the Maryland Uniform
Certification of Questions of Law Act, MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 12-601 to
-609 (1989); MD. R. 8-305; GEICO, 322 Md. at 647 n.l, 589 A.2d at 465 n.l. The Court
of Appeals, in answering these certified questions, left open the possibility that legal
liability might be established on other grounds. See id. at 657, 589 A.2d at 470.
91. See GEICO, 322 Md. at 650, 589 A.2d at 466.
92. See id. at 657, 589 A.2d at 470.
93. See id. at 650-52, 589 A.2d at 466-67.
94. Id. at 647, 589 A.2d at 465. Proctor was travelling south on Piscataway Road in
Clinton, Maryland and struck Thompson's automobile as Thompson, while attempting
to turn north, crossed the southbound lane. Id. Investigating police officers determined
that Proctor, who was carrying a passenger at the time of the collision, was driving his
motorcycle in excess of 65 miles per hour, that he had been drinking, and that the motorcycle had rapidly accelerated just before the collision. Id.
95. Id. at 648, 589 A.2d at 465.
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third party tortfeasors and that GHI had the right to be reimbursed
by Proctor out of any injury recovery payments that he received
96
from a tortfeasor.
At the time of the accident, Thompson was insured by Government Employees Insurance Company (GEICO) with policy limits of
97
$25,000 per person, per accident, and $50,000 total per accident.
Despite the possible contributory negligence of Proctor,9 8 GEICO
settled Proctor's claim against Thompson for the policy limit of
$25,000. 99 Prior to that settlement, however, GHI had sent GEICO
written notice of GHI's right of subrogation regarding any settlement agreement that GEICO might make with Proctor.' 0 0 GEICO
acknowledged that it had received GHI's notice of subrogation prior
to settling with Proctor.' 0 '
After receiving payment from GEICO, Proctor declared bankruptcy.' 0 2 GHI unsuccessfully attempted to recover the amount of
the subrogated claim for medical expenses from Proctor in the
bankruptcy proceedings. 0 3 GHI subsequently filed an action in the
District of Columbia Superior Court seeking judgment against
GEICO in the amount of the subrogated claim, plus interest and
4
0

costs. 1

The District of Columbia court certified questions to the Court
of Appeals raising three issues: (1) whether a settlement payment
by a tortfeasor's insurer constitutes an implied waiver of the insurer's right to raise the defense of contributory negligence in an
action brought by an injured party's subrogee; (2) whether silence
96. Id. at 647-48, 589 A.2d at 465.
97. Id. at 648, 589 A.2d at 465.
98. Id.; see supra note 94.
99. GEICO, 322 Md. at 648, 589 A.2d at 465.
100. Id. GHI also sent a letter to Proctor and his attorney, notifying them of its right
of subrogation under the insurance policy and its right to recover any funds for medical
expenses received by them from, or on behalf of, Thompson. Id.
101. Id. GEICO's internal memorandum characterized GHI's notice of subrogation
as a "lien letter." Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. Tort damage awards are not subject to claims by secured or unsecured creditors. See MD. CoM. LAw I CODE ANN. § 9-104(k) (Supp. 1991). The claim was disallowed
as not recoverable from Proctor. See GEICO, 322 Md. at 648, 589 A.2d at 465.
104. GEICO, 322 Md. at 649, 589 A.2d at 465. Prior to filing a civil action against
GEICO, GHI sent a second letter to GEICO, again giving notice of GHI's right of subrogation and the amount claimed under that right. Id. at 648, 589 A.2d at 465. In a letter,
GEICO informed GHI that $25,000 had been paid to Proctor. GEICO also stated that,
because the policy limit had been exhausted, GEICO would not honor any subrogation
lien. Id. The trial court granted summary judgment to GHI, and GEICO appealed. Id.
at 649, 589 A.2d at 465-66.
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by a tortfeasor's insurer, after receiving notice of a subrogated interest in a claim, creates an implied contractual relationship between
the insurer and the subrogee; and (3) whether notice to a
tortfeasor's insurer of a subrogee's right creates a lien against any
funds offered in settlement by the insurer to the subrogor.
2.

Legal Background.-

a. Subrogation Law.-Subrogation,' 0 5 which developed as an
equitable doctrine,10 6 is the substitution of one person or entity in
place of another in regard to some claim or right against a third
party. 10 7 Subrogation has the effect of placing the ultimate burden
of payment upon the person who should, in fairness, bear it.'0 8
Conventional subrogation t° 9 is founded upon an agreement, express or implied, between a debtor or creditor and a third party, that
the third party will be entitled to all the rights and securities of that
debtor or creditor upon payment of the debt.' ti A person entitled
to subrogation "stands in the shoes" of the subrogor and is entitled
to all the rights and remedies of the subrogor. The subrogee may
use all the means that the subrogor could employ to enforce payment."'

Those rights and means, however, are no greater than

those of the subrogor.i

i2

In the insurance context, when an insurer

105. Subrogation is defined as "[t]he substitution of one person in the place of another with reference to a lawful claim, demand or right, so that he who is substituted
succeeds to the rights of the other in relation to the debt or claim, and its rights, remedies, or securities." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1279 (5th ed. 1979).
106. For Maryland cases holding that subrogation is based in equity, see Finance Co.
of America v. USF&G, 277 Md. 177, 182, 353 A.2d 249, 252 (1976); GEICO v. Taylor,
270 Md. 11, 20, 310 A.2d 49, 54 (1973); Security Ins. Co. v. Mangan, 250 Md. 241, 246,
242 A.2d 482, 485 (1968); George L. Schnader, Jr., Inc. v. Cole Bldg. Co., 236 Md. 17,
21-22, 202 A.2d 326, 329 (1964); Orem v. Wrightson, 51 Md. 34, 43 (1879).
107. See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 24, § 3.10(a), at 219.
108. See Bachmann v. Glazer, 316 Md. 405, 412, 559 A.2d 365, 368 (1989).
109. Subrogation is generally categorized as either conventional or legal. See KEETON
& WIDISS, supra note 24, § 3.10(a). Conventional subrogation results from either an
agreement of the parties or a statutorily imposed requirement. Legal subrogation exists
as a consequence of a judicial determination when conventional subrogation is lacking.
Id.

110. Bachmann, 316 Md. at 413-14, 559 A.2d at 369.
111. Id. at 413, 559 A.2d at 369; see also KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 24, § 3.10 (a).
112. See General Cigar Co. v. Lancaster Leaf Tobacco Co., 323 F. Supp. 931, 935 (D.
Md. 1971); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Godsey, 260 Md. 669, 674, 273 A.2d 431, 434 (1971);
see also Poe v. Philadelphia Casualty Co., 118 Md. 347, 353, 84 A. 476, 478 (1912)
("[T]he person so substituted can exercise no right not possessed by his predecessor,
and can only exercise such right under the same conditions and limitations as were binding on his predecessor."). See generally 16 COUCH CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 61:36
(Ronald A. Anderson ed., 2d ed. 1983).
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reimburses an insured for a covered loss, the insurer may be subrogated to the insured's rights against a third party who is responsible
13
for the loss."
These canons of subrogation law were recently expressed in
Hernandez v. Suburban Hospital Ass'n, Inc., it 4 in which the Court of
5
Appeals of Maryland held that a patient's unqualified assignment"1
to a hospital of the proceeds of an unliquidated tort claim operated
as a transfer of all the right, title, and interest of the assignor in any
recovery on the claim." 6 The Hernandez court disagreed with the
patient's argument that his obligation to the hospital was discharged
in bankruptcy and that the hospital was therefore precluded from
enforcing the assignment." 17 The court determined that the correct
rule was that an assignee of a chose in action acquires an equitable
113. KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 24, § 3.10(a).
114. 319 Md. 226, 572 A.2d 144 (1990).
115. Claims in tort, notably those involving injury or interference with the person, are
not assignable absent a statute or some special justification. See KEETON & WIDISS, supra
note 24, § 3.10(a)(7). This principle rests largely upon the theory that allowing such a
chose in action for personal injuries would lead to champerty and maintenance if a claim
were permitted to survive the death of either the victim or the tortfeasor. See generally
Andrea G. Nadel, Annotation, Assignability of Proceeds of Claim for Personal Injury or Death,
33 A.L.R. 4th 82 (1984).
Maryland has avoided the problem of determining whether personal injury actions
survive death by its adoption of a survival statute. See MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN.
§ 6-401 (1989), which provides:
(a) At law.-Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a cause of
action at law, whether real, personal, or mixed, survives the death of either
party.
(b) Slander.-A cause of action for slander abates upon the death of either
party unless an appeal has been taken from a judgment entered in favor of the
plaintiff.
(c) In equity.-A right of action in equity survives the death of either party if
the court can grant effective relief in spite of the death.
Id.
The assignability of an unliquidated tort claim was also considered in Hernandez.
The court recognized the modem rule that "a chose in action in tort is generally assignable." Hernandez, 319 Md. at 234, 572 A.2d at 148. The court noted further that "[als to
public policy considerations ... we see no danger of champerty or maintenance, nor any
other public policy reason to preclude the assignment of expected personal injury claim
benefits to secure hospital or medical expenses actually incurred." Id. at 235, 572 A.2d
at 148.
116. 319 Md. at 235-36, 572 A.2d at 148; see also Miller v. Horowitz, 172 Md. 419, 430,
191 A. 906, 911 (1937) (holding that certain acts-executing an assignment of a legacy
of an interest in a trust estate, giving notice to the trustee of the assignee's rights, and
making the assignee a party with the assignor's consent-serve to perfect a lien on the
assignor's interest); Seymour v. Finance & Guar. Co., 155 Md. 514, 531, 142 A. 710, 716
(1928) (finding that an agreement for assignment of a debt is an assignment pro tanto of
the fund and thereby vests equitable title to the fund in the assignee).
117. 319 Md. at 237-38, 572 A.2d at 149.
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lien against the subject of the assignment. " 8 There is striking similarity between the assignment made by the subrogor in Hernandez
and the assignment made in GEICO. Although the Court of Appeals
did not cite the Hernandez decision when it ruled in GEICO, there is
no apparent explanation for the GEICO court to contradict a decision it made thirteen months earlier.
b. Effect of Settlement or Compromise.-It is a rule of general application in most jurisdictions that the doctrine of waiver" 9 cannot be
used to bring risks not covered by the terms of an insurance policy
within the policy's coverage. 20 The rule follows the theory that the
doctrine of waiver should not require an insurer to pay for losses for
which it charged no premium. Maryland courts have recognized this
rule, holding that a waiver is valid only when the subject matter of
2
the waiver is within the terms of the contract.' '
It follows that the execution of a compromise or settlement
agreement by an insurer and a claimant should not act to bar the
insurer from raising defenses to liability in a subsequent action
brought by a party outside the settlement contract. To consider
such a settlement offer or agreement as a waiver of an insurer's right
to defend its insured from liability would amount to an increase in
the insurer's obligations under the policy.
This rule regarding waiver parallels judicial rules concerning
the admissibility of settlement agreements into evidence.' 22 Offers
of settlement and compromise are considered irrelevant to the question of liability because they are not intended as admissions of liabil118. See id. at 238, 572 A.2d at 149.
119. Waiver is defined as "the intentional relinquishment of a known right, or such
conduct as warrants an inference of the relinquishment of such right, and may result
from an express agreement or be inferred from circumstances." Food Fair v. Blumberg,
234 Md. 521, 531, 200 A.2d 166, 172 (1964); see also 16B JOHN A. APPLEMAN & JEAN
APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 9085 (1981).

120. GEICO, 322 Md. at 651, 589 A.2d at 467 (citing A/C Elec. Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co.,
251 Md. 410, 419, 247 A.2d 708, 713 (1968)).
121. See, e.g., Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Urner, 264 Md. 660, 668, 287 A.2d 764,
768 (1972); A/C Elec. Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 251 Md. 410, 419, 247 A.2d 708, 713
(1968); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Brookman, 167 Md. 616, 620, 175 A. 838, 840 (1934).
122. See FED. R. EVID. 408. The Rule provides:

Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting
or offering or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising
or attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or
amount, is not admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its
amount. Evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations
is likewise not admissible.
Id. Maryland is in accord with this view. See Burwell v. Easton Memorial Hosp., 83 Md.
App. 684, 692, 577 A.2d 394, 397 (1990).
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ity by the parties making them, but rather are extended for the
purpose of "buying peace."' 23 Moreover, a privilege attaches to
such offers in order to further the public policy of encouraging parties to settle disputes out of court. 1 24 An insurer's willingness to
settle does not necessarily imply a specific belief that the adversary's
claim is well founded; rather, it could be based on the insurer's belief that further defense of the claim would cause such annoyance or
expose the insurer or insured to such risk that payment of the sum
25
demanded is preferred.1
c. Silence as a Mode of Acceptance.-It is a well-recognized doctrine of contract law that silence by an offeree cannot operate as
acceptance of an offer or as manifestation of assent.' 26 Therefore,
no recovery in contract may be had against a party who is silent in
the face of another's communication or conduct. 12 7 Similarly, an offeror does not have the power to cause silence of the offeree to operate as acceptance when the offeree does not intend acceptance.'12
In Laurel Race Course, Inc. v. Regal ConstructionCo. ,129 the Court of
Appeals reaffirmed this doctrine, 30 holding that silence can operate
as an acceptance only in limited circumstances.' 3 ' Laurel involved a
demand for payment by a contractor for construction services that it
had performed for a racetrack owner. There was neither a written
32
contract nor an express acceptance of the services by the owner.
The court held that silence by the owner-offeree can operate as acceptance only when the offeree, with reasonable opportunity to reject the offered services, accepts the benefit of the services under
circumstances that would indicate to a reasonable person that the
services were offered with the expectation of compensation. 13
123. See 4 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1061, 1062 (James H. Chadbourne ed.,
rev. ed. 1978).
124. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 274 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984).
125. See WIGMORE, supra note 123, § 1061.
126. See 1 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 72 (1963 & Supp. 1991).
127. See id.
128. See id. § 73.
129. 274 Md. 142, 333 A.2d 319 (1975).
130. See id. at 156-57, 333 A.2d at 328-29.
131. Id. The court noted that when the offeree, with reasonable opportunity to reject
services performed by an offeror, takes the benefit of those services, he will be considered to have manifested his assent to the offer. See id. at 156, 333 A.2d at 329; see also
Mohr v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 216 Md. 197, 205, 140 A.2d 49, 52 (1958)
("[Mlere silence will generally not raise an estoppel against a silent party.").
132. Laurel, 274 Md. at 144-46, 333 A.2d at 322-24.
133. See id. at 157, 333 A.2d at 328-29.
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d. Subrogee's Lien Against Settlement Proceeds.-It has been recognized that when an insured subrogates or assigns a chose in action
to an insurer-subrogee, the subrogee acquires an equitable lien
against the proceeds recovered in connection with that claim or offered in settlement thereof.'" 4 This tenet is most succinctly expressed in Pomeroy's treatise on equity law:
[E]very express executory agreement in writing, whereby
the contracting party sufficiently indicates an intention to
make some particular property, real or personal, or fund,
therein described or identified, a security for a debt or
other obligation, or whereby the party promises to convey
or assign or transfer the property as security, 3creates
an eq5
uitable lien upon the property so indicated.1
This doctrine extends to property not yet in existence at the time
36
when the contract is made.'
Relying upon this equitable lien theory, the majority of states
have adopted the principle that the rights of an insurer-subrogee
are not defeated by a tortfeasor's procurement of a full release from
liability from the insured-subrogor after receiving notice of the insurer's subrogated rights.'3 7 Maryland authority is in accord with
this view. In Cleaveland v. C & P Telephone Co. 138 the Court of Appeals concluded that when an insurer who may be liable to an injured party affects a settlement with and obtains a release from that
party with knowledge that an insurer-subrogee has already paid the
amount of its liability to that party, the insurer remains liable to the
subrogee for the full amount of its subrogated claim.'3 9 Both the

134. See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 24, § 3.10(a).
135. 5 POMEROY'S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1235 (5th ed. 1941).
136. Id. § 1236.
137. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Holmes, 50 P.2d 473, 474 (Cal. Ct. App. 1935); Bahn v.
Shalev, 125 A.2d 678, 680 (D.C. 1956); Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Home Ins. Co.,
108 N.E. 525, 531 (Ind. 1915); Wolverine Ins. Co. v. Klomparens, 263 N.W. 724, 725
(Mich. 1935); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Vaccari, 245 N.W.2d 844, 847-48 (Minn. 1976);
General Exch. Ins. Corp. v. Young, 212 S.W.2d 396, 401 (Mo. 1948); Omaha & Republican Valley Ry. v. Granite State Fire Ins. Co., 73 N.W. 950, 951-52 (Neb. 1898); Davenport v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 404 P.2d 10, 13 (Nev. 1965); Ocean Accident &
Guar. Corp. v. Hooker Electro-Chem. Co., 147 N.E. 351, 355 (N.Y. 1925); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Associates Transports, Inc., 512 P.2d 137, 142 (Okla. 1973); United
Pacific Ins. Co. v. Schetky Equip. Co., 342 P.2d 766, 772 (Or. 1959); Hospital Serv.
Corp. v. Pennsylvania Ins. Co., 227 A.2d 105, 112 (R.I. 1967). These cases represent
the majority rule. See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 24, § 3.10(c)(3).
138. 225 Md. 47, 169 A.2d 446 (1961).
139. See id. at 51, 169 A.2d at 448.
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Hernandez court140 and the Cleaveland court' 4 ' noted the underlying
policy concern that the release and settlement may work a fraud
upon the insurer-subrogee, and therefore should not constitute a
defense against an action by the subrogee to enforce its subrogation
rights.
3.

Analysi.-

a. Waiver Theoy.-In GEICO, the Court of Appeals properly
rejected GHI's argument that settlement of Proctor's personal injury claim constituted a waiver of either Thompson's or GEICO's
42
right to raise defenses to liability in a subsequent legal action.'
The court noted that waiver requires an intentional relinquishment
3
of a known right; whether a right was waived is a question of fact.14
The court reasoned that GEICO, faced with a possible penalty for
44
its failure to settle a claim in good faith and in a timely manner,
did not intentionally relinquish defenses that it may have had if the
145
claim had proceeded to litigation.
46
The court's decision comports with general rules of evidence
that consider offers to compromise or settle a disputed claim irrelevant to the issue of liability of the party making the offer. Only if the
settlement contains specific admissions of fact made during the
47
course of negotiations is the existence of a settlement admissible.
If the GEICO court had found that GEICO's settlement with Proctor
barred its right to raise contributory negligence in subsequent litigation, the effect would be to discourage parties from settling claims
for fear that the settlement would be an admission of liability.
140. 319 Md. 229, 236, 572 A.2d 144, 148-49 (1990).
141. 225 Md. at 51, 169 A.2d at 448.
142. 322 Md. at 652-53, 589 A.2d at 467.
143. See id. The court stated that although waiver is applicable in the insurance context, it cannot be asserted when to do so would amount to an expansion of coverage
beyond limits intended by the policy. See id. at 651, 589 A.2d at 467. The court went on
to conclude, however, that this exception to the waiver doctrine was not applicable to
the facts of the GEICO case. See id. at 652, 589 A.2d at 467.
144. See id. at 652-53, 589 A.2d at 467. The court observed that an insurer's bad faith
refusal to settle a claim within the policy limits may be grounds for holding the insurer
liable for any judgment in excess of policy limits. See id. The court inferred that the
impetus for GEICO's settlement with Proctor was probably the fact that its insured had
entered a through highway from a driveway. See id. at 653, 589 A.2d at 468. The court
suggested that because Proctor had the right-of-way, GEICO settled the claim in recognition of the risk of a substantial verdict against its insured. See id. at 654, 589 A.2d at
468.
145. See id. at 652-53, 589 A.2d at 467.
146. See supra notes 122-125 and accompanying text.
147. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 124, § 274, at 811.
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b. Contract Theory.-The GEICO court properly concluded that
GEICO's failure to respond to GHI's lien notice was insufficient to
create a promise by GEICO to satisfy GHI's claim as subrogee. The
court recognized that fundamental principles of contract law do not
interpret silence as a mode of acceptance of an offer.1 48 The court
also rejected GHI's contention that GEICO was required to include
it in any settlement negotiations. In doing so, the court distinguished the facts of the case from two cases by the Maryland and
New York Courts of Appeal.' 49 Relying upon both contract principles and the dissimilarity between the GEICO facts and the facts of
cases cited by GEICO, the court concluded that it would not have
been reasonable for GEICO to expect that its failure to respond to
50
GHI's lien notice would induce action or forbearance by GHI.1
c. Lien Theor.-An analysis of relevant case law'"' reveals that
the Court of Appeals incorrectly denied GHI's claim that, as Proctor's subrogee, GHI had acquired an equitable lien against the proceeds of any settlement funds paid by GEICO. The court did not
analyze GHI's lien theory, but merely stated that "GHI offers no
authority for the contention that a subrogee acquires a lien when it
obtains its subrogation rights, and we know of none."' 1 52 The court
ignored the precedent established in both Hernandez and Cleaveland-that settlement with knowledge of an insurer's subrogated
claim does not extinguish liability 5 -and instead relied upon the
precept that a subrogee stands in the shoes of the subrogor and acquires only those rights to which the subrogor would have been
entitled.
Although this is a familiar maxim of equity, the manner in
which the court applied the principle to its analysis is weak and unconvincing. Because the court ignored prior case law, which had
148. See GEICO, 322 Md. at 655-57, 589 A.2d at 468-69; see also supra notes 126-133
and accompanying text.
149. See GEICO, 322 Md. at 655-56, 589 A.2d at 469. The court found neither Erie
Ins. Exch. v. Calvert Fire Ins., 253 Md. 385, 252 A.2d 840 (1969), nor Underwriters at
Lloyds, London v. Richards Frgt. L., 190 N.E.2d 8 (N.Y. 1863), to be factually similar.
See GEICO, 322 Md. at 655-56, 589 A.2d at 469. In Erie, the Maryland Court of Appeals
held that an insurer who was placed on notice of a subrogated claim and who "promised to
pay the claim" necessarily required the subrogee to be a party to the settlement negotiations. 253 Md. at 390, 252 A.2d at 480 (emphasis added). The GEICO court similarly
distinguished Richards because, in that case, the subrogee was a party throughout settlement negotiations. See GEICO, 322 Md. at 656, 589 A.2d at 469.
150. See 322 Md. at 655-56, 589 A.2d at 469.
151. See supra notes 134-141 and accompanying text.
152. GEICO, 322 Md. at 649-50, 589 A.2d at 466.
153. See supra notes 114-118, 138-141 and accompanying text.
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held an insurer who settles with notice or knowledge of a subro54
gated interest liable for the full amount of the subrogee's claim,'
GEICO undermines the purpose of subrogation law by allowing
double recovery by the insured and promoting fraud upon the unwary subrogee.
4. Conclusion.-The Court of Appeals' decision in GEICO, denying an insurer-subrogee's claim for reimbursement of medical
payments from the tortfeasor's insurance company, is inconsistent
with prior Maryland law and contrary to the law followed in the majority of states. Moreover, the court failed to make clear the rationale behind its decision. The court did not distinguish the facts of
GEICO from other cases in which the tortfeasor's insurer was not
relieved of its financial obligations to the subrogee of the tort claim
when that insurer had actual knowledge of the existence of the subrogee's interest in the settlement funds. Nor did the court provide
policy reasons that would justify the result of GEICO. On the contrary, the holding appears to frustrate one of the central functions
that subrogation law fulfills: placing the economic responsibility for
injuries on the party who caused the loss without allowing double
15 5
recovery by the injured person.
JEFFREY H. COHEN
JOSEPH T. MURRAY

154. See Hernandez v. Suburban Hosp. Ass'n, Inc., 319 Md. 226, 236-37, 572 A.2d
144, 148-49 (1990); Cleaveland v. C&P Tel. Co., 225 Md. 47, 51-52, 169 A.2d 446, 448
(1961).
155. See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 24, § 3.10(a)(1).
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State and Police Officer Liability to an Innocent Third Party Injured in
a High Speed Chase

In Boyer v. State,' the Court of Appeals considered the liability of
the State, Charles County, and a state police officer for damages
caused by a fatal car collision that occurred when a suspected drunk
driver, pursued at high speeds by a state trooper and county deputy
sheriffs, struck the rear of a car occupied by a Charles County
couple.2 The couple's surviving sons brought suit against the State,
the County, and the state trooper, alleging vicarious liability on the
part of the State and the County for the police officers' negligence,
and alleging gross negligence against the trooper in his individual
3
capacity.
Because the State's liability turned on the issue of whether the
trooper's decision to pursue had been negligent, the court considered for the first time the nature of the duty of care owed by police
officers to third parties who might be injured as a consequence of a
high speed chase involving the police.4 The court also addressed
the meaning of "operating [an] emergency vehicle" in the context
of section 19-103 of the Transportation Article, which imposes liability on the owner or lessee of an emergency vehicle for the negligent acts of the driver.5 Finding that a police officer engaged in a
high speed automobile chase owes a duty to innocent third parties
such as other drivers, and reinforcing its previous broad interpretation of the language of section 19-103, the court vacated the lower
court's grant of summary judgment for the State and remanded as
1.
2.
county
3.
4.

323 Md. 558, 594 A.2d 121 (1991).
See id. at 562-64, 594 A.2d at 122-23. The plaintiffs did not bring suit against the
deputy sheriffs. Id. at 564 n.1, 594 A.2d at 124 n.l.
Id. at 564, 594 A.2d at 124.
See id. at 586, 594 A.2d at 135.
5. MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 19-103(b)(1) (1987) (amended 1990). This section
provides:
An operator of an emergency vehicle, who is authorized to operate the emergency vehicle by its owner or lessee, is immune from suit in his individual capacity for any damages resulting from a negligent act or omission while
operating the emergency vehicle in the performance of emergency service ....
Id. The 1990 amendments were not relevant to the issue in Boyer; a portion of the pre1990 version was moved to § 5-399.5 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. See
Act of May 29, 1990, ch. 546, 1990 Md. Laws 2381; MD. CTS. &JuD. PROC. CODE ANN.

§ 5-399.5 (1989 & Supp. 1991). Hereafter, all references to § 19-103 will be to the pre1990 version, which was in effect when the incident giving rise to Boyer occurred.
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to the County. 6 Summary judgment in favor of Trooper Titus was
affirmed, however, because the court found that the officer's actions
did not rise to the level of gross negligence as a matter of law.7
Gross negligence must be shown in order to hold the operator of an
emergency vehicle personally liable for acts committed while performing emergency services. 8
1. The Case.-On August 9, 1984, Maryland State trooper
Robert C. Titus was patrolling Route 301 in Waldorf in his police
cruiser when he observed a car being driven in an "unsafe and erratic manner."9 Trooper Titus suspected that the driver was intoxicated.' O When both vehicles stopped at a red light, Titus got out of
his car and told the driver, Richard Milton Farrar, to pull his vehicle
to the shoulder of the road after the light turned green." When the
light turned green, however, Farrar accelerated and drove south on
Route 301 at a high rate of speed. 2 Trooper Titus pursued Farrar
and was joined in the chase by several other police officers, including deputy sheriffs from the Charles County Sheriff's Office, and
3
Maryland State Police officers.'
The pursuit ended when Farrar struck the rear of another vehicle at the intersection of Route 301 and Route 225 in La Plata. 4
The car Farrar hit was occupied by Mary Jackisch Boyer and her
husband, Joseph Boyer.' 5 Mrs. Boyer died at the scene of the accident.' 6 Mr. Boyer was hospitalized and later died as a result of his
injuries. 17
The surviving sons of the Boyers filed a complaint in the Circuit
6. See Boyer, 323 Md. at 591, 594 A.2d at 137-38.

The court remanded as to the

County pursuant to rule 8-604(d) to allow the plaintiffs to amend their complaint and
assert the County's ownership of the police vehicles, if possible. See id. at 576, 594 A.2d
at 130; MD. R. 8-604(d).
7. See Boyer, 323 Md. at 580, 594 A.2d at 132.
8. See MD.TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 19-103 (relieving an individual operating an emer-

gency vehicle from liability only for negligence); see also Boyer, 323 Md. at 578-79, 594
A.2d at 131. Section 19-103 defines the performance of emergency services to include
"[p]ursuing a violator or a suspected violator of the law." MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 19103.
9. Boyer, 323 Md. at 562, 594 A.2d at 123.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.at 563, 594 A.2d at 123.
13. Id.
14. Id., 594 A.2d at 124.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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Court for Prince George's County, naming the County Commissioners of Charles County, the Charles County "Sheriff's Department,"
18
Trooper Titus, the State of Maryland, and Farrar as defendants.
The claim against Trooper Titus alleged that he had been grossly
negligent in failing to arrest Farrar while stopped at the red light, in
pursuing a suspected drunk driver at excessively high speeds
through heavy traffic areas, in continuing the pursuit at such speeds,
and in failing to activate immediately all of his vehicle's emergency
equipment."9 The complaint also asserted vicarious liability on the
part of the State for Trooper Titus's negligence, and on the part of
the Charles County "Sheriff's Department" and the County Commissioners of Charles County for the alleged gross negligence of the
deputy sheriffs who joined in the chase.2 °
The case was transferred to the Circuit Court for Charles
County, which granted summary judgment in favor of the County
Commissioners of Charles County, the Charles County "Sheriff's
Department," the State of Maryland, and Trooper Titus. 2 ' The
Court of Special Appeals affirmed the decision. 22 The Court of Appeals granted certiorari and affirmed as to Trooper Titus and the
Charles County "Sheriff's Department," affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part as to the State, and remanded as to the
Charles County Commissioners. 3
2.

Legal Background.-The doctrine of sovereign immunity

"derived from the theory that the highest feudal lord was not subject to suit in his own courts."124 Traditional justifications for the
doctrine have had lessening impact,2 5 and seem antithetical to the
18. Id. at 563-65, 594 A.2d at 124.
19. Id. at 564, 594 A.2d at 124.
20. Id. The claims against the County and the State also alleged negligent hiring,
training, retention, and supervision of the employees. Id.
21. The orders of summary judgment were certified as final pursuant to rule 2602(b). Boyer, 323 Md. at 570-71, 594 A.2d at 127; see MD.R. 2-602(b). Farrar was not
involved in the summary judgment motions; apparently his trial was still pending during
the Boyer appeal. 323 Md. at 571 n.7, 594 A.2d at 127 n.7.
22. See Boyer v. State, 80 Md. App. 101, 106, 560 A.2d 48, 50 (1989), aff'd in part,
vacated in part, and remanded in part, 323 Md. 558, 594 A.2d 121 (1991).

23. Boyer, 323 Md. at 591, 594 A.2d at 137-38.
24. Steven D. Frenkil, Comment, The State as a Party Defendant: Abrogation of Sovereign
Immunity in Tort in Maryland, 36 MD. L. REV. 653, 654 (1977).

25. Historical justifications for sovereign immunity rested on the premise that the
King was infallible and that, consequently, his acts could not be impugned in the courts
he had established. Id. at 654-55. Modern apologists for the doctrine have stated that
the underlying premise of sovereign immunity is that it is improper to divert public
funds for use by private citizens. Id. at 658. A variation of this theme argues that
although private recovery from a government entity might be appropriate in some cases,
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nature of state governments. Nevertheless, the doctrine has survived. The Court of Appeals has asserted that the state's sovereign
immunity is grounded in considerations of public policy rather than
divine right.2 6
However, these considerations have been
subordinated in recent years to competing policies seeking to remedy the unfairness inherent in leaving innocent parties without a
remedy for torts committed by state employees.
The Maryland Tort Claims Act2 7 provides a broad waiver of

governmental immunity for certain claims arising out of the negligence of a state employee."8 Under the statutory scheme, the state,
not the individual employee, may be held liable for acts of simple
negligence committed by the employee while acting within the
scope of his public duties.2 9 Maryland's statutory waiver of immunity does not extend to claims for punitive damages, however, and
does not relieve employees of liability for damages caused by their
gross negligence.3 0 Therefore, the Maryland Tort Claims Act functions both as a broad remedy for injured third parties and as a limited safety net to relieve state employees of liability for acts less than
grossly negligent.
The related doctrine of public official immunity also protects a
government employee from liability for negligence under certain
circumstances. 3 ' Public official immunity is supported by the discrethe danger of enormous judgments against the government could threaten its stability.
Id. at 658-62.
26. See Godwin v. County Comm'rs, 256 Md. 326, 333, 260 A.2d 295, 298 (1970)
(discussing sovereign immunity in Maryland).
27. MD. STATE Gov'T CODE ANN. §§ 12-101 to -109 (1984). At the time of the Boyer
incident, the Act was codified at MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 5-401 to -408
(1984). Although some changes were made during the recodification, none are pertinent to the Boyer case. 323 Md. at 565 n.2, 594 A.2d at 124 n.2.
28. See MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-403(a)(1) (1984) (amended 1988).
The Boyer court referred to the pre-1985 language of the Maryland Tort Claims Act. See
323 Md. at 579 n.14, 594 A.2d at 131 n.14. Section 5-403(a) waives the state's immunity
in tort for, inter alia, "[a]n action to recover damages caused by the negligent maintenance or operation of a motor vehicle by a State employee." MD. CTS. & JuD. PROC.
CODE ANN. § 5-403(a)(1).
29. MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-404(b). The 1984 version of this section,
which was applied by the Boyer court, provides:
A State employee who has acted within the scope of his public duties, absent
malice or gross negligence, is not liable in his individual capacity for any damages resulting from tortious conduct for which the State has waived its immunity under this subtitle, even when the damages exceed the limits of the State's
waiver of immunity.
Id.

30. See id. § 5-403(b)(1) ("The immunity of the State in tort is not waived for .

.

[p]unitive damages-...."); id.§ 5-404(b); see also supra note 29.

31. See Frenkil, supra note 24, at 667-68. The immunity granted protects the public
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tionary function doctrine, which provides that an official who makes
a discretionary decision in the course of performing her public duties will not be liable if the decision is later determined to have been
negligent. However, the immunity does not apply to ministerial
acts, which are acts required to be performed as a duty of the official's employment.8 2 Although it is difficult to distinguish between
discretionary acts and ministerial acts, Maryland still recognizes the
33
distinction.
A third instance of immunity in Maryland is found in section 19103 of the Transportation Article, which grants immunity to drivers
of emergency vehicles "for any damages resulting from a negligent
act or omission while operating the emergency vehicle in the performance of emergency service." 4 Section 19-103 also provides
that the owner or lessor of an emergency vehicle shall be liable for
the negligent acts of a driver; the statute explicitly states that political subdivisions waive their immunity in this regard.3 5
The liability imposed on owners and lessors of emergency vehicles is limited to damages occurring when the driver is "operating
the emergency vehicle."3 6 In Thomas v. State,3 7 the Court of Appeals
construed the term "operating" broadly to include various acts beyond the mere driving of an automobile.3 ' Relying on several decisions from other jurisdictions, 9 the Thomas court concluded that
official from personal liability for the unintended consequences of a decision based on
his judgment. Because the act of governing inherently requires decisions based on personal judgment, it is inappropriate to allow a jury to substitute its judgment for that of
the decision maker. To allow otherwise would exert impermissible pressure upon those
entrusted to govern. Id.
32. James v. Prince George's County, 288 Md. 315, 326-27, 418 A.2d 1173, 1179
(1980). The Court of Appeals stated:
"Where [a public officer's] duty is absolute, certain, and imperative, involving
merely the execution of a set task-in other words, is simply ministerial-he is
liable in damages to anyone specially injured either by his omitting to perform
the task, or by performing it negligently or unskillfully. On the other hand,
where his powers are discretionary, to be exerted or withheld according to his
own judgment as to what is necessary and proper, he is not liable to any private
person for a neglect to exercise those powers, nor for the consequences of a
lawful exercise of them, where no corruption or malice can be imputed, and he
keeps within the scope of his authority."
Id. (quoting Doeg v. Cook, 58 P. 707, 708 (Cal. 1899)).
33. See James, 288 Md. at 326-27, 418 A.2d at1179.
34. MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 19-103(a)(3) (1987) (amended 1990).
35. See MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 19-103(c)(1).
36. Id.
37. 277 Md. 314, 353 A.2d 256 (1976).
38. See id. at 316-19, 353 A.2d at 258-59.
39. See id. The court cited to several cases, including State v. Joswick, 233 A.2d 154
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"operating" encompasses "driving" but also includes any manipulation of the mechanical or electrical devices of a vehicle.4 ° Although
the Thomas court was interpreting "operating" in the context of a
criminal action for driving or attempting to drive while intoxicated,4 ' the decision laid the foundation for a broad interpretation
of "operating" within the context of section 19-103.
Further, because the waiver of immunity in section 19-103 is
based on a finding of negligence by the driver, the waiver has no
effect if the driver of the emergency vehicle owed no duty of care to
potential victims. In Ashburn v. Anne Arundel County,4 2 the Court of
Appeals held that a police officer who decided not to chase a suspected drunk driver owed no duty to innocent third parties injured
thereafter by the drunk driver.4" Prior to Boyer, however, no Maryland court had considered the existence or breadth of the duty owed
by the driver of an emergency vehicle to innocent third parties injured after the official had commenced a high speed chase.
3. The Court's Reasoning; Analysis.-The Boyer court affirmed the
judgment in favor of the Charles County "Sheriff's Department,"
observing that no statute established the existence of such an entity.4 4 However, it remanded the claim against the County Commissioners, allowing the plaintiffs to allege, if possible, that the vehicles
driven by the deputy sheriffs were owned by Charles County. 4 5 The
court found that Trooper Titus was protected by the doctrine of
public official immunity for his decision not to apprehend Farrar at
the red light,4 6 and further held as a matter of law that the trooper's
conduct during the chase did not amount to gross negligence. 4 7 Finally, the court affirmed in part and vacated in part the judgment in
favor of the State; the State had not waived its immunity for
Trooper Titus's alleged failure to apprehend the suspect,4 8 but the
trooper owed a duty of due care to the Boyers such that if the duty
was breached, the State would be liable for the consequences.4 9
(Del. 1967); McDuell v. State, 231 A.2d 265 (Del. 1967); Williams v. State, 142 S.E.2d
409 (Ga. Ct. App. 1965); Prudhomme v. Hults, 278 N.Y.S.2d 67 (N.Y. App. Div. 1967).
40. 277 Md. at 318, 353 A.2d at 258-59.
41. See id., 353 A.2d at 258.
42. 306 Md. 617, 510 A.2d 1078 (1986).
43. See id. at 626, 510 A.2d at 1082.
44. See 323 Md. at 572 n.9, 594 A.2d at 128 n.9.
45. See id. at 576, 594 A.2d at 130.
46. See id. at 578, 594 A.2d at 131.
47. See id. at 580, 594 A.2d at 132.
48. Id. at 582-83, 594 A.2d at 133.
49. Id. at 588, 594 A.2d at 136.
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New proceedings were ordered to determine whether Trooper
Titus breached this duty.5 °
Because section 19-103(c) of the Transportation Article makes
the owner or lessee of an emergency vehicle liable for the negligence of authorized operators, the Charles County Commissioners
and the State sought to characterize their employees' decisions to
commence and maintain the chase as beyond the common usage of
the term "operate." ' 5' Given the broad construction given to the
term in Thomas v. State,52 this argument was doomed to fail. The
court concluded that a decision to operate a vehicle in a situation in
which a reasonable person would refrain from doing so may amount
to the negligent "operation" of a vehicle.5" By adhering to the
broad interpretation of the term "operate" delineated in Thomas,
the Boyer court reaffirmed the remedial policy behind the statutory
waivers of immunity. Construing "operate" to include the operator's responsibility for assessing factors relevant to the decision of
whether to proceed, and imposing the continuing responsibility of
assessing whether intervening factors have rendered further operation of the vehicle imprudent, support the policy of providing a remedy to innocent third parties injured by the negligence of state
employees.
Turning to the question of whether Trooper Titus would be
personally liable for his initial decision not to apprehend Farrar at
the red light, the court held that the doctrine of public official immunity protected the police officer's decision of whether to apprehend the suspect.' In Ashburn v. Anne Arundel County,5 5 the court
found the arrest function to be discretionary; therefore, a police officer's decision not to detain a suspected drunk driver" is shielded
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

See id. at 591, 594 A.2d at 137-38.
Id. at 573-74, 594 A.2d at 128-29.
277 Md. 314, 316-19, 353 A.2d 256, 258-59 (1976); see supra notes 36-41.
See Boyer, 323 Md. at 574-75, 594 A.2d at 129.
See id. at 577, 594 A.2d at 130-31.
306 Md. 617, 510 A.2d 1078 (1986).
At the time of the Boyer incident, § 16-205.1 (b)(2) of the Transportation Article

provided:

[1]f a police officer stops or detains any person who the police officer has reasonable grounds to believe is or has been driving or attempting to drive a motor vehicle while intoxicated, while under the influence of alcohol, while so far
under the influence of any drug, any combination of drugs, or a combination of
one or more drugs and alcohol that the person could not drive a vehicle safely,
.the police officer shall:
(i) Detain the person ....
MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 16-205.1(b)(2) (1987)
amendments are not relevant to the present case.
*

.

(amended 1990 and 1991). The
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by the doctrine of public official immunity.5 7 The Ashburn court held
in the alternative that a police officer who decided not to apprehend
a suspected drunk driver owed no duty, enforceable in tort, to third
parties who might later be injured by the drunk driver.5 8 In the instant case, the court regarded both holdings as dispositive of the
claim that Trooper Titus was negligent for failing to apprehend Farrar at the red light.5 9
This holding is strongly grounded in a policy that seeks to avoid
any stifling effect on the discretion exercised by a police officer in
deciding whether to apprehend a suspect. If officers were not
shielded by public official immunity in contemplating whether to detain a suspect, they would be less likely to stop drivers who appear
to be intoxicated in the first place.6" A policy that so hampers police
officers would deter effective police conduct, decrease police morale, and fail to serve the public interest in stopping crime. 61 The
Boyer court's continued application of public official immunity to a
police officer's decision not to detain a suspect is, therefore, amply
justified.
Although the court found that Trooper Titus may have been
negligent for deciding to pursue Farrar, section 19-103(b) of the
Transportation Article protected Titus from liability for damages
caused by negligence committed while operating his police car, an
emergency vehicle.6 2 In addition, the Maryland Tort Claims Act
would have protected Titus, as a state employee, from liability for
negligence committed within the performance of his duties.6 3
Both protective provisions would have been inapplicable, and
57. See 306 Md. at 625-26, 510 A.2d at 1082.
58. Id.
59. See Boyer, 323 Md. at 578, 594 A.2d at 131.
60. Though Boyer deals with an intoxicated suspect, this reasoning could apply to an
officer's decision to apprehend any driver suspected of wrongdoing. If the police were
deterred from making any traffic stops, there would surely be a threat to the public
safety.
61. See D. SCHULTZ, POLICE PURSUIT DRIVING HANDBOOK 1 (1979), quoted in Sean M.
Carlin, Comment, High-Speed Pursuits: Police Officer and Municipal Liabilityfor Accidents Involving the Pursued and an Innocent Third Party, 16 SETON HALL L. REV. 101, 113 n.105
(1986).
62. Boyer, 323 Md. at 578, 594 A.2d at 131. See supra notes 5, 8 for the pertinent
portions of § 19-103 of the Transportation Article.
63. The pre-1985 language of the Maryland Tort Claims Act waived the state's tort
immunity for "[a]n action to recover damages caused by the negligent.., operation of a
motor vehicle by a State employee," and it rendered the State employee "not liable. ..
for any damages resulting from tortious conduct for which the State has waived its immunity under this subtitle." MD. CTS &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 5-403(a)(1), 5-404(b)
(1984) (amended 1988).
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Trooper Titus held personally liable, however, if the trooper's actions amounted to gross negligence.' The standard for alleging
gross negligence is well developed in Maryland, and requires the
pleading of facts sufficient for a jury to conclude that the defendant
acted with a wanton and reckless disregard for human life.6 5 The
plaintiffs' allegations failed to meet this requirement, and the court
held that Titus's conduct was not grossly negligent as a matter of
law. 6 6 Therefore, the summary judgment in favor of Trooper Titus
was affirmed. 6 7
The court's approval of a stringent standard reaffirms a policy
of Maryland courts to avoid the imposition of gross negligence
when it has not been clearly established. 68 By refusing to infer from
Trooper Titus's conduct a "wanton and reckless disregard for
human life," the court reasserted its stance that a distinct intent requirement must be met before a state police officer will be held personally liable.
Though Trooper Titus was relieved from personal liability for
his negligent decision to pursue Farrar, the court noted that the
Court of Special Appeals had improperly excused the State from all
liability for Trooper Titus's actions.69 The Court of Special Appeals
had relied on Bradshaw v. Prince George's County, 7° which was over64. See Boyer, 323 Md. at 578, 594 A.2d at 131. Section 19-103(c)(2) of the Transportation Article provides: "This subsection does not subject an owner or lessee to liability
for the operator's malicious act or omission or for the operator's gross negligence."
MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 19-103(c)(2) (1987) (amended 1990).
65. See Nast v. Lockett, 312 Md. 343, 366-67, 539 A.2d 1113, 1124-25 (1988). In
Nast, the court held that driving under the influence of alcohol did not constitute gross
negligence as a matter of law. Id. The court held that the traffic laws the defendant
violated, coupled with the amount of alcohol she ingested, did not elevate her conduct
to the level of gross negligence. See id. The court did not believe these acts showed the
requisite wanton or reckless disregard for human life. See id.; see also Hughes v. State,
198 Md. 424, 431-32, 84 A.2d 419, 422 (1951) (discussing "gross negligence" and
wanton and reckless disregard of human life" in the context of manslaughter).
66. Boyer, 323 Md. at 580, 594 A.2d at 132.
67. Id. at 591, 594 A.2d at 138.
68. Before ajury can consider the issue of punitive damages, "the evidence must be
sufficient ... to establish that the defendant . . . had a wanton or reckless disregard for
human life in the operation of an automobile. The legal threshold that must be crossed
... is a stringent one." Nast, 312 Md. at 351, 539 A.2d at 1117. The court concluded
that only conduct of an outrageous nature would be sufficient to imply this state of
mind. Id. at 352, 539 A.2d at 1117.
69. See Boyer, 323 Md. at 582, 594 A.2d at 133.
70. 284 Md. 294, 396 A.2d 255 (1979), overruled by James v. Prince George's County,
288 Md. 315, 418 A.2d 1173 (1980). The Court of Special Appeals in Boyer relied on
Bradshaw's holding that a governmental employer is not liable when "the alleged tortious conduct on which the suit against [it] is based results from actions of an individual
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ruled by James v. Prince George's County. 7 ' In James, the court held that
the state's waiver of immunity was co-extensive with the immunity
granted to a public official, meaning that "when [the government]
has waived immunity ... [it] is liable for torts committed by its officers even though those officers themselves are not liable because
of public-official immunity."17 2 This position is consistent with the
pre-1985 language of the Maryland Tort Claims Act, which made
the state liable for an employee's negligence, despite the employee's
personal immunity.78
Once the court determined that the State could be held liable if
Titus's acts amounted to negligence, it considered the issue of
whether and to what extent the officer owed the Boyers a duty of
care. 74 Dismissing arguments by the State regarding the applicability of Ashburn to the question, 7 5 the court observed that police officers, though exempt from certain traffic rules, still owe others on
the road a duty of care.7 6 Police officers are expected to obey this
who is personally immune." Boyer v. State, 80 Md. App. at 106, 560 A.2d at 50 (citing
Bradshaw, 284 Md. at 305, 396 A.2d at 260).
71. 288 Md. 315, 418 A.2d 1173 (1980). The James court declined to follow Bradshaw. The court noted that most jurisdictions followed the principle that the government, when it has waived immunity, will be liable for the torts of its employees, though
the employees themselves are shielded by public official immunity. See id. at 333, 418
A.2d at 1183. The James court decided to follow the majority. See id.
72. Id. at 333, 418 A.2d at 1183. The Court of Appeals in Boyer did not reach the
issue of whether Trooper Titus's conduct in pursuing and continuing to pursue Mr.
Farrar was protected by public official immunity, since it held his acts protected by § 19103 of the Transportation Article and by the Maryland Tort Claims Act. See 323 Md. at
578, 594 A.2d at 131. The court did note, however, that several jurisdictions have held
an officer's commencement and continuation of a high speed chase to be "ministerial"
and not protected by public official immunity. Id. at 586-87, 594 A.2d at 135; see, e.g.,
Biscoe v. Arlington County, 738 F.2d 1352, 1363 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("[S]upervising and
instructing officers, conducting a felony stop, and conducting a felony pursuit . . .are
ministerial, not discretionary acts.").
73. The pre-1985 language of the Maryland Tort Claims Act stated that a "judgment
in tort for money damages against a State employee ... is a judgment against the State
only and may not be executed against the employee in his individual capacity." MD.
CTS. &JuD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-404(a)(3) (1984) (amended 1988). The current language of the Maryland Tort Claims Act is essentially the same. Compare id. with MD.
STATE Gov'T CODE ANN. § 12-105 (1984 & Supp. 1990) and MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE
ANN. § 5-399.2(b) (1989 & Supp. 1991).
74. See Boyer, 323 Md. at 583, 594 A.2d at 134.
75. See id. at 584, 594 A.2d at 134. The State argued that Ashburn relieved Trooper
Titus of a duty to the Boyers. See id. In Ashburn, the officer had no mandatory duty to
arrest a suspected drunk driver, and the court found that the officer owed no duty of
care to those whom the driver might later injure. 306 Md. 617, 626, 510 A.2d 1078,
1083 (1986). The Boyer court distinguished Ashburn as involving a decision not to apprehend and not a decision to pursue. Boyer, 323 Md. at 584, 594 A.2d at 134.
76. Boyer, 323 Md. at 584, 594 A.2d at 134. Section 21-106(d) of the Transportation
Article provides: "This section does not relieve the driver of an emergency vehicle from
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duty with regard to the safety of "all persons," and though the duty
is qualified with respect to fleeing criminals, it does extend to "non77
participants in . . . [the] chase."
With no Maryland authority directly on point, the court first examined an analogous Maryland case. In Keesling v. State,78 the court
was faced with a tort action brought by an innocent motorist who
alleged that state police being held hostage in their police car suggested that the captors commandeer the plaintiff's car so as to avoid
being caught in the more conspicuous police car. 79 The captors
then got into the plaintiff's car, ordered him to drive, and
80
threatened to shoot him when the car was stopped at a roadblock.
The Keesling court concluded that a police officer is negligent "[i]f
...
in performing his responsibilities [he] places a private citizen in
a zone of danger without reasonable justification. '"81 Further, negligence may be found if the "officer[ ] set[s] into motion a chain of
events which the officer knew or should have known would likely
lead to ... injury [to third parties caused] by the criminals or by the
police effort to [apprehend the criminals]." 8 2 The Boyer court found
Keesling persuasive, concluding, after quoting Keesling at length, that
"it seems clear under Maryland law that Trooper Titus owed the
Boyers a duty of care."8 "
The court then looked to out-of-state cases involving police
chases.8 4 In Biscoe v. Arlington County,8 5 the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit held that regardless of whether an officer's decision not to apprehend a suspect is ministerial or discretionary, the officer's decision to pursue a suspect is clearly a part of
day-to-day operational activities, and therefore ministerial.8 6 Because only discretionary acts are protected by immunity,8 7 the Biscoe
court held the county liable for the injuries of an innocent bystander
struck during a county police officer's vehicular pursuit of a susthe duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons." MD. TRANSP.
§ 21-106(d) (1987).
77. Martin v. Rossignol, 226 Md. 363, 370, 174 A.2d 149, 153 (1961).
78. 288 Md. 579, 420 A.2d 261 (1980).
79. Id. at 581, 420 A.2d at 262.
80. Id. at 582, 420 A.2d at 262.

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 589, 420 A.2d at 266.
Id. at 591, 420 A.2d at 267.
Boyer, 323 Md. at 586, 594 A.2d at 135.
See id. at 586-87, 594 A.2d at 135.
738 F.2d 1352 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
Id. at 1363.
See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
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pected bank robber.8 8 The holding in Biscoe represents the majority
in cases involving high speed chases that result in injury to third
parties.8" Following the majority, the Boyer court held that Trooper
Titus owed a duty of due care to the Boyers during the high speed
chase.9 0
Although it remanded to determine whether the plaintiffs' allegations of negligence were sufficient, the court offered guidance for
the trial court in considering the breach of duty issue. The court
properly noted that when assessing the conduct of a police officer
confronted with an emergency situation, the factfinder must consider the response of a reasonably prudent police officer faced with
an equally difficult and dangerous situation.9 ' Although a high
speed chase is unquestionably dangerous, letting a drunk driver
continue unimpeded also threatens the public safety. Thus, the of-

ficer's decision should be considered in light of these competing factors. Further, the court adopted the position that an officer's
violation of in-house pursuit guidelines should be viewed only as an
aggravating circumstance.9 2 This position takes on greater meaning
in light of cases in other jurisdictions placing much more emphasis
on self-imposed interdepartmental pursuit policies in answering the
question of whether the officer's actions amounted to negligence. 3
4. Conclusion.-In resolving the claims set out before it, the
Court of Appeals in Boyer adhered to well-developed bodies of law
governing the doctrines of public official and sovereign immunity,
as well as Maryland case law regarding gross negligence. The court
exercised reasonable discretion in allowing the plaintiffs to amend
their complaint against the Charles County Commissioners. Further, although imposing a duty of care on police officers involved in
high speed chases, the court showed sensitivity to the concerns of
88. 738 F.2d at 1363.
89. Boyer, 323 Md. at 586, 594 A.2d at 135.
90. See id. at 588, 594 A.2d at 136.
91. See id. at 589, 594 A.2d at 136.

92. See id. at 591, 594 A.2d at 137.
93. See, e.g., DeLong v. City & County of Denver, 530 P.2d 1308 (Colo. Ct. App.
1974) (finding that the trial court erred in refusing to admit police department rules
regarding speeds while conducting emergency procedures in congested areas), aff'd,
545 P.2d 154 (Colo. 1976). See generally David Rand, Jr., Annotation, Municipal Corporation's Safety Rules or Regulations as Admissible in Evidence in Action By Private Party Against
Municipal Corporationor Its Officers or Employeesfor Negligent Operation of Vehicle, 82 A.L.R. 3D

1285, 1295-98 (1978) (listing cases in which courts have held it to be reversible error to
refuse to admit into evidence police department safety regulations for establishing an
applicable standard of care).
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police officers in emergency situations, recognizing the constraints
under which police officers must perform their duties. Finally, the
court declined to fashion hard rules that might cause self-imposed
police safety guidelines to become instruments by which liability
could be presumptively imposed.
B.

Limits on the Power of Referendum

In Baltimore County Coalition Against Unfair Taxes v. Baltimore
County,9 4 a coalition of Baltimore County businesses and citizens unsuccessfully attempted to submit for referendum a county ordinance
imposing a tax on nonreusable sealed beverage containers. 95 Relying on the Baltimore County Charter, 96 the Court of Appeals held
that a referendum involving the county appropriations process must
contain the budget line item at issue and indicate an increase in the
97
disputed program over the previous year's appropriation amount.
Individual statutes imposing a tax cannot be referred to the
electorate.98
Although this holding is involved and arguably complex, it is
consistent with the treatment of referendum provisions by previous
Maryland courts. 99 In Baltimore County Coalition, however, the usual
methods employed by courts for refusing referenda' 0 0 were unavailable, and the court was forced to create a new basis for denial.
1. The Case.-The Baltimore County beverage container tax
ordinance imposes an excise tax upon distributors who supply
nonreusable beverage containers; the tax is two cents for each
container with a capacity of up to sixteen ounces and four cents for
containers with larger capacities.' 0 ' On May 30, 1989, when the or94. 321 Md. 184, 582 A.2d 510 (1990).
95. See id. at 206, 582 A.2d at 521; see BALTIMORE CourT, MD., CODE, art. VIII,

§§ 11-68 to -72 (1978 & Supp. 1988-89) (container tax ordinance).
96. BALTIMORE CouNTv, MD., CHARTER § 309 (1978 & Supp. 1988-89).

97. See Baltimore County Coalition, 321 Md. at 205, 582 A.2d at 520.
98. See id.
99. See infra notes 128-135 and accompanying text. Courts are especially reluctant to
shift power to the electorate when a referendum involves the budget process. See, e.g.,
Bickle v. Nice, 173 Md. 1, 5, 192 A. 777, 779 (1937) (holding that a gas tax statute was
exempt from referendum); Winebrenner v. Salmon, 155 Md. 563, 567, 142 A. 723, 725
(1928) (refusing to allow a referendum on a statute authorizing the issuance of bonds to
finance the construction of a state office building); cf. Avara v. Baltimore News American, 292 Md. 543, 553, 440 A.2d 368, 373 (1982) (holding that the public may be excluded from certain sessions of the Maryland General Assembly that focus on financial
concerns).
100. See infra text accompanying notes 128-132.
101. BALTIMORE COUNTY, MD., CODE art. VIII, § 11-68 (1978 & Supp. 1988-89).
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dinance was enacted, the legislature also adopted the Annual
Budget and Appropriation Ordinance of Baltimore County. °2
Budget figures indicate that Baltimore County expected to raise
$2,125,000 in revenues from the container tax, 0 3 less than 1 percent of the county's total General Fund of $807,101,657.1"4
In his budget message submitted to the Baltimore County
Council on April 11, 1989, Baltimore County Executive Dennis F.
Rasmussen explained that the container tax would be used "to help
offset the ever-increasing costs of solid waste disposal and the cost
of a planned recycling effort."' 0 5 The accuracy of this statement is
questionable, however, in light of a signed affidavit by Baltimore
County Budget Deputy Director Fred Homan: "[T]he budget
message for FY 1990, which recommends a tax on non-reusable
beverage containers, is merely justification for that levy; by no
means does it set aside those funds for their contribution to a special [fund], or [any] fund other than the general fund."'10 6 Homan
stated further that "the amounts of revenue needed to balance the
budget are simply unrelated to the purpose of any one or more appropriation, but are based upon the total of estimated budget
costs."' 0 7
The container tax law was due to take effect on December 1,
1989.108 On July 21, 1989, the Baltimore County Coalition Against
Unfair Taxes (BCCAUT), an unincorporated association of individuals and corporations, filed a referendum petition seeking to delay
the law's implementation.'0 9 Baltimore County nevertheless an102. Baltimore County Coalition, 321 Md. at 194, 582 A.2d at 515.
103. BALTIMORE COUNTY, MD., OPERATING BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR 1990, exhibit b at 2
(May 30, 1989).
104. Id., exhibit c at 16.

105.

BALTIMORE COUNTY, MD., BUDGET MESSAGE, FISCAL YEAR

1990 (Apr. 11, 1989).

106. Personal Affidavit of Fred Homan, Deputy Director of the Budget at 7, Baltimore
County Coalition (No. 90-124).
107. Id.
108. Baltimore County Coalition, 321 Md. at 188, 582 A.2d at 512.
109. Stipulation at 2, Baltimore County Coalition (No. 89-124). The referendum petition
was "filed with the board of supervisors of elections of Baltimore County within fortyfive days after the enactment of the law to be referred to the voters at the next general
elections," as required by the Charter. Id.; BALTIMORE COUNTY, MD., CHARTER § 309(a)
(1978 & Supp. 1988-89). In addition, BCCAUT collected 21,645 valid signatures, 1202
more than were required pursuant to this section of the Charter. Stipulation at 3, Baltimore County Coalition (No. 89-124).
If a satisfactory referendum petition is filed, "such law or ordinance or part thereof
to be so referred shall not take effect until thirty days after its approval by a majority of
the qualified voters of the county voting thereon at the said next general election." BALTIMORE COUNTY, MD., CHARTER

§ 309(a).
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nounced its intention to enforce the provisions of the statute. " 0
BCCAUT responded by suing the County for declaratory and
injunctive relief in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County."' On
November 11, 1989, the trial judge issued a declaratory judgment in
favor of the County." l2 The court reasoned that section 309 of the
Baltimore County Charter exempts from referendum "new or initial
appropriations for maintaining the county government";' 1 yet the
court conceded that increases in existing appropriations are not
similarly immune from the process.'"' The court then applied this
legal framework and determined that the container tax ordinance
qualified as a "new or initial appropriation" because the revenue
source did not exist during the previous year." 15 Consequently, the
circuit judge found that the ordinance could not be submitted for
6
referendum under section 309 of the Charter."
Prior to argument in the Court of Special Appeals, the Court of
Appeals granted certiorari and advanced the case on its docket for
prompt resolution." 7 On December 1, 1989, the court issued an
order affirming the circuit court's determination;" l8 in its subsequent opinion, however, the Court of Appeals rejected the lower
court's reasoning." 9
Chief Judge Murphy, writing for the court, proclaimed that the
County Charter provision allowing an increase in an appropriation
to be subject to referendum under section 309(a) does not include
specific laws imposing taxes, such as the container tax ordinance.
Instead, the legislation brought to referendum to represent the "increase" must be in the form of a specific line item of the county
budget. 20 Under this analysis, the Court of Appeals claimed that
BCCAUT erred in two respects. First, by focusing on the tax ordinance itself, the coalition brought the wrong item to referendum;
and second, the relevant line item that could have been brought to
110. See Baltimore County Coalition, 321 Md. at 189, 582 A.2d at 512.
111. Id. BCCAUT sought a declaration that the tax ordinance was without effect and
unenforceable unless and until approved by the voters. Id. The coalition also sought an
injunction against enforcement of the ordinance and the collection of the tax pending
the result of the vote. Id.
112. Id., 582 A.2d at 512-13.
113. Id., 582 A.2d at 513 (quoting BALTIMORE COUNTY, MD., CHARTER § 309(a)).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 189-90, 582 A.2d at 513.
117. Id. at 190, 582 A.2d at 513.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 205, 582 A.2d at 520.
120. Id.
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referendum, the appropriation for solid waste disposal, was lower
than the appropriation made for solid waste disposal in the previous
year's budget and thus was not an "increase" amenable to the refer2
endum process.1 1
2. Legal Background.- Section 309 of the Baltimore County
Charter reserves referendum power to the people, allowing "registered voters of the county[ ] to approve or reject at the polls[ ] any
enacted law or ordinance or part of any such law or ordinance of the
county council."' 2 2 The referendum power of county voters is not
absolute, however. Section 309(a) details the limitations on this
power:
No law making any appropriation for maintaining the
county government, or for maintaining or aiding any public
institution, not exceeding the next previous appropriation
for the same purpose, shall be subject to rejection or repeal
under this section. This increase in any such appropriation
for maintaining the county government or for maintaining
or aiding any public institution shall take effect only as in
the case of other laws, and such increase, or any part
thereof, specified in the petition may be referred to a vote
of the people of the county upon petition .... 3
Article XVI of the Maryland Constitution serves as the foundation and origin of the county referendum provision.' 24 The language of the state and Baltimore County provisions is almost
identical; the only significant alteration is the county's allowance of
legislation creating increased funding for "maintaining the county
government" to be referred to county voters. 1 25 The state referendum provision, ratified on November 2, 1915,126 allows appropriations increases to be submitted for referendum only if the revenue
measure exclusively involves "maintaining or aiding any public
institution." 127
121. Id. at 205-06, 582 A.2d at 520-21.
122. BALTIMORE COUNTY, MD., CHARTER
123. Id.

§

309(a) (1978 & Supp. 1988-89).

124. PROPOSED HOME RULE CHARTER FOR BALTIMORE COUNTY, MARYLAND 100 (1955);
see MD. CONST. art. XVI, § 1(b).
125. Compare BALTIMORE COUNTY, MD., CHARTER § 309(a) with MD. CONST. art. XVI.
126. MD. CONST. art. XVI, § I(b).

127. Id.; Baltimore County Coalition, 321 Md. at 202, 582 A.2d at 519. The state provision provides, in relevant part:

No law making any appropriation for maintaining the State Government, or for
maintaining or aiding any public institution, not exceeding the next previous
appropriation for the same purpose, shall be subject to rejection or repeal
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In response to the threat of interference with governmental
functions that accompanies a grant of referendum power to voters,
Maryland courts tend to curtail the power of the state and local referendum provisions. The judiciary has frequently employed three
methods for invalidating or discarding referendum petitions. First,
courts have strictly adhered to the technical requirements 128 of the
applicable referendum law and invalidated any petitions that failed
to meet these requirements.12 9 Second, courts have held particular
county referenda to be beyond the scope of the Home Rule Amendment' of the Maryland Constitution.'
Finally, when the preceding methods are unavailable, as in Baltimore County Coalition, courts
have construed the language of the specific state or county referendum statute at issue to discount the validity of the petition. 132
under this Section. The increase in any such appropriation for maintaining or

aiding any public institution shall only take effect as in the case of other laws,
and such increase or any part thereof specified in the petition, may be referred
to a vote of the people upon petition.
MD. CONST. art. XVI, § 1(b).
128. For example, the referendum provisions have specific requirements regarding
timeliness, form of the petition, and required number of voter signatures. See BALTIMORE COUNTY, MD., CHARTER § 309 (1978 & Supp. 1988-89).
129. See City of Takoma Park v. Citizens for Decent Gov't, 301 Md. 439, 449-50, 483
A.2d 348, 354 (1984) (holding that the referendum petition did not describe the statute
under consideration in sufficient detail to advise voters); see also Selinger v. Governor of
Maryland, 266 Md. 431, 434-35, 293 A.2d 817, 819 (1972) (asserting that submitted
petitions must carry a sufficient number of valid signatures), cert. denied sub nom. Russek v.
Governor of Maryland, 409 U.S. 1111 (1973); Tyler v. Secretary of State, 229 Md. 397,
404-06, 184 A.2d 101, 104-05 (1962) (rejecting a referendum petition upon discovering
the falsity of the circulator's affidavit testifying to the validity of signatures); Gittings v.
Board of Supervisors of Elections, 38 Md. App. 674, 677-78, 382 A.2d 349, 351 (1978)
(invalidating a petition including signatures of unqualified voters as part of the required
amount).
130. Article XI-A of the Maryland Constitution, popularly known as the Home Rule
Amendment, provides for the distribution of powers between the state legislature and
the political subdivisions of the state. See MD. CONST. art. XI-A. The underlying purpose of the article is to share with the counties and Baltimore City, within well-defined
limits, powers formerly reserved to the state. See Ritchmount Partnership v. Board of
Supervisors of Elections, 283 Md. 48, 57, 388 A.2d 523, 533 (1978).
131. See, e.g., State Admin. Bd. of Election Laws v. Talbot County, 316 Md. 332, 336,
558 A.2d 724, 726 (1989) (invalidating county charter amendment authorizing certain
voter-initiated legislation); Griffith v. Wakefield, 298 Md. 381, 390, 470 A.2d 345, 350
(1984) (rejecting charter amendment depriving the Baltimore County Council of all authority in certain types of labor dispute resolution); Cheeks v. Cedlair Corp., 287 Md.
595, 614, 415 A.2d 255, 265 (1980) (holding unconstitutional a citizen-initiated charter
amendment granting extensive police power to a newly created agency).
132. See Jack B. Gohn, Note, Interaction and Interpretation of the Budget and Referendum
Amendments of the Maryland Constitution-Bayne v. Secretary of State, 39 MD. L. REV. 558,
564-71 (1980) (describing how petitions were held invalid as the meaning of the phrase
"appropriation for maintaining state government" evolved and became increasingly
refined).
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The judiciary takes a particularly stringent approach to textual
interpretation when the legislation sought to be referred involves
state finances. Courts generally defer to the policy goals of "prevent[ing] interruptions of government," 133 and guarding "against
the possibility of the government being embarrassed in the performance of its various functions. ' 134 As one circuit judge explained:
"[It is difficult to imagine a more effective method of sabotaging
the State government than to deprive it of its anticipated revenues.
It cannot be doubted that this is the
very thing the [referendum]
'35
exception was designed to prevent."'
Maryland courts have narrowed the scope of the state referendum provision by refining the precise definition of an "appropriation." In 1927, the Attorney General opined that a statute
authorizing a gas tax to fund highway construction was an "appropriation" because the statute explicitly assigned the use of particular
funds. 13 61 In Winebrenner v. Salmon,'" 7 the Court of Appeals agreed
with the Attorney General and refused to grant a referendum on the
gas tax statute. The court also noted that the tax law and annual
budget bill were in pan materia and must be construed together as
38
though they constituted one act.'
The Winebrenner reasoning proved determinative in subsequent
cases. In Bickle v. Nice,' 3 9 state bonds issued to raise money exclusively for the construction of a state office building were considered
part of an appropriation scheme under article XVI. 140 On the other

hand, in Dorsey v. Petrott,' 4 ' the Court of Appeals ruled that a statute
creating a new administrative structure to fund the conservation of
Maryland fisheries was properly classified as "general law,"' 4 2 and
therefore was subject to the voters' referendum powers. 43 Most recently, in Kelly v. Marylanders for Sports Sanity, 14 the court determined that a law authorizing a state financing scheme was an
appropriation as contemplated in the referendum amendment be133.
134.
135.
(1949)
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Bickle v. Nice, 173 Md. 1, 10, 192 A. 777, 781 (1937).
Winebrenner v. Salmon, 155 Md. 563, 568, 142 A. 723, 725 (1925).
Carl N. Everstine, The Legislative Process in Maryland, 10 MD. L. REV. 91, 154
(citing Black v. Boone, reprinted in THE DAILY RECORD, Jan. 24, 1948).
See 12 Op. Atty. Gen. 228, 234 (1927).
155 Md. 563, 142 A. 723 (1928).
See id. at 567, 142 A. at 725.
173 Md. 1, 192 A. 777 (1937).
Id. at 5, 192 A. at 779.
178 Md. 230, 13 A.2d 630 (1940).
See id. at 247-49, 13 A.2d at 639.
Id. at 251, 13 A.2d at 640.
310 Md. 437, 530 A.2d 245 (1987).
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cause it set aside money for an exclusive purpose. 145
The sensitivity of the appropriations process compelled the
drafters of Section 309 to limit by express language the extent to
which voters can influence county budgetary policy.' 46 Although
the definition of "appropriation" existed when the Baltimore
County Charter was drafted in 1956, the county referendum provision is broader in scope than article XVI of the Maryland Constitution. 14 7 The absolute limits of Section 309, however, must be drawn
pursuant to canons of statutory construction, which place primary
importance on the plain meaning of the language used, 148 and prohibit the addition or deletion of words to or from the statute. 149 In
addition, the intent of the enacting legislature may be considered in
50
the analysis. 1

In 1956, individual taxable income was taxed by the federal
government at a maximum rate of ninety-one percent. 15 1 Because
Baltimore County voters could not significantly influence federal tax
policy, the reservation of power to the electorate under the county
145. Id. at 464-65, 530 A.2d at 258-59.
146. A number of Maryland counties address the issue of appropriations in their respective county charters. The Anne Arundel County provision is almost identical to that
of Baltimore County: "The increase in any such appropriation for maintaining the
County government or for maintaining or aiding any public institution shall only take
effect as in the case of other ordinances, and such increase, or any part thereof, specified
in the petition may be referred to a vote of the people of the County upon petition
as above provided." ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY, MD., CHARTER § 308 (1983); see, e.g.,
HARFORD COUNTY, MD., CHARTER § 220(a) (1983); HOWARD COUNTY, MD., CHARTER
§ 211 (a) (1977); MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CHARTER § 114 (1984); PRINCE GEORGE'S
COUNTY, MD., CHARTER § 319 (1987); TALBOT COUNTY, MD., CHARTER § 217(a) (1977).
The State Constitution guarantees the right of referendum over all local appropriations
measures to residents of "code counties": Allegany, Caroline, Kent, and Worcester
counties. MD. CONST. art. XI-F, § 7 ("Any action of a code county in the enactment,
amendment or repeal of a public local law is subject to a referendum of the voters in the
county .... "). The Wicomico County Charter reflects this guaranty: The people have
reserved the power to refer "any public local law or any part of any public local law
hereinafter passed." WICOMICO COUNTY, MD., CHARTER § 309(a) (1978) (emphasis
added).
147. See Baltimore County Coalition, 321 Md. at 202, 582 A.2d at 519.
148. State v. Intercontinental, Ltd., 302 Md. 132, 137, 486 A.2d 174, 176 (1985) (stating that the primary source of legislative intent is the language of the statute itself).
149. In re Ramont K., 305 Md. 482, 485, 505 A.2d 507, 508 (1986) ("A court may not
insert or omit words to make a statute express an intention not evidenced in its original
form.").
150. Harden v. Mass Transit Admin., 277 Md. 399, 406, 354 A.2d 817, 821 (1976)
("The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and carry out the real legislative intent.").
151. See I.R.C. § 1 (1954); Tax Rate Tables, Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) 109-11, at
10,115-17 (1955). The current maximum tax rate is 31% of individual income. See
I.R.C. § 1 (1991).
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referendum provision may have been considered necessary to prevent total depletion of individual resources by the superimposition
of local and state taxes on top of burdensome federal taxes. Thus,
the plain language of the county provision, as well as the historic
context within which it was promulgated, indicate that the power
reserved to the people is broad.
3. The Court's Reasoning; Analysis.-In Baltimore County Coalition,
the Court of Appeals had few sources on which to base its decision.
Although the state referendum provision had been interpreted by
previous courts, the variant county version had not been applied for
approximately thirty years.' 52 Although several other counties have
similar referendum provisions concerning appropriations,15 3 these
provisions do not provide clarity as to the precise meaning of an
"increase" in appropriations.
Both BCCAUT and Baltimore County agreed that the container
tax ordinance was "an appropriation for maintaining county government";' 5 4 the dispute focused on whether the tax represented an
exempt "new" appropriation or a referable "increase." The Court
of Appeals looked to the budgetary and fiscal procedures set forth
in Article VII of the Baltimore County Charter for guidance. 5 5 The
court relied heavily on section 706, which groups the county executive's current expense budget, capital budget, capital program, and
budget message together as a complete budget package.15 6 Section
706's further requirement of "[a] comparative statement of the receipts and expenditures" for the immediately preceding and next
ensuing fiscal years as "classified by agency, character and object,"' 1 57 persuaded the court to conclude that an increase in a project or program reflected in a line item of the budget bill is
referable, but the tax law itself is not. 15 8
There are two basic problems with the Court of Appeals' analysis. First, by separating the statute from the remainder of the
budget package, the Court acted in direct contrast to Winebrenner's
152. The campaign against the container tax law represented the first time in 27 years
in which a referendum petition carried the support of a sufficient number of Baltimore
County voters. Brief for Petitioners at 12, Baltimore County Coalition (No. 89-124).
153. See supra note 146.

154. Reporter's Official Transcript of Proceedings, Injunction Hearing at 2-3, Baltimore County Coalition (No. 89-124).
155. See Baltimore County Coalition, 321 Md. at 205, 582 A.2d at 520; see also BALTIMORE
COUNTY, MD., CHARTER art. VII, § 706 (1978 & Supp. 1988-89).
156. See Baltimore County Coalition, 321 Md. at 205, 582 A.2d at 520.
157. BALTIMORE COUNTY, MD., CHARTER art. VII, § 706.
158. Baltimore County Coalition, 321 Md. at 205, 582 A.2d at 520.
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requirement that "the act and the budget... be construed together
as though they constituted one act."' 5 9 Maryland law dictates that
its budget and corresponding tax statutes should be treated in pari
materia,16 ° and Baltimore County Coalition presented no reason to
diverge from this principle.
Second, regardless of the requirements expressed in section
706, the county budget package simply does not specify an intended
use for the container tax revenue. The Court of Appeals attempted
to follow the County Executive's message' 6 ' by linking the tax revenue with a specific line item for solid waste management. This allocation, however, ignores the $2,125,000 expected revenue from the
tax: the 1990 appropriation for the Department of Environmental
Protection's program for solid waste management reflects a $32,074
62
decrease from the previous fiscal year.'
Furthermore, Budget Director Homan implied that if the revenue from the tax were to be incorporated into a specific portion of
the budget, it would be represented by the general fund line item
for refuse collection. 163 This suggestion has not only been unequivocally rejected by the Budget Director himself,"6 but it creates a
mathematical impossibility: the $380,760 increase from the 1989
appropriation level for refuse collection ($15,967,229) to the 1990
level ($16,347,989) cannot fully account for the $2,125,000 ex165
pected revenue from the bottle tax.
In summary, no line item in the operating budget can measure
the appropriation "increase" created by the container tax statute.
This is an insufficient reason to deny the voters' referendum privilege; otherwise, the County Council could refuse specifically to allo159.
160.
161.
162.

155 Md. 563, 567, 142 A. 723, 725 (1928).
Id.
See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
Baltimore County Coalition, 321 Md. at 205-06, 582 A.2d at 521; see also BALTIMORE

COUNTY, MD., OPERATING BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR 1990, exhibit c at 10 (May 30, 1989).

This program received an appropriation of $1,514,414 in fiscal year 1989; the fiscal year
1990 appropriation for this purpose totalled $1,482,340. Id. In addition, the amount of
revenue expected from the bottle container tax ($2,125,000) exceeds the Department of
Environmental Protection's water quality and solid waste allocation by $642,660. Compare id., exhibit b at 2 with id., exhibit c at 10. No elements of the budget package specify
the intended allocation of these remaining funds.
163. Affidavit of Fred Homan, Deputy Director of the Budget, at 7, Baltimore County
Coalition (No. 89-124).
164. Id. ("In short, there is no direct causal linkage in the budget between the beverage container tax and the amount of appropriation for refuse collection and disposal set
forth in [the operating budget].").
165. BALTIMORE COUNTY, MD., OPERATING BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR 1990, exhibit c at 7
(May 30, 1989).
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cate funds and avoid being checked by the voting public. The
"increase" described in section 309 must, therefore, refer to the total "increase" in the general fund, which amounted to $59,854,918
in 1990.166 This reasoning, combined with the Winebrenner analysis,
which clearly categorizes the budget and appropriations acts as a
single entity, leads to the inescapable conclusion that BCCAUT proceeded properly by putting the container statute to referendum.
4. Conclusion.- The treatment of BCCAUT's referendum petition under the Baltimore County Charter was consistent with the
Court of Appeals' historical trend of curtailing the power of referendum. Yet, although the court's denial in Baltimore County Coalition
may have been based on a valid policy rationale, its dubious interpretation of "increase," under the guise of accepted statutory construction, has the effect of denying the public its right to review the
Baltimore County container tax statute.
C. A Limit to Immunity for State Troopers
In Sawyer v. Humphries, 16 7 the Court of Appeals held that an offduty state trooper was not automatically entitled to immunity from a
tort action when the plaintiff alleged that the trooper instigated a
roadside altercation, physically assaulted the plaintiff, and later had
the plaintiff arrested. 6 ' Significantly, the court held that the pertinent statutory scheme granting state employees immunity for actions within the scope of their public duties' 6 9 should be read in
light of the common-law phrase "scope of employment."' 70 Under
this interpretation, it was a question for the jury whether the alleged
conduct was beyond the protection of statutory immunity because
1 71
the officer acted outside the scope of his public employment.
In holding that the trooper could be exposed to a claim for
damages, the Sawyer court reversed the Court of Special Appeals,
which had held that a law enforcement officer is considered "on
duty" at all times, and had then drawn from this holding the non
sequitur that this trooper was therefore acting within the scope of
166. See id., exhibit c at 16.
167. 322 Md. 247, 587 A.2d 467 (1991).
168. See id. at 260-61, 587 A.2d at 473-74. The court concluded that the trial court
erred in dismissing the complaint but noted that at trial the evidence could still establish
immunity. See id. at 262, 587 A.2d at 474.
169. See MD. STATE GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 12-101 to -204 (1984 & Supp. 1990).
170. Sawyer, 322 Md. at 254, 587 A.2d at 470.
171. Id. at 260-61, 587 A.2d at 473-74.
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his duty.'17 The intermediate court's ruling, while expanding the
trooper's personal shield against liability, would have concurrently
diminished the state's immunity from claims; therefore, the Sawyer
court responded appropriately by blocking what might have become
a wide open door for plaintiffs at the state's expense.
1. The Case.-According to the complaint in Sawyer,' 73 the
plaintiffs, Robert Andrew Sawyer and Dean Hundley, were driving
along Route 31 in Carroll County behind a car driven by the defendant, Edwin M. Humphries. 1 74 Unknown to the plaintiffs, Humphries
was wearing civilian clothwas an off-duty state trooper. Humphries
75
ing and was driving his personal car.'
At some point, Sawyer and Hundley noticed Humphries making
hand signals toward them.' 76 Humphries then pulled over to the
shoulder of the road. Sawyer and Hundley passed Humphries's vehicle and turned down a side road to investigate a construction site
at which they hoped to obtain employment.' 7 7 Upon returning to
Route 31, the plaintiffs saw Humphries's car parked on the side of
his car and motioning for
the road; Humphries was leaning against
17
him.'
approach
to
Hundley
and
Sawyer
As the plaintiffs drove slowly toward him, Humphries allegedly
picked up some rocks and threw one at their car, denting the passenger side.' 79 Sawyer swerved, then made a U-turn and parked on
As Sawyer got
the opposite side of the street from Humphries.'
out of his car, Humphries picked up more rocks; Sawyer grabbed an
empty beer bottle, allegedly to defend himself.'' Humphries then
the hair, beating him about the
attacked Sawyer, "grabbing him by
'8 2
face and threatening to kill him."'
When Hundley stepped out of the car to help his companion,
172. See Sawyer v. Humphries, 82 Md. App. 72, 83-84, 570 A.2d 341, 347 (1990), rev'd
and remanded, 322 Md. 247, 587 A.2d 467 (1991).
173. The Court of Appeals treated the allegations of the complaint as true because
the appeal was from the trial court's granting of the defendant's motion to dismiss. Sawyer, 322 Md. at 253 n.4, 587 A.2d at 470 n.4; see Cox v. Prince George's County, 296 Md.
162, 169, 460 A.2d 1038, 1042 (1983).
174. Sawyer, 322 Md. at 249, 587 A.2d at 468.
175. Id. at 249-50, 587 A.2d at 468.
176. Id. at 250, 587 A.2d at 468.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. Humphries claimed that he acted in self defense. Id. at 257 n.6, 587 A.2d at
472 n.6.
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Humphries released Sawyer and warned Hundley to get back in the
car; Hundley heeded the warning.' 3 Sawyer then got into the pas84
senger seat of his car, apparently too badly injured to drive.1
Humphries approached Sawyer's vehicle and offered to exchange
information; Sawyer refused, and he and Hundley drove away from
18 5

the scene.

Later that day, the plaintiffs again encountered Humphries
8 6
when they came to a stop sign in the town of New Windsor.
Humphries got out of his car, approached the plaintiffs, and slapped
Sawyer across the chest, stating that he was a Maryland State Police
Officer. 1 87 Humphries attempted to arrest Sawyer by physically removing him from the car, but Sawyer's seat belt was fastened.'8 8
Despite repeated requests by Hundley and Sawyer for Humphries to
present his police identification, Humphries refused.' 8 9 Other officers eventually arrived and arrested Sawyer. The record presented
to the court, however, did not indicate whether Sawyer had been
charged with any offense.' 90
One year later, Sawyer and Hundley filed a complaint against
Humphries, alleging several counts of assault and battery.' 9 ' The
state was not named as a defendant, however, and Humphries
moved to dismiss, claiming he was entitled to personal immunity as
a state employee acting within the scope of his employment and
without malice.' 92 The Circuit Court for Carroll County dismissed
the complaint, and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed. 193 On the
183. Id. at 250, 587 A.2d at 468. According to the plaintiffs, Humphries said to Hundley, "[u]nless you want some too, boy, you better get back in the car." Id.
184. Id.

185. Id. at 250-51, 587 A.2d at 468.
186. Id. at 251, 587 A.2d at 469. Sawyer and Hundley claimed they had seen Humphries driving in front of them at one point, but he later turned down a side road and
began following them. Id., 587 A.2d at 468. The Court of Special Appeals' opinion
indicated that Humphries pursued the plaintiffs from the time they left the initial incident. Sawyer v. Humphries, 82 Md. App. at 75, 570 A.2d at 342.
187. Sawyer, 322 Md. at 251, 587 A.2d at 469.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 251-52, 587 A.2d at 469. It is not clear why the plaintiffs did not seek to
reach the state coffers. It is possible that their grievances against Humphries were so
vehement that they wanted personal retribution. Also, Humphries may have had sufficient assets to pay punitive damages, which are not available against the state. See MD.
CTS. &JuD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-399.2(a)(1) (Supp. 1991). It is also possible, however,
that the plaintiffs simply missed the 180-day notice deadline for tort actions against the
state. See MD. STATE GOV'T CODE ANN. § 12-106(d)(2) (1984).
193. See Sawyer v. Humphries, 82 Md. App. at 87, 570 A.2d at 348.
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plaintiffs' petition, the Court of Appeals granted certiorari.'

94

2. Legal Background.-Until passage of the Maryland Tort
Claims Act' 95 in 1981, Maryland was one of a handful of states that
retained absolute sovereign immunity in tort.' 96 This common-law
doctrine, derived from the immunity of the English crown, held
state governments immune from liability for the torts of their employees. 9 7 The doctrine had two aspects: procedurally, a state
could not be sued without its consent; and substantively, a state
could not be found liable in tort unless it had waived its
immunity.' 98
In certain circumstances, the state employee could also claim a
qualified immunity, often leaving an injured plaintiff with no remedy. For instance, the doctrine that was known as "public official
immunity" shielded certain government employees-including law
enforcement officers-if they were considered public officials, rather
than mere employees, and if they were exercising discretionary,
rather than ministerial functions.' 99
The resulting inequity against victims prompted a general erosion of sovereign tort immunity, both by statute and by judicial abrogation. 200 Maryland's response was the enactment of the Tort
Claims Act, which waives the state's immunity to the extent of insurance coverage, but only when the tortfeasor-employee acts both
"within the scope of the [employee's] public duties" and without
194. Sawyer v. Humphries, 320 Md. 87, 576 A.2d 220 (1990).
195. The Maryland Tort Claims Act was initially codified at MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC.
CODE ANN. §§ 5-401 to -408 (1984) and was recodified at MD. STATE GOV'T CODE ANN.

§§ 12-101 to -204 (Supp. 1990).
196. KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 25.00-2, at 557
(1976). In 1976, Maryland was one of only five states that adhered to the traditional
rule, granting immunity from liability for torts occurring in the exercise of governmental
functions. Id. By 1977, two of the five states had judicially abolished the immunity. Id.
§ 25.00 (Supp. 1977).
197. See, e.g., State ex rel. Watkins v. Rich, 126 Md. 643, 645, 95 A. 956, 957 (1915)
(holding that the State Roads Commission, as a governmental agency charged with a
public function, was protected by sovereign immunity).
198. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895B cmt. a (1977). The lack of immunity,
of course, does not automatically constitute liability, but does make it possible to establish liability. Id.
199. See, e.g., State ex rel. Cocking v. Wade, 87 Md. 529, 541-44, 40 A. 104, 106-07
(1898) (holding that the sheriff was a public officer exercising judgment and discretion;
thus, there was no cause of action against him for the murder of a prisoner by a lynch
mob); cf Robinson v. Board of County Comm'rs, 262 Md. 342, 347, 278 A.2d 71, 74
(1971) (holding that police officers enjoy immunity only when acting without malice); see
also supra text accompanying notes 31-33.
200. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895B cmt. b (1977).
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malice or gross negligence. 2 ° 1 In those situations, a state government employee retains personal immunity.20 2
Determining the appropriate defendant under the statute,
therefore, depends on the facts of each case. A state employee is
not entitled to immunity and may be held personally liable if she
commits a tort with malice or gross negligence or outside the scope
of her "public duties." On the other hand, the state may be liable if
one of its employees commits a tort while acting within the scope of
his "public duties" and without malice or gross negligence. Before
Sawyer, however, neither the Maryland legislature nor Maryland
courts had defined the phrase "scope of the public duties. "203
Confronted by the question, the Court of Special Appeals
looked extensively at the history and functions of Maryland State
Police troopers, and policemen in general, concluding that a
trooper is considered to be, "for police purposes[,] on duty twentyfour hours a day, seven days a week, fifty-two weeks a year. "'24 The
lower appellate court then stated that "[s]ince Trooper Humphries
acted as a law enforcement officer[ ] at the time of the incident
about which Sawyer and Hundley complain, he was under the umbrella of the Maryland Tort Claims Act." ' 5
201. MD. STATE GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 12-101 to -204 (1984 & Supp. 1990). Section
12-104 provides: "Subject to the exclusions and limitations in this subtitle, the immunity of the State and of its units is waived as to a tort action, in a court of the State, to the
extent of insurance coverage under Title 9 of the State Finance and Procurement Article." Id. § 12-104(a).
Section 5-399.2 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article provides exclusions
from the waiver of immunity. See MD. CTS. & JuD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-399.2 (Supp.
1991). The state has not waived its sovereign immunity for claims based on a state
employee's tortious act or omission that "[i]s not within the scope of the public duties of
the State personnel[,] or . . . [ius made with malice or gross negligence." Id. § 5399.2(a).
Consistent with its desire to ensure a remedy to injured plaintiffs, the Maryland
legislature dictated that the provisions of the Tort Claims Act should be construed
broadly. See MD. STATE Gov'T CODE ANN. § 12-102 (1984).
202. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-399.2(b). This section provides that
"[s]tate personnel are immune from suit in courts of the State and from liability in tort
for a tortious act or omission that is within the scope of the public duties of the State
personnel and is made without malice or gross negligence." Id.
203. 322 Md. at 253, 587 A.2d at 470. The court noted, however, that it had impliedly
treated the phrase to mean scope of employment in Rucker v. Harford County, 316 Md.
275, 292, 558 A.2d 399, 407 (1989). See Sawyer, 322 Md. at 253, 587 A.2d at 470.
204. Sawyer v. Humphries, 82 Md. App. at 84, 570 A.2d at 347. As the Court of
Appeals later commented, however, whether Humphries was on duty was only one factor in determining whether he had acted within the scope of his duties. See Sawyer, 322
Md. at 259, 587 A.2d at 473.
205. Sawyer v. Humphries, 82 Md. App. at 84, 570 A.2d at 347. Perhaps the court

concluded that Humphries had "acted as a law enforcement officer" because of Sawyer's
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The court also held that the trial court's dismissal was appropribecause
Sawyer could not prevail on his claim that Humphries
ate
acted maliciously in throwing a rock at Sawyer's car, pulling his hair,
and punching him repeatedly. 20 6 The Court of Special Appeals dismissed these assertions as "[b]ald allegations of malice or gross
negligence... not sufficient to remove the immunity protective umbrella from police officers. To allow bald allegations to serve to
all law enforceclose the immunity umbrella would, in effect, render
20 7
ment officers susceptible to the pleader's pen.
3. The Court's Reasoning; Analysis.-The Court of Appeals in
Sawyer read the scope of a police officer's duties more narrowly than
the lower courts. After determining that the General Assembly intended the state to bear tort liability for its employees' actions to the
same extent as a private employer, the court held that the phrase
"scope of the public duties" was synonymous with the phrase
"scope of employment" as used in the common-law rule of respondeat superior.20 8
This rule of vicarious liability allows a plaintiff to sue the employer, or principal, for the tortious acts of an employee, or agent,
ultimate arrest in New Windsor. Id. at 76, 570 A.2d at 343. The court's bald assertion,
however, was clearly begging the question. At the very least, it was undisputed that
Humphries had hurled a rock at Sawyer's car; if the allegations of Sawyer's complaint
were taken as true, Humphries had done a great deal worse. Id. at 74, 570 A.2d at 342.
The Court of Special Appeals' formulation, because it considers state police to be
on duty at all times, reduces the immunity inquiry to one question: whether the trooper
acted with malice or gross negligence. If answered in the negative, the state may be held
liable regardless of whether the trooper's activity truly was within his public duties. This
formulation exposes the state to significant liability. For example, the state could be
liable for damages resulting from an automobile collision caused by the ordinary negligence of an "off-duty" officer, regardless of the fact that the officer was driving his personal car while on vacation or returning home from a bar. Of course, later cases could
have distinguished these situations by concluding that the trooper had not acted as a law
enforcement officer.
206. See id. at 86, 570 A.2d at 348.
207. Id. The court was concerned that such "bald allegations" of malice could force
an officer to pay for his or her own defense. Id. The Act provides, however, that in
actions against state personnel, the Maryland Attorney General, if requested by the employee, must investigate the incident and represent the employee if it is determined that
the employee acted within the scope of employment and without malice or gross negligence. MD. STATE Gov'T CODE ANN. § 12-304 (1984). The employee must agree beforehand to reimburse the costs of representation if the tort is held to be outside the scope
of employment, or to have been performed with malice or gross negligence. Id. § 12305 (1984 & Supp. 1990). If the Attorney General declines representation, but a court
determines that the employee is entitled to immunity, the employee is entitled to reimbursement by the state. Id. § 12-310(b).
208. Sawyer, 322 Md. at 253-54, 587 A.2d at 470.
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when committed within the scope of employment.2 0 9 The scope of
employment includes conduct that is in furtherance of the employer's interests or incidental to authorized acts.2 t0 Whether conduct is incidental depends on a number of considerations, including
whether the conduct is of the same general nature as that authorized, whether the act is close in time and place to the authorized
2
time and place of duties, and whether the conduct is foreseeable. "1
Factors indicating that an act is outside the scope of employment include serious criminality of the act; personal motives and
self-interest, or a departure from the employer's business; and unprovoked, unusual, or outrageous conduct.21 2 Given these principles of respondeat superior, the Court of Appeals concluded that
Humphries's alleged actions, if proven, would lie clearly outside the
scope of his employment, and Humphries could not, therefore,
claim immunity. 1l The court reversed the Court of Special Appeals
209. See, e.g., Wilson Amusement Co. v. Spangler, 143 Md. 98, 101-05, 121 A. 851,

853-54 (1923) (holding a theater owner liable for damages resulting from an assault and
battery by an employee-doorkeeper). When employees have deviated grossly from the
line of duty, or are pursuing what are clearly their own interests, they are said to be on a
"frolic of [their] own," and the employer is absolved of vicarious liability. See, e.g., Carroll v. Hillendale Golf Club, Inc., 156 Md. 542, 546, 144 A. 693, 695 (1929) (holding
that employer was not liable when its employee shot someone, because the employee
was motivated by personal interests); see also Stavitz v. City of New York, 471 N.Y.S.2d
272, 274 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (holding that a police officer's assault on his neighbor
was the result of a personal dispute).
210. See generally RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF

AGENCY §§ 228-29 (1957).

211. Id.; see also Wood v. Abell, 268 Md. 214, 226-28, 300 A.2d 665, 672 (1973) (holding that the vice president of the county fair association acted within the scope of employment because the acts performed were customary for that position); Drug Fair of
Md., Inc. v. Smith, 263 Md. 341, 347, 283 A.2d 392, 396 (1971) (holding that a store
cashier was acting within the scope of employment when apprehending an alleged shoplifter at the employer's request). But see LePore v. Gulf Oil Corp., 237 Md. 591, 595-600,
207 A.2d 451, 453-56 (1965) (holding that an assault by an employee authorized only to
attempt to make a collection did not occur within the scope of employment).
212. RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

OF AGENCY

§ 229 (1957).

Outrageous and seriously

criminal acts by employees have usually been held to be outside the scope of employment, sometimes as a matter of law. See, e.g., Henley v. Prince George's County, 305 Md.
320, 330 n.2, 503 A.2d 1333, 1338 n.2 (1986) (holding employer not liable for sexual
assault and murder committed by employee). This is true even when the outrageous act
was aided by abuse of the employee's official position. See, e.g., City of Green Cove
Springs v. Donaldson, 348 F.2d 197, 202 (5th Cir. 1965) (holding that a rape and assault
by a police officer was outside his scope of duty as a matter of law, even though the
victim was initially taken into custody for speeding); Gambling v. Cornish, 426 F. Supp.
1153, 1155 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (holding that imprisonment, false arrest, and rape by police
officers were acts outside the scope of duty as a matter of law); Snell v. Murray, 284 A.2d
381, 385 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1971) (holding that the city was not liable for bullet
wounds inflicted by a drunken police officer who was trying to extort the proceeds of a
dice game), aff'd per curiam, 296 A.2d 538 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1972).
213. Sawyer, 322 Md. at 257, 587 A.2d at 472.
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and remanded the case for trial, leaving open the question of liability. According to the court, the evidence would show as a matter of
fact or law whether Humphries acted within the scope of his employment, and it was the trial court's duty to proceed with the
case.

2 14

In addition, the Court of Appeals found that "the complaint
sufficiently alleged malice so that Mr. Humphries would not be entitled to immunity under the Act."-"2
The plaintiffs' allegations that
Humphries threw rocks at them, physically attacked Sawyer, and
threatened to kill him, clearly showed malice on the part of Humphries. 2 6 Thus, the plaintiffs were entitled to proceed to trial even
21 7
if Humphries had acted within the scope of his police duties.
Because Humphries's claim of immunity required factual determinations and the plaintiffs sufficiently alleged malice to overcome
an immunity defense, Humphries was not entitled to a dismissal.2 1 8
The Court of Appeals thus effectively placed governmental immunity for state troopers at roughly the same level as that of private
employees; the scope of employment of a state trooper is no longer
In light of these principles, it seems obvious that the defendant's alleged
conduct, at least prior to the incident in the town of New Windsor, was outside
of the scope of his employment. The defendant was off duty and driving his
personal car. Under the allegations of the complaint, the defendant's throwing
a rock at the plaintiffs' car and his attack upon the plaintiffs along Route 31 had
nothing to do with the defendant's duties as a police officer. As to that activity,
there is no suggestion in the complaint that Mr. Humphries was attempting to
question, stop, detain or arrest the plaintiffs in connection with any traffic or
criminal offense or any other matter of concern to the police department. On
the contrary, insofar as it appears from the complaint, Mr. Humphries was acting for purely personal reasons and not incidental to any State law enforcement
purpose.
Id. at 257-58, 587 A.2d at 472. In a footnote, the court added that even under Humphries's version of the events, he was acting initially not to detain or arrest Sawyer, but
in self defense. Id. at 257 n.6, 587 A.2d at 472 n.6.
Although the court seemed to indicate that self defense is a personal motive not
imputable to the employer, it is not clear whether the court would be so harsh if the self
defense was combined with the exercise of a police function. Other courts have held
such a mixture to be within the scope of duties. See, e.g., Banks v. City of Chicago, 297
N.E.2d 343, 349 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973).
214. See Sawyer, 322 Md. at 262, 587 A.2d at 474. In most respondeat superior cases,
whether an agent or servant was acting within the scope of his employment has been
held, at least when the facts are in dispute, to be a question for the jury. See, e.g., Wood,
268 Md. at 228, 300 A.2d at 672; Drug Fair of Md., Inc., 263 Md. at 346-47, 283 A.2d at
396; LePore, 237 Md. at 593, 207 A.2d at 452; Rusnack v. Giant Food, Inc., 26 Md. App.
250, 265, 337 A.2d 445, 454 (1975).
215. Sawyer, 322 Md. at 261, 587 A.2d at 474.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 262, 587 A.2d at 474.
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219

all-encompassing.
At least one important difference remains between the liability
of the state as employer and private employers' liability, however.
Under the traditional respondeat superior doctrine, if an employee
commits a tort while acting within her scope of employment, the
employer may be vicariously liable, even if the employee acts with
malice.2 20 Under the terms of the Act, however, the state retains immunity when the employee acts with malice or gross
negligence.221
4. Conclusion.-Because Sawyer recognizes a boundary around
a state trooper's scope of employment, and therefore a limit on the
trooper's immunity, the opinion restores the possibility of an effective remedy to a plaintiff who sues the trooper in his personal capacity, whether because of a missed notice deadline, out of a desire for
personal retribution, or in hopes of a punitive damages award. For
plaintiffs who seek to reach the deeper pockets of the state, however, Sawyer strikes a note of caution against excessive hyperbole in
drafting a complaint.2 2 2 The more outrageous the depiction of the
trooper's actions, the less likely the actions will be found to be
within the scope of employment. If the trooper's actions are held to
be outside the scope of employment, the plaintiff has no cause of
action against the state. For the defendant, either state trooper or
state government, Sawyer means more instances in which a case will
turn on its facts, with liability assessed against the government when
the trooper's negligent tort arises from the performance of his duties, and against the trooper personally when he acts outrageously
or in his private capacity.
D. Local Elected Officials Are Not Immunized for ElectioneeringActivities
In Ennis v. Crenca,22 3 the Court of Appeals held that an elected
official's statements to the press are outside the scope of employ219. Although the court did not specifically delineate what constitutes the scope of
employment of a police officer, the nature of an officer's duties requires the scope to be
broader than that of other government and private employees. Id. at 258, 587 A.2d at
472.
220. See, e.g., Cox v. Prince George's County, 296 Md. 162, 170, 460 A.2d 1038, 1042
(1983) (accepting the common-law notion that a master is responsible for the conduct of
his servant, even if the servant acted recklessly or willfully).
221. See MD. CTs. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-399.2(a)(4)(ii) (Supp. 1991).
222. Hyperbole in such a situation is probably unnecessary anyway, because the state
has not waived immunity for punitive damages. See id. § 5-399.2(a)(1).
223. 322 Md. 285, 587 A.2d 485 (1991).
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ment when such statements can be characterized as campaign activity and are made for the elected official's own purposes.22 4 Because
the Maryland Local Government Tort Claims Act (LGTCA) 225 only
immunizes local elected officials 226 from personal liability for conduct within the scope of employment,2 2 7 the LGTCA did not apply
to the electioneering activities at issue in Ennis.2 2 8
1. The Case.-On September 22, 1987, Joan Ennis and Rosalie
Crenca, a Montgomery County legislator, met for lunch in the
Montgomery County Council office building. 229 At the time of the
meeting, Ennis was president of the Allied Civic Group, Inc., an organization opposed to a proposed development plan for Silver
Spring. 2 0 According to Ennis, the purpose of the brief meeting was
to express the Allied Civic Group's opposition to the development
plan. 2 3 ' Despite the opposition, Crenca voted for the development
plan in November 1987.232
In December, Crenca requested a fellow county employee to
notify the press that Ennis had offered Crenca a bribe at the September meeting. 2 33 Further, Crenca told a local reporter that Ennis
had offered to pay off Crenca's campaign debt in exchange for
Crenca's vote against the development project.2 3 4 Crenca's allegations of bribery were published in the Montgomery Journal, the Washington Times, and the Washington Post.23 5 On April 29, 1988, Ennis
224. See id. at 295-96, 587 A.2d at 490-91.
225. Act of June 2, 1987, ch. 594, 1987 Md. Laws 2709 (codified at MD. CTS. &JUD.
PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 5-401 to -404 (1989)).

226. The LGTCA definition of "employee" includes elected officials. See id. § 5401 (c)(ii).
227. See id. § 5-402(a).
228. See 322 Md. at 294, 587 A.2d at 490.
229. Id. at 288, 587 A.2d at 486.
230. See id., 587 A.2d at 486-87. Crenca had previously been president of the same
organization. Jo-Ann Armano, Money Allegedly Offered to Crenca, WASH. POST, Dec. 10,

1987, at BI.
231. See Ennis, 322 Md. at 288, 587 A.2d at 486-87.
232. See id., 587 A.2d at 487. The Montgomery County Council voted 4 to 3 for the
development plan. Crenca, president of the council at the time, was a key vote.
Armano, supra note 230, at Bl.
233. Ennis, 322 Md. at 288, 587 A.2d at 487.
234. Id. According to the Washington Post, Crenca had a campaign debt of approximately $3800. In the same article, Ennis claimed that she personally had no money, the
Allied Civic Group was "threadbare poor," and the other organization to which she
belonged had not given her authority to spend money. Armano, supra note 230, at BI.
235. Ennis, 322 Md. at 288, 587 A.2d at 487. The Washington Post carried the story for
three consecutive days. See Jo-Ann Armano, Montgomery Political Flap Becomes Bitter and
Baffling, WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 1987, at BI [hereinafter Armano, Montgomery Political
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was indicted for offering a bribe to an elected official.2 6 The State
later entered a nolle prosequi in that case. 7
Ennis filed suit against Crenca in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, charging Crenca with libel and slander.238 Ennis
did not name Montgomery County as a codefendant in her complaint and did not notify the county of the suit against Crenca.2 3 9
Under the LGTCA, a party may not maintain an action for unliquidated damages against a local government or its employees unless notice is given to the local government within 180 days of the
alleged injury.2 4 0 Therefore, Crenca moved to dismiss Ennis's action, claiming that Ennis failed to provide the required notice to the
county. 241' Ennis amended her complaint, stating that she was suing
Crenca in her individual capacity and not as an officer or representative of the county. 42
The circuit court held that as a matter of law Crenca was acting
within the scope of her employment, and therefore, the LGTCA applied when she allegedly defamed Ennis. 43 Because Ennis had not
given the required notice to Montgomery County, the circuit court
dismissed the action.2 4 4 Ennis filed an appeal with the Court of Special Appeals, 24 5 and prior to argument in that court, the Court of
Appeals issued a writ of certiorari.2 4 6
The Court of Appeals held that Crenca was acting outside the
scope of her employment and that the LGTCA consequently did not
apply.2 4 7 The court reversed the dismissal by the Circuit Court for
Montgomery County and remanded the case for trial. 48

Flap];Jo-Ann Armano, Md. Officials to Look Into Crenca Claim, WASH. POST, Dec. 11, 1987,
at BI [hereinafter Armano, Crenca Claim]; Armano, supra note 230, at BI.
236. Ennis, 322 Md. at 289, 587 A.2d at 487.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. See MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-404(a) (1989).
241. Ennis, 322 Md. at 290, 587 A.2d at 487.
242. Id., 587 A.2d at 488.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 291, 587 A.2d at 488.
246. Id.
247. See id. at 296, 587 A.2d at 491.
248. See id. at 296-97, 587 A.2d at 491.
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Legal Background.-

a. Sovereign Immunity.-Sovereign immunity is based upon the
common-law presumption that the "King can do no wrong." 2 49 The
State of Maryland and its political subdivisions have sovereign immunity "by reason of [the state's] prerogative as a sovereign, and on
grounds of public policy." '2' 0 Among the public policy grounds forwarded in support of sovereign immunity, financial considerations
are perhaps the most prominent. 2 5 '
Political subdivisions in Maryland have sovereign immunity unless the General Assembly directly or by implication waives that immunity.2 5 2 In 1987, the General Assembly partially waived the
sovereign immunity of local governments by enacting the Local
Government Tort Claims Act. 25 3 The main purpose of the LGTCA
was to require local governments to defend their employees in lawsuits, thereby reducing the impact of lawsuits "on the incentive of
public employees and officials to do their jobs to the best of their
25
abilities." 4
The liability of a local government is limited, however. The
LGTCA only requires a local government to defend one of its employees in a lawsuit if the action is based on alleged tortious conduct
that occurred while the employee was acting within the "scope of
employment.

'2 5 5

Therefore,

the duty to defend an employee

hinges upon whether the alleged tortious conduct falls within the
scope of employment.
249. Edwin M. Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE LJ. 1, 2 (1924).
250. State v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 34 Md. 344, 374 (1871).
251. See Godwin v. County Comm'rs, 256 Md. 326, 333-34, 260 A.2d 295, 298-99
(1970).

252. See id. at 334, 260 A.2d at 299 (finding negligence arising out of the maintenance
of county roads to be an implicit exception to the rule that counties have sovereign
immunity).
253. See Act of June 2, 1987, ch. 594, 1987 Md. Laws 2709 (codified at MD. CTS. &
JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 5-401 to -404 (1989)).

254. Ennis, 322 Md. at 291, 587 A.2d at 488.
255. MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-402. Section 5-402(a) states:
Each local government shall provide for its employees a legal defense in any
action that alleges damages resulting from tortious acts or omissions committed by an employee within the scope of employment with the local government.
Id. Governments act through their employees. Theoretically, the state could always be

impleaded under the general allegation that one of its employees has acted tortiously,
absent maintenance of a boundary between personal acts and acts in the name of the
state. The term "scope of employment" provides such a boundary. See generally
Borchard, supra note 249, at 13. Cf supra note 208 and accompanying text.
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b. Test for Scope of Employment.-In Sawyer v. Humphries,2 56 the
Court of Appeals analogized the "scope of public duties" under the
Maryland Tort Claims Act 25 7 to the scope of employment concept

under the doctrine of respondeat superior.2 5 8 The Sawyer court confirmed earlier decisions that found an employee's conduct within
the scope of employment if (1) the conduct furthered the employer's business, and (2) it was such that it would have been authorized by the employer.2 5 9 Unauthorized conduct could be within
the scope of employment if it was incidental to the performance of
duties entrusted to the employee.2 6 °
The Sawyer court emphasized that an employee's protection of
personal interests is outside the scope of employment, even if the
conduct occurs during business hours at the place of business. 26 '
Therefore, whether the activity at issue can be considered the promotion or protection of personal interests by the government employee is an important determination to be made in disputes
involving local government employees.
c. Analogous Legislative Immunity at the Federal Level.-The extent
of legislative immunity at the federal level illustrates the types of
activities that are often considered protection of personal interests,
and therefore outside the legislator's scope of employment. Federal
legislators are protected by the Speech or Debate Clause of the
United States Constitution 26 2 for statements made in committee and
Senate or House proceedings. 26 ' The purpose of the clause is to
prevent members of Congress from being hindered in the performance of their legislative tasks by having to defend their actions in
256. 322 Md. 247, 587 A.2d 467 (1991).
257. MD. STATE GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 12-101 to -110 (1984 & Supp. 1990).
258. 322 Md. at 254, 587 A.2d at 470 (holding that an off-duty police officer had not

acted within the scope of his public duties when he assaulted and battered a motorist).
For a thorough analysis of Sawyer, see supra Subpart XII.C.
259. 322 Md. at 254, 587 A.2d at 470.
260. Id. at 256, 587 A.2d at 471. The court recognized that the time, place, and purpose of the action are key factors in determining whether the conduct, although not
authorized, is nevertheless incidental to the scope of employment. See id.
261. Id. at 256-57, 587 A.2d at 471.
262. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1. The clause provides that "for any Speech or Debate
in either House, [Senators or Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other

Place." Id.
263. See Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 625 (1972) (extending the protection
of the Speech or Debate Clause to matters that are "an integral part of the deliberative

and communicative process by which Members participate in committee and House
proceedings").
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court, 2 64 a policy similar to the stated purpose of the LGTCA.2 6 5

The Supreme Court has limited the scope of protection granted
by the Speech or Debate Clause, finding that the clause "does not
extend beyond what is necessary to preserve the integrity of the legislative process.

' 266

In United States v. Brewster,26 7 the Court held

that activities such as news releases or speeches delivered outside of
Congress are "political in nature rather than legislative ' and are
not likely to be protected under the Speech or Debate Clause. 2 69
Further, in Hutchinson v. Proxmire,2 70 the Court specifically held
that newsletters and press releases are beyond the protection of the
Speech or Debate Clause.2 7 ' United States Senator William
2 72
Proxmire bestowed his "Golden Fleece of the Month" award
upon several agencies that provided funding to Ronald Hutchinson,
a research behavioral scientist, who Proxmire claimed "made a fortune from his monkeys and in the process made a monkey out of the
American taxpayer. "271
Proxmire delivered a speech in the Senate2 7 4 about Hutchinson's research and included the text of the speech in a press release.2 7 5 The substance of the speech was repeated again in a
newsletter sent to many of Senator Proxmire's constituents.2 7 6
When Hutchinson brought a defamation suit against Proxmire, the
Senator maintained that the statements made in the press release
264. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 123 (1979).
265. See supra text accompanying note 254.
266. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 517 (1972); see also Benford v. American
Broadcasting Co., 502 F. Supp. 1148, 1152 (D. Md. 1980) (summarizing the limitations
on the applicability of the clause).
267. 408 U.S. 501 (1972).
268. Id. at 512.
269. See id.
270. 443 U.S. 111 (1979).
271. See id. at 133.
272. Senator Proxmire gave his "Golden Fleece" awards to agencies that sponsored
projects he considered the most glaring examples of wasteful government spending.
The National Science Foundation, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration,
and the Office of Naval Research received the award for their sponsorship of research
scientist Ronald Hutchinson's research. Id. at 114.
273. Id. at 116. Hutchinson filed suit in the United States District Court in Wisconsin
for defamation, interference with contractual relations, intentional infliction of emotional anguish, and invasion of privacy. Id. at 121-22.
274. Proxmire does not remember actually delivering the speech on the Senate floor,
but it appeared in the Congressional Record. The Court assumed, without discussion,
that a speech printed in the Congressional Record carries immunity under the Speech or
Debate Clause. Id. at 116 n.2.
275. Id. at 115-16.
276. Id. at 117.
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and newsletter were protected by the Speech or Debate Clause as
part of the "informing function" of Congress.2 77 The Supreme
Court concluded that "[v]aluable and desirable as it may be in broad
terms, the transmittal of such information by individual Members in
order to inform the public and other Members is not a part of the
legislative function or the deliberations that make up the legislative
process."'2 7 Congressional activities such as constituent newsletters and press releases are thus excluded from the protection of legislative immunity.
3. The Court's Reasoning.-The Court of Appeals examined several factors in deciding that Crenca's report to the press about the
alleged bribe offer was outside the scope of her employment as a
county legislator. The court found that Crenca's statements to the
press were essentially electioneering activities2 79 and that such activities are outside the scope of an elected official's employment, rendering the LGTCA inapplicable."'
a. Statements to the Press.-According to the Court of Appeals,
Crenca's statements to the press were not made in furtherance of
her duties as a county legislator, nor were the statements implicitly
authorized by the county. 28 ' Thus, the Sawyer standard was not
met. 22882 Crenca's argument that her statements to the press were
protected because they related to her activities as a public official
regarding matters of public interest2 83 therefore failed. The Court
of Appeals found that there was nothing peculiar to Crenca's job as
a county legislator that made revelation of an alleged bribe a benefit
to the public.2 8 4
Although the Hutchinson and Brewster opinions support the
proposition that an elected official's reports to the press are political
rather than legislative activity, 28 5 the Court of Appeals explicitly
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.

See id. at 132.
Id. at 133.
See Ennis, 322 Md. at 295, 587 A.2d at 490.
See id. at 294, 587 A.2d at 490.
See id. at 296, 587 A.2d at 490.
See supra notes 259-261 and accompanying text.

283. Defendant's Response to Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint
at 2, Ennis (Montgomery Cir. Ct. No. 36177). Crenca's argument was very similar to the
"informing function" argument put forth by Senator Proxmire. See Hutchinson v.
Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 132 (1979); supra text accompanying note 277.
284. See Ennis, 322 Md. at 295, 587 A.2d at 490.
285. Brewster provides the basis for determining that statements to the press are political rather than legislative in nature. See 408 U.S. 501, 512 (1972). Hutchinson provides
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stated that "under some circumstances, an elected official may be
acting within the scope of his or her employment when making
statements to the press." 2 8 6 The court then examined the surrounding circumstances to determine the nature of Crenca's actions. In particular, the court determined that the length of time
that elapsed before Crenca reported the alleged bribe offer to the
press indicated that Crenca's remarks were initiated for reasons
other than to discharge her duties as a county legislator.2 8 7 Furthermore, the court referred to an article in the Washington Post that indicated that Crenca was being considered as a candidate for Congress
at the time of the press statements.2 8 8 This fact undoubtedly influenced the court's determination that Crenca was politically motivated to publicize the alleged bribe offer. Finally, the court was
influenced by the fact that Crenca had not notified the Attorney
General or the State's Attorney of the bribe offer prior to her statements to the press. 28 9
29
The Court of Appeals concluded from its analysis of the facts

°

that Crenca's statements to the press were intended to discredit her
political opponents and that the undermining of political opponents
characteristically constitutes electioneering. 2 9 ' According to the
court, electioneering activities were not the type of activities for
which the LGTCA was enacted.2 92
b. Campaign Activities.-The relationship of campaign activities
to scope of employment was an issue of first impression in Maryland. Other states, however, had dealt with the issue in the context
of interpreting the terms of homeowners' insurance policies to determine whether particular activities of a political candidate are in
the basis for determining that news reports are not protected by legislative immunity.
See 443 U.S. at 133.
286. Ennis, 322 Md. at 296, 587 A.2d at 491.
287. See id. at 294, 587 A.2d at 490.
288. See id. at 289, 587 A.2d at 487. The Washington Post reported that "leading county
Democrats are pressuring [Crenca] to change her mind and run [for Congress]."
Armano, supra note 230, at B5.
289. See Ennis, 322 Md. at 295 n.6, 587 A.2d at 490 n.6 (stating that the report of an
alleged bribe to an appropriate government official is quite different from a report to the
press). Crenca said she notified the county attorney in late September or early October
but no official action resulted from the discussion. Armano, Crenca Claim, supra note 235,
at B6.
290. The case was before the Court of Appeals on an appeal from an order to dismiss
Ennis's complaint. Therefore, the allegations of the complaint were accepted as true.
Ennis, 322 Md. at 287, 587 A.2d at 486.
291. See id. at 294-95, 587 A.2d at 490.
292. See id. at 294, 587 A.2d at 490.
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the pursuit of an occupation or are within the scope of political employment.'" 3 The Court of Appeals supported its determination
that campaigning activities are outside the scope of an elected official's employment by pointing to these states' opinions involving
coverage under a business-pursuit clause in a homeowner's insurance policy. 29 4 Business-pursuit clauses limit the insurer's obligation to indemnify the insured for tortious conduct arising from
activities related to the insured's business.2 9 5
The Court of Appeals gave primary emphasis to a decision of
the Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court. In Burdge
v. ExcelsiorInsurance Co. ,296 two motorists were injured in an accident
allegedly caused by the negligent placement of a campaign sign of a
candidate seeking re-election. The candidate sought coverage for
his liability under his homeowner's policy although the policy contained a business-pursuit exclusion. 2 7 The Burdge court held that
although campaign activities "may result in the candidate's obtaining a 'profession or occupation,' they cannot themselves be regarded as activities conducted in the performance of that profession
or occupation. ' 298 Because the insured was not engaged in a business pursuit by maintaining a campaign sign, the insurance company was obligated to indemnify him under the homeowner's
2 99
policy.
By adopting the rationale of the Burdge court that campaigning
activities are job-seeking rather than job-related, the Court of Appeals decided that electioneering activities are outside the scope of
employment.3 0 0 Thus, Crenca's actions were not within the coverage of the LGTCA. s '
4. Analysis.-"Scope of employment" is a limitation on the responsibility of a local government to shield its employees from liability. As such, the types of activities considered outside the scope
of a public official's employment are important considerations for all
parties in a dispute involving a local government employee.
293. See, e.g., Burdge v. Excelsior Ins. Co., 476 A.2d 880 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1984);
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.

Ploen v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 525 N.Y.S.2d 522 (1988).
See Ennis, 322 Md. at 294-95, 587 A.2d at 490.
See Burdge, 476 A.2d at 882.
476 A.2d 880 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984).
Id. at 881.
Id. at 882.
Id. at 883.
See Ennis, 322 Md. at 295, 587 A.2d at 490.
Id.
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The Court of Appeals' first finding, that statements to the press
are electioneering activities, is consistent with the Speech or Debate
Clause cases in the federal courts.3 0 2 However, Crenca's statements
to the press do not appear to be electioneering activities. Unlike
statements made at a fund-raising dinner3 0 3 or statements made in a
constituent newsletter,3 0 4 allegations of a community organization's
bribery are not clearly made for campaign purposes.
In Kilgore v. Younger," °5 the California Court of Appeals found
that an action by an elected official may be motivated by political
aspirations and yet be within the official's scope of authority if such
action is "indistinguishable from actions initiated by public officials
truly oblivious to the political ramifications of their moves. '"306
However, the timing and circumstances surrounding Crenca's disclosures to the press 0 7 distinguish them from actions initiated by
officials "oblivious to the political ramifications." Crenca was being
considered as a candidate for Congress, and therefore theoretically
had a motive to discredit her political opponents by intimating that
they had accepted a bribe from Ennis. Although the Court of Appeals did not analyze Crenca's statements under this more appropriate standard, the court correctly found that Crenca's statements to
the press were initiated to secure her own political future.
The justification for the Court of Appeals' second finding, that
electioneering activities are outside the scope of employment, is
more apparent than the first. The Court of Appeals recently determined in Sawyer v. Humphries3 08 that when a public official is acting
to protect personal interests, the acts are outside the scope of em-

302. See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 127-28 (1979) ("Whatever imprecision there may be in the term 'legislative activities,' it is clear that nothing in history or
in the explicit language of the [Speech or Debate] Clause suggests any intention to create an absolute privilege from liability or suit for defamatory statements made outside
the Chamber.").
303. See Cheatum v. Wehle, 159 N.E.2d 166 (N.Y. 1959) (concerning slanderous statements made by commissioner of the State Conservation Department about a department
employee during a dinner speech given before a number of civic and business leaders).
304. See Hutchinson, 443 U.S. 111.
305. 162 Cal. Rptr. 469 (1980).
306. Id. at 476.
307. Marilyn Piety, a friend of Crenca and a fellow county employee, leaked the allegations about Ennis to the press because "[Crenca] felt strongly it ought to come out."
Armano, Montgomery PoliticalFlap, supra note 235, at B4. The leak to the press occurred
three months after the alleged bribe offer was made, but shortly after an Allied Civic
Group meeting during which Crenca was harshly criticized for her vote in favor of the
development plan. Armano, Crenca Claim, supra note 235, at B6.
308. 322 Md. 247, 256-57, 587 A.2d 467, 471 (1991).
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ployment.3 °9 The "business" of a local government is to provide
governmental services to its citizens; candidates for governmental
office engage in electioneering activities to further their own personal political futures.31 The Court of Appeals properly concluded
that when the activities of an elected official can be characterized as
electioneering or campaigning, those activities are outside the scope
of the official's employment. 3 '
This holding is not surprising. Many government offices are
filled with elected individuals and each election involves a certain
level of campaigning. The imposition of liability on local governments for all the political comments of office-seekers would create
an unreasonable strain upon public funds. Government actions
themselves affect many people and the potential for injury (and economic liability) is great. Tortious acts of individuals seeking government positions are not the acts of government and are clearly
beyond the LGTCA's partial waiver of governmental immunity.
The impact of the Ennis opinion upon Maryland law will not be
dramatic. The Court of Appeals closely followed its own precedent
in applying the scope of employment test to this new situation.
However, the opinion may have a greater impact on the laws outside
of Maryland. As indicated by the Court of Appeals' reliance upon
the interpretation of business-pursuit clauses, there is little case law
interpreting the relationship between electioneering activities and
the scope of employment. This decision is likely to shape and influence the interpretation of other states' local government tort claims
acts.
5. Conclusion.-The purpose of the LGTCA is to provide a
remedy to persons tortiously injured by government action and to
protect government employees from personal liability for tortious
conduct arising from government employment.3 1 2 The General Assembly, however, has been unwilling to waive sovereign immunity
completely, as indicated by the "scope of employment" limitation.
In Ennis, the Court of Appeals held that statements made to the
press by an elected official that are not made pursuant to official
309. See id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 256-261.
310. See Ploen v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 525 N.Y.S.2d 522, 525 (1988) ("[Tlhe
process of seeking re-election is akin to searching for employment, not performing ...
duties while employed.").
311. See Ennis, 322 Md. at 294, 587 A.2d at 490.
312. See Act ofJune 2, 1987, ch. 594, 1987 Md. Laws 2709; supra text accompanying
note 254.
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duties are outside the scope of employment.3 '3 Elected officials will
continue to seek media coverage, but local governments are not responsible under the LGTCA for providing legal representation to
those officials who make defamatory statements in an effort to further their own political aspirations. " 'No man ought to have a right
to defame others under colour of a performance of the duties of his
office .... It is neither within the scope of his duty, nor in furtherance of public rights, or public policy.' "314
STEPHEN

KAREN
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BURGOON
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KAMIL ISMAIL
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313. 322 Md. at 296, 587 A.2d at 491.
314. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 128 (1979) (quoting 2
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 863, at 329 (1833)).

E. JOSEPH

JOSEPH STORY,

XIII.
A.

TORTS

Assumption of Risk As a Matter of Law

In Schroyer v. McNeal,' the Court of Appeals held, as a matter of
law, that a defendant who walks across a surface she knows to be
covered with "packed snow and ice" assumes the risk of injury due
to the slippery conditions.' In so doing, the court expanded the
implied assumption of risk defense in Maryland by providing a way
for judges to reassess a plaintiff's right to recover without directly
overruling a jury's finding of negligence by the defendant.'
Although the Schroyer decision builds on extensive Maryland
precedent and respected authority, it warrants criticism for its cryptic interpretation of that precedent and its aggressive encroachment
on the fact-finding role traditionally reserved for the jury. Future
defendants now have the luxury of shopping between judge and jury
when arguing that tortious injuries were the plaintiff's own fault.
Future plaintiffs must avoid framing their denials of contributory
negligence in ways that will subject them to findings of assumption
of risk as a matter of law. And judges in future trials have gained an
additional tool with which to combat excessive judgments and plaintiff-biased juries.
1. The Case.-In January 1985, Frances McNeal slipped and
fell on the snow- and ice-covered parking lot of Thomas and Patricia
Schroyer's hotel in Garrett County, Maryland.4 McNeal had registered as a guest in the hotel and requested a room close to an exit
for the convenience of carrying work materials from her car to her
room.5 Part of the hotel parking lot was cleared, but the rooms closest to an exit were adjacent to an uncleared area of the lot.6 That
part of the lot was covered by "packed ice and snow" and the sidewalk was unshoveled and slippery. 7
The Schroyers gave no warning when they assigned the room to
1. 323 Md. 275, 592 A.2d 1119 (1991).
2. See id. at 277, 592 A.2d at 1120.
3. See id. at 288, 592 A.2d at 1126. Although the doctrines of contributory negligence and assumption of risk both remain fact specific, the court concluded that "while
the issue of [McNeal's] contributory negligence may well have been for the jury, the
opposite is true with respect to her assumption of risk." Id.
4. d. at 278, 592 A.2d at 1120.
5. Id., 592 A.2d at 1120-21.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 279, 592 A.2d at 1121.

804

19921

TORTS

805

McNeal, even though it was the hotel's policy to warn guests not to
use the unshoveled exits during inclement weather.' Furthermore,
it was contrary to stated hotel policy to assign rooms in those parts
of the hotel during inclement weather.9
McNeal fell and broke her ankle upon returning to her car after
having previously made one successful crossing of the snow-covered
area.' ° She testified that although she noticed that the entrance was
not shoveled, she "didn't think it was that slippery."" McNeal also
2
insisted that she had walked "carefully."'
The Schroyers moved for judgment after the close of McNeal's
case and again at the conclusion of all the evidence, based in part on
the theory that McNeal had assumed the risk of injury by crossing a
sidewalk she knew to be slippery.' 3 The court denied both motions.' 4 The jury found the Schroyers negligent and awarded McNeal $50,000.'" The trial judge had not instructed the jury on the
issue of assumption of risk' 6 and presumably the jury did not consider this issue during its deliberations. Contending that the trial
7
judge erred in denying both motions, the Schroyers appealed.,
The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial
court.' 8 In so doing, it focused on whether contributory negligence
(rather than assumption of risk) could be found as a matter of law
and decided that it could not.' 9 Further, the court noted the deference due to the jury's fact-finding role, concluding that "this case
properly belonged in the hands of the jury. '20
After granting the Schroyers' petition for certiorari, 2 ' the Court
of Appeals reviewed the case in light of the assumption of risk defense and reversed. 2
8. Id. at 278, 592 A.2d at 1121.
9.Id.
10. Id. at 279, 592 A.2d at 1121.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 277, 592 A.2d at 1120.
16. Brief of Appellee at 10, Schroyer (No. 90-162).
17. See Schroyer v. McNeal, 84 Md. App. 649, 652, 581 A.2d 472, 474 (1990), rev'd,
323 Md.275, 592 A.2d 1119 (1991).
18. See id. at 659, 581 A.2d at 477.
19. See id. at 656-57, 581 A.2d at 475-76.
20. Id. at 659, 581 A.2d at 477. The intermediate appellate court noted, "While this
Court might not have come to [the] conclusion [that the plaintiff acted reasonably] or
reached the same verdict, this case properly belonged in the hands of the jury." Id.
21. See Schroyer v. McNeal, 322 Md. 132, 586 A.2d 14 (1991).
22. See Schroyer, 323 Md. at 289, 592 A.2d at 1126.
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2. Legal Background.-Rather than reversing the Court of Special Appeals' finding that McNeal was not contributorily negligent as
a matter of law, 23 the Court of Appeals instead focused on the issue
of assumption of risk. 24 To define assumption of risk and distinguish it from contributory negligence, the Schroyer court relied on
Dean Prosser's treatise on torts2 5 and the American Law Institute's
Restatement, 26 and the Maryland case law that has interpreted
7
them.

2

In Gibson v. Beaver,28 the court quoted Prosser extensively to
fashion its own version of assumption of risk. 29 The Gibson court
determined that "implied assumption of risk requires knowledge
and appreciation of the risk, and a voluntary choice to encounter
it,"30 and that an objective standard should be used to determine
whether the plaintiff had the requisite knowledge and appreciation."' The court stated that the plaintiff's knowledge and appreciation are usually questions of fact for the jury, " 'but where it is clear
that any person of normal intelligence in his position must have understood the danger, the issue must be decided by the court.' "32
Thus, the Gibson court opened the door to authorized judge-made
determinations of the assumption of risk issue.
The Schroyer decision was built directly on the foundation laid
by Gibson. Notably, however, the Gibson court found the plaintiff's
23. The opinion notes that because the court was able to reach its decision based on
an assumption of risk analysis, it was unnecessary to consider the two other grounds for
appeal: McNeal's contributory negligence as a matter of law and the Schroyers' nonnegligence as a matter of law. See id. at 277-78, 592 A.2d at 1120.
24. See id. at 277, 592 A.2d at 1120. The court found the issue of assumption of risk
to be preserved because it was one of the premises of the Schroyers' denied motions for
judgment. See id. at 277 n.2, 592 A.2d at 1120 n.2; see also MD. R. 2-519(a) (describing
process of motion for judgment).
25. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 68 (5th
ed. 1984).
26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496 (1977).
27. See 323 Md. at 280-83, 592 A.2d at 1122-23.
28. 245 Md. 418, 226 A.2d 273 (1967).
29. See id. at 421, 226 A.2d at 275.
30. Id.

31. See id. This objective standard contradicts both Prosser and the Restatement,
which both assert that the standard for assumption of risk should be subjective. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496D cmt. c (1977) (stating that "[i]n this it differs
from the objective standard which is applied to contributory negligence"); KEETON et al.,
supra note 25, § 68, at 487. By imposing an objective standard, it can be argued that
Gibson blurs the line between assumption of risk and contributory negligence, basing
them both on a reasonable person analysis.
32. Gibson, 245 Md. at 421, 226 A.2d at 275 (quoting WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF TORTS § 55, at 33 (2d ed. 1955)); see also KEETON et al., supra note

25, § 68, at 489.
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conduct to indicate that the defendant had breached no duty, 3
while the Schroyer court found the plaintiff's conduct to bar recovery
regardless of whether any duty of care had been breached by the defendant. 34 Gibson, in other words, recognized the form of the defense known as "primary" implied assumption of risk,3 5 while
Schroyer recognized "secondary" implied assumption of risk.3 6
Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., a New Jersey decision,
is considered the leading case on the distinction between primary
and secondary implied assumption of risk, as well as the leading case
abolishing secondary assumption of risk.3" The New Jersey court
explained:
[W]e think it clear that assumption of risk in its secondary
sense is a mere phase of contributory negligence, the total
issue being whether a reasonably prudent man in the exercise of due care (a) would have incurred the known risk and
(b) if he would, whether such a person in the light of all of
the circumstances including the appreciated risk would
have conducted himself in the manner in which plaintiff
acted.3 9
Although Maryland has recognized Meistrich's assertion that assumption of risk and contributory negligence frequently overlap, it has
never specifically questioned the validity of the secondary form of
the implied assumption of risk defense.4 °
Regardless of whether the primary or secondary form is at issue, strict standards limit the court's ability to apply assumption of
risk as a matter of law. Illuminating the Gibson decision on this point
is Kasten Construction Co. v. Evans,4 in which the court stated that
33. See 245 Md. at 422, 226 A.2d at 276 ("This voluntary undertaking.., freed the
defendants as a matter of law from liability for harm which might flow from the
undertaking.").
34. See 323 Md. at 282, 592 A.2d at 1123.
35. This form of the defense, actually reflecting the defendant's non-negligence, has
been generally accepted as a valid defense. See KEETON et al., supra note 25, § 68, at 496;
see also 4 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 21.7, at 256 (2d ed. 1986)
(Assumption of risk in the primary sense "is simply a left-handed way of describing a
lack of duty.").
36. "Secondary" implied assumption of risk, which bars recovery despite the defendant's breach of duty, has taken on a disfavored status in many jurisdictions. 4 HARPER et
al., supra note 35, § 21.0, at 190 n.4.
37. 155 A.2d 90 (NJ. 1959).
38. See HARPER et al., supra note 35, § 21.7, at 257-58 n.12; KEETON et al., supra note
25, § 68, at 493 n.39.
39. Meistrich, 155 A.2d at 95-96.
40. See Baltimore County v. State, 232 Md. 350, 361, 193 A.2d 30, 36 (1963).
41. 260 Md. 536, 273 A.2d 90 (1971).
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"the doctrine of assumption of risk will not be applied unless the
undisputed evidence and all permissible inferences therefrom clearly
establish that the risk of danger wasfully known to and understood by
the plaintiff."4 2 Further, the Kasten decision's focus on what the
plaintiff appreciated reveals a shift toward a subjective standard.43
Using the language of a subjective test, the court stated: "It would
be putting it too high, we think, to say that, as a matter of law, [the
plaintiff] knew, understood and appreciated [the risk he was taking]
and that he voluntarily assumed that risk." 4 4 Thus, leaving the issue
to the jury was appropriate.
Subsequently in Kahlenberg v. Goldstein,4 5 the court used the Kasten rule as a specific limitation on a trial court's right to encroach on
the jury's fact-finding authority.4 6 The Kahlenberg court vacated a
Court of Special Appeals' finding of assumption of risk as a matter
of law, reinstating the jury's verdict and affirming the trial judge's
decision to let the jury decide the facts.4 7
It was with this backdrop of Maryland cases, in which assumption of risk as a matter of law was foreclosed and the issue left to the
jury, that the Schroyer decision was made. Schroyer departs from the
standards of Kasten and Kahlenberg, interpreting Gibson as allowing
judges more freedom in finding assumption of risk as a matter of
law.
3. The Court's Reasoning.-The Gibson objective focus and the
Kasten-Kahlenberg subjective focus collide head on in Schroyer. The
result, however, is not a selection of one standard over the other
but, rather, a further muddling of the issue.
The Schroyer court carefully isolated for its review the issue of
assumption of risk,4 8 avoiding the previously litigated issues of neg42. Id. at 544, 273 A.2d at 94.
43. The Kasten court did note without criticism, however, that Gibson called for an
objective standard. See id.
44. Id. at 545, 273 A.2d at 94.
45. 290 Md. 477, 431 A.2d 76 (1981).
46. See id. at 494, 431 A.2d at 86. The Kahlenberg court inserted the phrase "as a
matter of law" into the Kasten caveat, so that the rule now reads, " 'assumption of the
risk will not be applied [as a matter of law]'" absent extremely clear circumstances. Id.
(brackets in original) (quoting Kasten, 260 Md. at 544, 273 A.2d at 94).
47. See id. at 497,431 A.2d at 87 ("The differences... both within the Plaintiff's own
testimony and by comparison to the description given by other witnesses ... created a
factual question for the jury to resolve on the issue of the Plaintiff's assumption of the
risk.").
48. See 323 Md. at 283, 592 A.2d at 1123 (stating that "[a] plaintiff who proceeds
reasonably, and with caution, after voluntarily accepting a risk, not unreasonable in itself, may not be guilty of contributory negligence, but may have assumed the risk").
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ligence and contributory negligence. Judge Bell, writing for the
court, offered an extensive overview of the development of assumption of risk case law in Maryland and explained how assumption of
risk differs from contributory negligence.4 9 The holding, however,
hinged on a reading of the three precedents cited above.
The heart of the opinion, as well as the heart of the confusion,
lies in the following passage:
The test of whether the plaintiff knows of, and appreciates,
the risk involved in a particular situation is an objective
one, and ordinarily is a question to be resolved by the
jury.[5 ° ] Thus, "the doctrine of assumption of risk will not
be applied unless the undisputed evidence and all permissible inferences therefrom clearly establish that the risk of
danger was fully known to and understood by the plaintiff."[ 51] On the other hand, when it is clear that a person
of normal intelligence in the position of the plaintiff must
have understood the danger, the issue is for the court.5 2
This passage demands close scrutiny with regard to who decides "appreciation" and by what standard. In the first sentence,
the court put forth an objective standard to be used by juries. The
second sentence indicates a more subjective test by focusing on the
particular plaintiff's awareness, while reiterating the jury's authority
to decide the issue. Next, inexplicably, the last sentence reverts
back to the Gibson holding, favoring an objective test to be applied
by the court. These mixed messages demand resolution.
The Schroyer court, however, spared itself the task of reaching
such a resolution by relying on Dean Prosser. The court stated,
"[t]he danger of slipping on ice was identified by Prosser as one of
'5 3
the risks which anyone of adult age must be taken to appreciate.
According to the court, Prosser's assertion eliminated the need
to evaluate McNeal's appreciation of the risk on either an objective
or a subjective basis, by either the jury or the court. Appreciation of
this particular risk is simply deemed a settled issue. Because McNeal had admitted in her testimony that she knew of the risk and
49. See id. at 280-84, 592 A.2d at 1121-24.

50.
Md. at
51.
52.
Md. at
53.

at 488.

The court here cited Gibson, 245 Md. at 421, 226 A.2d at 275, and Kahlenberg, 290
494-95, 431 A.2d at 86.
The court here quoted Kasten, 260 Md. at 544, 273 A.2d at 94.
Schroyer, 323 Md. at 283-84, 592 A.2d at 1123. The court here cited Gibson, 245
421, 226 A.2d at 275.
Schroyer, 323 Md. at 284, 592 A.2d at 1123; see KEETON et al., supra note 25, § 68,
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had voluntarily encountered it, 54 the Prosser view of the appreciation requirement was dispositive of the issue.5 5
In dicta, the court seemed to indicate a preference for the
judge-determined objective standard. The court inferred from McNeal's testimony that "it cannot be gainsaid that she intentionally
exposed herself to a known risk," 5 6 even though such voluntariness
and knowledge were never evaluated by the jury.5 ' "Consequently," the court continued, "while the issue of her contributory
negligence may well have been for the jury, the opposite is true with
respect to her assumption of the risk."'5' This assertion reflects the
Schroyer court's favoring of the older Gibson rule over the more recent Kasten-Kahlenberg test. Such a conclusion was only possible,
however, because the factual question of appreciation was foreclosed from consideration by reliance on Prosser.
4. Analysis.-The Schroyer court demonstrated its willingness to
find assumption of risk as a matter of law even though the issue was
never fully addressed at trial, either by judge or by jury. In fact, the
trial judge's refusal to grant the Schroyers' motions for judgment
based on the assumption of risk defense, and his failure to instruct
the jury on the issue, reveal his determination that consideration of
the issue was unnecessary. 5 9 In one stroke, the Court of Appeals
revived the issue, noted that some risks are presumed appreciated,
and took the entire issue from the jury. The questions remain:
When must (or may) a trial judge decide the issue, and what is left
for the jury?
Both Prosser and the Restatement provide strong counter-arguments to the court's ruling. Based on their rationale and the Schroyer
court's failure to state a final assumption of risk standard, it seems
54. See Schroyer, 323 Md. at 278, 288, 592 A.2d at 1121, 1125; infra text accompanying notes 85-89 (illustrating that testimony offered for the purpose of denying an accusation of contributory negligence should not be used to satisfy the unaddressed
elements of assumption of risk).
55. See Schroyer, 323 Md. at 284, 592 A.2d at 1123.
56. Id. at 288, 592 A.2d at 1126.
57. See supra text accompanying note 16. The fact that neither the judge nor jury
considered the assumption of risk issue at the trial level highlights the aggressiveness of
the position taken by the Court of Appeals.
58. Schroyer, 323 Md. at 288, 592 A.2d at 1126.
59. The trial judge may not have offered an assumption of risk instruction because
he believed the fully litigated contributory negligence dispute disposed of the issue.
"[W]hen they overlap, a discussion of contributory negligence may necessarily include
assumption of the risk." Id. at 287, 592 A.2d at 1125; see Bull S.S. Line v. Fisher, 196
Md. 519, 528, 77 A.2d 142, 147 (1950).
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possible to limit the effects of Schroyer to a narrow line of disputes
surrounding very common risks.
a. Appreciation of the Risk.-The Schroyer court accepted, without
hesitation, Prosser's suggestion that "the danger of slipping on ice"
is a risk appreciated as a matter of law. 60 Prosser also states, however, "[i]n the usual case, [a plaintiff's] knowledge and appreciation
of the danger will be a question for the jury."'" The Restatement is
even more explicit, warning that "[t]he court may itself determine
the issue only where reasonable men could not differ as to the conclusion." 6 2 This call for a fact-specific determination indicates that
the Kasten-Kahlenberg approach is preferred.
Both Prosser and the Restatement 6 3 propose that the standard
should be a subjective one-what the particular plaintiff appreciates4-rather than the objective standard used for considerations
of negligence. 6 5 Similarly, both also caution that a plaintiff's unreasonable failure to appreciate a danger is a consideration in contributory negligence rather than assumption of risk.'
Given these considerations, Prosser's proffer of specific dangers
60. See 323 Md. at 284, 592 A.2d at 1123; KEETON et al., supra note 25, § 68, at 488.
Other specified risks assumed to be appreciated are the risks "of falling through unguarded openings, of lifting heavy objects, of being squeezed in a narrow space, of inflammable liquids, of driving an automobile whose brakes will not operate, of
unguarded circular saws or similar dangerous machinery, and doubtless many others."
Id.

61. KEETON et al., supra note 25, § 68, at 489. See generally id. § 37, at 238 (Functions
of Court and Jury). "The most common statement is that if reasonable persons may
differ as to the conclusion to be drawn, the issue must be left to the jury; otherwise it is
for the court." Id.
62. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 496D cmt. e (1977).
63. In the interest of intellectual honesty, it must be noted that agreement between
the Restatement and Dean Prosser should come as no surprise. Dean Prosser was the
reporter of the second Restatement. See id. at iii, viii.
64. See supra note 31; KEETON et al., supra note 25, § 68, at 487 ("The standard to be
applied is, in theory at least a subjective one, geared to the particular plaintiff and his
situation .... ").
65. Prosser does note that "the standard applied in fact [to assumption of risk deliberations] does not always differ greatly from that of the reasonable person." KEETON et
al., supra note 25, § 68, at 488. This problem lies at the heart of the on-going debate
over the continued existence of the implied assumption of risk defense. See generally 4
HARPER et al., supra note 35, § 21.7, at 256 ("[Wlhere the phrase assumption of risk is used
to refer to contributory negligence-plaintiff's unreasonable assumption of a risk defendant is bound not to put on him-then the rule for pleading or proving contributory
negligence should apply.").
66. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496D cmt. b; KEETON et al., supra note
25, § 68, at 487. A plaintiff's "failure to exercise due care either to discover or to understand the danger is not properly a matter of assumption of risk, but of the defense of
contributory negligence." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496D cmt. b.
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to be deemed appreciated as a matter of law provides the court with
an unfortunate crutch. 6 7 In Schroyer there was compelling testimony
to suggest that reasonable people could indeed differ as to whether
McNeal appreciated the risk she knowingly encountered. Rather
than a sheet of ice, McNeal walked across "packed ice and snow,"6
a surface arguably less dangerous and less susceptible to full appreciation than sheet ice. This distinction highlights the essential problem of considering Prosser's examples as absolutes.6 9 Furthermore,
McNeal's own testimony calls into question her appreciation of the
danger. She stated, "I didn't think it was that slippery," noting that
she had walked across the area without incident one time already. 7 °
Finally, the Schroyers' failure to warn indicates that McNeal may not
have had an opportunity to appreciate fully the risk. 7 ' The Court of
Special Appeals, in affirming the jury's verdict, noted that "the jury
could have decided that she assumed she would not have been assigned a room at the west side entrance if the entrance was too dan72
gerous to use."
Taken together, these facts cloud the court's assertion that "[ilt
' 73
is clear, on this record, that McNeal took an informed chance.
Likewise, the conclusory declaration that "[t]he record reflects . . .
that 'McNeal
was fully aware of the dangerous condition of the premises" 74 becomes suspect. Awareness requires knowledge coupled
with appreciation; knowledge alone is insufficient. 75 Reasonable
minds could differ as to McNeal's awareness (regardless of what
Prosser said about the dangers of ice) and, therefore, the issue
should have been submitted to a jury for proper determination.
67. A list of dangers such as those mentioned earlier, see supra note 60, allows the
court to avoid evaluation of the facts by any standard, to avoid remanding the case for
further factual inquiry, and to avoid juries who may tend to favor injured plaintiffs.
68. Schroyer, 323 Md. at 279, 592 A.2d at 1121.
69. See, e.g., Gast, Inc. v. Kitchner, 247 Md. 677, 687, 234 A.2d 127, 132 (1967).
"Cases dealing with slipping on ice recognize the varying degrees of opaqueness of ice
and many adjectives are used in describing its appearance, such as, 'glassy sheet,'
'smooth,' 'slick,' 'thin,' 'slippery,' 'glazed,' 'solid,' 'thick,' 'wavey,' 'ridged,' and 'uneven,'
to mention a few." Id. Each adjective suggests a different level of danger and
recognition.
70. Schroyer, 323 Md. at 279, 592 A.2d at 1121 (emphasis added).
71. Id. The standard the court proposed to apply required the danger to be "fully
known .

.

. and understood." Id. at 283, 592 A.2d at 1123.

72. Schroyer v. McNeal, 84 Md. App. at 659, 581 A.2d at 477.
73. Schroyer, 323 Md. at 288, 592 A.2d at 1125.
74. Id.
75. See KEETON et al., supra note 25, § 68, at 487 ("Moreover, he must not only know

of the facts which create the danger, but he must comprehend and appreciate the nature
of the danger he confronts.").
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b. The Landowner-Invitee Approach.-Many Maryland slip-andfall cases similar to Schroyer have been decided by applying an analysis of the liabilities of a landowner to an invitee.76 In fact, the Court
of Special Appeals briefly considered this area of law, but limited its
landowner-invitee review to a discussion of the Schroyers' primary
negligence.7 7 Applying the same principles, the Schroyer court could
have found a more appropriate way to justify its finding that McNeal
assumed the risk. This approach, however, contains familiar
problems.
Restatement section 343A has been generally accepted in Maryland as meaning that a "landowner or occupier owes to invitees a
duty of reasonable care to see that the place is safe, but he is not the
insurer of the invitee's safety. ' ' 78 The Restatement adds, "[t]he possessor of land may reasonably assume that [an invitee] will protect
himself by the exercise of ordinary care, or that he will voluntarily
assume the risk of harm if he does not succeed in doing so." 79 As an
invitee, McNeal should have been expected to protect herself from
obvious dangers such as the icy condition she knew to exist.8 °
Section 343A warns, however, that landowners still have a duty
to warn "against the known or obvious condition or activity, if the
possessor has reason to expect that the invitee will nevertheless suffer physical harm."'" The Schroyers' failure to warn8 2 once again
becomes relevant, suggesting that because McNeal had not been
alerted, she could not have assumed any risk.
Furthermore, section 343A inquiries belong in the hands of
76. This law is embodied in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343A(l) (1977)
(Known or Obvious Dangers), which provides: "A possessor of land is not liable to his
invitees for physical harm caused to them by any activity or condition on the land whose
danger is known or obvious to them, unless the possessor should anticipate the harm
despite such knowledge or obviousness." Id.; see also id. § 343 (Dangerous Conditions
Known to or Discoverable by Possessor).
In Maryland, the leading slip-and-fall case analyzed under § 343 is Honolulu Ltd. v.
Cain, 244 Md. 590, 224 A.2d 433 (1966). See also, e.g., Mondawmin Corp. v. Kres, 258
Md. 307, 266 A.2d 8 (1970); Western Md. Ry. Co. v. Griffis, 253 Md. 643, 253 A.2d 889
(1969); Gast, Inc. v. Kitchner, 247 Md. 677, 234 A.2d 127 (1967).
77. See Schroyer v. McNeal, 84 Md. App. at 654, 581 A.2d at 474.
78. Link v. Hutzler Bros. Co., 25 Md. App. 586, 590, 335 A.2d 192, 195 (1975); see
also Mondawmin Corp., 258 Md. at 315, 266 A.2d at 12; Honolulu Ltd., 244 Md. at 595, 224
A.2d at 435; KEETON et al., supra note 25, § 61, at 425.
79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343A cmt. e.
80. The Restatement says, "the fact that the danger is known, or is obvious, is important in determining whether the invitee is to be charged with contributory negligence or
assumption of risk." Id. cmt. f.
81. Id.; see Schroyer v. McNeal, 84 Md. App. at 654, 581 A.2d at 474; Pfaff v. Yacht
Basin Co., 58 Md. App. 348, 354, 473 A.2d 479, 482 (1984).
82. Schroyer, 323 Md. at 278, 592 A.2d at 1121.
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the jury. "[U]nder ordinary negligence principles the question [of
whether a warning is necessary] is properly one of fact for the jury
except in the clearest situations. '"83 Jury determination is also required for the knowledge requirement, which includes appreciation
of the danger involved.8 4
For these reasons, it is doubtful that section 343A landownerinvitee law could have provided the court with a way to justify a determination of the issue by a court, as a matter of law.
c. The PracticalTrap.-A final consequence of the Schroyer' decision is its creation of a practical trap for future plaintiffs arguing
against accusations of contributory negligence. To deny such negligence, plaintiffs must demonstrate to the factfinder, i.e., the jury,
that they acted reasonably. However, in so demonstrating, plaintiffs
must now be wary not to admit certain knowledge that will allow the
court to find assumption of risk as a matter of law. The Schroyer facts
provide a perfect example of this dilemma.
In the course of denying the Schroyers' assertion that she was
contributorily negligent, McNeal testified that she saw the ice and
snow, knew it to be slippery, and proceeded "carefully." 8 " The jury
found that this did not meet the standard for contributory negligence and, thus, did not bar McNeal from recovering for the
Schroyers' established negligence.8 6 The Court of Appeals used
that same testimony to deny McNeal's right to recover, construing
admissions made in one context (denial of contributory negligence)
to satisfy the elements of a separate defense that McNeal had no
direct opportunity to dispute.
This was a practice the court had earlier sought to prevent.
"While assumption of risk and contributory negligence.., are not
the same," the court stated in Bull Steamship Line v. Fisher,87 "nevertheless they may arise from the same fact, and, in a given case, a
88
discussion of one may necessarily include the other."
83. 4 HARPER et al., supra note 35, § 27.13, at 247.
84. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343A cmt. b. See supra text accompanying notes 68-71 for a full discussion of the factual questions surrounding appreciation of
the risk in Schroyer.
85. Schroyer, 323 Md. at 279, 592 A.2d at 1121.
86. See id.
87. 196 Md. 519, 77 A.2d 142 (1977).
88. Id. at 528, 77 A.2d at 147; see also Western Md. Ry. Co. v. Griffis, 253 Md. 643,
648, 253 A.2d 889, 893 (1969) ("There was no testimony that Griflis knew of the danger. But even if this were not the case, the court's instruction on contributory negli-

gence was broad enough to cover an assumption of the risk ....").
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The backdoor approach to assumption of risk taken in Schroyer
creates new problems in trial planning. Injured plaintiffs must assert their reasonableness to deny their own negligence, but now
they must also affirmatively deny that their reasonableness reflects
an assumption of the risk. The Schroyer decision essentially forces
plaintiffs to raise (and deny) the issue of their own assumption of
risk.

89

5. Conclusion.-Schroyermarks an expansion of the assumption
of risk defense in Maryland. Following the lead of the Court of Appeals, trial judges are likely to take a more active role in finding assumption of risk as a matter of law and preventing injured plaintiffs
from recovering from negligent defendants. It is likely that defendants will force the issue of assumption of risk when the true debate
of any negligence action should center on the reasonableness of the
parties. And it is likely that plaintiffs will have to adopt preventative
measures in their negligence cases to avoid any consideration of the
defense or to keep the crucial issues in the hands of the jury.
In a case in which the Court of Appeals clearly could have left
the fact-finding role in the hands of the jury, it assumed that role
under the guise of assumption of risk analysis. Most distressing, it is
now likely that courts in negligence actions will unjustly exclude issues of reasonableness (and appreciation of danger, its assumption
of risk counterpart) from the consideration of juries.
B.

Good Samaritan Statute-Emergency Medical Technicians

In Tatum v. Gigliotti,9 ° the Court of Appeals extended the protection provided by Maryland's Good Samaritan statute9 ' to Emergency Medical Technicians (EMTs) providing emergency services in
the course of their employment.9 2 The court held that the statute
affords protection regardless of whether the technicians have a pre93
existing duty to render care or are paid a salary for their services.
The court's holding dictates that the statute's gross negligence standard should be applied to EMTs under virtually any
89. But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496G, at 580 (1977) ("[T]he burden
of proof of the plaintiff's assumption of risk is upon the defendant."). The Schroyer
court's willingness to find assumption of risk as a matter of law is likely, in some cases, to
cause a de facto shift of the burden to the plaintiff to prove that she did not assume the
risk.
90. 321 Md. 623, 583 A.2d 1062 (1991).
91. MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-309 (1989).
92. 321 Md. at 629, 583 A.2d at 1065.
93. See id.
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circumstances.

To a certain extent, the impact of the court's interpretation of
Maryland's Good Samaritan statute has been lessened by a subsequent statute conferring limited civil immunity upon fire and rescue
squads for injury resulting from acts or omissions performed within
the course of their duties. 95 While the Tatum holding will no longer
have a direct effect on EMTs, the decision will affect a number of
other groups that are included in the Good Samaritan statute. 96
Prior to the enactment of Good Samaritan statutes, health care
workers who voluntarily treated patients in emergency situations
could be held liable for a failure to use reasonable care.
Over the
last thirty years, most states have enacted statutes designed to encourage health care workers to render gratuitous services in emergency situations without fear of potential liability.9" Maryland's
Good Samaritan statute originally provided protection against civil
liability only to physicians. 99 The statute has since been expanded
to include numerous other health care professionals (including licensed EMTs) who might provide gratuitous services in emergency
situations.' 0 0
94. See id.
95. See MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-309.1. This section applies to individual fire and rescue personnel, as well as their respective companies, and provides immunity from civil liability for all acts performed within the course of duty, except for willful
or grossly negligent acts. See id. The language of this section supports a far more limited interpretation of the Good Samaritan statute than was given by the Court of Appeals. See infra notes 158-160 and accompanying text.
96. Members of law enforcement agencies and the National Ski Patrol are also protected by § 5-309. See MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-309(b)(2). Section 5-309.1
confers immunity only on fire and rescue squads. Id. § 5-309.1.
97. See KEETON et al., supra note 25, § 56, at 378 & n.57.
98. See Samuel J. Hessel, Good Samaritan Laws: Bad Legislation, 2 J. LEGAL MED. 40, 40
(1974). Over 80% of the states have enacted "Good Samaritan" statutes for the purpose of encouraging and protecting health care professionals who render emergency
care. Id.
99. See Act of March 14, 1963, ch. 65, 1963 Md. Laws 100 (current version codified at
MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-309). The statute provided limited immunity to
physicians licensed by the state's Board of Medical Examiners for acts or omissions not
amounting to gross negligence if the services were rendered gratuitously. See id.
100. In 1964, the General Assembly expanded the statute to include "members of
volunteer ambulance and rescue squads." See Act of April 7, 1964, ch. 48, 1964 Md.
Laws 104. One year later, the statute was expanded further to include registered nurses
and licensed practical nurses. See Act of April 8, 1965, ch. 475, 1965 Md. Laws 668. In
1969, the General Assembly deleted the word "volunteer" that preceded "ambulance
and rescue squads," and provided coverage to members and employees of all fire departments and ambulance and rescue squads. See Act of May 14, 1969, ch. 616, 1969
Md. Laws 1432. In 1976, the various provisions enacted in the prior 13 years were
consolidated into 4 subsections and listed in § 132 of article 43. See MD. ANN. CODE art.
43, § 132 (1980). The current version of Maryland's Good Samaritan statute is simply
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By applying the Good Samaritan statute to salaried emergency
employees who are already under a duty to render services, the
court expanded the scope of the statute's coverage. The court's interpretation takes the statute beyond its original purpose of encouraging health care professionals to volunteer their services in
emergency situations. The language of a subsequent legislative enactment dealing specifically with EMTs cuts against this interpretation and supports the proposition that the scope of immunity
conferred by the Good Samaritan statute was intended to be more
limited than the Tatum holding mandates.
1. The Case.-Norman Tatum, Jr., the plaintiff's son, had suffered from chronic asthma since the age of three.' 0 ' On September
21, 1981, Tatum experienced a severe asthma attack and called the
Prince George's County Fire Department for assistance. 0 2 The defendants, Gregory Gigliotti and Richard Miller, who were statecertified EMTs employed by the Prince George's County Fire Department, responded to the call.' 0 3
In an effort to help Tatum breathe, the EMTs placed a paper
bag over Tatum's face;' 0 4 this procedure contravened the prescribed treatment for an asthma attack.' 0 5 Although Tatum was
having great difficulty breathing, the EMTs assisted him in walking
down twelve flights of stairs to the ambulance rather than carrying
him out on a stretcher.'
While in the ambulance, Gigliotti attempted to place an oxygen mask over Tatum's face, but Tatum
struggled and refused to wear the mask. Tatum fell off the ambulance bench on the way to the hospital, arriving at the emergency
0 7
room lying face down on the floor of the ambulance.
Although the ambulance report listed Tatum as conscious and
stable, an emergency room nurse testified that Tatum was in complete cardiac and respiratory arrest when he arrived at the hospital. 10 8 Tatum died at the hospital after unsuccessful attempts to
the recodified version of § 132, with few, insubstantial changes. See MD. CTS. & JUD.
PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-309.
101. Tatum, 321 Md. at 625, 583 A.2d at 1063.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. Although this procedure is the prescribed treatment for hyperventilation, it
contravenes the prescribed treatment for an asthma attack, in which shortage of oxygen
is a primary concern. d.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 625-26, 583 A.2d at 1063.
108. Id. at 626, 583 A.2d at 1063.
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revive him; the physician who performed the autopsy listed severe
oxygen deprivation as the cause of Tatum's death.' 0 9
Elizabeth Tatum, Norman's mother, brought a wrongful death
action against Gigliotti, Miller, and Prince George's County." °
Before trial, the counts against Miller and the county were dismissed.'
After twelve hours of deliberation, the jury informed the
court that it was deadlocked as to the liability of Gigliotti." t 2 The
court declared a mistrial and then granted the defendant's motion
for judgment on the grounds that the Good Samaritan statute applied to Gigliotti and there was insufficient proof of gross negligence.' ' The Court of Special Appeals affirmed on several
grounds." 4 The only issue considered by the Court of Appeals was
whether the immunity provided by the statute applied to a salaried
EMT who was acting within the scope of his employment duties.' ' 5
2. Legal Background.-At common law, a person had no affirmative duty to aid another in peril." 6 One who voluntarily attempted
to aid another assumed the legal duty to use reasonable care under
the circumstances.' 1'7 In response to the fear that this rule operated
as a serious deterrent to physicians who might otherwise be willing
to give emergency aid, a great majority of states have enacted Good
Samaritan statutes absolving certain individuals or groups from liability under certain circumstances."' Good Samaritan legislation
has been branded ineffective and unnecessary by some commentators, however.1

9

109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See Tatum v. Gigliotti, 80 Md. App. 559, 574, 565 A.2d 354, 361 (1989), aff'd,
321 Md. 623, 583 A.2d 1062 (1991). The Court of Special Appeals held that the Good
Samaritan statute applied to an EMT regardless of the fact that he received a salary. See
id. at 568, 565 A.2d at 358. The court reached this conclusion by focusing on the difference between the situation in which a rescuer receives a salary from a third party and the
situation in which a rescuer charges the victim directly for his services. See id. at 567, 565
A.2d at 357. The court held that only the latter situation would prohibit application of
the statute. See id. at 568, 565 A.2d at 358. The court also held that Gigliotti's conduct
did not, as a matter of law, constitute gross negligence. See id. at 569, 565 A.2d at 359.
115. See Tatum, 321 Md. at 625, 583 A.2d at 1062.
116. See KEETON et al., supra note 25, § 56, at 378.
117. Id.
118. Id. Over 80% of the states and the District of Columbia have enacted Good
Samaritan statutes since the first statute of this kind was enacted in 1959. Hessel, supra
note 98, at 40.
119. See, e.g., Hessel, supra note 98, at 40 (questioning the actual effect the statutes
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Most Good Samaritan statutes share several common characteristics. A few statutes confer immunity to all persons;' 20 however,
most apply only to physicians and other health care professionals.,l2
Another common requirement is that the emergency services must
be rendered "in good faith"; some states require an absence of willful or grossly negligent conduct.' 22 A final similarity among many
Good Samaritan statutes is that12 3the protected emergency services
must be rendered gratuitously.
Although the coverage as to specific individuals or groups
under Maryland's Good Samaritan statute has expanded since the
statute's adoption,' 2 4 the basic requirements of the statute have remained relatively unchanged. 125 At the time of Tatum's death in
1981, Maryland's Good Samaritan statute was located in article 43,
section 132.126 There is little difference between that version and
the current version of the statute other than format changes; no substantive change was made via the recodification.1 27 Section 132 perhave had on the conduct of physicians); J.S. Shannon, Note, Good Samaritan StatutesAdrenalinfor the "Good Samaritan," 13 DEPAUL L. REV. 297, 304 (1964) (questioning "the
soundness of a law which seeks to further a policy of humanitarianism by releasing a

tortfeasor from his obligation to respond in civil damages for his wrongful acts").
120. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1799.102 (West 1990) (containing no

language limiting the immunity provided by the statute to any class of persons).
121. Shannon, supra note 119, at 298; see, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-557b (West
1991) (including language indicating that the immunity provided in the statute is limited
to specific classes of people). The policy argument advanced in favor of limiting immunity to persons trained to administer medical services is that the law should encourage
the best possible aid. See Shannon, supra note 119, at 299. However, this argument has
not escaped criticism. See id.
122. Shannon, supra note 119, at 300; see, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1344 (1981) (providing immunity to persons providing emergency medical care "in good faith"); MD.
CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-309 (1989) (excluding acts of "gross negligence");
OHto REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.23 (Baldwin 1991) (excluding acts constituting "willful or
wanton misconduct").
123. Hessel, supra note 98, at 40; see, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1344(a) (granting immunity only as to services rendered without expectation of compensation); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 768.13(2) (West 1986) (applying immunity only for gratuitous emergency care);
MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-309 (protecting services rendered for no fee and
without compensation).
124. See supra note 100 and accompanying text for a discussion of amendments made
to the statute since its enactment.
125. Compare Act of April 7, 1964, ch. 48, 1964 Md. Laws 104 (applying only to physicians, but requiring that services be provided without compensation and fall short of
gross negligence) with MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-309 (containing the same
requirements but applying to a broad range of skilled individuals).
126. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 132 (1980) (current version at MD. CTS. & JUD.
PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-309).
127. The recodified Good Samaritan statute found in § 5-309 contains the same requirements for coverage and provides immunity to the same groups and individuals as
its predecessor. See MD. CTS. &JuD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-309; supra note 125.
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tained to civil liability for "[p]hysicians, nurses and certain other
persons rendering aid under emergency conditions."' 128 Section 132(a) limited civil liability to professional acts or omissions
amounting to gross negligence performed "(1) at the scene of an
emergency; (2) in transit to medical facilities; or (3) through com129
munications with personnel rendering emergency assistance."'
Those entitled to immunity included persons licensed by the State
of Maryland to provide medical care who "charge[d] no fee or compensation" for the services at issue.'3 0 Section 132(b) provided the
same protection to "a member of any State, county, municipal or
volunteer fire department [or] ambulance and rescue squad ...cer13
tified . . .as an emergency medical technician."' '
3. The Court's Reasoning.-Before the Tatum decision, Maryland's Good Samaritan statute had never been interpreted by the
Court of Appeals, beyond the court's recognition that the statute
132
creates no affirmative duty to render assistance to one in need.
On appeal, Tatum contended that the statute did not apply to Gigliotti for two reasons: He was paid a salary by Prince George's
County and thus his services were not rendered "without compensation"; and Good Samaritan statutes do not apply to persons who are
under a pre-existing duty to render assistance due to the nature of
their employment. 133
a. Compensation Exclusion.-The Court of Appeals summarily
dismissed the argument that the statute was inapplicable because
Gigliotti was paid a salary. '34 However, this question was discussed
more thoroughly by the Court of Special Appeals, which held that
the statutory requirement that no fee be "charged" was satisfied because Gigliotti did not charge a fee directly to Tatum. 135 The Court
of Appeals relied on the lower court opinion and an opinion of the
Attorney General in determining that a salaried EMT is covered by
128. MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 132 (current version at MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE
ANN. § 5-309).
129. Id. § 132(a).
130. Id.
131. Id. § 132(b).
132. 321 Md. at 627, 583 A.2d at 1064. In Pope v. State, 284 Md. 309, 396 A.2d 1054
(1979), the Court of Appeals found that § 132 imposed no requirement that assistance
be rendered to a person in need. Id. at 325, 396 A.2d at 1064.
133. See Tatum, 321 Md. at 628, 583 A.2d at 1064.
134. See id.
135. See Tatum v. Gigliotti, 80 Md. App. at 568, 565 A.2d at 358.
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the Good Samaritan statute. 136 The Attorney General opined:
The whole statutory scheme reflects the principle that, if
the victim is charged for the help by the person seeking
immunity, then no immunity is available under the Good
Samaritan Law; but, if the victim is not charged by the one
rendering the assistance and seeking immunity, then even a
salaried employee is entitled to immunity absent gross
negligence. 137
Further, the court was influenced by the fact that the word "volunteer," which had preceded the phrase "ambulance and rescue
squads," was deleted when the statute was amended in 1969.138
Based on the fact that Gigliotti received no compensation from
Tatum directly, coupled with the legislature's deletion of the term
"volunteer" from the statute, the court determined that the compensation exclusion did not prevent the granting of immunity to
3 9
Tatum.
b. Pre-existingDuty.-Tatum's next argument was that Good Samaritan statutes do not apply to persons who are under a pre-existing duty to render assistance by the nature of their
employment. 40 For support, Tatum cited several out-of-state cases
indicating that when there is a pre-existing duty to rescue, Good
Samaritan statutes are inapplicable.' 4 ' For example, in Henry v.
Barfield,'4 2 the Court of Appeals of Georgia reasoned that a doctor
with an employment duty to render medical services had no need
for an inducement to render such aid.' 43 The Georgia Court held
that Good Samaritan statutes are directed at persons "who by
136. See Tatum, 321 Md. at 627-28, 583 A.2d at 1064.
137. 64 Op. Att'y Gen. 175, 177 (1979).
138. See Tatum, 321 Md. at 629-30, 583 A.2d at 1065; supra note 100.
139. See Tatum, 321 Md. at 629-30, 583 A.2d at 1064-65.
140. See id. at 628, 583 A.2d at 1064.
141. See id. at 628-29, 583 A.2d at 1064 (citing Lee v. State, 490 P.2d 1206, 1209
(Alaska 1971) (finding that a police officer acting under a statutory duty to rescue was
not protected by Good Samaritan statute), rev'd on other grounds, 545 P.2d 165 (1976);
Henry v. Barfield, 367 S.E.2d 289, 290 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988) (concluding that a doctor
was covered by the Good Samaritan statute unless there was a pre-existing duty to treat);
Clayton v. Kelly, 357 S.E.2d 865, 868 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987) (determining that a doctor
with an employment duty to aid a patient at the hospital was not covered by the Good
Samaritan statute); Hovermale v. Berkeley Springs Moose Lodge No. 1483, 271 S.E.2d
335, 341 (W. Va. 1980) (holding that members of Moose Lodge with a pre-existing duty
to aid a fellow member on land owned by the lodge were not covered by the Good
Samaritan statute)).
142. 367 S.E.2d 289 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988).
143. Id. at 290.
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chance and on an irregular basis come upon or are called upon to
render emergency care." 14 4 Although there are relatively few reported cases addressing this question, Good Samaritan statutes are
usually held not to apply to situations in which a rescuer has a preexisting duty to rescue. 145 Rescuers in this situation require no encouragement from the legislature to volunteer services that they are
already obligated to perform.
The Court of Appeals was unpersuaded by these authorities,
however, and instead relied on principles of statutory construction. 146 The court held that the clear language of section 132(b)
expressly applied to a member of a county ambulance and rescue
squad certified as an EMT. 14'7 Gigliotti was such an individual."' 8
The court stated that the General Assembly must have known that
members of ambulance squads are under a pre-existing duty to provide medical care and are typically salaried"' 9 and that if those
EMTs were not intended to be covered by the statute, they would
have been excluded, rather than having immunity expressly extended to them. 150 Thus, as a county EMT, Gigliotti was entitled to
51
the statutory immunity.'

4. Analysis.a. Compensation Exclusion.-Both the Attorney General and the
Court of Special Appeals overlooked an interpretation of the "no
fee" requirement that fits more squarely within the purpose of the
Good Samaritan statute than the interpretation chosen. Rather than
distinguishing between the situation in which a rescuer receives a
salary from a third party and the situation in which a rescuer directly
charges the victim, the more appropriate distinction focuses on
144. Id.
145. See supra note 141.
146. Citing Potter v. Bethesda Fire Dep't, Inc., 309 Md. 347, 353, 524 A.2d 61, 64
(1987), the court noted that the words of a statute are to be given their ordinary meaning and reasonably construed in reference to the purpose to be accomplished. See
Tatum, 321 Md. at 629, 583 A.2d at 1065.
147. Tatum, 322 Md. at 629, 583 A.2d at 1064. The court asserted that the Maryland
statute is distinguishable from the out-of-state cases because of its express inclusion of
EMTs. See id. In doing so, the court ignored the possibility that the mere inclusion of a
group (EMTs) does not necessarily mandate that the statute be applied to members of
that group under all circumstances. The statute might apply only in situations in which
the incentive purpose of the statute is required.
148. Id. at 625, 583 A.2d at 1063.
149. Id. at 629, 583 A.2d at 1065.
150. Id.
151. Id.
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whether the emergency services are provided while the rescuer is
receiving a salary, or whether they are provided during a time when
the rescuer is not directly earning a salary.' 5 2 In the latter situation,
the statutory incentive fills the gap left by the absence of a salary
incentive. Thus, one of the purposes of Good Samaritan statutes is
promoted if the above interpretation is applied.
The fact that the word "volunteer" was deleted from the preface to the phrase "ambulance and rescue squads" also can be understood within this context. If the purpose of the Good Samaritan
statute is to encourage skilled professionals to provide gratuitous
services
in emergency situations without the fear of potential liability,' 5 3 there is no logical reason why volunteer members of ambulance crews should be any more encouraged than paid members
with the same qualifications. Absent any clear legislative purpose
for this deletion, 5 4 an equally plausible explanation is that the General Assembly simply intended to encourage paid as well as volunteer members of ambulance crews to come to the rescue while off
duty. Under this analysis, Gigliotti was receiving a salary at the time
he rendered emergency services to Tatum and the Good Samaritan
protection would not apply.
b. Pre-existing Duty.-The court also overlooked the possibility
that EMTs could be included in the statute, but that the statute is
not applicable under all situations, particularly when a pre-existing
duty exists. If the purpose of the Good Samaritan statute is to encourage individuals with specialized skills to provide medical services in emergencies, then EMTs-individuals possessing specialized
skills in such situations-clearly should be included in the statute.
However, inclusion of a given group in the statute does not, by itself, mandate that the statute be applied to every individual in that
group in every situation. The goals of such statutes must also be
taken into consideration in determining whether a particular person
warrants protection. If circumstances arise in which the statute's ultimate goal-trained emergency care for injured parties-is already

152. Thus, an ambulance crew member would be receiving compensation within the
meaning of the statute if he was on duty at the time he performed the emergency services. He would not be receiving compensation within the meaning of the statute if he
was off duty at the time the services were provided.
153. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
154. The amendment to the Good Samaritan statute by which the word "volunteer"
was deleted contains no explanation for the change. See Act of May 14, 1969, ch. 616,
1969 Md. Laws 1432.
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achieved by a pre-existing duty, then application of the statute is
superfluous and serves no useful purpose.
The argument that the statute is inapplicable to EMTs performing emergency services in the course of their duties is further supported by the language of a subsequently adopted statute that
essentially provides broad immunity to fire and rescue squads for
acts performed within the course of their duties under any circumstances. 155 Apparently, this statute was enacted in response to Utica
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Gaithersburg-WashingtonGrove Fire Department,
Inc.,t 6 in which the Court of Special Appeals indicated that a volunteer fire department or ambulance squad might not enjoy the same
sovereign immunity that a city or county fire or ambulance squad
enjoys.

57

Because the language of the later statute applies to rescue
squads performing acts within the course of their duties,'
the argument can be made that the legislature did not believe that the
prior Good Samaritan legislation covered EMTs in the course of
performing their pre-existing duties.' 5 9 Also, if the Good Samaritan
statute was intended to cover EMTs under emergency situations in
which they had a pre-existing duty, it follows that when the legislature enacted the subsequent expansive immunity statute, they would
have completely omitted EMTs from the Good Samaritan statute.
If, on the other hand, the Good Samaritan statute was intended to
apply to EMTs only while performing acts outside of their employment duties, then EMTs should remain in the statute even after the
155. See MD. CTS. &JUD. PRoc. CODE ANN. § 5-309.1 (1989). This section was enacted
in 1983 and provides immunity from civil liability to fire and rescue companies and their
individual members for acts or omissions performed within the course of their duties,
except those acts or omissions that are willful or grossly negligent. See id; see also Act of
May 31, 1983, ch. 546, 1983 Md. Laws 1736.
156. 53 Md. App. 589, 455 A.2d 987, cert. denied, 296 Md. 224 (1983); see also Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n v. Riverdale Heights Volunteer Fire Co., 308 Md. 556,
569, 520 A.2d 1319, 1326 (1987) (noting that the statute was passed in response to the
Utica decision).
157. 53 Md. App. at 62, 455 A.2d at 994. The bill was originally introduced "for the
purpose of providing that certain volunteer fire companies are immune from civil liabil-

ity in the same manner as a local government agency." Act of May 31, 1983, ch. 546,
1983 Md. Laws 1736. The specific language of the original purpose clause was significantly expanded in the final version of the statute. See id.
158. See MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-309.1.

159. Of course an equally reasonable counter argument is that the legislature had
always intended to cover EMTs for negligent acts arising out of the provision of emergency services performed within the course of their duties. The subsequent statute, it
could be argued, was only enacted to cover other acts of negligence for which a rescue
squad might also be held liable and for which municipal and county squads were already
protected via sovereign immunity.
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subsequent grant of immunity.' 6
5. Conclusion.-The general purpose of Good Samaritan statutes is to mitigate the harshness of the common-law rule that a rescuer may be held liable for failure to exercise ordinary care during a
rescue attempt. By limiting the scope of potential liability, the statutes were designed to encourage medical professionals to render
assistance in emergency situations. The Tatum court's holding,
although no longer applicable to EMTs, will have an effect on other
rescuers included in the statute. Because those paid a salary to provide emergency services are already under a duty to come to the
rescue of individuals in need of emergency medical assistance, extension of Good Samaritan protection by the Court of Appeals does
little to further the statute's purpose, and unnecessarily allows negligent professionals to escape the obligation to respond in civil damages for their wrongful acts.
C.

Punitive Damagesfor Torts Arising out of Contracts*

In Schaefer v. Miller, 6 ' the Court of Appeals reaffirmed its holding in H & R Block, Inc. v. Testerman' 6 2 that actual malice must be
established prior to an award of punitive damages in an action involving a tort arising out of a contractual relationship.163 The court
expressly declined to create an exception to the Testerman rule establishing implied rather than actual malice as the standard for recovery in cases involving breach of fiduciary duty or fraud." 6 The
court's decision also has the effect of extending the Testerman rule to
medical malpractice suits.
160. EMTs are still included in the language of the current Good Samaritan statute,
see MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-309, despite the fact that the later immunity

statute has been in force for over eight years. See Act of May 31, 1983, ch. 546, 1983 Md.
Laws 1736; MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-309.1.
* EDITOR'S NOTE: The Court of Appeals decided Owens-Illinois, Inc. v.
Zenobia, No. 90-66, slip op. (Md. Ct. App. Feb. 14, 1992) too late for inclusion in the
discussion that follows. The Zenobia court abandoned the "arising out of contract"
distinction in regard to punitive damage claims. See id. at 32. The court held that in all
tort actions not involving intentional torts, a plaintiff must prove actual malice in order
to recover punitive damages. See id. at 41.
161. 322 Md. 297, 587 A.2d 491 (1991).
162. 275 Md. 36, 338 A.2d 48 (1975).
163. See Schaefer, 322 Md. at 309-10, 587 A.2d at 497; see also Testerman, 275 Md. at 47,
338 A.2d at 54.
164. See Schaefer, 322 Md. at 311, 587 A.2d at 498; see also Miller Bldg. Supply v. Rosen, 305 Md. 341, 355, 503 A.2d 1344, 1351 (1986) (refusing to permit a punitive damages award for fraud arising out of a contractual relationship).

826

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 51:804

1. The Case.-At age seventy-two, Amelia R. Schaefer was diagnosed by her ophthalmologist, Gerald A. Miller, M.D., as having a
cataract in her right eye. 16 5 A stronger prescription for her eyeglasses temporarily corrected the problem.' 6 6 During Schaefer's
next annual eye examination, however, Miller advised her that the
cataract needed to be removed.' 67 On July 27, 1983, Miller surgically removed the cataract and implanted an intraocular lens in
68
Schaefer's eye. 1
A few days after the surgery, Schaefer developed an infection in
her right eye; Miller admitted her to the hospital.' 69 Miller treated
the infection with antibiotics and a vitrectomy. 170 On August 24,
1983, Miller determined that Schaefer's eye was still infected, and
he performed laser therapy.' 7 ' Schaefer's final visit to Miller's office
72
resulted in a new eyeglasses prescription.'
In October of 1984, Schaefer filed a medical malpractice suit
against Miller.' 73 The claim was heard by a Health Claims Arbitration panel, whose award recommendation was rejected by both
parties.

74

Schaefer brought suit in the Circuit Court for Baltimore
County, alleging that Miller performed the cataract surgery without
informed consent. The complaint also alleged that he failed to comport with the standard of care applicable to all preoperative and
postoperative care.1 75 Ajury found for Schaefer on both counts and
awarded her $350,000 in compensatory damages and $750,000 in

165. Schaefer, 322 Md. at 301-02, 587 A.2d at 493.
166. Id. at 302, 587 A.2d at 493.
167. Id.
168. Miller v. Schaefer, 80 Md. App. 60, 66, 559 A.2d 813, 815-16 (1989), aft'd, 322
Md. 297, 587 A.2d 491 (1991).
169. Schaefer, 322 Md. at 302, 587 A.2d at 494. Schaefer remained in the hospital for
two weeks. During that time "she was on antibiotics, suffered pain, and was unable to
see out of the affected eye." Id.
170. Id. A vitrectomy is a procedure in which the fluid in the eye is removed and
replaced with saline solution. RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
2128 (2d ed. 1987).
171. Schaefer, 322 Md. at 302, 587 A.2d at 494. The therapy was conducted over the
course of three office visits. Id.
172. Id. at 302-03, 587 A.2d at 494.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 303, 587 A.2d at 494. The Health Claims Arbitration panel awarded
Schaefer $1.00 in compensatory damages and $25,000 in punitive damages. Id.
175. See id. At trial, another ophthalmologist testified as an expert witness. The testimony included statements that Miller had not complied with the required standard of
care for obtaining informed consent and treating Schaefer's postoperative infection. Id.
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punitive damages. '
Miller appealed, claiming that because the alleged tort arose
out of a contractual relationship, punitive damages could not be
awarded absent proof of actual malice.' 7 7 The Court of Special Appeals reversed the award of punitive damages. It held that the negligence counts arose out of an implied contractual relationship
Schaefer's assertion that Miller had
between the parties, 178 despite 79
committed three distinct torts.'
Therefore, the case fell within the ambit of H & R Block, Inc. v.
Testerman,' 8 0 which established that actual malice must be proven in
order to recover punitive damages for tortious conduct arising out
of a contractual relationship.'' Having decided that the case fell
actual
under Testerman, the court found that Schaefer failed to prove
83
malice,' 8 2 and reversed the award of punitive damages.
The Court of Appeals granted certiorari and affirmed.' 84 In its
opinion, the Court of Appeals reiterated its application of the rule
' specifically declining to create an excepannounced in Testerman, "85
tion to the actual malice requirement. Such an exception would
have established implied malice as the standard for the recovery of
punitive damages for injuries arising out of contract actions involv176. Id. at 304, 587 A.2d at 495. The compensatory damages were later reduced to
$50,000. Id.
177. Id. at 304-05, 587 A.2d at 495. The trial judge characterized the claim against
Miller as a negligence claim, and the jury was instructed that it could award punitive
damages if it found that Miller had acted with implied malice. Id. at 304, 587 A.2d at
495.
178. See Miller v. Schaefer, 80 Md. App. at 76, 559 A.2d at 821. The Court of Special
Appeals found that a contractual relationship existed between Miller and Schaefer based
on Schaefer's acceptance of Miller's diagnosis that the cataract had to be removed. See
id. at 75, 559 A.2d at 820.
179. Schaefer argued that Miller committed fraud, battery, and negligence. See id. at
72, 559 A.2d at 818. The Court of Special Appeals held, however, that because Schaefer
did not claim fraud and battery before the trial court, only the claim of negligence could
be addressed on appeal. See id. at 73, 559 A.2d at 819.
180. 275 Md. 36, 338 A.2d 48 (1975).
181. See id. at 47, 338 A.2d at 54.
182. Miller v. Schaefer, 80 Md. App. at 77, 559 A.2d at 821. Actual malice has been
defined as "the performance of an act without legal justification or excuse, but with an
evil or rancorous motive influenced by hate, the purpose being to deliberately and willfully injure the plaintiff." Testerman, 275 Md. at 43, 338 A.2d at 52. This definition is in
contrast to that of implied malice, which was defined by the court in Wedeman v. City
Chevrolet Co., 278 Md. 524, 366 A.2d 7 (1976), as "conduct of an extraordinary nature
characterized by a wanton or reckless disregard for the rights of others." Id. at 532, 366
A.2d at 13.
183. Miller v. Schaefer, 80 Md. App. at 77, 559 A.2d at 821.
184. See Schaefer, 322 Md. at 311, 587 A.2d at 498.
185. See id. at 310-11, 587 A.2d at 498.
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ing the breach of a fiduciary duty.'8 6 Further, for the benefit of the
lower courts, the court identified the characteristics of torts "arising
18 7
out of" contractual relationships.
2.

Legal Background.-

a. General Rule.-It is a well-settled principle in American common law that punitive damages18 8 may not be awarded in actions
arising out of a breach of contract. 8 9 An award of punitive damages
is permitted, however, in actions based solely on tort law.' 9 0 Historically, contract and tort remedies have been separately delineated,
on the theory that punitive damages are meant to punish the tortious actor and to deter future tortious actions, while compensatory
damages are awarded to compensate the plaintiff for an actual
loss.'

9

'

Within the past two decades, however, a "hybrid" or "borderland area" of tort and contract has developed.' 9 2 In "hybrid" cases,
the plaintiff receives punitive damages based on tortious conduct
arising out of a breach of contract. 9 3 These cases are considered
exceptions to the general rule that punitive damages are not
94
awarded for a breach of contract.'
The earliest cases in which courts allowed punitive damages for
breach of contract involved the breach of a contract to marry and
the breach of public service contracts.' 9 5 More recently, various
states have developed several other categories. The most prominent exceptions are: (1) breach of contract accompanied by
186. See id. at 310, 587 A.2d at 497.
187. See id., 587 A.2d at 497-98.
188. Punitive damages have also been called exemplary damages, vindictive damages,
or "smart money." See CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES
§ 77 (1935).
189. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 (1981); 5 ARTHUR L. CORBIN,
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1077, at 438 (1964).
190. See KEETON et al., supra note 25, § 2, at 9; MCCORMICK, supra note 188, § 81, at
286.
191. See 5 CORBIN, supra note 189, § 1077, at 437-38; MCCORMiCK, supra note 188,

§ 77, at 276.
192. See Leslie E. John, FormulatingStandardsforAwards of Punitive Damages in the Borderland of Contract and Tort, 74 CAL. L. REV. 2033, 2036 (1986); Gary L. Strausberg, A
Roadmap Through Malice, Actual or Implied: Punitive Damages in Torts Arising Out of Contract in
Maryland, 13 U. BALT. L. REV. 275, 275 (1984).
193. See infra notes 195-199 and accompanying text.
194. For a thorough discussion of the development of exceptions to the common-law
rule, see John, supra note 192, at 2043-46. See also TimothyJ. Sullivan, Punitive Damages
in the Law of Contract: The Reality and the Illusion of Legal Change, 61 MINN. L. REV. 207,
220-51 (1977).
195. 5 CORBIN, supra note 189, § 1077, at 440-44.
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fraud;' 9 6 (2) breach of fiduciary duty;' 97 (3) breach of contract accompanied by an independent tort;' 98 and (4) breach of an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.' 9 9
b. Development of the Maryland Rule.-Rather than categorizing
certain types of contractual breaches as exceptions to the rule, the
Court of Appeals has held fast to the principle that punitive damages are not to be awarded in breach of contract actions. 20 0 The
196. See, e.g., Bud Wolf Chevrolet, Inc. v. Robertson, 519 N.E.2d 135, 137 (Ind. 1988)
(permitting a punitive damages award for breach of contract when conduct constituted
fraud, gross negligence, or oppressiveness); Vernon Fire & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Sharp,
349 N.E.2d 173, 185 (Ind. 1976) (awarding punitive damages against insurance carrier,
who fraudulently misled policyholder to think he had full coverage); Jones v. Abraini,
350 N.E.2d 635, 648-50 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976) (finding proof of fraudulent state of mind
sufficient for award of punitive damages in action for breach of contract for sale of motor home); Floyd v. Country Squire Mobile Homes, Inc., 336 S.E.2d 502, 503-04 (S.C.
Ct. App. 1985) (determining that punitive damages are appropriate for breach of contract accompanied by a fraudulent act); Hilder v. St. Peter, 478 A.2d 202, 210 (Vt. 1984)
(holding punitive damages proper in cases in which the breach is of a "willful and wanton or fraudulent nature"); Glidden v. Skinner, 458 A.2d 1142, 1144-45 (Vt. 1983) (allowing a punitive damages award in a breach of sales contract action, for vendor's
alleged false and fraudulent misrepresentations); Berry v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,
381 S.E.2d 367, 374 (W. Va. 1989) (stating that punitive damages can be awarded to an
insured if the insurer actually knew that the claim was proper and denied payment willfully, maliciously, and intentionally).
197. See, e.g., Ramsey v. Culpepper, 738 F.2d 1092, 1099 (10th Cir. 1984) (finding that
under New Mexico law "the failure of a realtor to disclose important information to a
fiduciary, if willful or wanton, can be the basis for a punitive damages award"); Wagman
v. Lee, 457 A.2d 401, 404 (D.C.) (noting that "[a]lthough punitive damages are not
recoverable for breach of contract, this rule is inapplicable if there exists an independent
fiduciary relationship between the parties"), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 849 (1983); Capitol
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Hohman, 682 P.2d 1309, 1310 (Kan. 1984) (permitting a
punitive damages award for willful breach of trust); Purcell v. Automatic Gas Distrib.,
Inc., 673 P.2d 1246, 1251 (Mont. 1983) (holding that the "breach of a fiduciary relationship constituting a constructive fraud forms the basis for an award of punitive damages"); Mulder v. Mittelstadt, 352 N.W.2d 223, 230 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984) (allowing
punitive damages in shareholder's derivative suit in which directors' breaches of fiduciary duty were deliberate and malicious).
198. See, e.g., Great Western Say. v. George W. Easley Co., 778 P.2d 569, 580 (Alaska
1989); Lewis v. Guthartz, 428 So. 2d 222, 223 (Fla. 1982); Morrow v. L.A. Goldschmidt
Assoc., 492 N.E.2d 181, 184 (Ill. 1986); Art Hill Ford, Inc. v. Callendar, 423 N.E.2d 601,
602 (Ind. 1981); Higgins v. Blue Cross, 319 N.W.2d 232, 235 (Iowa 1982);
Plains Resources, Inc. v. Gable, 682 P.2d 653, 664 (Kan. 1984); Shearin v.
Fletcher/Mayo/Assoc., 687 S.W.2d 198, 202 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); Woods Petroleum
Corp. v. Delhi Gas Pipeline Corp., 700 P.2d 1023, 1028 (Okla. Ct. App. 1983); Highland
Constr. Co. v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 683 P.2d 1042, 1049 (Utah 1984); Gasque v.
Mooers Motor Car Co., 313 S.E.2d 384, 388 (Va. 1984).
199. SeeJohn, supra note 192, at 2046-48. This exception has its origins in California
law and has also been characterized as an exception created for the breach of an insurance contract. See Sullivan, supra note 194, at 240-44.
200. See Schaefer, 322 Md. at 299, 587 A.2d at 492; Miller Bldg. Supply v. Rosen, 305
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court has created its own unique rule, however, for those cases in
which a tort "arises out of" a contractual relationship. 2 ' The rule
provides that punitive damages may be awarded if actual malice is
proven.
The Court of Appeals first delineated the Maryland hybrid rule
in H & R Block, Inc. v. Testerman.2 °2 In that case, the court held that
"where the tort is one arising out of a contractual relationship, actual malice is a prerequisite to the recovery of punitive damages. 2 0°
The Testerman court based its holding on the seminal case of Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. GardinerDairy Co. ,204 which stated that "if. .. there
was evidence tending to show that the defendant had caused the
contract to be broken for the sole purpose and with the deliberate
intention of wrongfully injuring the plaintiff, exemplary damages
might be recovered. 20 5
The Court of Appeals has attempted to address the "gray area
separating pure torts from contract cases," by requiring actual malice for punitive damages when a tort arises out of a contractual relationship.2 0 6 As the court stated in General Motors Corp. v. Piskor,2 °7
torts arising out of contractual relationships " 'frequently bear close
resemblance to actions for pure breach of contract' in which punitive damages are not recoverable. Nevertheless, torts of this genre
Md. 341, 348, 503 A.2d 1344, 1347 (1986); Siegman v. Equitable Trust Co., 267 Md.
309, 313, 297 A.2d 758, 760 (1972); St. Paul at Chase Corp. v. Manufacturers Life Ins.
Co., 262 Md. 192, 236, 278 A.2d 12, 33 (1971).
201. See Strausberg, supra note 192, at 280-81. Both Chief Judge Gilbert of the Court
of Special Appeals and Judge Eldridge of the Court of Appeals characterized the Maryland formula as unique. See Schaefer, 322 Md. at 312, 587 A.2d at 499 (Eldridge, J.,
concurring) (stating that "the Testerman-Wedeman rule ... is not supported by the decisions in any other jurisdiction"); Miller v. Schaefer, 80 Md. App. at 78, 559 A.2d at 821
(Gilbert, J., concurring) (claiming that "[n]o other jurisdiction has opted to march to the
Testerman drum beat, dance to Wedeman's tune, or vocalize Piskor lyrics").
202. 275 Md. 36, 338 A.2d 48 (1975); see also Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Hevey, 275 Md.
50, 53-54, 338 A.2d 43, 45 (1975) (decided the same day as Testerman).
203. Testerman, 275 Md. at 47, 338 A.2d at 54. Testerman involved a suit for damages in
both tort and contract alleging that the defendant "negligently, wantonly, maliciously
and intentionally" prepared federal income tax returns. Id. at 37-38, 338 A.2d at 49.
204. 107 Md. 556, 69 A. 405 (1908).
205. Id. at 569-70, 69 A. at 410. According to the Testerman court, "this rule has been
followed consistently." 275 Md. at 44, 338 A.2d at 53 (citing Siegman v. Equitable Trust
Co., 267 Md. 309, 314, 297 A.2d 758, 760 (1972); Daugherty v. Kessler, 264 Md. 281,
284, 286 A.2d 95, 97 (1972); St. Paul at Chase Corp. v. Manufacturers Life Ins. Co., 262
Md. 192, 238, 278 A.2d 12, 34 (1971); Damazo v. Wahby, 259 Md. 627, 639, 270 A.2d
814, 819 (1970)). But see Schaefer, 322 Md. at 316-17, 587 A.2d at 501 (Eldridge, J.,
concurring) (stating that the rule formulated by the Testerman court "had no support in
the Maryland cases relied on" by that court).
206. General Motors Corp. v. Piskor, 281 Md. 627, 639, 381 A.2d 16, 22 (1977).
207. Id.
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often involve conduct of the most opprobrious kind, which society
might well seek to punish and deter by means of exemplary damages." '2 °8 The Testerman rule is therefore an attempt to "fashion a
workable rule governing the recovery of punitive damages which
would be more stringent than that applied in pure tort cases, but
which at the same time would allow the possibility of recovery where
the particular conduct clearly warranted the imposition of such
damages. "209
The Testerman rule has been refined since its inception in 1975.
As a result of the refinements, a three-prong test has been developed to determine whether a tort arises out of a contractual relationship. "[T]he ingredients of the three-pronged test are 1) a
contract pre-exists the tort; 2) the contract is essential to the tort;
and 3) the plaintiff could sue on alternative theories of tort or
210
contract."
The court explained the first prong six months after Testerman
in Wedeman v. City Chevrolet Co. ,211 which involved an allegation of
fraudulent misrepresentation. The Court of Special Appeals had
held that punitive damages were not recoverable because the fraud
at issue was a tort arising out of a contractual relationship and the
21 2
plaintiff had not presented the requisite proof of actual malice.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision 21 " holding that when
the nature of the fraud at issue is fraudulent inducement to enter
into a contract, the fraud does not "arise out of" a contractual relationship. 2 4 The Wedeman court therefore established that in order
for a tort to arise out of a contractual relationship, the contractual
must have existed prior to the commission of the
relationship
tort. 2 15
208. Id., 381 A.2d at 22-23 (citation omitted).
209. Id., 381 A.2d at 23.
210. James F. McCadden, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases in Maryland, 6 U. BALT. L. REV.

203, 217 (1977); cf Strausberg, supra note 192, at 283-84 (identifying the three basic
elements as "(1) actual malice; (2) a contract that precedes the tort; and (3) a nexus
between the contract and the alleged tort").
211. 278 Md. 524, 366 A.2d 7 (1976).
212. City Chevrolet Co. v. Wedeman, 30 Md. App. 637, 643, 354 A.2d 185, 189, rev'd,
278 Md. 524, 366 A.2d 7 (1976).
213. Wedeman, 278 Md. at 528, 366 A.2d at 10.
214. Id. at 529, 366 A.2d at 11. Because the fraud did not arise out of a contractual
relationship, the case was not within the Testerman holding. Therefore, only implied malice, and not the higher standard of actual malice, was necessary to support an award of
punitive damages. See id. at 530-31, 366 A.2d at 11-12.
215. A second case decided the same day as Wedeman addressed the meaning of actual
malice, holding that actual malice may be inferred from "acts and circumstantial evidence." Henderson v. Maryland Nat'l Bank, 278 Md. 514, 520, 366 A.2d 1, 4 (1976).
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The second prong of the test was enunciated in General Motors
Corp. v. Piskor,21 6 which involved "torts in the purest sense of that
term-false imprisonment and assault.121 7 The Piskor court held
that despite the existence of a contractual relationship, punitive
damages were appropriate upon a finding of actual or implied malice because the torts at issue did not arise out of that relationship. 1 t
The court clarified this determination, stating that for a tort to arise
out of a contractual relationship, it must arise "directly from performance or breach of the contract ' 21 9 and there must be "a direct
nexus between the tortious act and performance or breach of the
terms and conditions of the parties' underlying contract. "220
In Miller Building Supply v. Rosen, 2 2 t the court reaffirmed the Testerman rule, suggesting a third prong of the "hybrid" case test. The
Rosen court explained that "[plerhaps the clearest applications of
the Testerman principle occur when the plaintiff and the tortfeasor
are in privity and the conduct of the tortfeasor may properly be
pleaded alternatively (whether or not actually pleaded), as a breach
of contract and as a tort. ' 22 2 The opinion implies that if a claim
could properly be pleaded as a tort or breach of contract claim, the
claim arises out of a contractual relationship and the Testerman rule
applies to a punitive damages request.
3. The Court's Reasoning; Analysis.-Initially it appears that the
decision in Schaefer merely reaffirms, without comment, the Court of
Appeals' adherence to a rule that no other jurisdiction has
adopted. 3 Closer examination of the Schaefer decision, however,
reveals that it has expanded the Testerman rule to include claims of
216. 281 Md. 627, 381 A.2d 16 (1977).
217. Id. at 639, 381 A.2d at 23.
218. See id. at 640, 381 A.2d at 23.
219. Id. at 637, 381 A.2d at 21.
220. Id. at 640, 381 A.2d at 23.
221. 305 Md. 341, 503 A.2d 1344 (1986). Rosen involved a claim of fraud arising out
of an employment contract. See id. at 344, 503 A.2d at 1345.
222. Id. at 349, 503 A.2d at 1348; see also McCadden, supra note 210, at 217; Strausberg, supra note 192, at 284.
223. In his concurrence, Judge Eldridge (joined by Judges Cole and Chasanow)
sharply criticized the rule. Judge Eldridge's criticism is that the Testerman rule has "utterly no relationship to the purposes of punitive damages, leads to irrational results, and
has been arbitrarily and inconsistently applied." Schaefer, 322 Md. at 312, 587 A.2d at
499 (Eldridge, J., concurring). He advocated overruling Testerman and its progeny and
reinstating either the rule established in Davis v. Gordon, 183 Md. 129, 36 A.2d 699
(1944) (concluding that in negligence actions, punitive damages are not recoverable unless there is proof of actual malice), or the rule outlined in Smith v. Gray Concrete Pipe
Co., 267 Md. 149, 297 A.2d 721 (1972) (allowing punitive damages upon a finding of
implied malice). See Schaefer, 322 Md. at 330, 587 A.2d at 508 (Eldridge, J., concurring).
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medical malpractice premised on negligence in which an implied
contractual relationship exists between a physician and patient.
The Schaefer decision sets the outer parameters for cases in
which there is a tort arising out of a contractual relationship. Based
on its decisions in Wedeman2 2 4 and Piskor,22 5 the court reiterated the
determinative test for whether a tort arises out of a contractual relationship.2 2 ' The test has several factors: (1) the contractual relationship must pre-exist the contract; (2) the negligence must find
" 'its source in the contract without which the wrong would not have
been committed' -1;227 (3) there must " 'be a direct nexus between
the tortious act and performance or breach of the. . . contract' ";228
and (4) the tort and contract must be so " 'intertwined that one
could not be viewed in isolation from the other.' 229
The court said nothing about the "third prong" of the test expressed in Rosen 2 3 0 -whether the plaintiff could plead alternatively
in tort or in contract. 23 This may be because the "alternative
pleading" test has been called "definitional": in order to receive
punitive damages at all, one must allege a separate cause of action in
tort.23 2 Otherwise, the action is pled only in contract and punitive
damages will not be available.23 3
The Schaefer court also expressly declined to create an exception
that would have established implied rather than actual malice as the
standard for cases involving a breach of fiduciary duty. 23 4 The court
rejected the exception, however, only on the basis that Schaefer
failed to claim the independent torts of breach of fiduciary duty and
battery in her original complaint. 23 5 There was no indication in the
opinion as to whether, in the future, the court will set implied malice
as the standard for recovery of punitive damages for a breach of
224. 278 Md. 524, 366 A.2d 7 (1976).
225. 281 Md. 627, 381 A.2d 16 (1977).
226. See Schaefer, 322 Md. at 310, 587 A.2d at 497-98.
227. Id., 587 A.2d at 497 (quoting Wedeman, 278 Md. at 529, 366 A.2d at 11).
228. Id., 587 A.2d at 498 (quoting Piskor, 281 Md. at 640, 381 A.2d at 23).
229. Id. (quotingPiskor, 281 Md. at 637, 381 A.2d at 21). The factors set out in Schaefer are essentially the same as those described earlier, see supra note 210 and accompanying text, specifically factors one and two of the McCadden list and factors two and three
of the Strausberg list.
230. 305 Md. 341, 503 A.2d 1344 (1986).
231. See id. at 349, 503 A.2d at 1348. This is the third factor in McCadden's list. See
supra note 210 and accompanying text.
232. See Strausberg, supra note 192, at 284.
233. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
234. See 322 Md. at 309-10, 587 A.2d at 497.
235. See id. at 310, 587 A.2d at 497.
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fiduciary duty resulting from a breach of contract.23 6
The most significant aspect of the Schaefer decision is the court's
implicit expansion of the Testerman-Wedeman rule. Testerman and its
progeny involved contracts in a commercial setting. 23 7 The cases
relied on by the Testerman court also involved commercial contracts.2 38 Schaefer is the first case after Testerman in which the court
has found that a malpractice claim of negligence arose from an implied contract between a doctor and patient.23 9
In finding that a contract existed between Schaefer and Miller,
the Court of Special Appeals explained that "[t]he relationship between a physician and patient is a consensual one arising out of an
express or implied contract. ' 240 However, " 'malpractice is predicated upon the failure to exercise requisite medical skill and, being
tortious in nature, general rules of negligence usually apply in determining liability.' ",241 Nonetheless, the Court of Special Appeals
based its opinion to deny punitive damages on its holding in Roebuck
v. Steuart,24 2 in which it "unequivocally held, based on Testerman, that
actual malice was a requirement for the recovery of punitive damages in an attorney malpractice action. "243
The Court of Appeals accepted the lower court's finding that an
implied contract existed between the parties, without reference to
the lower court's discussion.2 4 4 In doing so, the court implicitly expanded the Testerman-Wedeman actual malice standard to all malprac236. See id.
237. See, e.g., K & K Management v. Lee, 316 Md. 137, 557 A.2d 965 (1989) (contract
for operation of a motel under a profit-sharing lease); Miller Bldg. Supply v. Rosen, 305
Md. 341, 503 A.2d 1344 (1986) (employment contract); Henderson v. Maryland Nat'l
Bank, 278 Md. 514, 366 A.2d 1 (1976) (loan contract); Food Fair Stores Inc. v. Hevey,
275 Md. 50, 338 A.2d 43 (1975) (employment contract); H & R Block, Inc. v. Testerman,
275 Md. 36, 338 A.2d 48 (1975) (contract between tax preparers and clients).
238. See, e.g., Siegman v. Equitable Trust Co., 267 Md. 309, 297 A.2d 758 (1972)
(breach of contract between bank and depositor); Daugherty v. Kessler, 264 Md. 281,
286 A.2d 95 (1972) (interference by third party of contract to lease building); St. Paul at
Chase Corp. v. Manufacturers Life Ins. Co., 262 Md. 192, 278 A.2d 12 (1971) (breach of
financing contract); Damazo v. Wahby, 259 Md. 627, 270 A.2d 814 (1970) (interference
with contract for commissions); McClung-Logan Equip. Co. v. Thomas, 226 Md. 136,
172 A.2d 494 (1961) (breach of contract for sale); Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Gardiner
Dairy Co., 107 Md. 556, 69 A. 405 (1908) (interference by third party of contract to
furnish goods).
239. See 322 Md. at 309-10, 587 A.2d at 497.
240. Miller v. Schaefer, 80 Md. App. at 73, 559 A.2d at 819.
241. Id. at 74, 559 A.2d at 819 (quoting Benson v. Mays, 245 Md. 632, 636, 227 A.2d
220, 223 (1967)).
242. 76 Md. App. 298, 544 A.2d 808 (1988).
243. Miller v. Schaefer, 80 Md. App. at 75, 559 A.2d at 820.
244. See Schaefer, 322 Md. at 309-10, 587 A.2d at 497.
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tice cases. Thus, it is likely that in future malpractice cases, punitive
damages will be awarded only after actual malice has been established. Moreover, because the court found that Schaefer's complaint was "based solely upon two theories of negligence, ' 24 5 future
courts could read Schaefer as requiring actual malice for the recovery
of punitive damages in actions based solely on claims of negligence.
4. Conclusion.-Since 1975, a Maryland plaintiff bringing a tort
action that arose out of a contractual relationship had to prove actual malice to recover punitive damages. In Schaefer, the court expanded the actual malice requirement to the field of medical
malpractice suits. The court has indicated its willingness to look beyond the pleadings to the underlying facts to find that an alleged
tort is intertwined with an implied contractual relationship, even
when the allegations describe tortious conduct such as negligence.
This rule will further limit the award of punitive damages in actions
involving torts arising out of a breach of contract and potentially in
actions involving allegations of negligence.
D. Extension of the Witness's Privilege to Make Defamatory Statements
In Odyniec v. Schneider,2 46 the Court of Appeals held that a physician who was to serve as an expert witness in a hearing pending
before the Health Claims Arbitration Office was immune from liability for making an allegedly defamatory statement to a party in the
arbitration during a medical examination of that party.24 7 In so
holding, the court properly extended the absolute privilege granted
to witnesses in judicial proceedings to witnesses in quasi-judicial
Health Claims Arbitration proceedings.
Two further implicit extensions of the privilege, however, may
prove more significant. This case is the first in Maryland in which a
court has protected a verbal statement made during the pendency of
a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding. It also appears to be the first
case in Maryland or any other state applying the privilege to a preliminary statement made by a potential witness to someone other
than an attorney or person with similar fact-gathering responsibility.
There are persuasive arguments for both extensions of the privilege and, on balance, the case appears to have been decided correctly. The court weakened the impact of its opinion, however, by
failing explicitly to identify and justify these extensions.
245. Id. at 305, 587 A.2d at 495.
246. 322 Md. 520, 588 A.2d 786 (1991).
247. See id. at 535, 588 A.2d at 793.
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1. The Case.-On August 13, 1986, Virginia R. Ensor underwent arthroscopic surgery on her right knee, during which the orthopedic surgeon allegedly lacerated the popliteal artery in her
knee.2 4 8 The surgeon did not discover the resultant internal bleeding until October 21, 1986, when he performed a magnetic
resonance imagery (MRI) scan.2 4 9
Having lost confidence in this surgeon, Ensor sought surgical
advice and treatment from Norman A. Odyniec, M.D. and Mitchell
Mills, M.D.2 50 Odyniec subsequently performed corrective surgery
on Ensor's right knee to ligate the ends of the severed artery.2 5 '
On June 9, 1987, Ensor filed a medical malpractice claim with
the Health Claims Arbitration Office against the initial surgeon who
had severed her artery. 252 Pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-423, Ensor
was required to undergo a physical examination by a physician of
the defendant's choice.2 5 3 The expert retained for this purpose was
Roger E. Schneider, M.D.2 54 After a "cursory examination" of Ensor, 25 5 Schneider said to her:
You have been lied to by [Odyniec and Mills]. Your popliteal artery was never ligated. They have not told you the
truth. There is nothing wrong with your artery. You are
perfectly all right. It is just that you have been given false
information. 5 6
Upon hearing this, Ensor believed that Odyniec and Mills had
fraudulently treated her, had performed unnecessary surgery upon
her, and were responsible for her disability.2 5 7 She then underwent
an arteriograph, however, which indicated that they had properly
treated her knee.2 5 8
Odyniec and Mills filed a complaint against Schneider in the
Circuit Court for Baltimore County, alleging defamation.2 5 9 Schneider moved to dismiss on the ground that the complaint failed to
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.

Id. at 523, 588 A.2d at 787.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. The proceedings of the Health Claims Arbitration Office are governed by
MD. CTS. &JuD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 3-2A-01 to -09 (1989).
253. The Maryland Rules of Procedure govern all procedural issues involved in health
claims arbitration. Id. § 3-2A-02(c); see also MD. R. 2-423.
254. Odyniec, 322 Md. at 523, 588 A.2d at 787.
255. Id. at 524, 588 A.2d at 788.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 523, 588 A.2d at 787.
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state a claim upon which relief could be granted; he claimed that his
statements were absolutely privileged because they were made during the course of a judicial proceeding. 26 ° The circuit court agreed
and granted the motion to dismiss. 26 ' The plaintiffs appealed and
the Court of Appeals granted certiorari prior to consideration by
the Court of Special Appeals.2 62
2. Legal Background.-Participants in judicial proceedings are
immune from liability for defamatory statements made during the
proceedings.263 This "absolute privilege" derives from English
common law. 2 ' The underlying justification was explained by an
early commentator:
A participant in judicial proceedings may be utterly free
from malice, and yet in the eyes of a jury be open to that
imputation; or he may be cleared by the jury of the imputation, and may yet have to encounter the expense and distress of a harassing litigation. With such possibilities
hanging over his head, he cannot be expected to speak with
that free and open mind which the administration ofjustice
demands.2 6 5
Thus, immunity from liability for defamation promotes society's interest in the absolute candor and confidence of participants in judicial proceedings. In addition, there is an assumption that judicial
proceedings have internal safeguards that act to "minimize the occurrence of defamatory statements "266 and offer an alternative remedy to those who are defamed. 2 67 These safeguards include strict
control by the judge or judicial officer over the proceedings; the
rights to receive notice, to appear, to be represented by counsel,
and to cross-examine witnesses; and the penalty of perjury that may
260. Id. at 524, 588 A.2d at 788.
261. Id. at 524-25, 588 A.2d at 788.
262. See id.at 525, 588 A.2d at 789.
263. See Miner v. Novotny, 304 Md. 164, 170, 498 A.2d 269, 272 (1985); Keys v.
Chrysler Credit Corp., 303 Md. 397, 403-04, 494 A.2d 200, 203 (1985); Adams v. Peck,
288 Md. 1, 3, 415 A.2d 292, 293 (1980); Kennedy v. Cannon, 229 Md. 92, 97, 182 A.2d
54, 57 (1962).
264. See Adams v. Peck, 43 Md. App. 168, 171-74, 403 A.2d 840, 842-44 (1979)
(describing early English cases applying the privilege), aff'd, 288 Md. 1, 415 A.2d 292

(1980).
265. Judge Van Vechten Veeder, Absolute Immunity inDefamation: Judicial Proceedings, 9
COLUM. L. REV. 463, 470 (1909).
266. Gersh v. Ambrose, 291 Md. 188, 197, 434 A.2d 547, 552 (1981).
267. See Veeder, supra note 265, at 470; Note, Defamation-Absolute Privilege in Administrative Proceedings, 97 U. PA. L. REV. 877, 879 (1949).
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be imposed on sworn witnesses who lie.2 6
The privilege is "absolute" in the sense that it "protects the
person publishing the defamatory statement from liability even if
[the speaker's] purpose or motive was malicious, he knew that the
statement was false, or his conduct was otherwise unreasonable." 2 '6 9
Although most states follow the American rule, which requires that
to be protected the speaker must make statements somewhat pertinent to the subject matter of the judicial proceeding, 2 70 Maryland
has always adhered to the English rule, which protects the speaker
even if the statement is irrelevant to the proceeding. 2 7 '
The judicial proceedings privilege originally applied only to
statements made in the courtroom.2 7 2 It has since been extended,
however, to "statements contained in pleadings, affidavits and other
documents filed in a judicial proceeding or directly related to the
case." 273 The rationale for this extension is that these documents
aid in determining the truth, which is the ultimate goal of the judicial process. Because the purpose of the discovery phase of a judicial proceeding is the investigation of facts, declarants whose
statements are to be included in documents later filed with the court
should feel as uninhibited in communicating as they would in
court.2

74

Employing this reasoning, the Court of Appeals joined the majority of other jurisdictions when it held, in Adams v. Peck,27 5 that
"any defamatory statement which appears in a document prepared
for possible use in connection with a pending judicial proceeding
should be accorded an absolute privilege, regardless of whether the
268. See Veeder, supra note 265, at 470-71; Note, supra note 267, at 880-83.
269. Adams v. Peck, 288 Md. 1, 3, 415 A.2d 292, 293 (1980). A "qualified" privilege,
on the other hand, is destroyed upon a showing of malice. See Gersh, 291 Md. at 192, 434
A.2d at 549.
270. See Korb v. Kowaleviocz, 285 Md. 699, 701-02, 402 A.2d 897, 898 (1979). See
generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 588 (1977).

271. See Odyniec, 322 Md. at 527, 588 A.2d at 789; Keys v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 303
Md. 397, 404, 494 A.2d 200, 203 (1985). Although courts continue today to note the
distinction between the American and English rules, most American courts apply the
American rule so broadly that the practical distinction has almost vanished. See KEETON
et al., supra note 25, § 114, at 818.
272. Note, Developments in the Law of Defamation, 69 HARV. L. REV. 875, 920 (1956).

273. Odyniec, 322 Md. at 527, 588 A.2d at 789; see Adams, 288 Md. at 3-4, 415 A.2d at
293-94; DiBlasio v. Kolodner, 233 Md. 512, 520-23, 197 A.2d 245, 250-51 (1963). See
generally M. Schneiderman, Annotation, Libel and Slander: Application of PrivilegeAttending
Statements Made in Course ofJudicial Proceedings to PretrialDeposition and Discovery Procedures,

23 A.L.R.3D 1172 (1969).
274. See Adams, 288 Md. at 5, 415 A.2d at 294.
275. 288 Md. 1, 415 A.2d 292 (1980).
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document has been filed."-2 76
In Adams, a woman believed that her husband, from whom she
was separated, was abusing their children during his visits with
them.2 7 7 The mother's attorney referred her and one of her children to a psychiatrist, Dr. Peck, for an evaluation. Peck then sent a
written report to the attorney in which he stated that the father had
abused the children. 2 7' The father brought a defamation action
against Peck, who moved for summary judgment on the basis that
his statements were privileged because they were made in connection with the pending divorce litigation.2 7 9 In affirming the trial
court's grant of summary judgment, the Court of Appeals cited an
early English case, Watson v. M'Ewan,28 in which the House of
Lords extended the judicial privilege to a witness's statements published in a document that was prepared by an attorney in connection
with pending litigation. 21' The Court of Appeals, using Watson as
support, reasoned that the same public policy that protects witnesses' statements in court "must as a necessary consequence involve that which is a step towards and is part of the administration
ofjustice-namely, the preliminary investigation of witnesses to find
out what they can prove. "282
In Adams, as in the vast majority of American cases that have
held privileged the statements of a potential witness made during
the pendency of a judicial proceeding, the protected statement was
made to an attorney.2 83 The courts have justified extending the
privilege on these occasions by referring, as in Watson, to the importance of aiding the lawyer in his capacity as investigator of the facts of
a case. 2 8 4 In those cases in which the witness's privilege has been
held applicable to preliminary statements made to someone other
than an attorney, that person has exercised a similar investigative
276. Id. at 8, 415 A.2d at 295.
277. Id. at 2, 415 A.2d at 292-93.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 2-3, 415 A.2d at 292-93.
280. 480 App. Cas. (H.L. 1905).
281. See id.
282. Adams, 288 Md. at 7, 415 A.2d at 295.
283. See id. at 8, 415 A.2d at 296.
284. See, e.g., Robinson v. Home Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 49 N.W.2d 521, 527 (Iowa
1951) ("To hold an attorney or witness liable for statements made in a preliminary conference would discourage him from conferring about proposed testimony ...and thus
tend to defeat the ends ofjustice."); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 588 cmt.
b (1964) (stating that witnesses are protected "while engaged in private conferences
with an attorney at law with reference to proposed litigation, either civil or criminal");
LAURENCE H. ELDRIDGE, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION § 73, at 366-69 (1978) (discussing
how courts have applied the privilege to allow lawyers to investigate cases properly).
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function with regard to the judicial proceeding. 28 5
In many jurisdictions, but not in Maryland, courts have applied
the privilege to verbal statements made by a witness to an attorney. 28 6 This is the view of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which provides that a "witness is absolutely privileged to publish defamatory
matter concerning another in communications preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding or as a part of a judicial proceeding in
28 7
which he is testifying, if it has some relation to the proceeding.
Comment b under that section explains further that:
[t]he rule stated in this Section protects a witness while testifying. It is not necessary that he give his testimony under
oath; it is enough that he is permitted to testify. The privilege also protects him while engaged in private conferences with
an attorney at law with reference to proposed litigation,
either civil or criminal. 88
Many courts have also extended the privilege to witnesses testifying in settings other than traditional civil or criminal litigation.
For example, the privilege has been applied to witnesses in hearings
before federal administrative agencies,2 8 9 state insurance commissions, 29 state licensing boards, 29 ' and in other proceedings that
2' 92
have been commonly termed "quasi-judicial.
The Court of Appeals indicated in Gersh v. Ambrose 2 93 that it
would extend the privilege to "quasi-judicial" proceedings and announced a two-part test by which it would determine, on a case-bycase basis, whether a proceeding is sufficiently quasi-judicial to warrant the privilege. The Gersh court stated that the decision would
"turn on two factors: (1) the nature of the public function of the
proceeding and (2) the adequacy of procedural safeguards which
285. See, e.g., Anderson v. Matz, 384 N.E.2d 759, 761 (Ill. App. 1978) (physician's
report to insurance company); Vasquez v. Courtney, 557 P.2d 672, 673 (Or. 1976) (sheriff's letter to parole officer conducting presentence investigation).
286. See, e.g., Middlesex Concrete Prods. & Excavating Corp. v. Carteret Indus. Ass'n,
172 A.2d 22, 25 (N.J. 1961) (extending privilege to person "engaged in private conferences with an attorney with reference to litigation"); Zirn v. Cullom, 63 N.Y.S.2d 439,
440 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1946) (finding that statements made to a solicitor preparing the wit-

ness's testimony are protected).
287. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 588.
288. Id. cmt. b (emphasis added).
289. See, e.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512-16 (1978).
290. See, e.g., Johnson v. Independent Life & Accident Ins. Co., 94 F. Supp. 959, 965
(E.D.S.C. 1951); Robertson v. Industrial Ins. Co., 75 So. 2d 198, 200 (Fla. 1954).
291. See, e.g., McAlister & Co. v. Jenkins, 284 S.W. 88, 91 (Ky. 1926).
292. See Odyniec, 322 Md. at 529, 588 A.2d at 790.
293. 291 Md. 188, 434 A.2d 547 (1981).
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will minimize the occurrence of defamatory statements. "294 The
test is intended to determine whether a given proceeding is sufficiently analogous to litigation, in which the public function and procedural safeguards are presumed to exist, to warrant the potential
harm to defamed individuals.
In Gersh, the Court of Appeals applied the test to a public hear29 5
ing before the Baltimore City Community Relations Commission.
A staff member of the Commission brought a defamation action
against an Assistant State's Attorney for remarks made before the
Commission. 296 The court held that the hearing failed the quasijudicial nature test: it lacked the requisite procedural safeguards,
and its apparent benefit to society was "not sufficiently compelling
to outweigh the possible damage to individual reputations to war29 7
rant absolute witness immunity.
The Court of Appeals applied the Gersh test in two more recent
cases. In Miner v. Novotny,2 9 8 the court held that the privilege was
applicable to a citizen's statements in a brutality complaint against a
deputy sheriff, which triggered a full disciplinary investigation and
hearing. 299 However, in McDermott v. Hughley,3 00 the court declined
to apply the privilege to a statement contained in a psychologist's
report obtained as part of an "administrative investigation" con30
cerning a park policeman's fitness for duty.
3. The Court's Reasoning.-On its face, the Odyniec opinion appears to be straightforward. The court began its analysis by outlining the scope and policy basis of the judicial privilege in Maryland,
including a quotation from Adams v. Peck:
The evaluation and investigation of facts and opinions
294. Id. at 197, 434 A.2d at 551-52.
295. See id.at 189, 434 A.2d at 547.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 196, 434 A.2d at 551.
298. 304 Md. 164, 489 A.2d 269 (1985).
299. Id. at 176, 489 A.2d at 275. The court examined the procedural safeguards of
the proceedings, which included an impartial three-officer review board with power to
subpoena witnesses and documents and the officer's right to be represented by counsel
and to cross-examine sworn witnesses. See id., 489 A.2d at 274. Recognizing the importance of encouraging the filing of valid complaints, the court concluded that any damage
caused to a defamed officer's reputation by a false complaint was outweighed by the
public's interest in the proceedings. See id., 489 A.2d at 275.
300. 317 Md. 12, 561 A.2d 1038 (1989).
301. See id. at 26, 561 A.2d at 1045. The court found inadequate procedural safeguards in a "mere status conference," specifically noting the absence of sworn witnesses,
cross-examination, and, most importantly, a "legally cognizable tribunal administering
the proceeding." Id.
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for the purpose of determining what, if anything, is to be
raised or used in pending litigation is as integral a part of
the search for truth and therefore of the judicial process as
is the presentation of such facts and opinions during the
course of the trial, either in filed documents or in the courtroom itself. Such evaluation and investigation, and the
documents which these activities generate, are directly related to the pending litigation and occur during the course
of the judicial proceeding. 0 2
Next, the court discussed at length the Gersh test for determining the applicability of the absolute privilege to "nonjudicial proceedings," describing its application of the test in Gersh, Miner, and
McDermott.,3 The court then applied the test with meticulous care
to the Health Claims Arbitration procedure at issue.3 ° 4 Because the
procedure contained statutorily mandated due process safeguards
and because the proceedings served an obvious public function, the
court concluded that the procedure was "at least as functionally
comparable to a trial before a court as the administrative disciplinary proceedings involved in Miner v. Novotny. '"305
The court's initial analysis implied that it was merely following
precedent. However, the court then made an abrupt departure
from established case law in its sweeping statement: "[W]e conclude that the absolute privilege may safely be extended to statements of potential witnesses made during the pendency of [Health
Claims Arbitration] proceedings. ' 30 6 By itself, this implies that the
privilege attaches to any statement, written or not, made to any person during the pendency of the proceeding. The court implicitly
modified this holding in its next sentence, however, stating that
"[i]n this regard, we reiterate that '[tihe investigation, evaluation,
presentation and determination of facts are inherent and essential
parts of this process.' "307 This suggests that to be protected, witnesses must make their defamatory statements while participating in
one of these factfinding tasks.
The court further qualified its holding with what is probably the
most significant statement in the opinion:
302. 288 Md. 1, 8,415 A.2d 292, 295 (1980), quoted in Odyniec, 322 Md. at 527-28, 588
A.2d at 789.
303. See Odyniec, 322 Md. at 528-31, 588 A.2d at 790-91.
304. See id. at 531-34, 588 A.2d at 791-93.
305. Id. at 534, 588 A.2d at 792; see supra notes 298-299 and accompanying text.
306. Odyniec, 322 Md. at 534, 588 A.2d at 793.
307. Id. (quoting Adams v. Peck, 288 Md. 1, 5, 415 A.2d 292, 294 (1980)).
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Whatever Dr. Schneider's motivation may have been, he
made his verbal statement to Ms. Ensor, a party in the then
pending arbitration proceeding, while he was conducting a
medical examination of her in preparation for his participation in that proceeding. It was thus made in the course of
his participation in that pending proceeding and therefore
• . . the verbal statement is accorded the same absolute
privilege as if it had been
made by a witness during the
308
arbitration hearing itself.
Finally, the court recognized the potential harm of a defamatory
statement to a physician's reputation, but determined that such
harm is outweighed by the "societal value of maintaining the integrity of the [health claims] process itself."' 9
4. Analysis.-The Odyniec decision extends the witness's privilege in Maryland in three ways. The court chose, however, to identify and explain in detail only the least questionable of these
extensions-the application of the privilege to the quasi-judicial
Health Claims Arbitration process. It is difficult to understand why
the court so exhaustively treated this particular issue, given the unquestionable public interest in the proper resolution of malpractice
claims and the thorough procedural safeguards mandated by law.
Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a nonjudicial proceeding that more
closely resembles traditional litigation. Nevertheless, this issue was
clearly and correctly decided by the court.
The extension of the privilege to apply to verbal statements by a
potential witness made during the pendency of a judicial '° or
quasi-judicial proceeding is also, by itself, not very susceptible to
criticism. If the main purpose of the witness's privilege is to elicit
truthful testimony, it would be counter-productive and arbitrary to
limit the privilege to statements that are recorded in a document, as
this surely would inhibit some potential witnesses from being totally
candid during an oral investigation. Furthermore, preliminary verbal statements are protected in many other states, 3' 1 ' a view echoed
308. Id.
309. Id. at 535, 588 A.2d at 793.
310. Although Odyniec involves statements made during the pendency of quasi-judicial
Health Claims Arbitration proceedings, logic requires that the extension of the witness's
privilege to protect certain verbal and written statements made to persons other than
attorneys applies to traditional litigation as well. If a quasi-judicial proceeding contains
a sufficient number of the necessary protections to allow the privilege to apply, the privilege must apply to judicial proceedings in which all the necessary protections exist.
311. See supra note 286 and accompanying text.
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by the Restatement (Second) of Torts.3" 2 Finally, there are hints in existing Maryland precedent that some verbal statements should be
privileged. 3 '
The most significant extension of the privilege in Odyniec is also
the most ambiguous. Odyniec appears to be the first American case
to hold privileged the defamatory statement of a potential witness in
pending litigation made to someone other than an attorney involved
in the litigation or a person with an analogous fact-gathering function in the case. l4 It is the court's vagueness that makes the limits
of the extension difficult to ascertain. The difficulty lies in the sentence in the opinion that most resembles a holding, which cannot
reasonably be construed literally. In stating, "we conclude that the
absolute privilege may safely be extended to statements .

.

. made

during the pendency of such proceedings, ' '3 1 5 the court could not
have intended the privilege to apply to a statement made by a wit3 16
ness to any person at any time after the institution of the action.
Fortunately, the court did provide additional language indicating the probable limits of the privilege. The court emphasized that
Schneider made his statement "to Ms. Ensor, a party in the then
pending arbitration proceeding ...

while he was conducting a medical

examination of her in preparationfor his participationin that proceeding....
It was thus made in the course of his participationin that pending proceeding .... ",317 Therefore Schneider's statements were privileged.
It is reasonable to conclude that the court applied the privilege to
Schneider's statements because he made them at a time and place in
which he was acting as a proper participant in the fact-gathering
phase of the proceeding, and because he published them to another
312. See supra notes 287-288 and accompanying text.
313. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Cannon, 229 Md. 92, 98, 182 A.2d 54, 58 (1961) (stating in
dicta that an attorney's verbal statements would be privileged if made to someone with
an interest in the case); see also Adams v. Peck, 43 Md. App. 168, 185, 403 A.2d 840, 849
(1979) (holding that privilege extends to verbal statements), aff'd, 288 Md. 1, 415 A.2d
292 (1980). It is possible that the Court of Appeals avoided the verbal statement issue
in Adams, applying the more narrow "published in a document" requirement, to ensure
that there would be no problem establishing that the statements were pertinent to the
case. This is of course despite Maryland's claimed adherence to the English rule. See
Adams, 288 Md. at 4, 415 A.2d at 294; supra text accompanying notes 270-271.
314. See supra note 285 and accompanying text.
315. Odyniec, 322 Md. at 534, 588 A.2d at 793.
316. Obviously, this would be an absurd rule. The justification for the privilege is
based on eliciting the greatest amount of truthful testimony from witnesses so that it
may be considered by the attorneys in shaping the case and by the jury in deciding it. See
id. at 528, 588 A.2d at 789. Protecting a witness's slanderous statement to an
uninvolved third party simply would not serve this purpose.
317. Id. at 534, 588 A.2d at 793 (emphasis added).
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participant with an interest in the investigation."' 8 Thus, although
he did not make his statement to a lawyer, Schneider was still acting,
in a loose sense, in his role as a witness. This kind of broad inquiry
accords with the view of a frequently cited commentator, who wrote
that "the circumstances in which a communication is made must be
such that it may properly be considered a part of the proceeding[]
...[and] that it tend to further the proceeding in some manner. ' 3 1 9
Thus, the Court of Appeals' decision to apply the privilege to
encompass the statements made by potential witnesses in pending
litigation, who are in a position analogous to Schneider's, has a logical grounding in the traditional policy rationale of the privilege.
The court's repeated underscoring of the fundamental connection
between the investigative work that precedes a judicial proceeding
and the proceeding itself naturally suggests that any potential witness performing a legitimate role in that investigation should be
protected by the privilege.
Although it may be fruitless to speculate as to why the court did
not call attention to this seemingly justified extension of the privilege, it is possible that the court's dominant concern in Odyniec was
simply to avoid sending a danger signal to potential expert witnesses in malpractice claims. This hypothesis is bolstered by the
court's reference to the grave need to protect "the integrity of the
process ' 3 2 0 of malpractice arbitration.

5. Conclusion.-In Odyniec, the Court of Appeals applied the judicial privilege of a witness to the quasi-judicial Health Claims Arbitration process. The case also extended the privilege (in both
judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings) to protect some verbal statements made by potential witnesses and, more importantly, to protect certain statements made by a potential witness to persons other
than attorneys or individuals with a similar investigative function.
Although there appears to be a valid basis for the latter two exten318. It is unlikely that the court intended to imply that statements made to a person
not involved in the proceeding would be privileged, when case law from Maryland and
other jurisdictions suggests otherwise. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Cannon, 299 Md. 92, 98,
182 A.2d 54, 58 (1961) (indicating that the attorney was not protected by the privilege

as to "actionable words spoken before persons in no way connected with the proceeding"); Troutman v. Erlandson, 593 P.2d 793, 794 (Or. 1979) (holding that the attorney's
statement was not protected because it was made to a person not directly related to the
proceeding); Converters Equip. Corp. v. Condes Corp., 258 N.W.2d 712, 717 (Wis.
1977) (finding that statements to parties not involved with proceedings are not
protected).
319. Note, supra note 272, at 923.
320. Odyniec, 322 Md. at 535, 588 A.2d at 793.
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sions which can be discerned by a close examination of the opinion's
language, the failure of the court to identify and explain these
changes in the scope of the privilege may be the cause of unnecessary confusion in the future. Inevitably, the court will have to explicitly acknowledge and define the extensions to the privilege that
it implicitly recognized in Odyniec.
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